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Abstract 
 
Muang Fai water management customary law is the traditional community-based water 
management for agriculture in the northern part of Thailand. It has been used for over 700 years 
in the northern part of Thailand, southern part of China, Myanmar, PDR Lao and Vietnam. 
Nowadays, Muang Fai customary law is applied by at least 300,000 people in the norther part of 
Thailand, but it is not recognized by Thai law.  
This research investigates the present problems from the disconnect between Muang Fai water 
management customary law and national water management law in Thailand and makes 
recommendations on appropriate recognition of Muang Fai customary law to manage water 
sustainably. Because Muang Fai customary law has not been recognized in Thailand’s national 
laws, this research investigates the failure of previous laws to recognize customary law as well. 
The crucial research questions addressed by this research are: 
1) How does Muang Fai customary law operate as a system of water resource management in 
present day Thailand? 
2) To what extent is Muang Fai customary law related to water resource management consistent 
with sustainable development principles? 
3)  What approaches have been taken in other countries to legally recognize customary law in 
natural resource management applicable to water resources?  
4) Does the Thai legal system recognize Muang Fai customary law in water resource 
management? 
5) What role does customary law play in the Thai legal system for natural resource management 
applicable to water? 
6) What law reform approaches would improve the recognition of Muang Fai customary law for 
the sustainable development of water resources in Thailand. 
The rules, processes and institutions of Muang Fai customary law are examined to understand 
whether Muang Fai customary law continues to operate as a form of water resource management.  
The common pool resource theory pioneered by Elinor Ostrom, based on lessons learned from 
other examples of communal irrigation systems are applied to consider whether Mung Fai 
customary law can potentially provide for their sustainable development of their water resources. 
Then, the principles of sustainable development applicable to water resources are reviewed to 
provide the contemporary context of meaning, approaches and legal obligations of states to 
achieve sustainable integrated water resource management. The rules, processes and institutions 
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of Muang Fai customary law are compared with the principles of sustainable development and 
particularly sustainable integrated water resource management. 
Furthermore, this research reviews the legal theories relevant to customary law recognition in 
national legal systems (legal pluralism, human rights principles). The main focus is on the lessons 
learned from other developing countries in customary law recognition for the governance of 
natural resources, especially Samoa and Vanuatu which are successful in recognition of 
customary law and customary institutions to manage fisheries sustainably. The applicability of 
these frameworks to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions for 
managing water sustainably in Thailand is considered.  
Then, the present water policies, water law and the previous recognition of Muang Fai customary 
law are critically reviewed to identify the opportunities, challenges and problems related to the 
recognition and integration of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions in the water 
management processes of Thailand. Therefore, this research can provide the recommendations 
for future law reform taking into account Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions.  
This research will contribute to future research on similar topics which aim to create legal 
frameworks for customary law governance of natural resources that involve the recognition of 
locally specific laws and institutions through forms of legal pluralism and consistent with 
international human rights approaches and norms. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
We should build new management systems on the success of old traditions 
Abul – Rahman F. Al-Eryani 
Minister of Water & Environment, Republic of Yemen, 20071 
1.1 Introduction 
Muang Fai water management customary law is the traditional community-based water 
management framework for agriculture in northern Thailand. It has been used for over 700 years 
in this region, as well as in southern China, Myanmar, PDR Lao and Vietnam. Nowadays, Muang 
Fai customary law is applied by at least 300,000 people in northern Thailand, but it is not 
recognised by Thailand law. This research investigates the present problems related to 
thedisconnect between Muang Fai water management customary law and national water law in 
Thailand. The findings from the investigation are in turn used to make recommendations on 
appropriate recognition of Muang Fai customary law to manage water sustainably. Because 
Muang Fai customary law was once recognised in Thailand’s national laws, this research also 
investigates previous efforts to recognise customary law.  
The rules, processes and institutions of Muang Fai customary law are examined to understand 
whether the law continues to operate as a form of water resource management. The Common 
Pool Resource Management theory pioneered by Elinor Ostrom is applied to determine whether 
Muang Fai customary law can potentially provide for the sustainable development of their water 
resources. The theory is based on lessons learned from examples of communal irrigation systems. 
The principles of sustainable development applicable to water resources are then reviewed to 
provide the contemporary context of the meanings, approaches and legal obligations of States to 
achieve sustainable integrated water resource management. The rules, processes and institutions 
of Muang Fai customary law are compared to the principles of sustainable development, 
particularly sustainable integrated water resource management. 
                                                                
1Linda Schelwald-van der Kley and Linda Reijerkerk MDR, Water: a Way of Life: Sustainable Water Management in a Cultural 
Context (CRC Press, 2009) 29.   
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Furthermore, this research reviews the legal theories relevant to customary law recognition in 
national legal systems (legal pluralism, human rights principles). The main focus is on the lessons 
learned from other developing countries in customary law recognition for the governance of 
natural resources. Samoa and Vanuatu are especially successful in recognising customary law 
and customary institutions to manage fisheries sustainably. The applicability of these frameworks 
to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions for managing water 
sustainably in Thailand is considered. Then, the present water policies, water law and the 
previous recognition of Muang Fai customary law are critically reviewed to identify the 
opportunities, challenges and problems relating to the recognition and integration of Muang Fai 
customary law and Muang Fai institutions in the water management processes of Thailand. In 
turn, this research also provides recommendations for future law reform which take into account 
Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions.  
This research contributes further insights into similar topics which aim to create legal 
frameworks for customary law governance of natural resources that involve the recognition of 
local laws and institutions through forms of legal pluralism which are consistent with 
international human rights approaches and norms. 
1.1.1 Background 
Water is one of the most important components of all living things and is essential for economic 
growth.2 The problem with water, however, is that it is not distributed equally to all locations. 
Where there is a flood in one location, there is a water shortage somewhere else. Fresh water 
scarcity is a significant problem for many communities throughout the world and will likely get 
worse in response to increases in population and accelerated economic development in countries 
around the world.3       
Water management has been a key human concern throughout history.  This is evidenced in the 
ancient constructions and technologies such as the aqueducts of the Roman Empire,4 the ancient 
dams in China,5 the irrigation systems in Cambodia6 and the Qanut irrigation system in Iran and 
                                                                
2 Dante A. Caponera, Principles of Water Law and Administration National and International (Taylor & Francis Group, 2007) 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Larry W. Mays (ed), Ancient Water Technologies (Springer, 2009) 115. 
5 Els Slots, Mount Qingcheng and Dujiangyan (20 December 2013) World Heritage Site 
<http://www.worldheritagesite.org/sites/mountqincheng.html>. 
6 Mays (ed), above n 4, 234. 
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Central Asia.7  Concern about water management in the international community can be traced 
to the 1960s with the establishment of the United Nations Committee on Natural Resources.8,9 
The Committee has consistently been at the focus of international conferences ever since.10    
In legal terms, the primary role of modern laws related to natural resource management systems 
is to provide the rights over natural resources to individuals or the State. It is claimed that water 
laws play a vital role in effective water management because they provide a potential framework 
for the management of water resources effectively and sustainably. 11  Previously, water 
management projects were commonly conducted by States using a sectoral approach comprising 
top-down institutions 12  enforcing legislative standards. This was known as ‘command and 
control’.13 However, their effectiveness has been questioned.14 Since 1992, the Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM) principles15, the Nexus approach16 and greening water laws have 
been introduced into many international communities as a more effective approach to the 
management of water shortage problems.  
                                                                
7Ibid 87. 
8 Asit K. Biswas, ‘United Nations water conference action plan’ (1988) 4(3) International Journal of Water Resources Development 
148.  
9 Since 31 July 1998, the Committee on Natural Resources and the Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and 
on Energy for Development were merged into the Committee on Energy and Natural Resource for Development as established 
by Economic and Social Council resolution 1998/46.   
10  Please see Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972, Mar del Plata plan 1977, 
Brundstland Report 1987, Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 1992, Agenda 21, Chapter 18 .11 A I, 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002, The future we want, 2012.  
11Jessica Vapnek et al., Law for Water Management: A Guide to Concepts and Effective Approaches FAO Legislative Study No 
11 (10 November 2013) Food and Agriculture Organisation <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1284e/i1284e.pdf>. 
12 Integrated Water Resource Management Plan Training Manual and Operation Guide 2005 (10 December 2013) GWP Partner 
for Africa Development and Water Management <http://pawd.pbworks.com/f/IWRM+Planning-Training+Manual+Cap-
Net+GWP.pdf >.  
13 Neil Gunningham, ‘Beyond Compliance: Next Generation Environmental Regulation’, Regulatory Institutions Network, ANU, 
paper presented at the Current Issues in Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance Conference 1. 
14 United Nations Environment Programme, Integrated Water Resources Management Planning Approach for Small Island 
Developing States (12 March 2012), 5 <http://www.unep.org/pdf/sids.pdf>;  José Galizia Tundisi, ‘Water Resources in the Future: 
Problems and Solutions' (2008) 22(63) estudos avançados 7.  
15 The solution for containing water scarcity has been proposed in Dublin Statement. They are to: 1) manage water by the holistic 
approach with land, forest and other relating resources; 2) focus on the public participation of all stakeholders in the water 
utilisation process; 3) emphasise the role of women in the water utilisation process; and 4) treat water as an economic good in 
order to make people aware the value of water. Please see the guideline principle of the Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development. 
16 Holger Hoff, 'Understanding the Nexus: Background Paper for the Bonn 2011 Nexus Conference', Stockholm Environment 
Institute, Stockholm (2011)   
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Although it is claimed that modern water management is underpinned by legislation17, water 
customary law continues to be implemented by communities in remote areas.18 This constitutes 
an ongoing form of community-based natural resource management.19 The benefits of customary 
natural resource management are that they use a bottom-up approach with a focus on public 
participation20 and legitimacy in natural resource management.21 Moreover, customs can support 
statutory law enforcement by ensuring that remote communities have access to water comparable 
to urban communities.  
Unfortunately, there can be conflict between customary laws and statutory laws, particularly 
when customary laws relate to natural resource management. Some scholars argue that customs 
are “irrational”, “narrowly pragmatic” or “in the process of disappearance”.22 A customary law 
based development system may not achieve high levels of economic growth23 and is not always 
sustainable. Therefore, some officials argue that customary laws should be ignored and replaced 
by modern laws for economic development and social modernisation.24 Some scholars note, 
however, that there are numerous customs and traditions for natural resource management which 
can support sustainable development.25 They argue that customary law can play a critical role in 
managing natural resources at the grassroots level of society.26 Many water management customs 
and practices based on Indigenous knowledge are compatible with principles of sustainable water 
management.27 The significance of customary law for sustainable development and for coping 
with the adverse impacts of climate change has been explicitly, or implicitly, recognised in 
                                                                
17 Vapnek et al., above n 11, 11. 
18 Barbara van Koppen, Mark Giordano and John Butterworth, Communities-Based Water Law and Water Resource Management 
Reform in Developing Countries: Rationale, Contests and Key Messages (CABI, 2007). 
19 Peter Ørebech et al., The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development (Cambridge University Press 1st ed., 2010)  
20 Ibid 285. 
21 Black, Richard and Elizabeth Watson, 'Local community, legitimacy, and cultural authenticity in postconflict natural resource 
management: Ethiopia and Mozambique' (2006) 24(2) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 263,264 
22 Wolfe, J., Bechard, C., Cizek, P. and Cole, D. ‘Indigenous and Western Knowledge and Resources Management Systems’. 
School of Rural Planning and Development. Guelph, University of Guelph. 1992;  cited in Nandita Singh,  Water Management 
Traditions in Rural India: Valuing the Unvalued (10 December 2011) SASNET Swedish South Asian Studies Network < 
http://www.sasnet.lu.se/EASASpapers/21NanditaSingh.pdf >. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Nandita Singh, ‘Water Management Traditions in Rural India: Valuing the Unvalued’, 18th European Conference in Modern 
South Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, July 2004 
25 Ørebech et al., above n 19, 24. 
26 Ibid. 
27 For example, for Qanat or Karez system in Persia see F. Boustani. Sustainable Water Utilization in Arid Region of Iran by 
Qanats, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 43(2008); for traditional water management in India see Singh, 
above n 24.   
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almost all international declarations 28  on climate change and global warming. Community 
practices and methods of conservation, harvesting and efficient use of water have sometimes 
proven to be quite scientific and provide valuable insights into methods of managing resources 
in a sustainable way. However, this theoretical debate persists, and policy dilemmas remain 
unresolved in academic discourse. This is particularly the case in nations with traditional legal 
systems established prior to the subsequent super-imposition of statutory systems.29 
It is estimated that 1.8 billion people globally will be impacted by water scarcity by 2025. 
Currently, around 1.2 billion people live in areas where water supply is scarce. A further 500 
million people are estimated to be experiencing impending water shortage and 1.6 billion people 
currently face economic water shortages due to lack of investment in water infrastructure.30 It is 
also contended that modern day water problems are the result of a crisis in governance, 
particularly a lack of infrastructure to store and regulate water.31 Hence, it is clear that water 
scarcity is both global and country-specific problem that requires widespread responses. 
Thailand32 is not exempt from water scarcity.  Although the nation was once the world’s number 
one rice exporter33 and Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, was once called ‘Venice of the 
East’ 34, 2016 marked the worse water shortage in the country’ s history. 35 Thailand also has 
problems with flooding.36 Its climate is influenced by the southwest and northeast monsoons, 
                                                                
28 Refers to the international convention on climate change, global warming such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development 1992, Agenda 21, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, WSSD 2002, Convention on Biological 
Diversity.   
29 Donna Craig and Elizabeth Gachenga, 'The Recognition of Indigenous Customary Law in Water Resource Management' (2010) 
20(5) Journal of Water Law 278. 
30 United Nations, Water Scarcity (23 June 2018) United Nations Water for life decade < 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml>. 
31 Vapnek et al., above n 11, 10.  
32 Thailand is located in Southeast Asia. 
33  Arno Maierbrugger, Thailand Wants Rice Top Spot Back (1 Feb 2013) Investvine Southeast Asia Business News Site 
<http://investvine.com/thailand-wants-rice-top-spot-back/>  
34Catherine Bodry, Exploring Bangkok Canals (29 August 2012)  <http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20120827-exploring-bangkoks-
canals>. 
35 Panarat Thepgumpanat and Patpicha Tanakasempipat, ‘Thailand Facing Worst Water Shortage in Two Decades – 
Government’ (Reuters, 9 March 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/article/thailand-drought-idAFL4N16H2O6>; Sahisna Suwal,  
Water in Crisis – Thailand (23 June2018) The water project <https://thewaterproject.org/water-crisis/water-in-crisis-thailand >; 
Travel-impact-newswire, Thai Prime Minister Warns of Water Shortage: “Please Help Restore Balance in Nature (31 January 
2016)  <https://www.travel-impact-newswire.com/2016/01/thai-prime-minister-warns-of-water-shortage-please-help-restore-balance-
in-nature/>. 
36 Reliefweb, Thailand: Floods - May 2017(23 June2018) < https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2017-000053-tha>   
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with heavy rainfall between May and October contrasted to dry and cool weather from October 
to February.March to April is the transitional period often characterised by heavy thunderstorms. 
The average annual rainfall in Thailand is about 1622 mm, ranging from 1100 mm on the central 
plains and in the northeast of the country to 4000 mm on the southern peninsula near the 
Andaman Sea.37 In 2009, the total population of Thailand was around 68.7 million people, of 
which 66 percent lived in rural areas.  This is compared to 69 percent of the population living in 
rural areas in 1999.  From 1999 to 2009, the annual population growth rate in Thailand was an 
estimated 0.97 percent.  Moreover, in 2008, 98 percent of the population had access to water 
sources (99 and 98 percent in urban and rural areas, respectively). Sanitation coverage accounted 
for 96 percent (95 and 96 percent in urban and rural areas respectively) .38 Currently, population 
density in Thailand is about 134 inhabitants/km2.   
The estimated total water demand for Thailand in 2017 was approximately 151,750 million cubic 
metres.  Demand for water in agriculture was as high as 113,960 million cubic metres or 75 
percent of total water demand.  Around 27.390 million cubic metres (18% of total water demand) 
could have been used for ecological treatment (environmental flow). Water for consumption and 
tourism accounts for 6,490 million cubic metres or 4 percent of total water demand.  Water for 
industry was approximately 4,206 million cubic metres (3% of total water demand) .  Of the total 
water demand in Thailand, 102,140 million cubic metres of water is supplied by dams and 
reservoirs. However, a further 49,610 million cubic metres of water is not yet available.  
In terms of water for agricultural areas and water for consumption, 65,000 million cubic metres 
is supplied via water storage and irrigation. The remaining 48,960 million cubic metres of water 
depends on rainwater or other sources.39 Therefore, water for agricultural purpose in Thailand 
consists of two sources:  1)  government irrigation projects; and 2)  customary irrigation systems, 
for example the Muang Fai irrigation system in northern Thailand. 40  Water usage in the 
                                                                
37 Karen Farrenken (Ed), ‘Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in Figures: AQUASTAT Survey – 2011’ FAO Water Report 
No.37 Food and Agriculture Organization (2012) < http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2809e/i2809e.pdf>. 
38 Ibid.  
39  Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Royal Irrigation Department strategy 2016-2018 (10 December 2017) 
<www.rid.go.th/eng/strategic_map.php> 
40 Pornpilai Lertwicha, Supachai Methin, Nonthachai Namdhep, Muang-Fai: The Water Resource and the Human Resource 
Management on the Geographical and Cultural Base (Tarnpanya Press, Chiang Mai, 2009). 
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agriculture sector accounts for 70-75  percent of all water usage in Thailand.41 The average water 
usage per person in Thailand is 3,413 cubic metres/person, which is higher than the ‘serious water 
shortage’ standard of 1,000 cubic metre/person.42 The average water usage per person in Thailand 
is in neither a serious nor good state.43 Thailand is currently attempting to reform its water laws 
to allow for a transition to the use of legal instruments to manage water for sustainable water 
management.44 The attempted reforms include abolishing the People Irrigation Act (PIA)  which 
had acknowledges the Muang Fai irrigation system45 , albeit with some limitations. 46 These 
attempts at reform at least demonstrate that there exists some interface between statutory 
legislation and customary law.  
Despite the fact that Thailand has a civil law legal system47 and its economy is highly dependent 
on the agriculture sector, there are no specific water laws.  The provision of water is addressed 
only in various related laws.  Furthermore, there is no provision for the recognition of water 
management in customary laws, customary water rights, and traditional water institutions, 
particularly since the abolishment of the PIA.48  Although some local authorities and officials, 
who realise the value of Muang Fai, have tried unofficially to include the Muang Fai community 
in the water management process,49 customary rights and the traditional institutions are not 
guaranteed or secured by law.    
                                                                
41 Suwal, above n 35. 
42 Vichian Udomrattanasilpa, ‘Water Situation in Thailand’, Singapore International Water Week Water Leader Summit 24-25 
June 2008, <http://www.siww.com.sg/pdf/forum/SEA2-TheWaterSituationInThailand.pdf. 
43 National Broadcasting Services of Thailand, ‘Water Resource Act for sustainable water management’by (Mr. Orasart Apaipong, 
Deputy director of Department of Water Resource of Thailand), Clear cut, Obviously clear (เคลียร์คดั ชดัเจน... พ.ร.บ. น ้ำ เพ่ือกำรบริหำรจดักำรน ้ำ
อยำ่งย ัง่ยืน), Youtube video (Jul 14, 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLQDxPAVNBg&feature=youtu.be>. 
44 Ibid. 
45The Act to repeal People Irrigation Act Buddist Era 2482 B.E.2558 (Thailand)  
46 Due to the limitations of recognition within the PIA, Muang Fai faced many problems, particularly during the last two decades. 
For example, there were many water conflicts between water users in Muang Fai and outsiders who use the water without 
permission. Moreover, there were many land conflicts between the water users in the Muang Fai community and the new land 
owners. This is because some new land owners wanted to change the land use and filed to block some parts of the canal in Muang 
Fai Community so that downstream water users were not able to use the water. See Pornpilai et al., above n 40, 144. 
47 Thailand locates in the equatorial area in Asia, with diversity in population, culture and biodiversity. It therefore has a lot of 
customs, especially customs for natural resource management. In ancient times, there were many Kingdoms (City state) in 
Thailand. They were ruled by their own customary laws. Some customary law was transformed to written laws, but were applied 
only in their Kingdoms. Unfortunately, the impact of imperialism in the late eighteenth-century drove Thailand or Siam to adjust 
herself by centralising power to the strongest city State at that time, Bangkok. Moreover, the ancient legal system was reformed 
and replaced by a Western style legal system. That is, a civil law system with six code laws. However, Thai code laws did not 
codify all customs for all parts of Thailand. Moreover, the ancient laws of each part are totally abolished.   
48 The Act to repeal People Irrigation Act Buddist Era 2482 B.E.2558 (Thailand)  
49 See the order of Hod district, Chiang Mai province No. 005/2557     
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1.1.2 Focus / objectives of the thesis 
Thailand’s goal to achieve sustainable development of water resources emerges from the water 
scarcity problems with which it is regularly confronted. The most important question is whether 
the present water governance mechanisms in Thailand, without the inclusion of customary water 
management, help Thailand to achieve her goal. If it cannot, the questions emerge as to what kind 
of approach to water management and what kind of legal framework is required to mobilise water 
management in Thailand to promote sustainable development? 
Government agencies in Thailand report that State-led water management since the 
modernisation of the nation’s administrative systems (i.e. over the past 100 years) has resulted in 
53 percent of the cultivation areas in Thailand dependent on water from government irrigation 
projects. This means that around 46 percent or more of the cultivation areas still depend on water 
from other sources or from customary irrigation systems. It is clear that the water law in Thailand 
needs to deal with the water rights of farmers who use water from other sources or customary 
irrigation systems. However, the present water law of Thailand has no such provisions. Thus, the 
question is; What kind of hybrid system of law can mobilise water governance in Thailand to 
achieve sustainable water management? 
This thesis focuses on the challenges confronting people in Muang Fai communities to gain 
recognition of the Muang Fai systems under Thai water policies and laws. As such, it investigates 
the legal theories and practices (including legal pluralism and other approaches to recognising 
natural resource management in customary law) relevant to the context to determine the possible 
options that could be applied and adapted in the Thai legal context. 
In this thesis, Muang Fai customs in northern Thailand (Chiang Mai valley, particularly) as 
illustrated in relevant literature will be applied to re-examine the prospects for the recognition 
and implementation of customary law in union with both statutory law and people’s traditional 
way of life to support sustainable development in Thailand.     
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1.1.3 Research questions 
The main approach of this study is to investigate the compatibility of Muang Fai customs with 
the sustainable water management principles expressed in the Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development 1992, and other related materials. If found to be compatible, an attempt 
is then made to determine how the Muang Fai local irrigation systems can be recognised and 
supported by the current Thai legal system. This dissertation thus aims to answer the following 
research questions: 
1) How does Muang Fai customary law operate as a system of water resource management in 
present day Thailand? 
2) To what extent is Muang Fai customary law related to water resource management consistent 
with sustainable development principles? 
3)  What approaches have been taken in other countries to legally recognise customary law in 
natural resource management applicable to water resources?  
4) Does the Thai legal system recognise Muang Fai customary law in water resource 
management? 
5) What role does the customary law play in the Thai legal system for natural resource 
management applicable to water? 
6) What law reform approaches would improve the recognition of Muang Fai customary law for 
the sustainable development of water resources in Thailand. 
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1.1.4. Justification 
Thailand is comprised of many minority and culturally diverse groups.50 Many Thai people who 
identify with the nationalist ideology, however, deny this diversity.51 Furthermore, State-centric 
approaches and legal positivism dominate the thinking of most lawyers in Thailand,52 leading 
them to ignore the customs of local people, even though such customs support and complement 
State laws.53 In fact, Muang Fai customary law is not the custom of Indigenous people, but a local 
custom practiced by more 300,000 people residing in the north of Thailand. Therefore, this 
research aims to support local people in this region so that they can negotiate and transact with 
people outside the Muang Fai community. 54  The research also aims to explore the options 
available to facilitate the integration of customary laws and institutions into water resource 
management practices in this region. 
Community-based water laws around the world have been the focus of numerous research 
studies.55 Moreover, this thesis is not the first empirical study of Muang Fai. Nonetheless, this 
thesis applies Common Pool Resource Management theory and legal paradigms to contribute 
new insights into the body of research literature through its focus on the ways to recognise and 
maintain the sustainable traditional Muang-Fai community-based irrigation management in 
Thailand. Furthermore, it is the first study to be conducted with the aim of recognising Muang 
Fai for sustainable development in Thailand. It can therefore be asserted that this thesis offers 
original work through its study of Muang Fai via these approaches.  
                                                                
50 Cultural Survival, Network of Indigenous Peoples in Thailand and the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), ‘The rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Thailand’(2nd Cycle Universal Periodic Review 2016 Advocacy fact sheet, Network of Indigenous 
People in Thailand secretariat, 2016) 1 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/THA/INT_CCPR_ICO_THA_23570_E.pdf>; Dhir, Rishabh 
Kumar Dhir, Indigenous peoples in the world of work in Asia and the Pacific: a status report ,  International Labour Office – 
Geneva: ILO, 2015, 133 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
gender/documents/publication/wcms_438853.pdf>. 
51 Suchit Wongthet, ‘Localism is not attractive because of the destruction by ‘Nationalism’’,  Matichon, 7 August 2017, สุจิตต ์วงษ์
เทศ, ทอ้งถ่ินส้ินเสน่ห์ ไม่เก๋ไก๋ เพรำะถกูท ำลำยเห้ียนดว้ยอ ำนำจของ “แห่งชำติ” วนัท่ี 7 สิงหำคม 2560 <https://www.matichon.co.th/education/news_620604>; 
Suchit Wongthet, ‘Backward Knowledge of Thailand’, Matichon, 7 July 2016 สุจิตต ์วงษเ์ทศ : ควำมรู้ถอยหลงัของไทย วนัท่ี 7 กรกฎำคม 2559 
<https://www.matichon.co.th/columnists/news_203456>. 
52 Narongdecha Sarukositha, ‘Law is the Command of Sovereign’, Matichon, 3 Oct 2006, 
<http://www.senate.go.th/lawdatacenter/includes/FCKeditor/upload/Image/b/K39_jun3_6.pdf>. 
53 The Act to repeal People Irrigation Act, Buddhist Era 2482 B.E. 2558 (Thailand).  
54 J.S. Fingleton, Legal Recognition of Indigenous Groups FAO Legal Papers Online (11 November 2013) Food and Agriculture 
Organization < http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo1.pdf >.  
55 Van Koppen et al., above n 18, 3. 
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Many scholars in the field of Sociology in Thailand have studied the Muang Fai community and 
the activities of Muang Fai. One study has also investigated the legal aspects. However, no study 
to date has sought to identify a legal approach to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law 
and the Munag Fai community.  
For example, Vanpen studied the historical development and management of irrigation systems 
in Muang Fai with an aim to identify the most efficient means of water management for 
agricultural development.56 Her study indicated four factors related to Muang Fai to impact on 
this outcome: 1) the region’s physical features; 2) the irrigation systems’ physical structure; 3) the 
characteristics of the irrigation organisation; and 4) the characteristics of water management.57 
Amporn conducted an evaluation of the Muang Fai community in the Mae Wang river basin and 
indicated that the State often tries to intervene in the management of Muang Fai water 
management system. Specifically, it attempts to apply a ‘blueprint’ to the system in the Muang 
Fai community to make it the same as all other management systems.  Amporn argues that the 
State should support the Muang Fai community only when it cannot resolve its water 
management problems. 58  Sukkasem also studied State intervention into the Muang Fai 
community in the Mae Khan river basin. He reported that State intervention causes conflicts to 
emerge between the State and the local community, the depletion of local traditions and wisdom, 
and inefficiencies in water management in local areas. Furthermore, he pointed to the weakness 
of State irrigation management including: 1) the rigid nature of irrigation management according 
to legislation and the resulting conflict between Muang Fai customs and legislation; and 2) the 
lack of public participation. These outcomes increase the conflict between the Muang Fai 
communities located upstream of the river and the Muang Fai communities located downstream 
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of the river.59 Pornpilai and others have also studied Muang Fai and report on the problems of 
Muang Fai in present day Thailand.60  
In terms of law, Kanaporn studied Muang Fai through Muang Rai Sartra, the ancient code law 
of northern Thailand. The author argues that Muang Fai is meaningful for local people both in 
terms of irrigation and social unity. Therefore, Muang Fai should be recognised as a community 
right by the mechanism afforded in the 2007 Thai Constitution.61  
Muang Fai has also been studied by western scholars such as Falvey,62 Neef63  and others using 
approaches different to what is applied in this thesis.64 Hence, it is clear that this thesis is an 
original work that will be useful for local people and thus worth studying. 
1.1.5 Significance of this research       
Pornpilai claims that Muang Fai customary law, a community-based water management system, 
is an important social institution in northern Thailand’s rural areas.65 The institution has unified 
local people in northern Thailand for over 700 years and plays an important economic role. 
Chatthip contends that the Muang Fai community illustrates the ‘dual economy’ system in 
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Thailand as described by Julius Herman Boeke.66 The dual economy means there are two separate 
economic sectors within one country. One supports local needs and the other supports the global 
market.67 Hence, the importance of this research is not only to provide guidance on how to 
achieve recognition of community-based water management systems in Thailand, but also to help 
strengthen the local social and economic systems for sustainable development. The vital role of 
local communities and their normative systems is well established in the literature and research 
on water resources management.68 
Recognition of Muang Fai customary laws could also result in the recognition of land use 
regimes and protected areas according to Muang Fai customary law. Although the areas alongside 
the canals in Muang Fai are not big, and most of the river source forests of Muang Fai are under 
the supervision of Thai government, recognition of Muang Fai means that people in the Muang 
Fai community can participate in the conservation of the forests at the river source. The primary 
stakeholders in water management; namely, the local communities, must be included in the 
decision making in order to create sustainable development. The beneficiaries of recognising 
customary law in relation to sustainable development include the local communities that manage 
the networks of natural protection areas for which the government pays relatively little compared 
to other management systems.  
                                                                
66 Chatthip Nartsupha, Introduction in Pornpilai Lertwicha and Aroonrat Wicheankaeo, Villages and Communities of Mae Khan 
River Basin: Dynamic Economic System of 3 River Basins in Thailand Research Project 2000-2002 (Thai Research Fund, 2003) 
11. 
67 Ibid. However, Dual economy is described to a state in which two different economic sectors in one country. These are on 
markedly different levels in terms of development. The types of technology available as well as the overall functioning of these 
two systems are very different, as well.  See http://www.businesspundit.com/encyclopedia/economics/dual-economy/. 
68  See Prachanda Pradhan, ‘Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepal at the Crossroad’; Tang, S.Y., ‘Institutions and 
Collective Action in Irrigation Systems’, Thesis, Lam, Wai Fung, ‘Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, 
Infrastructure, and Collective Action’ (Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1998); Sharma, Shyam Sunder Prasad and U Hemantha 
Kumar, ‘Revisiting the Traditional Irrigation System for Sustainability of Farm Production: Evidences from Bihar (India)’, 87th 
Annual Conference, April 8-10, 2013, Warwick University Coventry, UK; Rabi Poudel, Farmers' Laws and Irrigation: Water 
Rights and Dispute Management in the Hills of Nepal (PhD thesis, Wageningen University, 2000); Ashutosh Sarker and Tadao 
Itoh, 'Design Principles in Long-Enduring Institutions of Japanese Irrigation Common-Pool Resources' (2001) 48(2) Agricultural 
Water Management 89; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990); Seyed Hamed Alemohammad and Shervan Gharari, 'Qanat: An Ancient Invention 
for Water Management in Iran' (2017) , Kashan, Isfahan Province, 'Qanat Irrigated Agricultural Heritage Systems' (2014); James 
Kho and Eunice Agsaoay-Saño, 'Country Study on Customary Water Laws and Practices: Philippines' (2005) Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), < http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/legal/docs/CaseStudy_Philippines.pdf >; Lorenzen, S and RP 
Lorenzen, A case study of Balinese irrigation management: institutional dynamics and challenges, Second Southeast Asia Water 
Forum. Nusa Dua, Bali.  
  
32 
 
Moreover, local people have easier access to justice under local customary law such as Muang 
Fai. This is because they can use the processes to resolve water resource conflicts in accordance 
with Muang Fai customary law. In most cases, centrist water resource management regimes are 
absent or ineffective in regions such as this. As a result, the contemporary viability of Muang Fai 
law and practices must be explored in regard to the principles of sustainable development.    
As Uraiwan69, Pornpilai70, Kanaporn71 and other scholars have indicated, Muang Fai custom is 
not only meaningful as an irrigation system. It is also a social mechanism that unifies people in 
the community as well as the engine to boost the local economy and conserve the natural capital. 
Recognition of Muang Fai is a way to achieve sustainable development at the same time.       
1.2. Intellectual context 
1.2.1 Conceptual and empirical aspects of research 
This thesis investigates the application of customary law in natural resource management   
through the theoretical and practical frameworks of common pool resources and legal pluralism. 
These approaches are applied to the research questions focusing on whether Muang Fai irrigation 
customs in northern Thailand could result in sustainability through the application of common 
pool resource management, and how Thai customary law should be recognised and 
accommodated in the legal system.    
A. Customary law and recognition of customary law 
‘Custom’ means ‘the habitual behaviour of men [sic] in a given society or community’72, or ‘a 
practice that emerges outside of legal constraints, and which individuals and organizations 
spontaneously follow in the course of their interactions out of a sense of legal obligation.’73 Rene 
David argues that the problem for customary law is that it is impossible to differentiate between 
                                                                
69 Uraiwan Tan-Kimyoung. ‘Muang Fai Communities are for people Institutional strength and Potentials’ Chulalongkorn 
University, Social Research Institute 1995,18. 
70 Pornpilai et al., above n 40, 44-45. 
71 Kanaporn above n 61, 12. 
72 Rene David, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. II: The Legal Systems of the World their Comparison and 
Unification (The Hague,1975) 97. 
73  Francesco Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law (20 November 2013) Social Science Research Network< 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262032 >. 
33 
 
social custom and legal custom because there is no settled definition in law. Therefore, the 
concept of legal custom is not the same for those who apply legal rules only as it is for those 
arising out of State constraint, or for those who adopt a sociological point of view.74 Moreover, 
Dawson argues that positivism, with regards to law, is the product of an authoritative State 
institution. 75  It follows that custom cannot be accepted as a law. Gachenga’s work further 
illustrates that the positivist legal theory which underpins the common law legal system does not 
support the development and implementation of customary law. This is because it does not 
recognise normative systems outside the realm of the State law-making mechanisms.   
Francesco argues that customary rules can be considered as ‘an implied and often non verbalized 
exercise of direct legislation by the members of society’.76 He further indicates that there are two 
elements for customary law; namely, quantitative and qualitative elements. Quantitative elements 
refer to the long usage (duration) of a social pattern among people and the universal practices; 
whereas, the qualitative element refers to the general acceptance of custom as a law by the people.   
With respect to water utilisation, it is argued that conflict between statutory law and customary 
law has become common place in many countries around the world, for example, Jamaica, 
Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe and New South Wales (Australia), Indonesia and Bolivia.77 
However, water customary laws play a vital role in managing and allocating water in 
communities. The problem is that the forms vary from area to area.78 Tom’tavala claims that 
States have four key options to deal with in respect to customary law.79: 1) replace customs with 
new norms based on new values; 2) reform some customs and leave others intact; 3) conserve the 
essence of certain customs; and 4) respect the essence of certain customs. Tom’tavala further 
contends that a government has two options in terms of approaches to recognising customary 
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law: negative measures and positive measures.  Negative measures are applied when the 
customary law contradicts the statute law, or the State law does not recognise the legal 
consequence of customary law. They include a prohibited observance of customary law and 
denial of the validity of customary law. Conversely, positive measures include the admittance of 
customary law as a fact, the incorporation of customary law as law, and measures of their 
acknowledgement. 
As mentioned above, the positivism underpinning common law impedes the acceptance of norms 
from outside the legal framework. They can, however, accept the harmonisation of pre-existing 
norms through the recognition of customary law with statutes.80 
In developed countries with Indigenous populations such as Australia, customary law is still used 
to govern natural resources in some areas. The Australian Law Reform Commission suggested 
five methods to recognise the customary law of Aboriginal people including: recognition as 
acknowledgement; the incorporation of Aboriginal customary laws; recognition by exclusion; 
recognition by translation; and recognition by adjustment and accommodation. The Commission 
adopts a ‘functional recognition’ approach which is not the general recognition of Aboriginal 
customary law for all purposes of Australian law, but recognition by reference, issue by issue, to 
topics of Australian law.81 However, the Australian government does not recognise the traditional 
institutions of Indigenous peoples. Rather, it creates new institutions through a co-management 
approach.82 Therefore, this thesis has chosen to study the recognition of traditional institutions 
to govern the coastal fisheries of Samoa and Vanuatu instead.   
The Muang Fai community in Thailand has used traditional institutions for effective water 
governance for a long time (see chapter 2). This indicates that it is not necessary to create new 
institutions.83  In Samoa and Vanuatu, recognition of customary law and customary institutions 
                                                                
80Elizabeth Wanjiru Gachenga, Integrating Customary and Statutory Laws systems of Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development. The Case of The Marakwet of Kenya (PhD Thesis,  University of Western Sydney, 2012) 248. 
81 See. Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No. 31(1986) para 209, 
Northern Territory Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law, Discussion 
paper No. 4 (1992) 4-25. 
82 Craig D, Hancock, Rea N, Gipey C, Penangk E, Nabangardi J and Scrutton T. An Agreement Approach that Recognises 
Customary Law in Water Management. Land & Water Australia Final Report. 2009. 
83 Jon Lindsay, 'Designing Legal Space: Law as an Enabling Tool in Community-Based Management' (8 Dec 2017) 
<https://rmportal.net/library/content/frame/designing-legal-space.doc/view?searchterm=institutions>. 
35 
 
to govern fisheries is embedded in the Constitution and various other legislation. This recognition 
is supported with policies, decentralisation, monitoring systems, capacity building programmes, 
cooperation with NGOs, and special units to make suggestions to and cooperate with local 
people. The need to recognise customary law and customary institutions stems from the 
unsuccessful implementation of Western style fishery laws by central governments. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of both financial and human resources to enforce the Western style laws 
effectively84 (see chapter 5).  
In the case of Thailand, the nation’s civil and commercial codes accept customary law as a 
subsidiary means of regulation to apply to civil and commercial cases when statutory law does 
not exist.85 This shows that customary laws have their own relevance.86 It has been argued that 
customary laws can be applied when they have been long-used by the State, when the custom 
has been implemented over a long time period, or the customary law does not conflict with 
written laws enacted afterwards.87 Generally, customary laws are known and exist in practice but 
are not documented. Hence, legal practitioners and scholars lack knowledge of customary laws 
and fail to recognise and implement them (see chapter 6). 
In the case of water management customs, Muang Fai customs were previously incorporated into 
the People Irrigation Act B.E. 2482 (1939 A.D.) (PIA). However, there were several problems 
regarding implementation and the Thai government issued many policies which contradicted the 
Act. Finally, the PIA was abolished in January 2015. In this thesis, the idea of a legal drafting 
commission and the enforcement of these policies is explored to study the lessons learnt from 
the failure of the PIA (see Chapters 2 & 6) with a view to creating a better legal framework to 
recognise Muang Fai customary law (see chapter 7). 
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B. Common Pool Resource Management  
One important question in this thesis is whether Muang Fai irrigation customary laws work 
effectively and sustainably? Garrett Hardin has argued that the system of common property 
ownership of natural resources can ruin the natural resources due to over exploitation. 88 
Furthermore, conflict between modern water laws and customary water laws can arise. For 
instance, modern water law applies water rights (ownership and relating rights) to the State and 
to individuals; whereas, customary water law (such as Muang Fai customary law) views water 
rights as common property for all members in customary institutions to enjoy.   
To answer this question, Ostrom’s proposal about common pool resources is reviewed. Ostrom 
critiqued the work of Hardin, refuting his ideas to identify panaceas for, or to apply universal 
measures to, natural resource management.89 Ostrom instead proposed the eight design principle 
for self organized regimes to manage common pool resources, in large part as a way to avoid 
Hardin’s response to common pool resources. Later, the diagnostic approach to understand the 
problem and avoid the panacea was proposed90 In this thesis, Ostrom’s eight design principle for 
self organized regime is also applied to examine Muang Fai customary law. 
C. Legal pluralism and the recognition of customary law 
Legal pluralism refers to the presence of more than one legal system in a social field 
simultaneously.91 Thus, it can be understood as the acceptance of customary law and statutory 
law within a society. In addition, legal pluralism has no univocal definition92 and can be used in 
multiple contexts. For example, ‘State legal pluralism’ refers to the recognition of different 
sources of law in a State legal system.93 Alternatively, legal polycentricism refers to the use of 
various sources in different sectors of the State legal system, and empirical legal pluralism refers 
to the ontological reality of the existence of difference and semi-autonomous legal orders within 
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the same temporal and spatial context.94 Legal pluralism deems that norms do not only reside in 
the State, but rather in a multitude of norm-generating communities.95 It is contended that a 
fundamental idea embedded in the definition of legal pluralism is to recognise the various 
definitions of ‘law’.96 It is also argued that legal pluralism cannot provide a conclusive definition 
of law in the same way as other legal theory does.97  
1.2.2 Literature review 
Three topics are investigated in this thesis to answer the research questions: 1) water and 
sustainable development, in particular the approach to sustainable water management; 2) Muang 
Fai irrigation customary law, especially its process and contemporary form; and 3) the 
relationships between current situations of sustainable development, water management, the legal 
system, and customary law in present day Thailand. 
A. Water and sustainable development 
As mentioned above, water is vital to sustain all living things. Furthermore, it is an important 
factor in sustaining ecological systems and economic development. It is claimed that sustainable 
water resource management is central to the concept of ‘sustainability’ in Brundtland’s report, 
along with the concept of ‘management’.98 It can be understood simply as ‘the management of 
water resources while taking into account the needs of present and future users’. 99  The 
International Hydrological Programme at UNESCO notes that a major task in sustainable 
freshwater management is to avoid/solve water-related problems, including future conflicts.100 
This is because water problems cannot be resolved quickly by technical solutions. It is further 
argued that political recognition of the importance of water and consideration of cultural, 
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educational, communication and scientific factors are vital for sustainable water resource 
management.  
 
The present principles to achieve sustainable water management appear in the Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development (DSWSD). A turning point for water management issues 
came after the Dublin statement and the Environment and Development Conference in Rio in 
1992.101 The Dublin Statement proposed an integrated approach to water resources management; 
that is, integrating public participation, the role of women in water utilisation, and the treatment 
of water as an economic good. Later, the Rio Conference established a common goal for the 
international community by putting in place appropriate institutional structures and legal 
instruments for water management.102 Savenije and Vander Zaag assert that the concepts and 
issues to address in the application of IWRM include water resources, water users, spatial scales 
and temporal scales.103 Biswas identified a number of problems for sustainable water resource 
management in developing countries including an incomplete framework for analysis; lack of 
appropriate methodology; and lack of adequate knowledge, institutional constraints and 
monitoring and evaluation.104 105  In terms of customary law recognition, the guide book to using 
an IWRM approach in water management suggests the need to recognise customary law and 
customary institutions.106 
B. Muang Fai irrigation customary law 
Muang Fai is a surface water management system for agriculture and plantations used in northern 
Thailand. It focuses on peoples’ participation, equitable sharing of water between water users, 
and compatibility with natural limitations. Many scholars argue that Muang Fai is a sustainable 
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water resource management custom.107 The popularity of the Muang Fai water management 
system in Southeast Asia is evidenced by the continued use in the southern part of China, 
northern Lao, Myanmar and Vietnam.108 However, it should be noted that the system currently 
lacks legal recognition in Thailand.109    
Despite lacking legal recognition, farmers in northern Thailand still practice Muang Fai using 
the customary law and institutions to manage water. Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai 
institutions are also unofficially recognised by government water institutions (see chapters 2 & 
6). Currently, it is estimated 80,000 hectares in northern Thailand are irrigated using the Muang 
Fai system.110 The Thai government has enacted water management policies that do not include 
Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community in the water management system of 
Thailand.   
There is much research relating to Muang Fai, most of which is social, anthropological and 
geographical in nature. Only a few studies have been conducted from a legal perspective.111 
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Muang Fai was first studied by Japanese academic, Shikeharu Tanabe, in 1976.112 Professors 
Vanphen and Uraiwan, Thai scholars, subsequently conducted further study. They indicated that 
Muang Fai water management customs were very effective and played a vital role in developing 
the agricultural sector in northern Thailand, alongside the government irrigation system. 
Furthermore, Uraiwan pinpointed that Muang Fai was a sustainable water management system 
for two reasons: it uses a sustainable management system; and it is a sustainable water user 
organisation. The Muang Fai system attempts to engage the water users in its activities. The 
fundamental principle of Muang Fai; that is, the equitable and reasonable right to utilise water 
harmoniously within changing natural conditions, guarantee the sustainability of the system. 
However, this sustainable custom is threatened by Thailand’s water management policy and 
laws.113 Pacharin argues that the main issue for Muang Fai custom is that the Thai government 
classifies property rights over water resources into two ways. Firstly, water is classified as a 
public resource, owned by the State. Secondly, water is classified as a private resource, owned 
by individual owners. Consequently, there is no place for water resources owned by the 
community. Furthermore, there are two different academic models for water management: 
Unitarianism and communitarianism. The Thai government supports the Unitarianism mode. 
Phatcharin recommends that when drafting a new water bill, it is necessary to recognise the 
multiple systems of water usage and the diversity of water rights according to customary law. 
This should allow local people to apply various and alternative water management approaches 
including those based on local knowledge and customary law.114 
C. Sustainable development, water management, legal systems and customary law in 
present day Thailand  
The principle of sustainable development has been incorporated into the Thai Constitution since 
1997.115 It also appears in the present Constitution.116 Although the principle of sustainability has 
                                                                
112 Phatcharin Bualoi, ‘Diversity of and Debates on Water Management: A Case Study of Water User Groups at Fai Wang Hai, 
Chiang Dao Sub-district, Chiang Dao District, Chiang Mai Province’ (Master of Arts [Social development] Thesis, Chiang Mai 
University, 2006) 5.  
113 Uraiwan Tan-Kimyoung. ‘Social Institution in Muang Fai Irrigation System: Comparative Study between the Communities in 
Plateau and the Communities in Plain in the Northern part of Thailand’, cited in Bualoi, above n 109. 
114 Bualoi above n 112,ฌ. 
115 Constitution of Thailand 1997(Thailand) Sec 46. 
116 Constitution of Thailand 2017 (Thailand) Preamble, Sec. 43,56,65, 72,75,250, 258.  
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been further incorporated into policies 117  and legislations 118  in Thailand, it has not been 
implemented effectively.119  
In terms of water management, the principle of sustainability has been incorporated into the 
strategic plans of relevant government agencies, especially the Royal Irrigation Department 
(RID), which is responsible for the management of water for agriculture. Because Thailand does 
not have a Water Act, laws relating to water management are embedded in various pieces of 
legislation and customary law is not acknowledged as a source of law. Moreover, there are many 
government agencies related to water management.  
Since 1997, Thailand’s Constitutions have recognised customs and have called for the 
preservation, conservation and application of local wisdom and knowledge as community rights. 
There is no subordinate law however to establish the criteria upon which customs or customary 
law should be recognised and implemented. Thus, there are arguably no customs or customary 
laws recognised in Thailand’s Constitution thus far.120   
1.3. Research method 
The research methodology of this thesis is shaped by the research questions and the nature of the 
topic. Due to the subject matter of this thesis - water management, sustainable development and 
customary law - the materials to be investigated and analysed span multiple disciplines. They 
include law, water management, economics, ecology, anthropology and sociology. The main 
focus in this thesis however is on law. This research study is a qualitative in nature based on the 
doctrinal, theoretical, historical, and comparative approaches across jurisdictions. The qualitative 
paradigms imply that this research aims to explore social relations in depth, to investigate the 
                                                                
117 See Office of the National Econoic and Social Development Plan, the National Economic and Social Development Plan of 
Thailand since 1992-present < http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_w3c/main.php?filename=develop_issue> and the Strategies 
of Royal Irrigation Department, the speech of Prime Ministers   
118 See the Constitutions of Thailand since 1997 and Pollution Control Department, Document for the Public Hearing Relating 
to the Codification of Environmental Law (5 July 2015) 2-14 
<http://infofile.pcd.go.th/law/Environmental%20law55_1.pdf?CFID=2542240&CFTOKEN=78832869>. 
119National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, The 11th National Economic and Social Development Plan 
of Thailand (2012-2016), 111-112 
<http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_w3c/ewt_dl_link.php?filename=develop_issue&nid=3786 >  
120It should be noted here that some journalists argue that the subordinate law relating to the communities’ right is delayed by the 
politicians who want to privatise the public natural resource through the public service concession system. Pakorn Phungneatra, 
‘From Commoner to Minister: No Sign for Changing the Gap Between Rich and Poor’ Bangkok Business News (online), 13 March 
2012 <http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/politics/op inion/prakorn_kob/20120313/441236/จำก-ไพร่-สู่-เสนำบดี-ยงัไม่มีสญัญำณแก้
เหล่ือมล ้ำ.html>. 
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personal opinions of individuals, and to collect and interpret unquantifiable materials.121 122 A 
study of Muang Fai is presented in this thesis to illustrate the issues in depth rather through the 
use of statistical data. Primary, secondary and tertiary sources are used to facilitate the research.   
A comparative and analytical approach has been chosen as the methodology of this thesis. In this 
research, the legal methods adopted in Samoa and Vanuatu to recognise customary laws and 
customary institutions with regards to natural resource management have been studied as well as 
their potential lessons and application to Muang Fai and Thai water law.   
The research methodology of this thesis consists of five stages as follows: 
In the first stage, the literature on Muang Fai customary laws in Thailand is reviewed and 
analysed extensively. This review is undertaken to ascertain whether Muang Fai customary laws 
are sustainable according to the concept of sustainability, sustainable water resource 
management principles, and the Common Pool Resource theory. In addition, the environmental, 
social and economic aspects of Muang Fai have been considered in this study. The literature 
relating to Muang Fai, including its laws and policies for water management of Thailand, is also 
reviewed to identify the problems and conflicts between statutory law and customary law for 
water management in Thailand. The review has been conducted using a doctrinal and analytical 
approach. 
The second stage is to investigate the principles of sustainable development and sustainable 
water resources management using theoretical and analytical approaches. This stage aims to 
identify the best approach to ensure sustainability in terms of water management, with a 
particular focus on IWRM and national legal obligations. This thesis uses the same approach 
adopted by Kwa to measure the extent to which Muang Fai customs are compatible with 
sustainable development principles.123 Hardin’s concept of common pool resource management, 
as well as Elinor Ostorm’s eight design principles for self organized regimes, are explored and 
                                                                
121Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law, (Thomson Reuters Lawbook Co., 2010)  106-107.  
122 Gachenga, above n 80, 11. 
123  The author argues that sustainable development principles can be successfully implemented by countries, particularly 
developing countries, because the concept has strong roots in traditional cultures which are dominant in developing countries. 
He proves the existence of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea’s tradition by analysing the principle of sustainable 
development.  See Eric Lokai Kwa, Traditionalizing Sustainable Development: The Law, Policy and Practice in Papua New 
Guinea (PhD Thesis, The University of Auckland, 2006). 
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analysed to discover the proper form of natural resource management. In addition, the legal 
theory surrounding water management such as property rights, water rights, economic 
instruments for regulation and new environmental governance concepts are examined to 
explicate the role of law in water management.  
The third stage is to explore the theories of customary law and the legal techniques for their 
recognition, especially the recognition of natural resources management customary law through 
a co-management approach. Further, the concepts of legal pluralism and human rights, which 
support customary recognition, are examined. During this stage, doctrinal, analytical and 
comparative approaches are applied to examine how and the extent to which the customs have 
been recognised and applied to facilitate sustainable development and natural resource 
management. This stage also explores the experience of customary law recognition in Samoa and 
Vanuatu to identify the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of each legal technique.  
The fourth stage examines the water policies, water laws, water institutions and the recognition 
and implementation of customary law in the Thai legal system. An historical and doctrinal 
approach had been applied to analyse statutory law, as well as the opinions of the legal 
committees which drafted the PIA in 1932. Thailand’s judicial precedents have been critically 
considered to better understand the lessons learned from the PIA’s failure to recognise Muang 
Fai during 1939-2015. 
Finally, the fifth stage compares, contrasts, analyses and critiques the experiences of other 
countries relating to the recognition of customary laws. All data are the synthesised to propose a 
legal framework and strategies to recognise water management customary laws in Thailand. This 
thesis also indicates the areas that require further research. 
  
1.4 Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.  
Chapter 2 profiles Muang Fai customary law in present-day Thailand including its meaning, 
processes, rules (water allocation, land management, financial management and conflict 
resolution) and limitations. It also identifies the current legal and non-legal issues associated with 
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Muang Fai customary law. This chapter aims to explore legal and non-legal theories, principles 
and concepts to answer the second research question. The issues canvassed are: 1) whether Muang 
Fai customary law is a sustainable customary law according to the argument of Bosselman; and 
2) whether Muang Fai is compatible with the principles of sustainable water development 
according to the Dublin principles on water and sustainable development and the legal 
obligations of the State according to the New Delhi declaration of principles of international law 
relating to sustainable development.  Furthermore, this chapter aims to examine whether Muang 
Fai institutions are sustainable according to Ostrom’s Common Pool Resources Management 
theory. This thesis places the information about Muang Fai customary in the second chapter to 
build understanding of Muang Fai customary law and its institutions before moving to the 
theoretical studies in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Chapter 3 builds upon the previous chapter by considering the principles of sustainable 
development, approaches to implementation and the legal duties of the State, in regards to the 
sustainable management of water resources particularly.  It also examines the CPRM theory, 
especially for irrigation.  The aim is to evaluate: 1) whether Muang Fai customary law, reported 
in chapter 2, is a sustainable customary law; 2) whether Muang Fai institutions can prevent local 
people from the tragedy of the common or the ‘common dilemma’; and 3) what the Thai 
government should do to intervene in the Muang Fai community in order to include Muang Fai 
in the present water management of Thailand. Evaluating these aspects are undertaken to answer 
the second research question. 
In Chapter 4, the trends in national level water law and the concepts and practices of customary 
law recognition, particularly in natural resource management, are addressed. This chapter also 
explores the legal principles to support customary law recognition including: 1) the concept of 
legal pluralism; and 2) the human rights based approach. This is to support the research question 
relating to why Muang Fai customary law should be recognised and to identify the best legal 
techniques to recognise Muang Fai customary law to ensure the sustainable development of 
Thailand.      
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Chapter 5 discusses the lessons learned about customary law recognition and natural resource 
management from the experiences of Samoa and Vanuatu. It aims to answer the third research 
question. Furthermore, it explores the threats resulting from customary law recognition for 
natural resource management in order to create the legal framework to recognise the Muang Fai 
community in the sustainable development of Thailand.  
Chapter 6 analyses the current policies, laws, and institutions relating to water management in 
Thailand. The aim is to examine how the Thai legal system treats customary law in natural 
resource management and how the system can be improved to recognise Muang Fai for the 
sustainable development of Thailand. It aims to answer the sixth research question.    
After studying the facts, theories and practices relating to Muang Fai, sustainable water resource 
management, CPRM, customary recognition in the natural resource management sector from 
chapter 2-6,  
 Chapter 7 proposes an approach to recognise Muang Fai customary law for sustainable 
development in Thailand.   The aim is to improve the legal mechanisms to recognise customary 
law and improve traditional institutions to govern water for irrigation in Thailand.  
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and indicates the areas for further research studies in sustainable 
water management and customary law recognition.
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Chapter Two - Muang Fai irrigation system in the past and in present day Thailand 
 
The previous chapter addressed the research questions of this thesis, gave a brief definition of 
Muang Fai customs, and outlined some problems of Muang customs in present day Thailand. 
It also outlined the economic and legal theories, which are examined in more detail in this 
chapter. Lastly, the previous chapter explained why Muang Fai customs are important to the 
farmers in Thailand and how they can support its sustainable development. 
This chapter aims to explore and analyse Muang Fai water management customary law (2.1) in 
order to address the Research Question: How does Muang Fai customary law operate as a 
system of water resource management in present day Thailand? 
It will discuss the role of Muang Fai irrigation systems in ancient and present day Thailand 
(2.2). The lessons learned from the past application of Muang Fai customary law and how it is 
presently applied will then be examined. The purpose of this discussion is to explain how 
Muang Fai customary law operates in present day Thailand  
2.1 Definition, general overview, rules, establishment and management systems of the 
Muang Fai irrigation system 
 
The Muang Fai system is draws on local wisdom about how to manage water for agricultural 
purposes. It was designed to be compatible with the specific conditions of each local area. To 
really understand Muang Fai customary law, such that lawyers can design laws to support and 
sustain the activities of Muang Fai, it is necessary to define Muang Fai and its specific 
characteristics for each area. Such characteristics include the topography of the area, its 
population, and religious beliefs and agricultural production in that area. The area of the 
northern Thailand is made up of around 93,690.85 square kilometres and includes various 
geographical characteristics. It is impossible to talk about it as a whole. Nonetheless, wherever 
possible specific place names are mentioned so as to be accurate and transparent. 
‘Muang’ and ‘Fai’ are two words in the Thai language. According to Thai dictionary, 
commissioned by Royal Institute of Thailand, ‘Muang’ is a noun which has two meanings. The 
first meaning is a well, a pool or a mine, and the second meaning is a ditch, a dike or a small 
canal for diverting water to a cultivation area.1 ‘‘Fai’ means a weir for irrigation.2 Falvey defines 
the meaning of Muang and Fai as ‘Muang’ meaning a small canal for diverting water from a 
river to a paddy field, and ‘Fai’ meaning a weir to lift water from a river before directing it to 
                                                                
1 Royal institution of Thailand, เหมือง(เหฺมือง) น. บ่อ เช่น เหมืองถ่ำนหิน เหมืองแร่; ล ำรำง, ร่องน ้ำส ำหรับชกัน ้ำเขำ้ไปหล่อเล้ียงพืชท่ีเพำะปลูก, เช่น ชกัน ้ำจำกเหมืองเขำ้นำ. 
(11 Dec 2014) Online Thai dictionary   <http://rirs3.royin.go.th/> 
2 Royal institution of Thailand, ฝำย น. ท่ีกั้นน ้ำเพ่ือกำรชลประทำน. (11 Dec 2014) Online Thai dictionary   <http://rirs3.royin.go.th/> 
47 
 
the ‘Muang’.3  Sumarttra defines the meaning of Muang Fai thus: the Muang Fai irrigation 
system is a water management system according to the local wisdom of Lanna people.4 The 
Muang Fai system can be split into two parts. The first part is a dam or weir to block water in 
order to lift up the water level. There is a water gate beside the weir to distribute water into a 
ditch. The second part is a ditch made by excavation to divert water to the paddy fields at the 
end of ditches.5 Pornpilai defines the Muang Fai system as ‘a water management system which 
uses the gravitational force to control the flow of water. …   In addition, the Muang Fai system 
also means the social management system’.6 Uraiwan contends that ‘Muang Fai is a social 
group organized at the level which is higher than the village’ and is the irrigation community 
of the people’s irrigation system.7  Hence, it can be argued that Muang Fai customary law is a 
water management system, a social management system and an organisational management 
system at the same time. Moreover, to understand Muang Fai customary law clearly, the water 
management system, the social management system and the organisational management 
system of Muang Fai should be studied together. It should also be noted that even though 
Muang Fai is generally considered to be the wisdom of Lanna people in northern Thailand, 
water management according to Muang Fai customary law can be found in many places in 
South-east Asia from the southern part of China, to PDR Lao, some parts of Myanmar and 
some parts of Vietnam where Tai ethnic groups live.8  
In terms of topography, Muang Fai water management is always found in the mountainous 
areas. 9  In Thailand, Muang Fai is always found in northern Thailand because that is the 
mountainous area.  The topography of northern Thailand is a high mountain range extending 
parallel north/south. There are plains and valleys alternating between these mountain ranges. 
The important mountain ranges are Luang Prabang Mountains, Dan Lao Mountains, Thanon-
Thongchai Mountain range, Khun Tan Mountain Range and Phetchabun Mountains. The 
mountains in the north are the source of four long rivers: the Ping River, Wang River, Yom and 
Nan which flow through the valleys. Both sides of the river shores are fertile areas and suitable 
for cultivation (see the physical map below).10 Traditionally, local people take advantage of 
nature by building a weir to block a river on the slope where the water always flows from high 
                                                                
3 John Lindsay Falvey, 'Sustainable Technologies in Thai agriculture' (2001) (115) ATSE Focus 
4 Sumarttra phulaiyao, ‘Muang Fai’, Prachatai (online) 11 Dec 2014 <http://www.prachatai.com/column-archives/node/2731>  
5 Ibid. 
6 Pornpilai Lertwicha, Supachai Methin, Nonthachai Namdhep, Muang-Fai: The Water Resource and the Human Resource 
Management on the Geographical and Cultural Base (Tarnpanya Press, Chiang Mai, 2009), 44. 
7  Uraiwan Tan-Kimyoung, Muang-Fai Communities Are For People: Institution Strength and Potentials (Chulalongkorn 
University, 1995) 12. 
8 Lertwicha, et al., above n 6, 33-35. 
9 Ibid 18.  
10 Office of Non-Formal and Informal Education (Thailand), Text book for social studies in High school (หนงัสือ เรียนสำระกำรพฒันำ 
สงัคม รำยวิชำสงัคมศึกษำ (สค31001) ระดบัมธัยม ศึกษำ ตอน ปลำย 3-4), (2011) Office of Non-Formal and Informal Education (Thailand)) < 
http://ccs.nfe.go.th/padrew-mediacenter/UserFiles/Pdf/morpai/sara5/sorkor31001.pdf> 
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land to low land.11  Sometimes the weir is constructed at the flood plain alongside a river.12 
Because the construction and the maintenance of weirs and ditches is heavy works and depends 
on intensive labour, water users unify as a community to manage water for their collective 
benefit. Hereafter, the organisation of water users is called the ‘Muang Fai community’.  
In terms of the population, people residing in northern Thailand can be classified into two major 
groups: the ‘Khon Muang’ and the hill tribe people. The ‘Khon Muang’ are a Thai ethnic group 
also called the ‘Lanna people’ or ‘Tai Yuan’ who live in the community or valley between the 
mountains.13 The hill tribe people are those people who stay on the high land. According to the 
Thailand government classification, the hill tribe people consist of nine groups.14 However, the 
economic growth during 1990s along with the good climate in northern Thailand has inspired 
people from other parts of Thailand to migrate to the north, in particular to the Chiang Mai 
valley area. In Thailand, the Muang Fai community is found in association with the water 
management practices of the Lanna people.15  
In terms of the religious and other beliefs of the people, the Lanna people follow Buddhism 
and animism together.16 The Buddhist beliefs of the local people is evidenced by the community 
temple in every village. In contrast, animism can most obviously evidenced during the rituals 
to sacrifice pigs, chickens and cows to the spirit of Muang Fai17 and Phee khun Nam18, which 
occur every May or June.19 The ritual sacrifice of animals is not at all part of the Buddhist belief 
system as Buddhism prohibits the killing of any kind of living thing.20 The ritual to make 
sacrifices to the spirit of Muang Fai and Phee khun Nam can still be seen in present day.21 It is 
                                                                
11 See Krisri Nimmanhemindra, ‘King Manrai’s Irrigation laws’ (1965) 1, Social Science Review 11; Vanpen Surarek, Historical 
Development and Management of Irrigation System in Northern Thailand 80; Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 44. 
12 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 44. 
13 Infomekong, Tai Yuan Geographical distribution, (23 June 2018) infomekong.com <http://www.infomekong.com/peoples/tai-
yuan/> 
14 Central Civil Registration, The Regulation of the Central Civil Registration for Considering the Legal Status of the Hill 
Tribe People B.E. 2543 with commentary (Thailand Central Civil Registration, 2014) 
15 Pornpilai Lertwicha and Aroonrat Wicheankaeo, Villages and Communities of Mae Khan River Basin: Dynamic Economic 
System of 3 River Basins in Thailand Research Project 2000-2002 (Thai Research Fund, 2003); Lertwicha et al., above n 40.,  
16John Lindsay Falvey, Thai Agriculture: Golden Cradle of Millennia (2000), 67,74.  
17 Manee Payomyong, The Tradition for Leang Phee khun Nam (13 November 2015) 
<http://www.artsandculture.mju.ac.th/goverment/20111119104834_artsandculture/File20131022193359_7926.pdf>; 
Dearntemdoung, Phee Khun nam, (16 May 2015) <http://oknation.nationtv.tv/blog/dearntemdoung/2009/10/12/entry-2>.  
18 ‘Phee khun nam’ means the chief of spirits who stays in the river source forest.  Local people believe that Phee khun nam 
protects the river source areas and provides rain to villagers. If the villager sacrifices animals every year correctly, Phee khun 
nam will give them sufficient water for agriculture. Conversely, Phee khun nam will create floods or water shortages if local 
people do not sacrifice animals.  
19 Payomyong, above n 17.  
20 Thich Nhat Hanh,  ‘Five wonderful precepts’ (1990), 1(2) The Mindfulness bell 1, 3. 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55beacc8e4b0c17151842dbc/t/56b913b20442624dd65c3be5/1454969784627/mb02.pdf
>.; Prince Vajirananavarorasa, The Five Precepts: The Buddhist Golden Rule (10 December 2017) 
<http://dharmaflower.net/_collection/5p-princevajira.pdf>. 
21 Good Rices of Thailand, The Ritual to Sacrifice Phee khunnam, (20 December 2016) Good Rices of Thailand 
<https://sites.google.com/site/2845goodrices/phithikrrm-thi-keiywkhxng/phithi-leiyng-phi-khunna>;  Dearntemdoung, Phee 
Khun nam, (16 May 2015) <http://oknation.nationtv.tv/blog/dearntemdoung/2009/10/12/entry-2>; 
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claimed that the ritual sacrifice to the spirit of Muang Fai and Phee khun Nam is a mechanism 
to support morale and encourage local people in their cultivation. It is further a mechanism to 
conserve natural resources, particularly the river’s source, the forest.22 However, it is reported 
that some Muang Fai communities have experienced conflict when farmers have changed their 
beliefs and refused to attend the ritual.23  Such conflict has been resolved by both parties 
agreeing that farmers who change their beliefs must still pay for the expense of the ritual the 
same as other people in the Muang Fai community. It is accepted that they might not attend the 
ritual because it is prohibited by their religion.24  
In terms of the agricultural production in northern Thailand, this varies from area to area and 
season to season. For example, farmers who live in the upper area of the Muang Fai canal grow 
plants differently to farmers who live in the lower area of the Muang Fai canal.25 However, the 
agricultural production of local people has also undergone changes following the introduction 
of the contract farming system last decade.26 Pornpilai reports on the agricultural production 
level of farmers in the Muang Fai community of the Mae Khan river basin in some detail. For 
example, farmers at the lower area of Muang Fai canal can cultivate this land for 4-6 months 
per year. They always grow rice, soy, and garlic to sustain their lives. However, farmers at the 
upper area of the Muang Fai canal can cultivate the land for 7-12 month per year.27 Furthermore, 
these farmers can grow rice, soy, and garlic, corn, onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, 
lettuce and tobacco. It is also reported that some farmers have changed their crops to grow 
longan (fruit) rather than the more traditional crops.28 This causes problems because the Muang 
Fai water management system is designed to deliver water to paddy fields at the same time (see 
further detail on this in sections 2.1.7 , 2.2.4 ). 
 
 
                                                                
NBT Chiangmai, Lumphoon Create the Ritual to Sacrifice Pheekhunnam, YouTube video 9 Jul 2013 < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6sxcIo4nw8>; 
Thai PBS, Community Television: Phee Khun nam, Youtube video 12 September 2016 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILpPRTzdAjQ>; 
Theerapong Kleawkla, Leang Phee Fai @ Mae Ngad Somboon Shool, Youtube video 19 June 2014 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Zg-Mqecx8o>; 
Thai PBS, Growing on Mothers Day and Harvesting on Fathers Day, Youtube video  2 November 2016 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSe9of1NgdA>. 
22   The Ritual to Sacrifice Phee Khun nam (Phee Fai), (10 January 2016) <http://province.m-
culture.go.th/lamphun/office/pdf8.pdf>. 
23 Pornpilai Lertwicha and Aroonrat Wicheankaeo, above n 15, 126-128. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 156. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 158. 
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Figure 1 Map of Thailand 
Source: This map is available from http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/thailand/map.html  
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Normally, two types of weirs are constructed by the Muang Fai system: a natural material weir 
and a cement weir 29. In the case of the natural material weir, water users make it using natural 
materials such as rock, bamboo, teak or wood from the local area. Sometimes, water users will 
make bamboo baskets and put rocks in the baskets. Then, they then put the bamboo baskets in 
the river to block the water. In the case of the cement weirs, theyhave all been made by the 
government to replace the natural material weirs. The cement weir is stronger than the natural 
material weir, but it causes many problems. Importantly, it erodes the solidarity among water 
users in the Muang Fai community and interferes with its role. It shifts the role of Muang Fai 
from  making decisions indepdently to an organisation whose only duty is to follow the 
command of the government30 (see the problems of Muang Fai 2.2.4).     
 2.1.1 Rules of Muang Fai 
To promote understanding of how Muang Fai can support sustainable development, the rules 
of Muang Fai are examined below. This thesis argues that rules embedded into Muang Fai 
customary law are compatible with the principles in the Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development.31 These principles manage water regimes according to integrated 
water resource principles with an emphasis on public participation and treating water as a 
commodity.32 The rules of Muang Fai customary law can be classified into two groups: those 
that deal with Muang Fai establishment and management; and those that deal with water 
management. The first group of rules covers the establishment of the Muang Fai community, 
management of the Muang Fai community, labour recruitment and obtaining the material for 
repairing the Muang Fai water system. The second group of rules covers the issues relating to 
water sharing, land use restrictions and dispute settlement. 
The establishment and processes of the Muang Fai community is represented in the figure 
below:   
                                                                
29 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 48-52.  
30 Amporn Chai-Yo, Development of Local-irrigation Organization in Mae Wang Watershed (Master of Education (Non-formal 
education) Thesis, University of Chiang Mai University, 2002). 
31 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development is the result of the International Conference on Water and 
Environment in 1992. It consists of four main guiding principles of water management: 1) water resource should be managed 
in the integrated water resource management approach (IWRM); 2) water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach; 3) women should be included in all water related activities; and 4) water should be recognised as an 
economic good. See, The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference 
on Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January 1992). 
32 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January, 1992), Principle 1, 2,3,4   
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Figure 2 The process of the Muang Fai water management system 
Traditionally, all rules embedded into Muang Fai customary law are the result of verbal 
agreement among all water users in a Muang Fai community. This verbal contract is referred 
to as ‘Sanya-Muang Fai’ [Sanya in Thai language means a contract).33 In present day however, 
the Sanya-Muang Fai has become a written contract.34 The details of the Sanya-Muang Fai in 
each Muang Fai community might differ from area to area. This is because of the differences 
of geography, the supply and quantity of water in each year, the number of water users, the 
water demands and the plant species using the water. In other words, resource availability, 
demand, and the environment are all taken into consideration.  
A. Muang Fai community establishment  
The Muang-Fai process begins with a meeting by the local people who want to use the water 
from the river. Then, they form the ‘Sanya Muang-Fai’ [water management contract) and elect 
                                                                
33 National Electronic and Technology Centre, contract (3) - N – ข้อตกลง (23 June2018) Thai English Electronic Dictionary 
<http://lexitron.nectec.or.th/2009_1/index.php?q=lookup/form/submit>. 
34 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 96-97.   
Farmer meeting
•Elect Water Manager (Gae Muang) and assistants
•Make a water management contract [Sanya Muang Fai] to:
• share the cost of the construction
• locate the water source area and the construction areas
• allocate the water
• share the duties among water users [farmers]
Constructing 
and operating
•Constructing Muang Fai
•Water allocation
•Water mornitoring & conflict management
•Organise a meeting annually to sacrifice the ghosts, protecting water and river source areas 
(May-June)
Maintenance & 
Miscellaneous
•Organize a meeting annually to maintain, to repair channels, weirs and dikes
•Maintain  Muang Fai structure
•Organise a meeting occasionally to accept new water users, accept new water allocation plans 
during drought,  and to repair weirs, dikes and canals after emergency floods.
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the ‘Gae Muang’ [Water Manager) and Muang Fai staff. Following this, all water users [members 
of Muang-Fai community) construct weirs or diversion dams to block the waterway in the upper 
part and dig irrigation channels, known among the northern people as ‘Muang’ or ‘Lum-Muang’, 
to direct the water to the lower plains. When the weirs and canals are constructed, water users 
manage and maintain them according to the rules provided in the water management contract. 
The contents of the water management contract comprise: 
1) The provision to set the annual work calendar of the Muang-Fai community 
2) The agreement of all water users to work on dredging and repairing the Muang-Fai 
irrigation system 
3) The provision of exemptions for water users who are ill and unable to join in dredging 
and repairing the Muang-Fai irrigation system 
4) The fine amounts for water users who do not work (dredging and repairing the Muang-
Fai irrigation system) as scheduled and for the irrigation administrators who do not fulfil 
their duties 
5) The fine amounts for water users who steals water or cause damages to the weirs or small 
canals 
6) The fine amounts for the equipment that water users fail to provide to maintain irrigation 
system, such as repairing weirs or dredging weirs 
7) The fine amounts for abstention from meetings 
8) The fine amounts for water users who did not bring food on working days  
9) The provision to establish the method for dredging the canal from the upper weirs to the 
lower weirs.35 36 
After concluding the ‘Sanya Muang-Fai’ and constructing weirs and ditches, water users in the 
Muang-Fai community utilise the water. In addition, administrators (Gae Muang, Gae Muang’s 
assistant, the Treasury Committee and the water messenger) in the Muang-Fai community carry 
out their duties. When the weirs and ditches need to be repaired, water users join together with 
their own the materials and equipment to repair the weirs and to dredge the ditches (Lam 
Muang). In fact, the date for maintenance and repairing is set clearly in the annual work calendar 
                                                                
35 Vanpen Surarerks, ‘Muang Fai Communities in Northern Thailand: People’s Experiences and Wisdom in Irrigation 
Management’(2006) 1 Journal of Development in Sustainable Agriculture, 44, 46 . 
36In fact, the provision of Sanya Muang-Fai had been ever recognised in Mangraisatra Code Law of ancient Lanna Kingdom 
and it obligates all people inside and outside the Muang Fai communities to follow it.  However, the Sanya Muang-Fai is not 
recognised in present day law. Then, the legal status of Sanya Muang-Fai is compulsory only to the people in communities who 
use water from the Muang-Fai system.    
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of the Muang Fai community. The materials, equipment and labour of water users are used 
instead of a water fee for using the water. Sometimes, water users need to pay a fine if they 
cannot participate in the construction or the maintenance of weirs and ditches. In addition, to 
express gratitude to the administrators who devote themselves to managing the Muang-Fai’s 
irrigation system, all water users give an exemption to the administrators as remuneration by 
allowing them to use water without paying the water fee or contributing materials or equipment 
to the maintenance of weirs and ditches according to the provisions in the Sanya Muang-Fai.37 
 
2.1.2. Management system of Muang Fai  
To understand the management of Muang Fai clearly, the roles of Muang Fai community 
members must be understood.  Generally, people in each Muang Fai community can be 
classified into five groups as follows. 
A. Gae Muang or Gae Fai: Water Manager 
A Water Manager, directly elected by water users, has duty to ensure all water users in the 
community maintain and repair weirs and ditches. He also has to enforce the provisions in the 
water management contract by inspecting the performance of water users. If there is a violation 
of the contract, the Water Manager must investigate the issue and issue a fine to the violator. 
In addition, the Water Manager has a duty to investigate and settle any water conflicts between 
water users. Lastly, the Water Manager has a duty to take notes or minutes of meetings and 
store the meeting minutes. 
The term of a Water Manager is two to four years. The former Water Manager can be re-elected 
by water users. Sometimes, a downstream water user who has leadership experience and knows 
a great deal about Muang Fai management is elected as Water Manager. Ratthapon explains the 
reasons for electing the downstream water user to be Water Manager38,  
...The downstream water users are always affected by the over 
exploitation of the upstream water users and he always needs to 
investigate the water stolen by the upstream water users. Electing the 
downstream water user to be the Water Manager is a good strategy to 
balance the benefit between the upstream water users and the 
downstream water users…39  
                                                                
37 Surarerks, above n 35, 44, 48. 
38 Ratthapon Tuntianupong, Participatory Weir Management in Mae San Watershade, Muang District Lamphun Province 
(Master of Sceince [Agriculture] Agriculture Exension Thesis, University of Chiang Mai University, 2009) 14.  
39 Ibid 14. 
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B. Gae Muang or Gae Fai’s assistant: Water Manager assistant 
Assistant Water Managers help the Water Manager to regulate water users in the Muang-Fai 
community as well as to provide the Water Manager with advice.40 The number of Water 
Manager assistants depends on the number of ditches in the Muang-Fai system. Sometimes, in 
a large scale Muang-Fai system, there are 10 assistants such as in the Soprong village in the 
western part of the Chiang Mai city.41 
C. The Treasury Committee 
The Treasury Committee manages the budget for the Muang-Fai community. It collects, records 
and stores the water fees as well as the payments of fines collected by the Water Manager from 
water users who violate the water management contract.   
D. Lam Nam, Lam Muang, Lam Fai: Water Messengers 
Water messengers are those people who transfer information about the Muang-Fai irrigation 
system requirements. This information typically includes the dates for repairing the weirs and 
for dredging ditches, the equipment and materials water users need to fix weirs and ditches, 
and the meeting dates for the people in the Muang-Fai community.  The number of water 
messengers in one Muang-Fai irrigation system depends on the number of villages involved in 
the system. In fact, there is a water messenger in every village who takes part in the Muang-Fai 
irrigation system.      
E. Water User  
Muang-Fai community water users provide the majority of labour to dredge ditches and repair 
and maintain the Muang-Fai irrigation system. Moreover, water users create water utilisation 
rules in the water management contract and agree to be bound by the water management 
contract.42 
It should be observed here that the number of water administrators in each Muang Fai 
community is different according to the size of the Muang Fai irrigation system.43 In the case 
of a Muang Fai irrigation system, which is shared by only one village, there might be only five 
to seven administrators and water users. In a big Muang Fai irrigation system, shared by many 
                                                                
40 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 67. 
41 Ounvichit, Tassanee and others, ‘Participatory Management Structure of Large Scale People’s Irrigation System: The case 
of the soprong Muang Fai System, Northern Thailand’ (2008) 46 Southeast Asian Studies, 148. 
42 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 69. 
43  See the organisation chart of a big Muang Fai community in Patcharee Arthan, The Adaptation of Local Irrigation 
Organizations to Public Intervention: A Case Study of Muang Fai Management of upper Mae ping Watersheds (Master of Art 
[Social Development Thesis, University of Chiang Mai University, 1995) 226. 
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villages, each village might have its own administrators and there is a supreme Water Manager 
to manage the entire Muang Fai irrigation system.44  
F. Roles of male and female water users in Muang Fai customary law 
Traditionally, male water users do most of the work in the Muang Fai community, particularly 
relating to dredging and the construction of a weir in a river or a canal. However, present day 
labour shortages has led to the recruitment of female laborers as well as the use of tractors in 
the construction or maintenance of a weir and ditches.45 There is evidence that one water 
messenger in Fai Muang Luang, in Chiang Mai province, is a woman.46 This fact demonstrates 
the support of Muang Fai customary law for the third principle of the Dublin Statement on 
Water and Sustainable Development and the third principle of the IWRM.47, 48 
G. Labour recruitment, labour management and material recruitment system in Muang 
Fai customary law  
The activities performed in a Muang Fai system (i.e., the construction and maintenance of a 
weir in the river and the maintenance of ditches) are very difficult and depend on intensive 
labour. The Muang Fai customary laws therefore have clear rules around the recruitment of 
labour. The principle of labour recruitment in Muang Fai customary law is that the more land 
you own and the more water you use, the more you need to work for the Muang Fai 
community49. There are two criteria for labour recruitment: the quantity of water each water 
user receives from the Muang Fai community; and the amount of the land owned by each water 
user.  The quantity of water used is calculated according to the size of the hole at the water gate 
of each water user. Normally, the size is calculated in the local unit of length, called a ‘Thang’. 
                                                                
44See the example organization chart of Muang Fai in Vanpen Surarerks, Historical Development and Management of 
irrigation system in Northern Thailand, (Dept. of Geography, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, 1986.)  177-
182.  56 177-182.   
45Saowapak Surawong, Environment Change and Muang-Fai Management by Communities in Tambon Saikaow and Tambon 
Thanthong, Amphoe Phan, Changwat Chiang Rai, (Master of Arts [Man and Environment Management) Thesis,  University of 
Chiang Mai University, 2000) 44.  
46 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 115.  
47 Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) means ‘a process which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise economic and social welfare in an equitable manner 
without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’. IWRM was influenced by Dublin principles. It consists of five 
principles as follows: 1) water should be managed in the basin or at catchment area level (hydrographical approach); 2) water 
development and management should be based on a participatory approach applying a decentralisation strategy; 3) water 
management needs to include women’s participation; 4) water should be managed as an economic good to ensure effectiveness; 
5) IWRM needs to include equitable, efficient management and sustainable use of water. (See Olli Varis, Muhammad Mizanur 
Rahaman and Virrpi Stucki, Integrated Water Resources Management Plans: The Key to Sustainability? (2008) 174 
<http://www.water.tkk.fi/English/wr/research/global/myth/14_Varis&al_Myths-of-Mekong.pdf>; Global Water Partnership, 
What is IWRM  (2015) <http://www.gwp.org/en/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM/IWRM-Principles/>.  
48 From the field observation, the author found that the woman cannot be a Water Manager. This is because Thai custom 
prohibits women from socialising with men who are not their relative. The Water Manager along with the Water Manager 
assistant needs to check the water daily. Thus, the woman cannot be the Water Manager. However, Muang Fai customary law 
permits woman to repair Muang Fai structures when a man is not available.  
49 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 92. 
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One thang is around four inches long.50 For example, people who receive one thang of water 
need to send one person in their family to contribute to the work of the Muang Fai community. 
Water users who receive two thangs of water need to send two people from their family to work 
for Muang Fai. Moreover, each water user needs to provide the tools and materials for the 
construction and repair of weirs and ditches. The administrator will also use the amount of land 
owned to calculate the length of ditches required by each water user to dredge. For example, a 
water user who has one hectare of land need to dredge 10 metres of ditch. If a water user has 
three hectares of land, he must dredge the ditch for 30 metres length.  
The definition of Muang Fai indicated that Muang Fai customary law is not only a water 
management system, but also a social management system (labour control system) and an 
organisational management system. Traditionally, each water user is classified into a group 
according to the location of their land and the weir which distributes water to their paddy field. 
Hence, water users in the same village might be members of different groups because their 
paddy fields are located in different areas. Each group is called a ‘Muad’ and has a duty to 
maintain the weir and dredging ditches in their Muang Fai community. The Water Manager 
will arrange balanced groups by combining water users who own large amounts of land and 
water users who have a small amount of land in each group. This is to balance the workload of 
each group. Thus, this process of Muang Fai demonstrates the principles of equity and social 
justice, which are important dimensions of sustainable development.     
2.1.3 Muang Fai community’s water management system 
The rules of water management in a Muang Fai community can be categorised into two types: 
water sharing among water users in the same Muang Fai community; and water sharing among 
Muang Fai communities in the same river. Naturally, the quantity of natural water supply each 
year is not the same and correspondingly the water demands of each water user might increase 
or decrease. Therefore, a water meeting to negotiate the water sharing arrangement is held 
annually after the ritual sacrifice to allow all water users need to attend the meeting. 
Traditionally, farmers will grow rice and other crops during the rainy season. The water 
allocation rules of the Muang Fai community are applied when there is not sufficient water for 
agriculture. However, changes in the system from the self-sufficient economy system to the 
market-based economy system, which emphasises rice cultivation, causes water shortages 
during the summer.51  The details of water allocation are explained in sections A and B below. 
                                                                
50 Ibid 102. 
 
51 Arthan, above n 43, 63. 
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A. Water sharing among water users in the Muang Fai community 
Currently, there are two methods to allocate water for to users: i) water allocation based upon 
calculating the amount of land owned by each water user; and ii) water allocation based upon 
calculating the demands of each water user.   
Normally, water sharing based on calculation of land ownership is decided at a general meeting 
of the Muang Fai community. The decision is made by providing the exact quantity of water 
for an exact amount of land. There are also rules about upper amounts of water that can be used; 
for example, no one user can exceed 150 cubic metres each year. All water users might agree 
that any water users who have one hectare of land, will receive 50 cubic metres of water. 
Therefore, any water users who have two hectares of land might receive 100 cubic metres of 
water. However, any water users who have more than three acres of land can gain a maximum 
of only one hundred fifty Cubic metres of water per year.52 The Muang Fai customary laws 
endorses equitable water sharing and limiting natural resources through water allocation. Thus, 
all water users can access the water subject to the natural limitations.    
In the case of a small Muang Fai community, there are usually a small number of water users. 
Therefore, the Water Manager can allocate water according to the demands of each water user 
as long as their collective consumption remains under the water supply limit in that year.53 
Amporn indicates that the amount of land of each water user and the number of water users are 
not the only factors being considered in water allocations. The type of soil is also a factor.54  For 
example, a clay paddy field will receive less water than a loose soil paddy field. This is because 
clay is more effective for holding water over longer time periods than loose soil. Furthermore, 
allocating an equal amount of water to a clay paddy field as to a loose soil paddy field could 
damage the rice due to over watering. 
In terms of water allocation, the Water Manager makes a water gate for each water user with a 
small square piece of log. The wooden water gate is placed in the ditch close to their paddy 
fields. The water gate board has a hole in the centre to regulate the quantity of water.55 The size 
of the hole is calculated from the quantity of water each water user is designated to receive 
from the Muang Fai system. To determine whether each water user receives the correct amount 
of water, the Water Manager measures the water level in each paddy field with a measuring 
stick.56    
   
                                                                
52 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 75. 
53 Ibid 75. 
54 Chai-Yo, above n 30, 61. 
55 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 75,102.   
56 Ibid 78. 
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B. Water sharing among Muang Fai communities in the same river  
Each Muang Fai community is always located on both sides of the river bank. Sometimes, there 
are many Muang Fai communities on the same river and in such cases it is necessary to have a 
custom for the allocation of water among each Muang Fai community. The allocation process 
starts with a meeting between the Water Managers of each Muang Fai community. They make 
decisions about the time needed to close the water gates on the river of each Muang Fai 
community to allow the downstream Muang Fai community the opportunity to divert water for 
use. Initially, they allow the downstream Muang Fai community to divert water based on an 
exact number of days. Then, they allow the upstream Muang Fai community to divert water 
from the river for an exact number of days.  This method is called ‘Lang- Num’.57 58 
Notably, the water allocation in Muang Fai customary law reflects clearly the concept of intra-
generational equality. The Muang Fai water management system allows all water users to 
access water equitably. This thesis argues that the Muang Fai water management systems 
reflects inter-generational equity as well because Muang Fai customary law emphasises the 
management of water under natural limitations without distorting the natural conditions. 
Therefore, the next generation still benefits from the water in the river.    
2.1.4 Land use restrictions in the Muang Fai community 
The rules of Muang Fai are not only rules for water management, but also for the regulation of 
land use around the Muang Fai community. All water users need to follow the land use 
restrictions.    
The three areas governed by Muang-Fai land use restrictions are: i) an area close to the spirit 
house of Pee Fai; ii) the forest that serves as the river’s source; and iii) the area alongside the 
ditches in the Muang Fai community.    
A. The area closes to spirit house and the river source forest 
There is no obvious evidence to indicate whether the ancient people realised the importance of 
the river source and forest to water supply. However, they had the foresight to create rules to 
regulate land use around the Muang Fai community and at the river’s source through the taboo 
and spirit system (Phee: ผี). In a Muang Fai Community, all people are prohibited from cutting 
trees in the area close to the spirit house of Pee Fai [the angel or spirit who protects the Muang 
                                                                
57 Ibid 80-85. 
58It should be observed here that the water sharing method among Muang Fai communities on the ‘Lang Nam river is similar 
to the water allocating method of the people in Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir State, India) and the Bedouin people which 
emphasise allocating time not quantity.  Please see Ganesh Pangare, Vasudha Pangare, Binayak Das, Springs of Life: India’s 
Water Resources, (Academic Foundation, 2006) 156; Andreas Rüther, In the Lap of the Mountains - Irrigation Systems of 
Ladakh's Farming Communities (3 February 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mhmf1FO4bM8>; and Aaron T. Wolf, 
Indigenous Approaches to Water Conflict Negotiations and Implications for International Waters, International Negotiation: 
A Journal of Theory and Practice, 5(2), (2000).  
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Fai). In fact, the sacrificial ritual to Pee Fai is held annually before maintenance begins on the 
Muang-Fai system. The ritual is called ‘Leang Phee Fai’.59  
There are also the same rules and rituals at the forest source of the river called ‘Leang Phee 
Khun Nam’60 or Pee Muang.61 Ritual sacrifice to the spirits who guard over the forest at the 
river’s source is ancient wisdom that aims to preserve the forest for sustainable water 
management.62 There is no sacrificial ritual to Pee Khun Nam in Muang Fai communities on 
the middle and lower parts of the river. 
B. The areas alongside the canal  
According to rules of Muang Fai, the areas alongside the canals are communal property and 
land-owners cannot use them for cultivation.63 However, the People Irrigation Act (PIA) of 1939 
provides that areas not exceeding five metres wide on both banks of a canal are to be set aside 
for disposing of the soil and mud dredged from the ditch.64 This causes problems to the Muang 
Fai communities in present day (see legal problem of PIA 4.3.3).  
2.1.5 Dispute settlement in the Muang Fai community 
 
According to the Muang Fai customary law, any water dispute is to be settled by the Water 
Manager and Water Manager assistants. Pornpilai indicates that disputes among water users 
always occur during the summer when the level of water in the river is lowest. Most disputes 
are about stolen water.65 The dispute settlement procedure always starts with an investigation 
by the Water Manager and his assistants. They check the water level in each paddy field using 
the water measurement stick, and check to see if the field has the correct level of water 
according to its allocation. If it is discovered that the water user has stolen water from the 
Muang Fai irrigation, the Water Managers will punish the violator.66 
Warnings, fines and halted water use are the sanctions imposed on those who steal water. 
Warnings are always issued in the first case of stolen water and fines are applied for the second 
and subsequent instances of stolen water. The fine will increase for repeated offences. The 
maximum sanction is to prohibit water use from the Muang Fai system.67  
                                                                
59 Trakoon Chamnan, Application of Buddhist Approach in Water Resource Management of Muang Fai Organization in 
Maevang Community, Chiang Mai Province (Master of Art [Social development) Thesis,  Chiang Mai University, Thailand, 
2008), 90-93. 
60Nikom Phommathep, Pee Khun Nam Muang Lanna (23 June 2018) Gotoknow < https://www.gotoknow.org/posts/140407 >.  
61 Puchong Mahawongsanan, Spirit Cult and Natural Resource Conservation in Ban Hae Tai Lue Community, Master of Arts 
(Man and Environment Management) Thesis, Chiang Mai University, 2008) 45. 
62 Ibid 45. 
63 Lertwicha et al., above n 6,144. 
64 People Irrigation Act B.E. 2482, (Thailand) Sec. 19. 
65 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 78. 
66 Ibid 78. 
67 Ibid 78. 
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The dispute settlement process in the Muang Fai community reflects the principles of public 
participation by showing that all water users can access justice without going to Court. This 
saves water users money and provides greater access to justice.68 Furthermore, this dispute 
settlement process also reflects the Common Pool of Resources theory as explained by 
Ostrom.69 
2.1.6 The benefits of Muang-Fai  
The Muang-Fai irrigation systems includes economic, environmental and social benefits as 
explained below:  
A. Economic benefits 
The Muang Fai system has many economic benefits. Muang-Fai customary laws apply 
economic tools to ensure the water is used effectively by collecting fees from water users and 
treating water as an economic good. In terms of the cost of construction and maintenance, the 
construction costs for the cement weirs and ditches is more expensive than the construction 
costs of weirs and ditches using natural materials.  Moreover, the construction costs  for the 
concrete weirs and ditches are paid by the government; whereas all costs for a  traditional weir 
and ditches are paid for by all water users in the Muang Fai community.70 It could be argued 
that leaving the construction of weirs and ditches to the Muang Fai community allows the 
government to direct more funds to other purposes and that local agricultural production would 
continue.  
In terms of construction, Muang-Fai systems can be built on a large or a small scale by local 
people using their own technology. Thus, there is no cost related to the use of hi-end technology. 
Muang Fai is arguably an example of appropriate technology as defined by Fritz Schumacher71 
because the irrigation systems uses cheap, traditional knowledge and technology, to which all 
local people have access (see further discussion in the limitations of Muang Fai). 
Muang Fai customary law has the capacity to save both the government and the people money. 
The government can benefit from forests in the upper river regions being protected areas 
without paying for their establishment and local people can manage and care for the protected 
areas under government regulation. In addition, traditional dispute settlement processes in the 
Muang Fai system cuts the cost of official dispute settlement processes.72  
                                                                
68 Minneh Kane, J. Oloka Onyango and Abdul Tejan Cole, ‘Reassessing Customary Law Systems as a Vehicle for Providing 
Equitable Access to Justice for the Poor’ (Paper presented at New Frontiers of Social Policy, Arusha International Conference 
Centre 12-15 December 2005), 6-7.  
69Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 
1990)100. 
70  Jaruwan Kaewmahanin, A Comparative Study on Efficiency of Public and Community-Based Irrigation Systems for 
Agriculture: A Case Study of Mae Ngud and Fai Mae Ping Irrigation Systems, Amphoe Mae Taeng, Changwat Chiang Mai 
(Master of Science [Resource Management] Thesis, Kasetsart University, 2000) 74. 
71 Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 130. 
72 Kane et al., above n 68, 6-7. 
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Jaruwan found that the cost of rice production using the Muang Fai irrigation system is lower 
than the cost of rice production using the public irrigation system.73 With good management, 
Muang Fai farmers can grow rice twice a year; whereas, areas using public irrigation systems 
lack water for planting during some periods of the year.74 Moreover, the government-built 
cement weirs and ditches can distribute water only to water users who have land close to the 
irrigation canal. In the Muang Fai system however, all water users in the community can access 
the water equitably with specific regard to the size of their land. Frequently, there are water 
conflicts between the upstream and downstream water users reliant on the public irrigation 
system. This is because the upstream water users in public irrigation systems have better access 
to water than the downstream water users.75 Recent research in 2008 indicated that some water 
users in public irrigation systems, particularly downstream water users, quit using the public 
irrigation system and restored the Muang Fai irrigation system to support their farming76 
because they could not access water equitably from the public irrigation system. 
Finally, Muang Fai customary law provides additional income to people and local communities 
through the development of agro-tourism in places connected to Muang Fai areas.77 The forests 
at the river sources as well as the areas alongside the ditches provide income to local people 
when preserved because the forest provides villagers with natural products such as mushrooms 
and local vegetables for eating or selling at the local market. In this way, Muang Fai areas act 
as a food basket and income resource for villagers, support food security in the community and 
strengthen the local economy. Notably, farmers in northern Thailand place considerable 
emphasis on poly-culture, growing many kinds of plants in one paddy field. They grow not only 
rice, but soybeans, onions, herbs, vegetables and tobacco.78 They do this by arranging their land 
in small sections, each growing a particular kind of plant. Even though private companies 
support monocultures and contract cultivation, many farmers in Thailand still apply traditional 
cultivation techniques. The Muang Fai customary and traditional cultivation systems of 
northern Thailand support the well-being of people in economic terms. 
Muang-Fai supports not only the quality of life, income and equity of access to water for both 
present and future generations. Because Muang-Fai customary laws preserve the forest that is 
the water source, this guarantees that the next generation can benefit from the natural resources 
as well as remain the primary managers of the water resource system. 
                                                                
73 Kaewmahanin, above n 70, 75. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 74. 
76 Lertwicha et al., above n 6,39, 159. 
77 Worapol Wattanalaungarun, Agro-Tourism in Weir System of Local Wisdom: Case Study of Hauy E-Khang Village, Mae Win 
Sub district, Chiang Mai Province (Master of Tourism Industry Management Thesis, Chiang Mai University, 2001) 76. 
78 Pornpilai Lertwicha and Aroonrat Wicheankaeo, above n 15, 156-165. 
63 
 
B. Environmental benefits 
The land use regimes in Muang Fai customary laws directly support environmental 
conservation in at least two ways. Firstly, the forest is conserved by local villagers who provide 
a protected area for plants and wild animals to conserve biodiversity. The areas alongside the 
major ditches in a Muang Fai community also provide a protected area for biodiversity since 
they have restricted use. Secondly, the soil around weirs can absorb water, especially where the 
weir and barrages are made from natural materials (dry wood, stones, soil, sand, mud and straw). 
Consequently, plants and vegetables grow well in these areas. Hence, the Muang-Fai system 
not only provides water for irrigation, but also provides a good environment for aquatic animals 
and nourishes the surrounding plants and forests. Weirs made from cement do not allow water 
to absorb into the soil around them.79 Furthermore, the Muang-Fai customary laws support 
utilisation of limited water resources without disturbing the natural environment. This is largely 
because Muang-Fai manages and distributes only natural surface water without the need to 
construct dams to store water and without the deforestation that comes with the construction 
of dams.  
Muang Fai customary law is traditional knowledge similar to other customary natural resource 
management regimes. It supports the precautionary principle when science has no exact 
answer.80 Muang Fai communities can predict how the new development projects can avoid 
flooding and the blocking flood ways because local people have strong knowledge of 
traditional flood ways. Further research regarding how Muang Fai traditional knowledge can 
support the precautionary principle in Thailand should be done. Research of Muang Fai 
traditional knowledge may also be useful to address climate change. 
In addition, the ritual of water users paying tribute to the angel or spirit that protects the forest 
and Muang-Fai system is used to encourage people to conserve the forest in the drainage basin 
as tihs is the water source.81 Thus, the Muang-Fai system conserves and preserves the ecology 
of the drainage basin and demonstrates respect for limited water resources. Lastly, producing 
local food from the forest at the river’s source can decrease the local carbon footprint by cutting 
the costs of food transportation to remote areas. 
C. Social benefits 
In term of social benefits, Muang-Fai promotes the participation of people in the community. It 
involves people in decision making to manage water resources to meet their needs effectively. 
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It also strengthens the community. Public participation in Muang-Fai comprises of five stages. 
Firstly, in developing the water management contract, all water users are involved in 
negotiating the issues covered by the contract. Secondly, during the annual meeting, all water 
users are again involved in decision-making when new issues arise such as the inclusion of new 
water users. However, there is no annual meeting when there are no new issues. In large-scale 
Muang-Fai systems, which have many weirs, ditches and water users, each Water Manager 
assistant arranges a meeting for water users in the same ditches to receive their input before 
meeting with the Water Manager.82 Thirdly, information transfer processes provide contact 
between water users and water messengers. This stage supports access to information for all 
water users. Fourthly, water users need to work together in construction and maintenance tasks, 
providing opportunities to exchange opinions and information about Muang-Fai. Finally, at the 
ritual sacrifice ceremony water users have the opportunity to meet annually to exchange 
opinions and information about Muang-Fai.   
The rules about public participation in Muang Fai customary laws strengthen relationships 
between people in the Muang-Fai community. It also strengthens relationships between upper 
and lower Muang Fai communities on the same river. This is because they need to meet to 
negotiate water allocation annually and to work together to maintain the weirs and canals. 
Furthermore, the upper riparian people may stop using water to let it flow to the lower riparian 
communities for a few days to help with their recovery from drought.83 Neef, Elstner and Schad 
point out that villagers in Muang Fai and neighbouring communities help villagers who lose 
their homes in flood. This shows the strong unity of Muang Fai communities.84   
The water allocation rules of Muang Fai customary law are also an effective mechanism to 
manage conflict among water users within a Muang-Fai community and between water users 
in upper and lower riparian Muang-Fai communities. Firstly, according to Muang-Fai tradition, 
the Water Manager allocates water to each water user when conflicts arise among water users 
in the same community.85  Secondly, traditional laws ensure the sharing of water to the lower 
riparian Muang-Fai communities by stopping water utilisation by upper riparian Muang-Fai 
communities for two or three days. This means that upper riparian Muang-Fai communities 
cannot monopolise the water in the river. Therefore, conflicts between water users in upper 
riparian and lower riparian Muang-Fai communities can be avoided.86 
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Additionally, people can access settlement processes for water disputes more readily because 
they need not waste money and time in Court. They can notify their case to a Water Manager 
and settle the dispute via traditional processes quickly and amicably. 
 
2.1.7 The limitations of the Muang Fai system 
 
The three main limitations of the Muang Fai system are as follows: 
1) Muang-Fai focuses on surface rather than underground water management and is concerned 
only with the quantity of water rather than the quality of water. Muang-Fai water management 
was developed in ancient times when water quality was not an issue. Moreover, there was 
sufficient water to supply all water demands given the smaller population at the time.  Thus, 
Muang-Fai needs to increasingly combine current knowledge of sustainable water resource 
management, particularly water quality management, and other ecosystem dimensions such 
climate change mitigation, and use these factors to inform the decision making process. 
2) Muang Fai systems are not durable in floods. This is particularly the case for Muang Fai made 
from natural materials. Furthermore, natural material weirs and ditches have problems coping 
with the build-up of sediment.87 Hence, water users need to clean, dredge and maintain them 
annually.   
3) A Muang Fai system can only distribute water to plants that require water simultaneously.88 
Water users who grow rice in Muang Fai communities cannot access water if they are 
surrounded by other water users who grow longan (fruit). This limitation of Muang Fai was 
noted by Pornpilai in 2009.89      
4) Muang Fai system depends on the people who believe in the same animism and work together 
to build and maintain the Muang Fai’s structure such as weirs, water gates and dikes after the 
ritual to sacrifice the spirit. Moreover, Muang Fai system also creates social relations among 
people who use water from the same dike under the ‘Muad’ system as mentioned above. 
Therefore, Muang Fai system will face problems when some water users of Muang Fai system 
or Muad system convert to other religious practices. The result is they may be denied the right 
to participate in the traditional ritual to sacrifice the spirit or other activities of Muang Fai 
system. Furthermore, it is reported that the social relation under Muad system and Muang Fai 
system is too exclusive in that it denies the acceptance of outsiders who want to be the new 
members of Muang Fai system, Muang Fai. This is because the outsiders do not believe in the 
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animism and it might lead to the conflict between water users in Muang Fai system and the 
newcomer.  Furthermore, the external farmers who want to be a water user in the Muang Fai 
system might not grow plants of the same species of water users in Muang Fai system, 
Therefore, it might cause problems relating to water delivery in Muang Fai system. 
2.2 Muang Fai irrigation system in Past and Present Thailand  
Muang Fai customary law has been applied in northern Thailand for over 700 years and is still 
applied now. Hence, it is necessary to examine why Muang Fai has survived such an extended 
period and how the lessons from the past can support the survival of Muang Fai in the present. 
This section presents an overview of the life of Muang Fai. It then presents the past Lanna 
society and roles of Muang Fai customary law through the lenses of social structure, 
administration and laws. Finally, it reveals the present day Muang Fai.   
2.2.1 Overview of the existence of the Muang Fai system 
 
The existence of Muang Fai can be divided into five periods according to the schedule below:  
 
Figure 3 Timeline: Muang Fai – from origin to present day 
 
The Muang Fai system first appeared in the historical documents of the Lanna Kingdom such 
as Tamnān mư̄ang Suwan Khōm Kham, and Tamnan Singhanawatikuman. Both documents are 
more than 1,000 years old.90 However, there is no evidence to indicate the legal status of the 
Muang Fai water management regime. 
Muang Fai was recognised in Mangraisatra ancient code law as written law and applied from 
1296-1892. Mangraisatra was abolished after the annexation of Lanna Kingdom to the northern 
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provinces of Thailand. However, local people still applied and followed the Muang Fai water 
management system as a customary law.   
Muang Fai customary law was recognised again by the Act to Regulate Canals, Weirs and 
Dikes 1934 (ARCWD 1934),91 and the People Irrigation Act 1939 (PIA 1939), respectively. The 
People Irrigation Act was abolished on 31 January 2015.92 The legal status of the Muang Fai 
water management system and Muang Fai customary laws is now unclear.     
Based on the Muang Fai time line, it is clearly evident that the norms of Muang Fai have passed 
the period when Muang Fai was recognised by both customary law and written law. This leads 
to question of how past recognition by law impacted Muang Fai customary law. The next 
section examines how Muang Fai survived to become a sustainable customary law for over 700 
years by considering the social structures, past administration and legal system. 
2.2.2 Muang Fai in the ancient Lanna Kingdom. 
Muang Fai norms appeared in the Lanna Kingdom in two forms: 1) as a norm without a clear 
legal status; and 2) as a customary law or written law. This thesis focuses on Muang Fai 
customary law since Muang Fai was recognised by the Mangraisatra in 1296. This is to explore 
how the social structures, administration and ancient laws acted to support Muang Fai norms 
to survive for a long time as a sustainable customary law. 
A. The past structures and administration of ancient Thai Lanna’s society and the role of 
the Muang-Fai system 
 
The Muang-Fai system first appeared in Lanna, the ancient independent kingdom in northern 
Thailand. Later, Lanna became the tributary state of Myanmar. In 1775, Siam took Lanna from 
Myanmar and broke it into several tributary kingdoms. Siam governed Lanna in the form of 
these tributary kingdoms and allowed them to have their own kings and legal system before 
being reorganised as a nation state in the nineteenth century.93 Muang Fai customary law has 
been used for more than 700 years in  Lanna territory. Lanna traditions have been labelled as 
‘hydraulic despotism’ by Professor Karl August Wittfogel. 94  The ruler maintained power 
through exclusive control over access to water. This can be seen through the provisions for 
irrigation systems in ancient law, called Mangraisatra.95  
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An ancient Lanna society consisted of six groups of people identified as the King, nobles, 
officers, monks, people and slaves. In addition, this ancient society had four institutions; 
namely, the monarchy, the religious institution, the institution of the officers and the family 
institution.  It had no explicit government organisation such as can be seen in the present day. 
In the Mangraisata, it is believed that the ancient Lanna Kingdom controlled labour manpower 
(productive factors) by assigning officers to control men for each 10, 50, 100, 1,000, 10,000, 
and 100,000 people. Moreover, it had no specific government organisation to regulate water 
management, but rather assigned a Water Manager in the Muang-Fai system to be a local officer 
to control the labour to work for the ruler and to settle disputes between water users.96 Hence, 
it can be said that the Muang-Fai system was not only the irrigation system, but also a system 
to control labour97, ensure the food security of the Kingdom, enrich the wealth of the ruler by 
collecting taxes or fees from the rice cultivation, and to protect the security of state. However, 
there is no overt evidence to indicate the explicit position of Water Manager as leader of 100 
people, 1,000 people or for 10,000 people. At that time, it was argued that the monarchy 
institution supported the Muang-Fai irrigation system by enacting the law to protect, recognise 
legal status of, and manage the Muang Fai system. It should be noted that the Muang Fai 
irrigation system in the ancient Lanna Kingdom is different from the present day Muang Fai 
irrigation systems. This is because in ancient times Muang Fai irrigation systems were 
constructed by the order of the King or noble people (top-down approach). Present day Muang 
Fai irrigation systems are constructed by water users who want to utilise the water (bottom-up 
approach). 
In short, this thesis argues that Muang Fai survived for so long because it was a system of 
labour control used by the ruler whereby the people were not free to migrate to another area. 
The Muang Fai of the past did not face labour shortage problems, except possibly during period 
of war.  Moreover, the Muang Fai system was supported by rulers through laws (see next topic). 
In addition, Muang Fai was intimately connected to food production, especially rice, in which 
everybody in society needed to participate. Hence, Muang Fai customary law arguably emerged 
in part from the real-life needs of people, but also from support by social administrators and 
rulers.     
 B. The ancient legal system in Lanna and Muang-Fai system 
The Muang Fai system was also supported by ancient Mangraisatra law. This section explores 
how this ancient law supported the Muang Fai system.      
Mangraisatra B.E. 1839 (A.D. 1296) 
Mangraisatra means ‘the Law of King Mang Rai’. However, there is no consensus among 
scholars that King Mangrai was the author of Mangraisatra because the colophons to the 
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manuscripts indicate that it was written by a monk. The Lanna Kingdom also had other laws; 
for instance, Klong Thammasart, Anajak, Rajasat and customary law. However, Mangraisatra 
is the only law to mention the Muang-Fai irrigation system. The Mangraisatra is quite different 
from present day legal codes because it does not illustrate the law in a systematic fashion. It 
shares some common features with other ancient laws in that it includes a collection of 
precedents or guides to be used by officials when similar cases occur.98  
In the case of the Muang-Fai system, Mangraisatra includes aspects of criminal law, outlining 
offences and related sanctions. Muang-Fai consists of eight offences: 1) destroying the spirit 
house of Pee Fai; 2) intending to, or recklessly causing harm by sailing the raft into the weir; 3) 
stealing water from Muang-Fai by not cooperating with other water users in the construction 
and maintenance of Muang-Fai; 4) destroying or harming all or part of the weir; 5) destroying, 
or harming the weir or the ditch for the purpose of fishing; 6) destroying the wall of a ditch to 
discharge water from the paddy for fishing; 7) taking advantage of other water users by 
allocating water to your own paddy more than has been allocated; and 8) stealing water during 
drought causing there to be insufficient water to share with other water users.99 Additionally, 
Mangraisatra introduced the principle of water allocations according to the principle of 
equality.100  
Four observations are worth noting here. Firstly, the Mangraisatra was enforced across all 
people in the Lanna Kingdom whereby everybody was required to comply with the Muang Fai 
rules relating to land and water management. Secondly, the Mangraisatra did not mention the 
water management contract (or Sanya Muang-Fai) and the management of the Muang-Fai 
community. This might be because the Muang-Fai management contract of each Muang-Fai 
community has its own features. They are different from each other due to geographic 
particularities and management methods. Furthermore, it is believed that the application of the 
Mangraisatra concerning the Muang-Fai system should be applied in combination with the local 
tradition regarding Muang-Fai management.101 In this writer’s opinion, the reason why the 
Mangraisatra did not provide provisions about the water management contract or Sanya 
Muang-Fai in a standard form is because it would make application of the Muang-Fai system 
too rigid and too difficult to apply to all cases. The Mangraisatra left the resolution of these 
issues to local traditions and the agreement of all water users in the Muang-Fai community.  
Thirdly, offences relating to the Muang-Fai system provided in the Mangraisatra supported 
public participation by imposing a high penalty rate (capital punishment) on water users who 
did not join in the construction and maintenance of Muang-Fai, but instead stole water from 
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Muang-Fai. Finally, it provides the principle of settling water conflicts among water users in an 
equitable manner. It can be said that this provision supports transparency in the water dispute 
settlement process.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ostrom argues that large regimes (about natural resource 
governing) can support self-organisation. They do so by providing the necessary information 
about natural resources, the arenas for the participants to examine and take part in the dispute 
settlement process, and the mechanisms to support local monitoring and sanction processes.102 
Mangraisatra is partly compatible with the argument posed by Ostrom because Mangraisatra 
supported Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community by: 1) forcing people to 
participate in the water utilisation process; 2) assigning power to the local Water Manager for 
the settlement of water conflicts; and 3) determining criminal offences and sanctions to back 
up Muang Fai customary law. 
In short, it is arguable that Mangraisatra supported the Muang Fai system in four ways and that 
this enabled the Muang Fai system to survive for a long time. Those ways are: 1) making the 
Muang Fai rules legally binding to all people; 2) allowing local people to craft their own rules; 
3) encouraging public participation in Muang Fai by providing sanctions; and 4) supporting the 
equitable settlement of water disputes by the Water Manager. 
 
2.2.3 Muang Fai norm before and after the recognition by ARCWD 1934 and PIA 1939 
 
In fact, legal documents relating to Muang Fai during the abolition of Mangraisatra up to 1934 
are rare. However, we know of Muang Fai customary law during that period from the minutes 
of the House of Representative of Siam. In the minutes, it was noted that the ARCWD was 
enacted in 1934 to assist farmers in the northern regions because water users were stealing 
water from the Muang Fai system and not working for Muang Fai.103 However, they were not 
punished because of a lack of criminal offence. Hence, while the Muang Fai system was still 
applied from 1892 to 1934 as a customary law, the enforcement of Muang Fai customary law 
was not strict. People could follow Muang Fai customary law without obeying the law.  In 
addition, it may have been the case that Muang Fai customary law was weakened when it was 
not recognised and reinforced by written laws. Thailand, or Siam at that time, was an 
agricultural society and people depended on the natural resources and cooperation among 
people. Ultimately, however, the Siam government needed to promulgate the ARCWD in 1934.   
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After Muang Fai was recognised by the ARCWD in 1934, there was a proposal to amend the 
ARCWD. The ARCWD was to include the water used by private entities.104 In 1939, the PIA 
was promulgated while the ARCWD was abolished. However, the problems relating to Muang 
Fai norms did not end there. The problems of the PIA should be studied here to prevent future 
confusion over the recognition of Muang Fai customary law. This thesis argues that the 
recognition of Muang Fai in 1934 and 1939 were improper recognitions. The specific problems 
with these oversights are outlined below.             
Firstly, the PIA did not recognise the customary application of the water management contract 
agreed to by all of water users. For example, under the PIA the water management contract was 
not binding to people outside the Muang Fai community. If the water in a river was stolen or 
used by people outside Muang Fai community, the thief would not be punished. This is because 
PIA only provided criminal offences for water users in the Muang Fai community, but not 
people outside Muang Fai.  This presently causes conflict.105  
Secondly, the PIA did not recognise the tradition relating to land uses in the Muang Fai system. 
Traditionally, the right and left banks of the ditches, from the centre to five metres wide, are 
deemed as property of the Muang Fai community. However, the PIA did not recognise this rule. 
In fact, the PIA provided that a district chief officer could order the disposal of soil or mud on 
the left or right bank of the canal, not exceeding five metres, when there was no place to dispose 
of the mud or soil.106 This means that the bank of the ditch belongs to the land owner and is not 
the property of the Muang Fai community. This has caused problems when new owners 
purchase land from the farmers and block the ditches. Other water users cannot use water from 
Muang Fai107 or dredge and clean the ditches and banks on the land of the new owner.   
Thirdly, the provisions relating to the dispute settlement process in the PIA did not have a time 
frame and lacked criteria for the allocation of water.108 Furthermore, the roles of water users in 
decision making processes in the PIA remains less than it should be because they cannot take 
part in the anticipatory negotiation to share water according to traditions within the Muang Fai 
system. 
Fourthly, the PIA had no power to present a case to the Court when there was conflict over 
water between a Muang Fai member and an outsider.109   
Fifthly, the PIA did not include the Muang Fai system in the planning process. This causes 
many problems. For example, it now allows for construction to take place that is incompatible 
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with the Muang Fai system such as roads being constructed in places that block the water flow 
into ditches resulting in floods,110 and new land uses that block the flow of water in the 
ditches.111 It has been reported that some water users who had previously received water from 
Muang Fai irrigation systems can no longer access the water following construction of concrete 
weirs and ditches. This is because the new concrete canals block the ditches of the Muang Fai 
irrigation systems.112 
2.2.4 Muang Fai irrigation system and Thailand society in the present day 
 
The present social structure, administration and legal system of Thailand are quite different 
from ancient Lanna society. The agricultural society has rapidly changed into an industrial 
society. The role of Muang Fai in the present day is only to allocate water for cultivation without 
controlling labour and regulating food security. However, the Muang Fai system is still useful 
and necessary to local people as mentioned earlier. At least 300,000 people still manage water 
through Muang Fai customary law.113 The changing roles of the Muang Fai system combine 
with other problems such as the abolition of the PIA, the migration of people, changes in water 
management technology, and a changing education system. The present day problems and 
challenges of Muang Fai can be described as legal or general in nature.   
A. Legal problems 
When the author commenced this research in 2013-2014, the PIA 1939, which recognised 
Muang Fai from 1939-2015, had not yet been repealed. However, the PIA 1939 was repealed 
on 31 January 2015 resulting in new legal problems for Muang Fai customary law, as discussed 
below.  
The legal problems resulting from the abolition of the People Irrigation Act 
The PIA was repealed in the Act to abolish the PIA put forward by the Thai government.114 
Abolition of the PIA was proposed by the Royal Irrigation Department of Thailand during the 
previous civilian government. The reason given was that the PIA was no longer being 
implemented.115  The previous civilian Cabinet of Thailand agreed with the proposal to abolish 
the PIA on 3 July 2012.116 However, political turmoil in 2013 followed by the Coup d’état in 
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2014 has meant that the draft law to abolish the PIA was slow to  pass  parliament. The National 
Assembly passed the Bill to abolish the PIA on 4 December 2014117 and this was noted in 
Thailand’s Gazette on 5 February 2015.118 Even though no legal problems have been reported 
within Muang Fai communities as a result of the abolition of the PIA, it does not mean there 
are not problems. The legal problems to potentially result from the abolition of the PIA are as 
follows: 
1) The legal status of the local water management committee appointed according to 
the PIA  
2) The legal status of the area alongside the ditches in Muang Fai communities 
3) The offences relating to Muang Fai communities 
4) The power and duties of the Water Manager and Water Manager assistants  
5) The status of water customary rights according to Muang Fai customary law  
6) The reconciliation process between the statutory water rights and the water 
customary rights 
7)  The dispute settlement process for resolving conflict between statutory water rights 
and water customary rights. 
 
Moreover, the abolition of the PIA means that the Thai government will no longer have limited 
recognition of traditional water resource management, like Muang Fai customary law.119 
B. The Challenges of Muang Fai in present day Thailand 
The challenges of Muang Fai in this thesis were considered before the repeal of the PIA. As 
yet, there is no data on the challenges of Muang Fai after the abolition of the PIA. The identified 
challenges are as follows: 
1) The rural-urban migration  
Teenage migration from rural to urban settings in northern Thailand causes severe labour 
shortage problems in the Muang Fai system because Muang Fai depends on human labour and 
public participation. The decline in labour in the agricultural sector, particularly in the northern 
regions, has two main impacts. Firstly, smaller numbers of existing water users in the Muang 
Fai Communities need to care for the Muang Fai irrigation system. Secondly, some farmers 
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have changed from rice cultivation to fruit cultivation [Longan, Lychee) because it requires less 
labour. However, this may cause other conflicts amongst water users because farmers no longer 
want water at the same time. The Muang Fai system is set up to distribute water to the plants 
which require water at the same period only.120   
2) Land use change 
The land use changes to affect the Muang Fai systems can be divided into two types: i) the land 
use changes outside the Muang Fai community; and ii) the land use changes within the Muang 
Fai community. The land use changes outside the Muang Fai community are those from the 
cultivation of rice in the mountainous area to the cultivation of oranges in other areas. Because 
oranges require a lot of water for cultivation, orange gardeners, who are not water users in the 
Muang Fai community, pump a lot of water from the river without prior consultation with the 
Muang Fai community.121 This leads to conflicts over water between orange gardeners on the 
mountain and the Muang Fai community at the foot of the mountain. Traditionally, Muang Fai 
customary laws prohibits all people from pumping water from the river because it violates the 
water rights of other water users. 
Some mountainous areas outside of the Muang Fai communities are changing to orange 
cultivation areas. This is also leading to pollution in the Muang Fai community. The pesticides 
and herbicides used to cultivate oranges contaminates the air and atmosphere around the 
cultivation area. The chemical contamination causes health and environmental problems for 
farmers and their families in the Muang Fai community nearby. 122 One severe water conflict 
to occur in the Fang district, in Chiang Mai Province, was reported in 2005 to the National 
Human Rights Commission of Thailand.123 It was reported that the orange producer company 
stole water from the ditches of a Muang Fai community by pumping the water from the ditches 
to the pools in their orange cultivation areas.124 Some cultivators also blocked the river and 
diverted water to the pools in their cultivation areas.125 The response from some water users in 
the Muang Fai community affected by this conduct was to destroy the pipes and weirs of the 
orange producer.126 It was also reported that the some water users in Muang Fai were shot as a 
result of the water conflict.127     
The land use changes inside Muang Fai communities involve changing cultivation areas into 
living areas or changing the plant species used for cultivation. Changing cultivation areas to 
                                                                
120 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 143. 
121  Pornpilai Lertwicha, Supachai Methin and Nonthachai Namdhep,  The Research Report on Case Study the Orange 
Cultivation Areas at Fang District, Mae Ai District and Chaiprakarn District: Problems and Dispute Settlement (National 
Human Rights Commission, 2005), 12 <http://library.nhrc.or.th/ulib/dublin.php?&f=dublin&ID=199>. 
122 Ibid 34-42. 
123 Ibid 29. 
124 Ibid 21, 29, 32. 
125 Ibid 29, 32. 
126 Ibid, 27-41. 
127 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 165. 
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living areas involves the sale of land tenure to third parties outside the Muang Fai community 
for the construction of houses by third parties outside Muang Fai. Some fill in the Muang Fai 
canals and claim that the canal is their property according to the statutory law. Therefore, 
farmers downstream no longer receive water from the Muang Fai system. 
The next kind of land use change inside the Muang Fai community regards plant species. The 
main change has been from the cultivation of rice cultivation to fruit cultivation. This land use 
change generates problems because the Muang Fai system is not set up to distribute water to 
different plant species which require water at different periods. For example, rice cultivation 
requires water during the first couple of months; whereas, longan gardeners do not want water 
at that time. They block the water upstream and the farmers downstream from the ditches cannot 
access water to grow rice. 
3) Government intervention 
Patcharee argues that Thai officials have intervened in the Muang Fai community in three 
ways.128 Firstly, they have tried to change the local technology for building or maintaining 
weirs and ditches. This was done by convincing water users that the concrete weirs are better 
than the weirs made from natural materials. The government has convinced the community to 
allow it to build them concrete weirs instead of traditional weirs. It might be true that the 
concrete barrage ditches are better than traditional ditches because water users need not dredge 
every season and the water will not leak and absorb into the soil alongside the ditches. However, 
water users in the Muang Fai community now depend on, and must obey, the State agency in 
terms of water management, thus losing their previous governance role in IWRM. Furthermore, 
it is reported that the solidarity among water users in Muang Fai communities has decreased 
sharply.129 Fewer water users now participate in repairing the weirs and ditches when they are 
damaged by strong storms. They now claim that the responsibility to repair the concrete weirs 
and ditches belongs to the government.130 This conduct implies no responsibility even when 
farmers get benefits from the concrete weirs and ditches.131     
Secondly, State agencies have tried to governmentalize Muang Fai communities to become a 
water association which must comply with central departmental regulations rather than 
determine their own water allocation. Finally, they have tried to change Muang Fai customary 
laws, particularly the water allocation rules. Water allocation by the State concerns itself with 
the water requirement of plants only. The water allocation is made by officials, not water users, 
and without the participation of water users. Therefore, water users do not have input into their 
access to water, even though they best understand their agricultural processes. The “top down’ 
                                                                
128 Arthan, above n 43, 117-119. 
129 See Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 161; and Mua Pla La Gin Dao, “Muang Fai the breath of Mae Ping River (เหมืองฝำยลมหำยใจของ
แม่น ้ ำปิง)” Youtube video (Jul 22, 2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofU9coA5Fk8>. 
130 Lertwicha et al., above n 6, 161. 
131 Ibid.  
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approaches thus undermine sustainable development. Furthermore, Pornpiali indicates that the 
failure of the public irrigation system for the agriculture sector, managed by Thailand’s 
government, has resulted in farmers no longer using the public irrigation system, but returning 
to refurbish their traditional methods and once again applying Muang Fai customary law.132   
4) The bias of state officers 
Another problem facing Muang Fai is the attitude of the State officers to Muang Fai irrigation. 
Pacharin observes that Thailand’s government organisations, in relation to water management, 
follow the suggestion by the Asian Development Bank to use economic tools to manage water. 
They have adopted a State-centric approach to water management and have ignored the 
traditional knowledge and experience of the Muang Fai community by not inviting 
representatives of the communities to sit on the Committee in the Sub River Basin Commission 
of the Mae Ping River Commission.133 This is despite the fact that Muang Fai was recognised 
by the PIA during that period. A contrary trend has been reported whereby some local 
authorities understand the value of Muang Fai customary law and have provided financial 
assistance for the maintenance of weirs and ditches in some Muang Fai communities.134   
Furthermore, it has been reported that some Muang Fai principles are included in the non-
juristic water user organisation of both the Royal Irrigation Department and the Department of 
Water Resources135  (see further detail in Chapter 4). It should be observed that the work of 
Pacharin is 10 years old and that Thailand might have changed its approach to Muang Fai. 
Nonetheless, Pacharin’s work is worth considering with regards to the problems of Muang Fai 
when it was recognised by the PIA.   
In short, it is evident that all challenges occurred during the implementation of the PIA and that 
all challenges show the inadequacy of the PIA to deal with the new challenges of Muang Fai. 
However, the PIA did at least protect Muang Fai by recognising it as a part of water law and 
the water management of Thailand.  
2.2.5 Lessons of Muang Fai customary law from past to present day 
In ancient times, Muang Fai was recognised in the basic laws of the Lanna Kingdom. The 
Muang Fai community had legal status in the legal system and it was accepted by all people. 
There was no intervention by the ruler. Furthermore, the rules of Muang Fai governed all people 
who stayed in the Muang Fai community, even though they sometimes resided outside the 
Muang Fai community. Moreover, the Muang Fai community was important to the Kingdom 
as a food production unit, a source of labour, and major contributor to the wealth of the rulers. 
                                                                
132 Lertwicha, above n 6, 159. 
133 Phatcharin Bualoi, Diversity of and Debates on Water Management: A Case Study of Water User Groups at Fai Wang Hai, 
Chiang Dao Sub-district, Chiang Dao District, Chiang Mai Province (Master of Arts [Social development] Thesis, Chiang Mai 
University, 2006) 142. 
134 Tuntianupong, above n 38, 134. 
135 Both the Royal Irrigation Department and Department of Water Resources allow the water user groups to draft the regulation 
of each group by themselves. 
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There was no migration in ancient times, except during war, and this contributed to a stable 
supply of labour in Muang Fai. For individuals, Muang Fai was important as a source of water 
for cultivation and as a source of income. Land use in ancient times was for agriculture, not for 
industrial or for private estates. Lastly, the size of the population size was not large and at that 
time the water resources and other natural resources were sufficient for everybody. 
In contrast, Thailand has changed from an agrarian society to an industrial society. During this 
transition, conflict has arisen around land use for agriculture purpose particularly, as well as 
land use for industrial and other purposes. The Muang Fai system no longer has a place in the 
Thai legal system after the abolition of the PIA. Muang Fai has not been supported by the 
present government of Thailand because it believes that Muang Fai contradicts water planning 
on a macro scale in Thailand and it does not support sustainable development for the country.136 
Although the Muang Fai community is no longer the food production unit and source of income 
for rulers, it is still important as a unifying element in local society. 
Muang Fai customary law has experienced both peaks and troughs throughout its history. The 
peak times were the period when Muang Fai was recognised by Mangraisatra code law. The 
trough was the period when Muang Fai was abandoned by the written law of Siam between 
1892-1934. This was evident from the fact that many farmers did not follow Muang Fai 
customary law, but still used water from the Muang Fai systems. The suffering experienced by 
water users who followed Muang Fai customary law was very serious as a result. Therefore, 
the ARCWD was proposed in 1934. One factor of concern is that the society of Siam between 
1892-1934 was an agricultural society which depended on natural resources. The government 
was then not reluctant to enact PIA. The previous legal recognition of Muang Fai raises the 
question here as to whether Muang Fai would have survived from 1934 to 2015 without the 
ARCWD and PIA. This thesis argues that written law plays a vital role in ensuring that 
customary law survives when it faces new challenges.   
2.3 Conclusion 
Muang Fai customary law is essentially a community-based water resource management 
system. Muang Fai customary law originated in the past with the experience, knowledge and 
technology of ancient people. Muang Fai’s rules regard management, water allocation, labour 
recruitment, land use limitations, cost sharing and dispute settlement. The management of 
Muang Fai focuses on the public participation while water distribution is based on the equitable 
and reasonable sharing of the resource. However, Muang Fai customary law has some 
limitations such as focusing only on water quantity and surface water management.  
                                                                
136 National Assembly of Thailand, Discussion Paper relating to a Bill to abolish the People Irrigation Act B .E. 2482 14th 
meeting/2557, Thursday 9 Oct 2014, 21 <http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_nla2557/apnla2557-031.pdf>. 
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Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions remain useful for farmers in northern 
Thailand in the present day as the entity to supply, allocate and deliver water for agricultural 
purposes. Today, Muang Fai customary law faces new challenges such as rural-urban migration, 
land use changes, government intervention and the bias of the officers. Despite these 
challenges, at least 300,000 people still apply Muang Fai customary law. Therefore, Muang Fai 
customary law should be improved and recognised within the present day water law and water 
management systems in Thailand to support sustainable development.    
The next chapter provide the theoretical context of sustainable development and sustainable 
water resource management. This is to determine whether Muang Fai water resource 
management customary law is a sustainable customary law, and the extent to which Muang Fai 
can support sustainable water management in Thailand.  
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Chapter Three - International frameworks for sustainable water resource management 
and common pool resource management 
  
Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis examined the meaning and processes of Muang Fai customary law as 
well as the problems and challenges of Muang Fai in present-day Thailand. This examination 
was undertaken to understand how Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions 
manage water in Thailand and the problems currently faced by Muang Fai.  
This chapter addresses the related Research Queston: To what extent is Muang Fai customary 
law related to water resource management consistent with sustainable development principles? 
Therefore, this chapter examines the principles and concepts of sustainable development (SD), 
particularly the SD principles applicable to water resources and Common Pool Resource (CPR) 
theory. This is to determine whether Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institution are 
compatible with the principles of SD; how Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai 
institutions can manage water sustainably; and what factors contribute to the sustainability of 
Muang Fai operations.   
The theoretical basis established in this chapter is used to critically compare and contrast the 
present water policies, water law and water management procedures in Thailand discussed in 
Chapter 6. Moreover, the application of CPR theory in this chapter enables consideration of 
how to create institutions to govern water resource sustainably according to CPR theory. This 
will provide insights into what the Thai government could do to prevent the existing Muang 
Fai community from the “tragedy of the commons dilemma?1 discussed in Chapter 7. 
This chapter begins by outlining how the concept of sustainable development emerged. It then 
focuses on the evolution of the sustainable development principles that provide the foundation 
of modern environmental law (3.1) and their specific application to water resource management 
(3.2). The examination then shifts to the extent to which Muang Fai customs are compatible with 
the principles of sustainable water management (3.3). Lastly, this chapter examines CPR theory 
and its application to irrigation management (3.4). This provides the theoretical link to the 
application of sustainable development principles to Muang Fai customary law and practices.  
3.1 Sustainable development; key points, legal obligations and customary law 
 
                                                                
1 Garrett Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
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Sustainability is not a new concept, appearing in the cultures of many ancient civilisations.2 
However, the concept of SD has emerged again in the twenty-first century3 because of the 
depletion of the environment 4  and natural resources 5 , the effects of climate change, and 
population growth as a result of the modernisation development approach6 employed after 
World War Two. 7  Eric Kwa argues that the principle of sustainability mobilises the 
international community to change the pattern of development from a ‘brown economy’ to a 
‘green economy’.8 Desai9 calls SD a ‘bridge concept’10 because it links environmental issues to 
development issues. Additionally, it is claimed that the emergence of the concept of SD has led 
to a paradigm shift in many fieldsincluding the environment, economics, management, and 
engineering.11  
3.1.1 Key points of sustainable development: meaning, components, critiques and the 
present-day challenges of the sustainable development 
 
Since the official declaration in 1987, SD has been analysed and interpreted in a vast array of 
circumstances. While a discussion of these analyses and interpretation is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, this chapter nonetheless aims is to establish the necessary background information, 
concepts and frameworks related to SD to apply to the research questions in this thesis. The 
focus is on the meaning of SD, (although it is recognised that there is no single authoritative or 
exhaustive meaning) and on understanding the legal obligations of States in relation to SD and 
the linkage between customary law and SD. 
  
Meaning of Sustainable Development 
                                                                
2 See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, 'Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and 
Prospects' (Oxford University Press, 2004), 15; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ   Rep   7,    
Separate   Opinion   of   Judge Weeramantry A(c) <http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-
EN.pdf>; and M.P. Ranaweera, 'Sustainable development, ancient wisdom and Sri Lankan technology' International 
Conference on Sustainable Built Environment (ICSBE-2010) Kandy, 13-14 December 201 (2013) 
<http://www.civil.mrt.ac.lk/conference/ICSBE_2010/vol_01/3.pdf > 
3 Segger and Khalfan, above n2, 15. 
4 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002).  
5Donella H. Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth (Universe Books, 1972) < https://www.clubofrome.org/report/the-limits-to-
growth/>. 
6 Tom R. Burns, ‘Sustainable Development. A Comment’, "Sociologica" 2/2012, doi: 10.2383/38272. 
7 Alistair Rieu-Clarke, International Law and Sustainable Development, (IWA Publishing, 2005) 31. 
8 Eric Lokai Kwa, Traditionalizing sustainable development: the law, policy and practice in Papua New Guinea, (PhD 
Thesis, The University of Auckland, 2006) 24-27. 
9 Nitin Dayalji Desai was the Deputy Secretary-General at the 1992 Rio Summit, the Secretary-General of the 2002 
Johannesburg Summit, and an Under Secretary-General at UN Headquarters from 1993 to 2003. 
10 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Framing Sustainable Development: The Brundtland Report – 20 
Years On (10 June 2015) <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd15/media/backgrounder_brundtland.pdf>. 
11 See Z Hafsa Orhan Aström, 'Paradigm Shift for Sustainable Development: The Contribution of Islamic Economics' (2011) 
1(1) Journal of Economic and Social Studies 73; Thomas N Gladwin, James J Kennelly and Tara-Shelomith Krause, 'Shifting 
Paradigms for Sustainable Development: Implications for Management Theory and Research' (1995) 20(4) Academy of 
Management Review 874. 
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Many scholars and organisations have defined the concept of SD.12  Over 500 attempts to define 
SD have been identified. 13  The most commonly accepted definition of SD appeared in 
Brundtland's report in 198714 which defined as follows: 
 Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.15   
 The concept of SD contains two key concepts: 
 the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on 
the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.16 
The concept of SD also focuses on equality among people both inter-generationally and intra-
generationally.17 In terms of the meaning of ‘need’ in the SD concept, the Brundtland report 
suggests that it should focus on the needs of poor people as a priority.18 However, it is still 
controversial as to the best method to measure the needs of people.19 In terms of ‘limitations’, 
this refers to the fact that natural resources have a limitation. This highlights a major difference 
between the modernisation approach to develop a county according to the idea of law, and the 
concept of SD in last century.20 The former is not concerned with the limitations of natural 
resources. 
 
                                                                
12 See Dan Cristian Duran et al., 'The Components of Sustainable Development - A Possible Approach' (2015) 26 Procedia 
Economics and Finance 806; Steve Connelly, 'Mapping Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept' (2007) 12(3) Local 
Environment 259. 
13 B. Carroll, Sustainable Development: An Eclectic View CIWEM International Directory, 
2003, London, Cameron Publishing, cited in David Woods, Sustainable Development: A Contested Paradigm, Economic 
Forum of Foundation for Water Research, Birmingham, UK; Gordon Ade-Ojo,'Epistemic groundings for literacy in sustainable 
development at the local governance level' (2009)5(1) Occasional Papers in Education & Lifelong Learning:  An International 
Journal 53. 
14 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: Our Common Future, Annex to document A/42/427 - Development and International Co-operation: 
Environment (1987) 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kwa, above n 8, 65.  
20The modernisation approach to country development posits that the natural resources have no limit and States should 
encourage the market system and free economy system to exploit the natural resource in their own jurisdictions. However, the 
modernisation approach could not eradicate poverty, but caused many environmental problems such as global warming, 
exhaustion of biodiversity, and pollution. Hence, it leads to the new paradigm of development; namely, sustainable 
development. See Kwa, above n 8, 26-28. 
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A) Components of Sustainable Development 
It has long-been accepted that SD links to three components of human survival: the 
environmental/ecological; the economic; and the human/social.21 Traditionally, the economic 
and environmental components have been discussed separately. This was before the emergence 
of the modern concept of SD.22 The social component was also isolated from the other two 
dimensions. 
 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 
26 August to 4 September 2002, another approach to the implementation of SD was proposed. 
As a result, the ‘3 pillars approach’ was declared as the outcome of the conference. The basis of 
this approach suggested that the operationalisation of SD requires a careful balance among the 
environmental, economic and social aspects. However, it has been argued by many that the 
economic pillar always prevails over the environmental and social pillars, and that this may not 
lead to a sustainable outcome.23Another view is that SD is more useful to the majority of people 
who are poor if the environmental pillar prevails over the other aspects.24   
 
Sustainable Development aims to achieve economic sustainability. This means ensuring 
production processes satisfy the present level of consumption without compromising future 
needs.25 It also means producing a maximum flow of income in terms of rational use and 
resource efficiency, particularly in the case of scarce resources.26 This is because poverty 
causes environmental problems.27 Historically, the conventional approach to development has 
been based on the assumption that natural resources have no limits and the depletion of natural 
resources can be resolved by modern technology. However, the logic of this approach is 
fundamentally flawed and increasingly fails to meet the basic needs of humans or the 
ecosystems that they rely upon.  
 
In terms of the environmental component, it is argued that people must accept the need to stay 
within the limitations of the natural resources.28 Furthermore, nature has three functions: the 
power function of resources; the waste receptor function; and the direct utility.29 Thus, people 
need to maintain the natural capital at both the source site and the sink site. For the source site, 
                                                                
21 Duran, above n 12, 806.  
22 Kwa, above n 8, 20. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 M Adil Khan, 'Sustainable Development: The Key Concepts, Issues and Implications. Keynote paper given at the 
International Sustainable Development Research Conference, 27–29 March 1995, Manchester, UK' (1995) 3(2) Sustainable 
Development 63. 
26 Duran, above n 12, 809. 
27 David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 
2011). 
28 Khan, above n 25, 63. 
29 DA Wardle and Ken E Giller, 'The Quest for a Contemporary Ecological Dimension to Soil Biology' (1996) 28(12) Soil 
Biology and Biochemistry 1549; cited in Duran, above n 12, 806. 
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they need to refrain from harvesting the renewable resource above the regeneration rate. For 
the sink site, people need to refrain from wasting more than the absorption capacity of nature. 
Additionally, development must not affect the ecological system.30 The key points of concern 
within environmental sustainability are ecosystem integrity, the carrying capacity of nature, 
and biodiversity.31 
 
With respect to the social component, the main issue is to eradicate poverty and to allocate and 
distribute wealth equality both within the current generation and intergenerationally.32 This is 
because of the link between poverty and environmental degradation along with the calls for 
environmental justice. 33  The focal points of social sustainability consist of equity, 
empowerment. education, accessibility, participation, sharing cultural identity, institutional 
stability34,  health, and sustainable population growth.35 
B) Critiques of Sustainable Development 
As mentioned earlier, the definition of SD is quite problematic. Many questions cannot be 
resolved at the present time. For example, it is not clear how to ‘meet the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 36  37 
Furthermore, Woods indicates that the cause of the contested paradigm of SD comes from the 
combination of three aspects (economic, environmental and social) that appear to be 
irreconcilable.38 Furthermore, the different standpoints of countries in the north and the south, 
with regard to environment and development, also creates difficulties in achieving SD. For 
example, the Paris Agreement 2015 fails to resolve many of the disagreements over liability, 
targets, funding and market mechanisms raised in the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 199239 and the Kyoto Protocol 1997.40 
                                                                
30 Duran, above n 12, 806. 
31 Khan, above n, 25, 63. 
32 Duran, above n 12, 806. 
33 Khan, above n 25, 63. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Florin Frant and Mirela Minica, The Dimensions of Durable Development. Annals of the University of Craiova Economic 
Science XXXVI7, 34323439; cited in Duran, above n 12, 806. 
36 Aström, above n 11, 73.  
37 Clayton and Bass asserted that ‘meeting the needs of the present generation’ should mean to meet the economic needs, 
social, cultural and health needs plus the political needs. Whereas, “without undermining the future generations’ ability to 
meet their own needs” is to lessen usage of natural resource, use renewable resources sustainably and regulate the wastes to 
be under the absorptive capacity of local and global sinks.  
Stephen Bass and Barry Dalal-Clayton, Sustainable Development Strategies: A Resource Book (Routledge, 2012) cited in 
Aström, above n 11, 73. 
38 Woods, above n 13, 1.  
39 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992. 1771 UNTS 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994). 
40 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 December 
1997, 2303 UNTS 162 (entered into force 16 February 2005). 
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C) Present-day challenges of sustainable development 
Although SD presently faces many challenges including population growth and the limitations 
of resources amongst others41, this section focuses on two contemporary issues relating to water 
management. The first issue is the market economy and the influence of neoliberalism42 as it 
relates to water. This is not a detailed discussion of neo liberalism as an ideological and 
economic approach. Rather, it is discussed as an influence affecting the present trend for the 
commodification of water as an economic good. This raises concerns about the dominance of 
the economic pillar over the other two pillars of SD.43 The second issue is environmental 
governance and is addressed because there is a crisis in water governance for SD, not just the 
insufficient infrastructure for water.44   
Sustainable development and neoliberalism in relation to water 
Neoliberalism is presently the economic approach adopted by most wealthy nations in the 
world.45 This raises questions about the extent to which SD can be applied within this neoliberal 
system. 46 Harris and Seid argue that the key concepts that underpin the ideology of 
neoliberalism are the free market and free trade47  Under the neoliberal ideology, it is believed 
that free markets can bring world prosperity, democracy, justice and respect for human rights 
when markets are free from the oppressive hand of the State.48 Initially, neoliberalism was 
suggested by officials of international financial institutions based in Washington as a suitable 
                                                                
41 John Guillebaud, ‘There are not enough resources to support the world's population’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
News (online), 10 June 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/ockhamsrazor/there-are-not-enough-resources-to-
support-the-worlds-population/5511900>. 
42 “Neoliberalism is both a body of economic theory and a policy stance. Neoliberal theory claims that a largely unregulated 
capitalist system (a free market economy) not only embodies the ideal of free individual choice but also achieves optimum 
economic performance with respect to efficiency, economic growth, technical progress, and distributional justice. The state is 
assigned a very limited economic role: defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and regulating the money supply.  State 
intervention to correct market failures is viewed with suspicion, on the ground that such intervention is likely to create more 
problems than it solves.  
The neoliberalism policy suggests the deregulation of business; privatization of public activities and assets; elimination of, or 
cutbacks in, social welfare programs; and reduction in taxes on businesses and the investing class. In the international sphere, 
neoliberalism calls for free movement of goods, services, capital, and money (but not people) across national boundaries. That 
is, corporations, banks, and individual investors should be free to move their property across national boundaries, and free to 
acquire property across national boundaries, although free cross-border movement by individuals is not part of the neoliberal 
program” Definition by David M Kotz, 'Globalization and Neoliberalism' (2002) 14(2) Rethinking Marxism 64 
43  PBS Transcript - Interview with Dr. Vandana Shiva <http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcript_shiva_print.html>. 
44 Vapnek, Jessica et al, 'Law for water management: a guide to concepts and effective approaches' (2009)(101) FAO 
Legislative Study,140.  
45 Kotz, above n 42, 64. 
46 It consists of 10 measures: 1) fiscal discipline; 2) a redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields offering both 
high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution such as primary health care, primary education and 
infer structure; 3) tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base); 4) interest rate liberalisation; 5) a competitive 
exchange rate; 6) trade liberalisation; 7) liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment; 8) privatisation; 9) deregulation 
(to abolish barriers to entry and exit); and 10) secure property rights. See John Williamson, 'Short History of the Washington 
Consensus, A' (2009) 15 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 7 9-10. 
47 Richard L Harris and Melinda J Seid, 'Critical Perspectives on Globalization and Neoliberalism in the Developing 
Countries' (2000) 16(1) Journal of Developing Societies 1, 11. 
48 Moses MM Daemane, 'Neoliberalism and Globalism, Failing Ideas for Sustainable Development and Poverty Alleviation 
for the Developing World: The Experiences of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America' (2014) 5(8) Journal of 
Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies 196, 197. 
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economic policy reform for Latin American countries. 49 In theory, neoliberalism assigns 
decision-making power to the market and tries to create a free market through deregulation.50 
It claims to reduce the power of big companies, groups of producers, and state enterprises 
through competition. 51 This is then supposed to result in efficiency of production and 
management in the business sector and governmental organisations. If neoliberalism causes the 
free movement of capital then, in theory, developing countries can benefit from foreign capital 
and foreign investment, creation of job opportunities, and investment in infrastructure by the 
developed countries.52 Under this system, producers need to adjust to competition in the market 
by improving their production processes through the use of technology to reduce their costs53 
and to take advantage of the enlargement of the global market. 54 
 
However, Bookchin indicates that the market economy cannot develop appropriate 
mechanisms to deal with social and environmental crises.55 This reflects the market economy’s 
focus on profit and growth without including these other essential dimensions.56 He further 
argues that the present attitude of the people towards nature, especially western people, is a 
cause of the problem.57 This is because people tend to take the position of overcoming and 
exploiting nature rather than seeking to coexist with it.58   Schmidt argues that neoliberalism 
promotes the worst aspects of labour instead of prioritising the welfare of people.59 This is 
because governments mainly focus on economic growth to the detriment of the social welfare 
needs of the population. This is largely done for cost-saving reasons. In reality, neoliberal 
policies often lead to contraction of jobs, rather than expansion. It has also been shown that 
privatisation of state enterprises causes hardship for the poor in terms of unemployment, an 
increase in service fees, and limited access to services.60   
 
In terms of the environment, it has been argued that neoliberalism and globalisation are 
destructive of SD due to the over exploitation and unsustainable use of natural resources for 
economic growth.  On the other hand, it is also argued that neoliberalism has introduced the 
application of market mechanisms to deal with environmental problems that could be useful as 
part of a regulatory and market “mix” of instruments for achieving SD. 
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Pearce and others have argued that economic growth and environmental conservation can work 
together effectively by following the green economy approach. 61 In their opinion, market 
mechanisms can be used to conserve the environment by the commoditisation of nature and by 
putting externalities into the internality of the cost of production. 62 The increasing cost of 
production will thus limit the consumption of natural resources and lead to the goal of 
environmental conservation.63 Furthermore, economic growth can occur through investment in 
green businesses and environmental infrastructure.64 These can generate jobs, income and result 
in economic growth.65    
   
The ‘green economy’  refers to an economy that results in improved human wellbeing and 
reduced inequalities over the long term, while not exposing future generations to significant 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities.66 Historically, the green economy was proposed 
by Pearce in his ‘Blueprint for a Green Economy’ .67 It was then an agenda item at the Rio+20 
Conference.68  The green economy concept does not replace the SD concept.  On the contrary, 
it supports the idea that the final objective of the economic system is to achieve SD.69  It is 
argued that the green economy is the central strategic economic policy agenda for achieving 
SD.70 It is also suggested that the green economy needs to support Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) and principles (discussed later in this Chapter) such as intergenerational equity and 
poverty eradication.71 The transformation of the brown economy to a green economy requires 
three major changes.  First, the full costs and benefits of environmental impacts must be 
incorporated into markets and economic policies.  This should include the development of 
environmental valuation and policy analysis. 72  Second, the transition to a green economy 
requires effective environmental policy implementation.  This implies the availability of better 
information relating to the environment to facilitate better decision making on economic 
matters, and the application of proper market-based instruments and proper market-regulatory 
measures. Third, interdisciplinary research, assessment, and monitoring should be done to 
evaluate the balance between natural capital and other forms of capital.73   Moreover, creating 
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conditions for a green economy requires the reformation of national regulations, policies, 
subsidies and incentives. Transformation of the international market, legal infrastructure, trade 
and technical assistance also need to be done.74    
 
However, Wilson claims that the green economy fails to resolve environmental problems and 
create social equality.75 This is because: 1) present knowledge about ecosystem services are 
inadequate and humans cannot work instead of nature, making it difficult to price the exact 
cost of ecosystem services; 2) the green economy does not take into consideration the rebound 
effect in economic systems and, consequently, even if the entrepreneur develops technology to 
cut the costs, the consumption of natural resources will not decrease; 3) the aim of the 
entrepreneur and businesses is not to conserve nature but to generate profit so their priority is 
not environmental conservation; and 4) the green economy might lead to an economic system 
in which only the rich can survive and afford the natural resources, with no concern for the 
poor.76 Wilson supports his argument by pointing to the failure of the carbon market as a 
mechanism for conserving the climate.77  Finally he proposes that humanity needs to accept that 
some aspects of nature are not a commidity and cannot be traded. The survival of humans 
depends on the natural environment. Because of this, Wilson argues that the commodification 
of nature is not sufficient to conserve the environment, but that context-specific measures such 
as legal protections, proactive conservation, supporting existing local institutions, and research 
into socioecological interactions are required. 78 
Sustainable Development & Environmental Governance 
It is commonly accepted that one cause of the ongoing environmental problems is the crisis in 
governance. 79  Traditionally, governments use strict rules and standards in the form of 
legislation to manage the environment.80 This is known as command and control regulation.81 
However, there are weaknesses in this approach.82 The complexity of environment problems 
and the various contexts in which they occur,83  as well as the influence of neoliberalism 
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contexts, have led to new ways to regulate human behaviour to resolve environmental 
problems; namely, the use of market-based instruments.84 However, market-based instruments 
also have weaknesses and cannot fully replace command and control instruments Market-based 
instruments need to be applied through centralised planning and be based on research and 
expertise, both of which are very important for setting the right level of market- based 
intervention such as taxes, charges, tariffs or caps.85  Policy makers always face difficulty in 
setting the type and level of market instruments when they have no existing market reference.86 
Many suggest it is time for the New Environmental Governance (NEG). Governance means the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at 
all levels. …it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate 
their differences. 87 The NEG aims to involve collaboration between a diversity of private, 
public and non-governmental stakeholders, who, acting together towards commonly agreed (or 
mutually negotiated) goals, hope to achieve far more collectively than individually.88 However, 
some scholars report drawbacks to the NEG. 89 NEG is more consistent with the evolving 
concept and principles of SD, as reflected in the Aarhus Convention on Access to information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
particularly.90 Although it cannot be said that the NEG is the final solution for environmental 
management, it can improve command and control and market-based instruments in terms of 
allowing systems to learn new knowledge and adapt to new complex environmental problems.91 
 
3.1.2 Sustainable development and legal obligations 
Since the global recognition of SD in 1987, the international community has tried to strengthen 
SD through international law and by creating supportive legal principles. In fact, the Legal 
Expert Group of the World Commission on Environment and Development proposed 22 legal 
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principles related to environmental protection and SD.92 A further 27 normative principles were 
declared in the Rio Declaration in 1992. 93  On the 6 April 2002, the International Law 
Association adopted the New Delhi Declaration on international law principles relating to SD.94 
It consists of seven principles: 1) the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resources; 2) equity and the eradication of poverty; 3) common but differentiated 
responsibilities; 4) precautionary approaches to human health, natural resources and 
ecosystems; 5) public participation and access to information and justice; 6) good governance; 
and 7) integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social 
economic and environmental objectives.95 Neither the New Delhi Declaration nor the 1992 Rio 
Declaration 1992 are legally binding instruments. However, they may be, or become, 
international customary law and be included in treaties.  
Currently the legal status of SD principles in international law is unclear. This can be seen from 
the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
project.96 Viriyo argues that the principle of SD was not examined clearly by the ICJ in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project case in 1997. 97  Three questions relating to SD were not 
considered in that case.98 First, the Court did not define clearly the legal status of the principles 
of SD. Second, the Court did not clearly define the normative content of the obligations. Third, 
the Court did not consider the relationship between the principle of sustainability and other 
legal principles in international environmental law such as the precautionary principle and the 
need for Environmental Impact Assessments.99 However, Sand argues that the Court invoked 
the concept of SD to suggest a way forward.100 Sands further points out that SD is a concept, 
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not a principle or rule, with a legal function in the majority Court’s opinion.101 Lastly, Sand pin-
points that the concept of SD has both procedural and temporal aspects, the content of which 
was not defined by the Court.102 
While the ICJ did not clearly indicate the legal status of the concept of sustainability in 
international law, the Vice President of the ICJ, Judge Weeramantry, pointed out in a separate 
opinion that SD principles are a part of modern international law to balance economic 
development and environmental protection. 103  Segger and Khalfan indicate that not all 
principles of international law on SD, even those that have appeared in treaties, have been 
recognised as international customary law.104 105 
Although the legal status of obligations to the principles of SD are not clear. This thesis follows 
the work of the International Law Association (ILA) by classifing the legal principles of SD 
into the seven principles below. 
Principle 1: The duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources 
  
This principle refers to the fact that States have sovereign right to manage their own natural 
resources according to their own environmental and developmental policies. However, States 
need to respect their international legal obligation by not causing significant harm to other 
States or areas outside their national jurisdiction.106 Furthermore, States have a duty to use 
natural resources in a sustainable manner for the benefit of their people by considering the 
rights of Indigenous peoples, the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, and the 
protection of the environment/ecosystems. Additionally, States must show concern for the 
needs of future generations while using natural resources in the present day.107 This principle 
has appeared in many international instruments, both legally binding and non-legally binding.  
Such instruments include the United Nation General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the 
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“Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” on 14 December 1962,108  the Stockholm 
Declaration 1972,109 the Rio Declaration 1992,110 the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
(JPOI) 2002,111 and the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC 
)1992.112   
Principle 2: The principle of equity and the eradication of poverty 
This principle aims to ensure an equitable distribution of responsibilities and resources among 
the world’s population, across both present and future generations. 113  This principle also 
includes the duty of the State to contribute to the eradication of poverty.114 This duty appears 
in the Charter of the United Nations,115 the Rio Declaration,116 the Millennium Development 
Goals,117 and the SDGs.118   
 
Principle 3: The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
This principle encompasses the idea that States and all relevant actors have common but 
different responsibilities to achieve SD and protect the environment. The duty of common but 
different responsibilities consists of two basic elements.  First, the common responsibility of 
states to protect the environment at the regional, national and global levels.119 Second, the need 
to take into account the different circumstances, particularly in relation to each state’s 
contribution to the evolution of a particular problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and 
control the threat.120 The principle of common but differentiated responsibility appears in both 
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legally binding and non-legally binding international instruments such as the Rio Declaration 
1992,121 the JPOI 2002122, the UNFCCC 1992,123 and the Kyoto Protocol.124 
 
Principle 4: The principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural 
resources and ecosystems 
This principle requires that States, international organisations and the civil society, particularly 
the scientific and business communities, avoid human activity which may cause significant 
harm to human health, natural resources or ecosystems, including in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. It is claimed that a precautionary approach is central to SD because it responds to 
environmental sustainability, social sustainability and development.125  
 
The precautionary principle consists of three duties: 1) the state has a duty to account for harm 
from development; 2) the state has the duty to plan with clear criteria and well-defined goals, 
with due consideration of all possible means, through an environmental impact assessment, to 
achieve an objective (including, in certain instances, not proceeding with an envisaged 
activity).126 In respect to activities which may cause serious long-term or irreversible harm, the 
state also has a duty to establish an appropriate burden of proof on the person or persons 
carrying out (or intending to carry out) the activity; and 3) the state has a duty to make decisions 
by endorsing a precautionary approach to risk management and the state should proceed to 
adopt appropriate precautionary measures even when the absence of risk seems scientifically 
assured.127 The precautionary principle appears in many international instruments, both legally 
binding and non-legally binding, such as such as the World Charter of Nature, the Rio 
Declaration 1992, the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Principle 5: The principle of public participation and access to information and justice 
Public participation is necessary for SD and good governance because it is a condition of 
responsive, transparent and accountable governments. It is also a condition for the active 
engagement of equally responsive, transparent and accountable civil society organisations, 
including industrial concerns and trade unions. The role of women in SD should also be a key 
concern.128 To achieve effective public participation in the context of SD, human rights need 
to be protected.129 Bell and McGilvary indicate that public participation has three core ideas: 1) 
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access to information; 2) access to decision making; and 3) access to justice.130 The principle of 
public participation appears in both legally binding and non-legally binding instruments 
relating to environmental protection and water management, as well as in global and regional 
treaties. For example, the Rio Declaration 1992,131 the Convention on Biodiversity 1992,132 the 
UNFCCC 1992,133 the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, the Aarhus Convention 1998134, and 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes 1992.135 
 
Principle 6: The principle of good governance 
Good governance consists of four obligations: 1) to adopt democratic and transparent decision-
making procedures and financial accountability; 2) to take effective measures to combat official 
or other corruption; 3) to respect due process in their procedures and to observe the rule of law 
and human rights; and 4) to implement a public procurement approach according to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) Code on Public Procurement.136 It is claimed that many human 
rights obligations of States support the principle of good governance, although there is no direct 
treaty to deal with this issue.137 The human rights instrument and treaties138 which support the 
principle of good governance are the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948139, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966140, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 141 , the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women 1979142; the Declaration on the Right to Development 1986143; 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990. 144 
                                                                
130 Stuart Bell and Donald McGillivray, Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 311. 
131 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF151/26 vol. 1 (1992) 
132 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) art 13.   
133 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992. 1771 UNTS 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994). Art. 6.  
134 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (entered into force 30 October 2001). 
135 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes opened for signature 17 
March 1992, 1936 UNTS 269 (6 October 1996) Art. 16. 
136Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, above n 2, 102. 
137 United Nations Human Rights Office of the high commissioner, Good Governance and Human Rights (20 June 2018) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx> 
138 Johanna Jokinen, International legal instruments addressing good governance (United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme, 2002) (12 May 2015) 
<http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2107_72061_Intl%20legal%20instruments%20good%20gov%20publication.pdf>. 
139 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III) UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183rd Plenary meeting, UN Doc 
A/810 (10 December 1948) art 21, 28.   
140 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered 
into force 23 March 1976) Art 2.  
141 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 3 January 1976) Art 2.   
142 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 December 1979, 
1249UNTS 13 (entry into force 3 September 1981) 
143 Declaration on the Right to Development, UN GAOR, 97th Meeting, Un Doc A/Res/41/128 (4 December 1986) annex 
144 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577UNTS 3 (entry into force 2 
September 1990) 
94 
 
 
Principle 7: The principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation 
to human rights and social, economic and environmental objectives 
This principle implies that the State should ensure the integration of all principles (human 
rights, social, economic and environmental) at all levels of governance structures (international, 
national, regional and local levels) in order to achieve SD.145 146 This obligation appears in the 
Rio Declaration147, the JPOI,148 the UNFCCC,149 the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
1992,150and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 1994.151 
   
3.1.3 Sustainable development and (local) customary law 
Bosselman and Orebech contend that customary law relates to SD because some customary 
law systems can govern natural resources more effectively than statutory law, especially 
CPRs.152 Furthermore, Bosselman and Orebech indicate that using customary law might not 
always result in sustainability, but studying customary law can provide methods to sustainably 
manage resources.153 The argument of Bosselman and Orebech is well supported by various 
examples of customary law for governing pasture,154 irrigation,155 fisheries, forests, and other 
natural resources studied by Ostrom and other CPR scholars. The role of customary law for 
sustainable natural resource management has been recognised at many international 
conferences and through international instruments relating to sustainable natural resource 
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management. For example, the Rio Declaration 1992,156 Agenda 21,157 the CBD 1992,158 the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 1971 
[Ramsar Convention on the Wetland],159 and the UNCCD 1994.160    
3.2 The principles of sustainability and the application to water resource management 
 
Water is an essential component for all living things. It is also a significant factor in relation to 
the wellbeing of people and economic development.161  Pearce et al. mention three important 
attributes of water: 1) water cannot be substituted by any other resource; 2) water is important 
for the survival of human kind; and 3) the depletion of today’s water might result in a heavy 
economic cost for the next generation.162  Similarly, Postel indicates the factors that make water 
management different from other resource management: 1) water is important for human 
survival; 2) water cannot be substituted; 3) water is limited, although water is a renewable 
resource; and 4) water is not distributed equally in terms of time and place.163  Historically, it is 
suggested that the need to manage water was at the origin of civilisation164 because water 
ensures the basic needs of a civilisation.165 Moreover, water and energy play a vital role in the 
human development process.166  The present-day water problems include: 1) the fact that around 
783 million people cannot access drinking water167 ; 2) how to respond to the social and 
economic demands of the increasing need for water168 in terms of quality and quantity; and 3) 
how to manage water to avoid the crisis presented by global climate change.169 Furthermore, 
water resources also face problems in relation to pollution and the increasing water demands 
of agriculture, industry and the energy sector.170  
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3.2.1 Meaning and evaluation of the sustainable water resource management concept  
 
Global water problems have led to the demand to find and implement strategies that ultimately 
lead to SD. This is often referred to as ‘sustainable water management’. In fact, there is no 
universal or official definition of sustainable water management. Russo and others observe that 
the difficulties in each definition has led to the rejection of a universal meaning.171 These 
difficulties consist of: 1) using subjective language and a lack of detail; 2) offering only a broad 
conceptualisation of the sectors or environments to consider; and 3) using qualitative and 
normative words which become difficult to interpret.172 For example, Mays defines sustainable 
water management as water management that meets current water demand for all water users 
without compromising future supply.173 However, Louck and others define sustainable water 
management as a system that contributes to the objectives of society, now and into the future, 
while maintaining their ecological, environmental, and hydrological integrity.174 It is clear that 
these authors indicate one important attribute of sustainable water management; namely, that 
management can be changed according to dynamic circumstances. This implies that systems 
are designed and operated to respond to any kind of change. This makes them more adaptive, 
robust and resilient to any kind of uncertainty. Moreover, they can recover from any failure 
without any undue cost.175   
 
The objective of sustainable water management, declared in Agenda 21, is to ensure that 
adequate supplies of good quality water are maintained for the entire population of the planet, 
while preserving the hydrological, biological and chemical functions of ecosystems, adapting 
human activities within the capacity limits of nature, and combating vectors of water-related 
diseases.176 The aim of sustainable water management in agriculture is defined as matching 
water availability and water needs in quantity and quality, in space and time, at reasonable cost 
and with acceptable environmental impact.177  Pearce and others also indicate that two criteria 
should be observed to ensure the sustainability of water: maintaining water quality and 
quantity.178 However, Larsen and Gujer point out that no matter how the concept of sustainable 
water management is defined, none of them work in practice.179  
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In terms of the meaning of sustainable water management, this thesis argues that the 
enforcement of a rigid meaning can lead to problems of blueprint thinking or what is known as 
the panacea problem which tries to apply only one approach to resolve any kind of water 
problem. Conversely, the absence of a universal (rigid) meaning of sustainable water 
management may sometimes provide benefits to practitioners by allowing them to interpret 
and adjust sustainable water management to fit with the specific physical economic and social 
conditions of their area. Moreover, Heintz argues that SD is a long-term process that requires 
human adaption to changes in the biosphere. Humans need to understand which of their 
measures or activities are working or not working to create the sustainability. 180  Hence, 
feedback mechanisms and indicators to measure sustainability are required.181   
 
Louck and others have proposed criteria to measure the sustainability of water resource 
systems.182 Louck also indicates the issues central to achieving sustainable water systems 
including the adaption of systems to change, scale, risk, technology and training.183  Flint 
proposes a process to establish criteria to measure sustainability and to measure the progress 
of activities to achieve sustainability. This process involves the participation of all 
stakeholders.184 Pykh and Pykh claim that the major drivers to impact water use in the future 
will be: 1) the size of the population; 2) patterns of water consumption and technologies; 3) trade 
policies and food production; and 4) the level of carbon emissions (which may increase the level 
of global heat). They further indicate what States should do to achieve sustainable water 
resource management at the national level:185  
i) Develop, maintain and protect watershed areas, irrigation systems, distribution 
networks and appropriate catchment systems and promote effective programmes 
for water conservation and prevention of water contamination through inter alia, 
the development of integrated of national water plans, the use of appropriate 
incentives and regulatory measures, community involvement in management and 
conservation, forest management and reforestation and investment strategies. 
 ii) Adopt appropriate standards for the management of fresh water resources, and 
develop and strengthen low-cost monitoring and assessment capabilities, linked 
to water resource data based, for relevant decision making tools including 
forecasting models for water management, planning and utilization.  
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iii) Strengthen procedures to monitor and respond to the impacts of natural and 
environmental hazards, in particular the impacts of climate change and climate 
variability, including drought and sea level rise, on water resources.  
vi) Encourage the development and acquisition of appropriate technology and 
training for cost effective sewage disposal, desalination and rainwater collection 
to provide sufficiently high-quality potable freshwater, including opportunities for 
technology interchange between small island developing states.  
v) Strengthen national capacities to make decisions between competing demands 
over the allocation of limited water resources.186 
Vapnek and others indicate the factors to potentially affect water management as 
presented in the chart below: 
 
Figure 4  Factors that affect present-day water management (Source: Jessica Vapnek et.al. Law for water management: a guide 
to concepts and effective approaches.FAO,2009) 
Sustainable water laws need to be designed to respond to these changes. 
3.2.2 Legal obligations implementation and sustainable water resource governance 
This thesis focuses on the role of law in terms of water management and water governance to 
determine whether the Thai government applies international standards for achieving 
sustainable water management. 
In term of the role of law in water management, Wouters argues that the law is applied at the 
national level, transboundary level, and international level to regulate conflicts between 
upstream and downstream users. Laws help to ‘create rule of games’ in the utilisation of water. 
Hence, it is the role of laws to provide stability, predictability and flexibility in water 
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management regimes. 187  Wouters focuses on conflict settlement among upstream and 
downstream users, citing the following examples of how laws are used to establish the rules of 
the game in water management:  
- defines the legal entitlement to water and identifies the rights and obligations tied to 
water use and thus provides the prescriptive parameters for its development; 
- provide the framework for balancing competing needs (i.e., framework for allocation 
and balancing of needs of all stakeholders); 
- design mechanisms to ensure the ongoing integrity of the regime (i.e., monitoring, 
regulation, compliance, dispute avoidance and settlement); and 
- facilitate the rational modification of existing regimes (i.e., to meet changing needs 
over time).188 
These functions of water laws as indicated by Wouter, are used to evaluate the water laws in 
Thailand and whether they can work to towards SD. Furthermore, to explore whether Thailand’s 
water laws meet international standards and are consistent with SD, this thesis considers two 
kinds of law: international obligations relating to water laws; and national implementation of 
water laws guided by the concept and principles of SD. However, the main focal point of this 
thesis remains the issues relating to the recognition of customary law in relation to water use 
in Thailand.   
a. International obligations 
Gachenga argues that the first generation of international water laws focused on navigational 
matters. The international water laws relating to environmental conservation matters have only 
been developed in recent years.189 
  
Currently, there are two kinds of treaties creating the legal obligations for States in regard to 
the utilisation of international watercourses. First, there are laws related to the non-navigational 
use of water in international watercourses such as the UN Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Use of International Watercourses 1997.  Second, there are laws related to 
ecological systems. These laws create the legal obligations for States at the international level 
such as the CBD 1992, the UNCCD, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. Reginal 
conventions also create international legal obligations. Examples of this are the Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of water in the Mekong River Basin 1995 
and the Agreement on the Commercial Navigation on Lancang-Mekong River.  
 
The international instruments mentioned above are not the only tools used to create legal 
obligations. There are also non-legally binding international instruments such as the works of 
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the ILA190 in relation to international rivers, which also provide guidelines on the utilisation of 
international rivers. The works of the ILA include the Helsinki rules on the use of international 
rivers191, and the Berlin rules on water resources.192  
 
International fresh water law has been criticised for the fact that it fails to create a framework 
for resolving the issue of water scarcity and problems of water access at the national level.193 
It does however provide guidance for governing international watercourses, transboundary 
water resources and the settlement of disputes.194 Furthermore, the obligations for international 
fresh water law belong to the State not the individual. Additionally, international freshwater 
law focuses only on the water resources shared by States.195    
The United Nation Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses was 
established on 17 August 2014.196 However, with only 36 countries ratifying the convention its 
legal effect is limited. Thailand has not signed, approved, accepted or acceded to this 
convention. Only some legal obligations in the form of international customary law can bind 
Thailand, however it is a party to the CBD, the Ramsar Convention and the regional treaties 
relating to water utilisation and navigation in the Mekong River, as mentioned above.      
Gachenga asserts that international water law has now moved forward from international 
considerations to global ones. This means that not only are States counted as players in the 
management of water, but also other players such as international organisations, Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), communities and the private sector are included in water 
governance. In fact, the word ‘global water governance” was first used in 2008 and defined as 
“the development and implementation of norms, principles, rules, incentives, informative tools, 
and infrastructure to promote a change in the behaviour of actors at the global level in the area 
of water governance”.197    
The present legal obligations for using water in international watercourses are: 
- The reasonable and equitable utilisation of water198 
- No significant harm199 
                                                                
190 Salman MA Salman, 'The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on 
International Water Law' (2007) 23(4) Water Resources Development 628. 
<https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Salman-BerlinRules.pdf>. 
191 Ibid, 629. 
192 Ibid, 630. 
193 Gachenga, above n 161, 94. 
194 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, open for signature 21 May 1997, 36 ILM, 
700 (entered in to force 17 August 2014). 
195 Gachenga, above n 161, 92. 
196 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, open for signature 21 May 1997, 36 ILM, 
700 (entered in to force 17 August 2014). 
197 Heather Cooley et.al., ‘Global Water Governance in the Twenty-First Century’, in The World’s Water (Island Press, 2014) 6. 
198 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, open for signature 21 May 1997, 36 
ILM, 700 (entered in to force 17 August 2014), Art 5.  
199 Ibid, Art 7. 
101 
 
- Notification and consultation regarding planned measures200 
- Cooperation in water utilisation201 
- Regular provision of information202 
- Environmental impact assessment203 
- Protection of international water courses and their ecosystems204 
- Peaceful dispute settlement205  
It is clear that international obligations set down in international water laws establish the rules 
of the game and the duty of each State to protect international watercourses and their ecosystem. 
They do not however establish the duty of the State to create sustainable water management at 
the national level.206  
Table 1 Missions of water law and international obligations according to the UN Convention on the Law of Non- 
Navigational Use of International Watercourses 1997  
Missions of water law according to the opinion of 
Professor Patricia Wouters207 
International obligations according to  UN Convention on 
the Law of Non-Navigational uses of International 
Watercourse 1997 
Defines the legal entitlement to water and identifies 
the rights and obligations tied to water use and thus 
provides the prescriptive parameters for its 
development 
- The reasonable and equitable utilisation of water 
- No significant harm 
- Environmental impact assessment 
 
Provides the framework for balancing competing 
needs (i.e., a framework for allocation and balancing 
of needs of all stakeholders) 
- The reasonable and equitable utilisation of water 
 
Designs mechanisms to ensure the ongoing integrity 
of the regime (i.e., monitoring, regulation, 
compliance, dispute avoidance and settlement) 
- Notification and consultation regarding planned measures 
- Cooperation in water utilisation 
- Regular provision of information 
- Peaceful dispute settlement 
Facilitates the rational modification of existing 
regimes (i.e., to meet changing needs over time). 
- The reasonable and equitable utilisation of water 
 
*These missions of water law were not mentioned 
by Wouters 208 
- Protection of international water course and their ecosystems 
- Environmental impact assessment 
Sources (Patricia Wouters, ‘The Relevance and Role of Water Law in the Sustainable Development of Freshwater: From 
“Hydrosovereignty” to “Hydrosolidarity”." Water International 25(2) (2000), 203 and UN Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational uses of International Watercourse 1997) 
In terms of the recognition of customary water rights of local people, these have been 
mentioned in various international water laws, both legally binding and non-legally binding. 
For example, both Article 6 of the United Nations convention on the Law of Non-Navigational 
Use of International Watercourses (1997) and Article 5 of Helsinki rules on the use of 
international rivers (1966) relate to the reasonable and equitable use of international 
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watercourses and international rivers. Even the Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development of water in the Mekong River Basin (1995), to which Thailand is a 
signatory State, mentions factors similar to those included in article. Although none of the 
international instruments mentioned above use the words ‘customary rights’, they do use the 
term ‘existing use’. This refers to the customary water rights of people as indicated by 
Fuentes.209 The notion of recognition of customary water rights for local people has also 
appeared in judgments and agreements of the ICJ, including the judgement of the Fisheries 
case between the UK and Norway 1951210, the Memorandum to the Exchange of Notes between 
the British and French Governments Defining the Boundary between the Gold Coast and 
French Soudan of 1904211, the Protocol accompanying the Final Report of the Commissioners 
Appointed to Delimit the Boundary between the British and French Mandated Territories of 
Togoland (21 October 1929)212, and the 1926 Exchange of Notes between the Belgian and 
British governments regarding the Frontier of Tanganyika-Ruanda-Urundi.213 
 
Hence, the customary water rights of local people are arguably recognised by international law 
and therefore Thailand is bound to respect such customary water rights.   
b. Domestic water law  
To achieve sustainable water management at a national level, some legal obligations need to 
be incorporated into domestic water law, particularly the legal principles of SD.214 Although 
international water law is often critiqued for its failure to create sustainable water management 
at the national level,215 States need to follow the principles of international water law that 
become the lex lata. These include the duty to not cause significant harm to another country or 
the duty to do Environmental Impact Assessments. Furthermore, States need to incorporate 
other international obligations into their water law according to treaties to which they are a 
party. An example is the Convention on Biological diversity UNFCCC. This section 
investigates only the general contents for domestic water law for sustainable water 
management. Chapter 4 provides more details about the present trends in domestic water law 
relating to the recognition of customary law. 
Although, it is clear that one purpose of water law is to create the rules of the game for 
management, States also have a duty to protect the ecosystems of the internal river in order to 
achieve sustainable water management. Furthermore, a participatory approach to water 
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management and transparency in public decision making needs to be incorporated into water 
legislation to ensure that minorities, women and children are not discriminated against. These 
aspects also need to be considered through impact assessments and economic instruments.216   
In terms of customary water law, it is important to consider how customary laws or rights can 
be included in water management. This thesis argues that water law scholars regard water 
management customary law, or water customary rights, as one source of water law.217 Legal 
entitlement to water therefore needs to include water management customary law or water 
customary rights in the process to reflect the intra-generational equality principle of SD.   
Table 2 Comparisons of missions of water law, contents of water law, and recommendations for sustainable water 
governance  
Missions of water law according 
to the opinion of Professor 
Patricia Wouters 
Contents of water law according to 
the suggestion of Dante A. 
Caponera218 
Further recommendations for 
sustainable water governance by Mc 
Caffery and Weber219 
Defines the legal entitlement to 
water and identifies the rights and 
obligations tied to water use and 
thus provides the prescriptive 
parameters for its development 
- Sources of water law (legislations / 
customary law) 
- Ownership/ other judicial status of 
water 
- Right to use water 
- Permit system / concession 
- Limitations of right to use water  
- Planning for SD of water resources 
- Implementation of plan (rights & 
duties of water users) 
 
Provides the framework for 
balancing competing needs (i.e., 
framework for allocation and 
balancing of needs of all 
stakeholders) 
- Water resource planning 
- Collection and use of information 
- Priorities to use water 
- Beneficial uses 
 
Designs mechanisms to ensure the 
ongoing integrity of the regime (i.e., 
monitoring, regulation, compliance, 
dispute avoidance and settlement) 
- Judicial and administrative control 
over water ownership, use and 
distribution 
- Penalties and sanctions 
- Implementation of plan (planning 
construction, financing and operation 
of water work) 
Facilitates the rational modification 
of existing regimes (i.e., to meet 
changing needs over time). 
- Recognition of reallocation of pre-
existing water rights 
 
*These missions of water law were 
not mentioned by Wouters 
- Harmful effect of water 
- Water quality and pollution control 
- Environmental protection 
- Underground water 
- Control and protection of water works 
and structures 
- Protected zones / areas 
- Legislation on financial aspects 
- Water user organisations 
- The relationships among water law 
and other legislations 
- Customary water law and institution  
- Participatory approach to water 
management 
- Transparency in public decision 
making 
- Conservation of fresh water resource 
- Integrated water resource 
management 
- Impact assessment 
- Economic instruments 
- General rules to the interpretation of 
water law 
- Sources of water under the regulation 
by law 
Sources: Patricia Wouters, ‘The Relevance and Role of Water Law in the Sustainable Development of Freshwater: From 
“Hydrosovereignty” to “Hydrosolidarity” (2000)25(2) Water International, Dante A. Caponera, Principles of Water Law and 
Administration National and International (Taylor & Francis Group, 2007) and Stephen C McCaffrey and Gregory S Weber, 
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Guidebook for Policy and Legislative Development on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Freshwater Resources (United 
Nations Environment Programme Nairobi, Kenya, 2005) 
  
Another present day approach to achieving sustainable water development is ‘greening the 
water law’. This means putting environmental considerations into both international and 
national water laws.220 The integration of environmental considerations into national laws can 
be done by measures such as providing environmental criteria in water permits or licenses,221 
providing pollution prevention measures, requiring Environmental Impact Assessment reports 
in water law, the prioritisation of water allocation for environmental purposes, and setting the 
environmental flow.   
3.3 Muang Fai irrigation systems and sustainable development 
As mentioned earlier, SD means development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This thesis argues that 
Muang Fai customary law is a continuing and sustainable customary law, as defined by 
Bossleman, which supports SD.222  
 
The following section compares and contrasts the principles of sustainability, the Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (DSWSD),223 with the Muang Fai system to 
explore the hypothesis that irrigation by Muang Fai communities is in fact sustainable water 
resource management. It considers whether the Muang Fai irrigation system should be adjusted 
to manage water resources more sustainably according to the SD principles as applied to 
IWRM. 
3.3.1. Principle of sustainability and Muang Fai irrigation system     
 
Key aspects of SD include the ‘needs of people’ and the ‘limitation of natural resources’. In 
terms of the needs of people, SD should create intergenerational equality and intra-generational 
equity. Thailand has accepted the principle of SD and repeatedly incorporated it into its 
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Constitutions and policies. Some examples of this are the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan224, the Water Management Strategic Plan 2016-2026225, and the strategic 
plan of the Royal Irrigation Department.226 It can be argued that Muang Fai customary law is 
compatible with SD because it creates environmental, social and economic benefits as 
mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, the water utilisation approach of Muang Fai and 
the rules of Muang Fai create a system of law consistent with SD. Water utilisation in the 
Muang Fai community creates intergenerational equality and intra-generational equity. This is 
because the rules of Muang Fai allow all water users (in the same generation at the same time) 
to access water equitably. At the same time, Muang Fai customary laws and some local customs 
conserve nature, in particular the river-source forest, allowing water utilisation within the 
limitations of nature. In particular, under Muang Fai customary law forests are not destroyed 
for the construction of dams, as mentioned above. In this sense, Muang Fai promotes the right 
for the next generation to utilise water.  
 
The rules of Muang Fai support public participation, another important element of SD. All 
water users can participate in meetings to draft water contracts or at annual meetings to express 
their needs. Indirectly, Muang Fai customary law supports the food security of local people, 
especially through the rule to preserve the river-source forest. The local people’s way of life 
relating to poly-cultures growing on their land is compatible with the report from the UN’s 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.227 The report suggests that small farms play a key 
role in the elimination of hunger, as opposed to the large agribusiness.228 This is because the 
large agribusinesses aim to produce food for livestock rather than for humans. It is argued that 
70 percent of the global food source is presently produced on small farms.229   
  
However, there are some who claim that Muang Fai irrigation is not a sustainable form of water 
management and is not economical.230 This is because the Muang Fai structures, particular the 
weirs made from natural materials, need to be repaired every year. They also claim that annual 
Muang Fai maintenance causes forest depletion and illegal logging.231 An example of this 
comes from the Muang Fai system in Chiang Rai province.232  While it is clear that weirs made 
                                                                
224 See the National Economic and Social Development Plan of Thailand since 1992-present day. All of them have incorporated 
the principle of sustainable development as one part of them. 
225 See Thailand’s National Strategic Plan for Water Resource Management (2016-2026). 
226 Royal Irrigation Department of Thailand, ThailandThe strategic plan of the Royal Irrigation Department () (, 201) 
227 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’, A/HRC/25/57 24 January 2014 
228 Ibid, 3, 7, 10, 15  
229 Ibid. 
230 Surawong, Saowapak, Environment Change and Muang-Fai Management by communities in Tambon Saikaow and 
Tambon Thanthong, Amphoe Phan, Changwat Chiang Rai (Master of Art (Man and Environment Management) Thesis, 
University of Chiang Mai University, 2000). 
231 Ibid 57. 
232 Ibid. 
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from natural materials are not as strong as concrete weirs, it should also be noted that even 
concrete weirs need to be repaired occasionally. Furthermore, maintenance of Muang Fai 
structures can be done using bamboo and rocks instead of logs. Bamboo can be grown alongside 
the ditches and need not be cut from the forest. Thus, it could be argued that the maintenance 
of Muang Fai irrigation systems is not the main cause of forest depletion and Muang Fai water 
resource management is still the sustainable water management.  Furthermore, this weakness in 
the Muang Fai irrigation system can be resolved by allowing the government to convert weirs 
made from natural materials to cement weirs, and by allowing local people to manage water 
according to their customary law. This is because the key point of the Muang Fai irrigation 
system is not its structures, but the management systems which place an emphasis on the 
participatory approach along with the local people who manage water sustainably and 
compatibly according to their needs.  
In addition, Neef, Elstner and Schad point out that villagers in Muang Fai and other 
neighbouring communities try to mitigate the effects of floods by dredging the river, widening 
the river bed, building riverbank protection, measuring rainfall and setting a siren to warn 
people of impending floods.233 
The activities of Muang Fai are compatible with the SD legal obligations in the following ways. 
First, the constructions of Muang Fai weirs do not absolutely block the water flow in the same 
way that a dam construction does. This means that aquatic animals can still move along the 
river. Furthermore, weir construction does not require a reservoir. Thus, it does not require the 
cutting of trees to construct the reservoir. Hence, the activities of Muang Fai cause minimal 
harm to other wildlife and people along the river. Furthermore, recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law would mean that the State would be allowing sustainable use of water and 
related natural resources for the benefit of local people. Second, the water management in 
Muang Fai provides equality of access to water both intra-generationally and 
intergenerationally, and contributes to the alleviation of local poverty by supplying local people 
with water for cultivation.  Third, activities of Muang Fai also allow local people to participate 
in the river-source forest conservation through traditional rituals. Thus, it can be said that Thai 
land follows the principle of common but different responsibility, if Thailand recognizes 
Muang Fai institutions and allows people to practice Muang Fai customary law. Although, it is 
a duty of state to follow the principle of common but different responsibility, states cannot fulfil 
this duty by themselves. The state needs to enact laws to recognize Muang Fai customary law 
to show that Thailand follows the principle of common but different responsibility.   Fourth, the 
decision-making process and activities in water management of Muang Fai, especially the 
construction and maintenance of weirs and dikes, depend heavily on the public participation of 
                                                                
233 Neef, A., et al. "The Interplay between Collective Action, Individual Strategies and State Intervention in Mitigating Flood 
Disasters in the Uplands of North Thailand and Northwest Vietnam." in Community, Environment and Disaster Risk 
Management (Emerald, 2013).  109-130. 
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members through meetings. It is clear, then, that Muang Fai supports the principle of public 
participation, as mentioned above. Fifth, the decision-making processes of Muang Fai are 
compatible with the principle of good governance, particularly that of using democratic and 
transparent processes through the election of a water manager.  
It is not clear whether the Muang Fai community should concern itself with all aspects of SD 
when they carry out their activities. However, the Muang Fai community member meetings 
enable a dialogue to take place in which they consider any issues that may arise. For example, 
a Muang Fai community can deny a new comer (outsiders) from using water from the Muang 
Fai system if it impacts upon the natural water supply capacity of the water resource.  
Table 3 Muang Fai’s activities and sustainable development 
Sustainable development legal 
obligations 
Muang Fai 
activities 
Reasons 
Duty to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resource 
 Not cause significant harm  
Equity and eradication of poverty  Sharing water equitably, both intra / inter generation and 
support the local economy 
Common but different responsibility  Support the responsibility of local people to conserve the 
river-source forest and use water economically 
Precautionary principle N/A - 
Public participation  Allowing people to access information, participate in 
decision making, and access to justice in water management 
Good governance  Using democratic and transparent processes in decision 
making 
Integration and inter relationship among 
social, economic and environmental 
aspects 
Partly Not clear, but the Muang Fai meeting process can be 
adjusted to be the discussion area for this issue.   
Source: International Law Association (ILA), New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development, ILA Resolution 3/2002, annex, UN Doc. A/57/329 (6 August 2002), 
3.3.2. Muang Fai & Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 1992 
The Muang Fai system is compatible with the DSWSD 1992 for three main reasons. First, the 
Muang Fai system is compatible with the 1st principle of the DSWSD 1992 by managing water 
and relating resources using a holistic approach. For example, Muang Fai takes into 
consideration the forest at the river source, the plant species grown in the areas where Muang 
Fai systems can distribute water, the need to construct weirs at a height which allows the fish 
to jump over them for breeding, the land use planning in the Muang Fai area, and the water 
demands of each species of plant. Hence, Muang Fai is an irrigation system which integrates 
water resources and other natural resources into its decision-making processes and which 
follows a holistic approach. However, the Muang Fai system does not focus on managing 
underground water and water quality including waste water. 
Second, the Muang Fai system is compatible with the 2nd principle of DSWSD 1992, namely 
the participatory approach. This is because Muang Fai has processes in place to involve people 
into water management in three ways: 1) to involve water users in access to water management 
information; 2) to give access to decision making and to conflict management; and 3) through 
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the positions of water messengers in the Muang Fai system whose main duty is to transmit 
information about water management to all water users in the Muang Fai community. Thus, it 
can be said that the Muang Fai system has the mechanisms in place to promote water users’ 
right to access information. Furthermore, Muang Fai has annual meetings that facilitate a 
dialogue to discuss water users’ opinions and interest in the decision-making process. Muang 
Fai promotes water users’ rights to participate in decision making.   
Moreover, the Muang Fai system has mechanisms in place to settle water conflicts among water 
users in the same community, and also between water users in the upper riparian community 
and lower riparian community. Each Muang Fai community has a water manager whose duty 
is to allocate water equitably to all water users according to tradition. Moreover, the Muang Fai 
system has preventive conflict measures for water users in the upper and lower riparian 
communities by sharing water according to odds days and even days. In this way, Muang Fai 
promotes water users’ rights to access a form of review, albeit a review process that is quite 
different from a judicial review conducted by a Court. It could be argued that the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the Muang Fai system is better than a judicial review because the 
Muang Fai system is faster and cheaper than a court proceeding and is applied in a local context. 
In IWRM, one common approach is to establish a River Basin Committee to support 
participatory decision-making processes on how to allocate water in the river basin. This 
approach is similar to the administration of Muang Fai where the Water Manager acts as a chief 
of the River Basin Committee and the Water Manager’s assistant who acts as leader of the 
water user group in each ditch. These people are responsible for transferring information and 
the water demands of each group to the committee within the Muang Fai system. 
Muang Fai is partly compatible with the 3rd principle of the DSWSD 1992 that emphasises a 
greater role for women in water related decision making. Actually, it cannot be said that Muang 
Fai supports the role of woman in the administration of Muang Fai, but Muang Fai customary 
law allows female water users to vote and to work along with male water users in Muang Fai. 
Moreover, some female water users are elected as water messenger in Muang Fai communities 
as previously mentioned.  
Finally, Muang Fai is compatible with the 4th principle of the DSWSD 1992 that deems water 
as an economic good. All water users in the Muang Fai system must share the costs and 
expenses of the Muang Fai system by paying water fees. Water users must also accept 
responsibility for the tools and equipment used to construct and maintain weirs and ditches, 
instead of paying for additional Muang Fai costs. Hence, it can be claimed that Muang Fai is 
compatible with the 4th DSWSD 1992 principle.234  This claim could be subjected to the 
                                                                
234 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January 1992), the 4th principle. 
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criticisms above related to neoliberalism. However, this economic arrangement is embedded in 
community directed rules and relationships. 
Table 4 Compatibility between the Dublin Principles on Water and Sustainable Development 1992 and Muang Fai 
customary law 
Dublin principle on Water and Sustainable Development 
1992 
Muang Fai rules 
Integrated water resource management  
Public participation  
Emphasise the role of woman partly 
Treating water as an economic good  
Source: The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on Water and 
the Environment, (Adopted 31 January, 1992), 
3.3.3. Muang Fai law, Water User Organisation concept and Thailand’s legislation to 
recognise Muang Fai 
As presented in the previous chapter, Muang Fai works as a Water User Organisation (WUO). 
It is, however, worth exploring how Muang Fai is different from modern WUOs and if it is 
possible to adjust Muang Fai to be a WUO in the modern sense. Muang Fai has previously been 
recognised as a customary law under both the ancient Muang Rai Sart Code Law (MRSCD) as 
well as the People Irrigation Act (PIA) implemented from 1939 to 2015. It is worth asking the 
question as to why Muang Fai customary law was not fully recognised from 1939 to 2015 and 
what factors led to the abolition of the PIA. To answer this question, the studies of legislation 
for WUOs undertaken by Hodgson235, other scholars,236 and the work in relation to CPR theory 
by Ostrom237 and other CPR scholars238 can be used to describe these phenomena. However, 
this section focuses only the work of Hodgson, with the next section describing the decline of 
some aspects of Muang Fai in terms of CPR theory. 
In terms of the differences between Muang Fai and modern WUOs, there is no doubt that 
Muang Fai worked as a WUO in ancient times. The similarities and differences are presented 
in Table 5 below: 
                                                                
235 Stephen Hodgson, Legislation on Water Users' Organizations: A Comparative Analysis (Food & Agriculture Org., 2003); 
Stephen Hodgson, 'Creating Legal Space for Water User Organizations: Transparency, Governance and the Law' (2009)100 
FAO Legislative Study; Stephen Hodgson, Legislation for Sustainable Water User Associations (Food & Agriculture Org., 
2007),   
236 Salman, Salman MA, The legal framework for water users' associations: a comparative study (World Bank Publications, 
1997) vol 360; Chandrasekaran, C et al., 'Water Users Association for Sustainable Water Management Experiences from the 
Irrigation Sector, Tamil Nadu, India (Wise practice documents under follow up of World Conference on Science contribution 
from International Hydrological Programme of UNESCO) (2002) New Delhi; UNECSO, International Water Management 
Institute and Scientific Information Centre Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, How to Establish Water Users 
Association Practical Step for Social Mobilizer (2003). 
237 Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner, 'Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems can Work' 
(1993) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 93; Elinor Ostrom, 'Design Principles in Long‐Enduring Irrigation Institutions' 
(1993) 29(7) Water Resources Research 1907; Elinor Ostrom, Crafting institutions for self governing irrigation system (ICS 
press, 1992) 
238Shui Yan Tang, Institutions and collective action: Self-governance in irrigation (ICS press, 1992); Wai Fung Lam, Governing 
irrigation systems in Nepal: institutions, infrastructure, and collective action (Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1998) Shui 
Yan Tang, On maintenance in irrigation system a preliminary analysis, Conference Paper, December 1987 
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Table 5 Similarities and differences between a modern water user organisation and a Muang Fai community 
Topic Modern WUO Muang Fai 
Tasks  - Water supply 
- Surface / ground water management, 
- Construct the water infra structure 
- Operate and maintain systems 
- Settlement of disputes 
- Conservation 
- Capacity building 
- Water supply 
- Surface water management 
- Construct the water infrastructure 
- Operate and maintain systems 
- Settlement of disputes 
 
Legal capacity - Open the bank account 
- Present case to the court 
- Contact the State’s official on behalf of the 
entity 
-No 
Administrative 
structure 
- General assembly 
- Management board 
- Chairman 
- Employee 
- Staff 
- General assembly 
- Chairman 
- Staff  
- Treasury committee 
 
Supervision Auditor committee - No 
Collect water fee for 
the O & M cost 
Collects water fees and creates effective water 
usage 
Collects water fees and creates effective water 
usage 
Source: Stephen Hodgson, Legislation on Water Users' Organizations: A Comparative Analysis (Food & Agriculture Org., 
2003) 
 
Muang Fai is similar in some respects to more modern forms of WUOs in term of the tasks, 
administrative structure, and collection of water fees for operational and maintenance costs. 
While the tasks of Muang Fai do not so obviously include conservation and capacity building 
activities, it was argued in the previous chapter that some rituals in Muang Fai, particularly 
‘Leang Pee Khun Nam’, can conserve the river-source forest. However, that ritual is only 
undertaken by Muang Fai located on the upper river close to the river-source forest. The ritual 
is not observed by Muang Fai communities in the lower river area. Muang Fai is clearly 
different from more modern WUOs in terms of its legal capacity and supervision. This is 
because Muang Fai in the present day is not legally recognised by Thailand. Muang Fai has no 
legal capacity and it does not fall within the supervision of the Thai government. 
Studying the differences between the PIA 1939, which recognised the Muang Fai community, 
and the work of Hodgson can provide some clues about the failure of the PIA. In terms of 
similarities and differences between the PIA and Hodgson’s suggestions regarding sustainable 
legislation to regulate and support WUOs (provided in section 3.2.2), it can be argued that the 
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PIA, which recognised Muang Fai customary law between 1939 and 2015, lacked the factors 
needed to ensure the legislation was sustainable. This is explained in Table 6 below: 
Table 6 Factors for sustainable legislation for Water User Organisation and the People Irrigation Act 1939-2015 
Factors of sustainable legislation for WUO People Irrigation Act 
Public law  
Recognises the legal entity of WUO  
Provides the legal capacity to Muang Fai  
Allows farmers to craft their internal rule  Not mentioned 
Assigns power to enforce law in their jurisdiction Not clear 
(Sources: Stephen Hodgson, Legislation for Sustainable Water User Associations (Food & Agriculture Org., 2007) and the 
People Irrigation Act of Thailand) 
Based on Hodgson’s analysis of factors for sustainable legislation for WUOs (Table 6), the PIA 
was not SD legislation. First, the PIA did not recognise Muang Fai institutions as a legal entity. 
Thus, Muang Fai lacked legal capacities such as the capacity to present a case to the 
administrative officer, or Court, on behalf of Muang Fai institution.239 Second, the PIA did not 
provide clear authority for Muang Fai to craft its own rules. Traditionally, farmers in Muang 
Fai have always crafted their own rules to reflect local conditions, ignoring some provisions in 
the PIA, particularly the settlement of water conflict. Fortunately, the PIA did not provide 
sanction for farmers who chose not to use official dispute settlement processes. 
Additionally, while the PIA allowed the Water Manager of each Muang Fai community to 
settle water disputes among irrigators in the same community, it did not allow for water dispute 
settlements between irrigators within the Muang Fai community and outsider irrigators. 
Furthermore, the Thai Court in 1972 ruled that the Muang Fai Water Manager is not a State 
officer and cannot present a case to the Court on behalf of the Muang Fai community.240 This 
meant that irrigators in Muang Fai communities had no legal capacity to enforce their laws to 
govern outsiders who used land or water in Muang Fai jurisdictions. The problems relating to 
Muang Fai’s lack of legal authority to enforce laws upon outsiders is similar to the failure of 
the ‘Village Fono Act’ in Samoa (See Chapter 5). Finally, it should be observed that the PIA did 
not refer to the taxation of Muang Fai. Although this issue is not directly linked to the 
sustainability of Muang Fai, it should be considered in the design of a legal framework in the 
future.        
3.3.4. Muang Fai & Integrated Water Resource Management 
As previously established, IWRM provides space for the integration of customary law and 
traditional water institutions. It has been argued that Muang Fai needs to be incorporated into 
Thailand’s water law and management processes, which follow an IWRM approach. This thesis 
argues that Muang Fai can be incorporated into the IWRM processes just as well as other 
                                                                
239 In Thailand, Muang Fai community can open the bank account as a group of people with the legal contract although it is 
not the juristic person, <https://www.bot.or.th/Thai/FIPCS/Documents/FPG/2559/ThaiPDF/25590157.pdf>. 
240 Mr. Sao Khuenkaew, Chief of T Huy Pa Muang irrigation system v Mr. Kam or Jankam Kaewruan [1972] Supreme Court’s 
Decision Number 2785/2515 (Supreme Court of Thailand) 
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WUOs. This is because the activities of Muang Fai communities are similar to the irrigation 
management activities241 and WUOs.242 The irrigation management activities are discussed in 
the next section, which considers CPRs. Furthermore, the public participation processes of 
Muang Fai are compatible with the IWRM approach to public participation. Muang Fai 
provides for full-scale public participation in water management, that may be greater than 
public participation within normal WUOs. Not only is the public participation aspect of Muang 
Fai compatible with IWRM, but the activities to integrate water and land management and the 
collection of water fees are also compatible. 
3.4 Common Pool Resources and Water Governance 
The following section of this thesis explores Common Pool Resource Management (CPRM) 
theory and how it relates to irrigation. It will also look at the role of government to support the 
utilisation of CPRs (CPR) to obtain the sustainable use. Finally, it will explore how the 
legislation to govern water, based on CPRM theory, should be designed to support SD. 
The CPRM theory is applicable to two questions relating to sustainable resource management: 
1) why do individuals participate in collective action to avoid the tragedy of the commons; and 
2) what kinds of rules make people successfully cooperate in the use of natural resources?243 
Initially, scholars argued that the over-exploitation of natural resources by unlimited users led 
to depletion of the natural resources. 244 The solutions for this problem were to centralise natural 
resources under State management or to privatise natural resources;245 that is, the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’. Some scholars who have understood the meaning of CPR however refute the 
arguments relating to the ‘tragedy of the commons’.246 CPR scholars from the 1980s onwards 
have shown that, with some conditions, people can cooperate for a long time and avoid the 
dilemma of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. This leads to the sustainable utilisation of natural 
resources. 
Conventionally, economic scholars classify resources into four types using the criteria of 
excludability and subtractability: Public Goods, Toll Goods, CPRs and Private Goods. CPRs 
are always defined as an open access resource and common property.247 However, Ciriacy-
Wantrup and Bishop differentiate between the meanings of open access resources and CPRs, 
arguing that nobody can exclude other people from utilising open access resources; whereas, 
                                                                
241 Norman Thomas Uphoff, Getting the process right: improving irrigation water management with farmer organization and 
participation (Cornell University Ithaca, NY, 1986), 33. 
242  See topic 3.3.3. Muang Fai law, Water User Organization concept and Thailand’s legislation to recognise Muang Fai above. 
243 Ostrom, above n 154,  
244  William Forster Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population: Delivered Before the University of Oxford, in 
Michaelmas Term 1832 (JH Parker, 1833); Hardin, above n 1, 1243.  
245 Hardin, above n 1. 
246 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom and Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, (2003) 302 Science 1907. 
247 Jonathon M Harris and Brian Roach (2013). Environmental and Natural Resource Economics: A Contemporary Approach, 
(ME Sharpe, 2013) 76. 
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only a clearly defined group of people can use CPRs and can additionally exclude non-members 
from resource utilisation.248 249 Ostrom and Hess indicate that the debate about a regime to 
govern CPRs stems from three areas of confusion: 1) the differences between common property 
and open access regimes; 2) the differences between CPRs and common property regimes; and 
3) the resource system and the flow of resource units.250  
Table 7 Types of goods in terms of economy 
  E
x
cl
u
d
a
b
il
it
y
 
Subtractability 
 Low High 
Difficult Public Goods CPRs  
Easy Toll Goods Private Goods 
Resource Types from Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 1994 p 7 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, CPRs share the same attributes as Public Goods and Private Goods; 
namely, excludability and subtractability.251 Excludability means people can be excluded from 
using the resource; whereas, contractibility means one person’s usage deducts the capacity of 
another person to use the same resource. 
In terms of CPRs, Gordon and Scott published their work on this topic between 1954 and 1968. 
They argued that the open access condition of fisheries would lead to the depletion of fish 
stocks.252 This work was then followed by the development of Game Theory, the prisoner’s 
dilemma in particular, which indicates why a person cannot cooperate with another person.253 
Later Olson, who worked on the Theory of Collective Action, indicated that there is a human 
trend to not cooperate voluntarily, even though we may have the same goal.254 He argued that 
there is an individual trend not to act to achieve the goal of the group, unless it involves a 
punishment or when individuals can join a small group.255 Shortly after Olson’s work, Hardin 
                                                                
248 Siegfried V Ciriacy-Wantrup and Richard C Bishop, ‘Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy’ (1975) 
15 Natural Resources Journal 713.  
249Although the differences between open access resource and common property have been pointed out, the contemporary 
economic textbook such as Harris and Roach (2013) were reluctant to define clearly the differences among common pool 
resource, open access resource and common property. The common property is used in the same meaning of open access 
resource and it is predicted that it will lead to the dilemma of common. Even though, this book accepted that the common 
property is regulated by some kind of local norms; it treats common property as the open access resource.  
250 Elinor Ostrom, and Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights (November 29, 2007). Indiana University, 
Bloomington: School of Public & Environmental Affairs Research Paper No. 2008-11-01. < 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1936062> 
251 Ibid. 
252 Edella Schlager, Chapter 4 Common Pool Resource Theory in Robert F Durant, Environmental Governance Reconsidered: 
Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities (MIT Press, 2004). 
253 Ibid. 
254Ibid.) 
255 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action cited in Schlager, above n 252.  
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argued in the ‘tragedy of the commons’ that the over exploitation of natural resources by 
unlimited users will inevitably deplete the natural resource.256  
The solutions to this problem, in Hardin’s view, is the centralising of natural resources under 
the State’s management or the privatising of natural resources. 257  Hardin’s model for 
environmental management, requiring intervention by State or international organisations, has 
been accepted popularly as a dominant paradigm to manage CPRs to avoid the ‘tragedy of the 
common’. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is also known as the CPR dilemma.    
Other theorists such as Dietz et al. do not agree with Hardin’s opinion,258 pointing to two main 
errors. First, Hardin argued that there are only two institutional arrangements (private property 
and the centralised State) can manage natural resources sustainably. 259 Second, they critique 
Hardin’s idea that all users will be trapped in a race to the bottom without the capacity to 
establish institutions to manage natural resources.260 Both the arguments of Ostrom and Dietz 
are supported by considerable research evidence from the work of CPRM scholars, which 
indicates that communities, under some conditions, can manage CPRs sustainably.261 Techera 
also suggests that a private person or institution does not have the aim of conserving natural 
resources, so privatisation is not the solution.262  It is also argued that Hardin confuses open 
access ‘CPRs’, which have no management regime and allow anyone to use said resource, and 
‘Common Property Resources’ which can be managed by government, individuals or the 
community.263  Even Hardin now accepts that ‘the Common’ in his theory should refer to the 
‘unmanaged common’.264 However, he still insists that the over-exploitation of the ‘unmanaged 
common’ may lead to the depletion of natural resources in the end.265 Hardin supports his 
argument using the fish as an example, pointing to their presently depleting stocks due to 
they’re being an (unmanaged) common resource according to the principle of the freedom of 
the high sea until the conclusion of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea.266 
                                                                
256Hardin, above n 1,1243.  
257 Ibid. 
258 Dietz, et al., above n 246.   
259 Ibid, 1907. 
260Ibid. 
261 Ostrom, above n 154. 
262 Erika Jane Techera, Law, Custom and Conservation: The Role of Customary Law in Community-based Marine 
Management in the South Pacific, (PhD Thesis, Macquarie University, 2009). 
263 Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, Common Property and Natural Resource a Conceptual Analysis (1992)68(3) Land and 
Economics249 . 
264 Garrett Hardin, 'Extensions of The Tragedy of the Commons' (1998) 280(5364) Science 683. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the State had no obligation to cooperate in the conservation 
and management of marine resources at high sea. See Convention on the High Seas 1958 opened for signature 29 April 1958 
450 UNTS11 (enter into force 30 September 1962) and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS3, 1834UNTS3, 1835UNTS3 (entry into force 16 November 1994), Art 116-120. 
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Dissatisfaction with the State-centric approach to the management of natural resources led 
others to question Hardin’s paradigm with regard to the management of natural resources. Many 
case studies undertaken during the 1980s have indicated that individuals, using CPRs, do not 
always lead to the destruction of natural resources. They have managed such resources through 
cooperation and by carefully crafting rules to govern the utilisation and limitation of the 
CPR.267 This shows that people who use CPRs within some institutional rules and careful 
management can manage natural resource sustainably.  
Ostrom indicates that CPRs can be managed by various methods from State ownership, to 
private ownership, to co-management and community-based management.268 To avoid the CPR 
dilemma, Ostrom suggests that the appropriator must concern themselves with three 
interrelated issues: 1) creating a new set of institutions; 2) making a credible commitment; and 
3) monitoring.269 Ostrom explains that the ‘tragedy of the common’ occurs when individuals do 
not cooperate when using CPR. Furthermore, Ostrom suggests that appropriators might avoid 
the CRP dilemma by coordinating and creating rules to utilise the CPR. However, Ostrom also 
warns that the appropriator may face collective action problems after avoiding the CPR 
dilemma. It is important to spend the time and resources needed to create a CPR institution and 
set of rules that is acceptable to all appropriators. Moreover, commitment to the rules, the 
monitoring processes and enforcement of the rules are other issues that appropriators might 
face. 
In terms of cooperation among appropriators to use the CPR, Ostrom indicates that two classes 
of attributes support the emergence of cooperation: 1) the attributes of the CPR; and 2) the 
attributes of the appropriators. The attributes of the CPR to support cooperation among 
appropriators are: 1) the feasibility to improve; 2) indicators; 3) predictability; and 4) spatial 
extent.270 These can be understood as follows: 
1) The feasibility to improve means that the CPR is of such quantity or value to organise that 
improvement is beneficial to all appropriators271 
 2) Indicators means that CPRs are available at low cost272 
 3) Predictability means the resource system flow is predictable273 
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4) Spatial extent means the CPRs are in the appropriate area allowing all appropriators to 
transport, use communication technology, and develop accurate knowledge of external 
boundaries and the internal micro-environment274  
Based on the above attributes, it is evident that not just any kind of CPR can be managed using 
a self-governing organisation.  
The necessary attributes of the appropriators consist of the following: 
1) Salience appropriators. These are appropriators who are dependent on the resource system 
for a major portion of their livelihood or other important activity275 
 2) Common understanding. Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource system 
operates and how their actions affect each other and the resource system276 
3) Low discount rate. Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future 
benefits to be achieved from the resource277 
 4) Trust and reciprocity. Appropriators trust one another to keep promises and relate to one 
another with reciprocity278 
 5) Autonomy. Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external 
authorities countermanding them279 
 6). Prior organisational experience and local leadership. Appropriators have learned at least 
minimal organisation and leadership skills by participating in other local associations or by 
studying how neighbouring groups have organised their systems280 
Furthermore, Ostrom proposed the following eight design principles for long-term cooperation 
in relation to CPRs: 
1) The CPR has clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties)  
2) There is congruence between the resource environment and its governance structure or rules  
3) Decisions are made through collective choice arrangements that allow most resource 
appropriators to participate 
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4) Rules are enforced through effective monitoring by monitors of those accountable to the 
appropriators  
5) Violations are punished with graduated sanctions  
6) Conflicts and issues are addressed with low-cost and easy-to-access conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
7) Higher-level authorities recognise the right of the resource appropriators to self-govern 
 
8) In the case of larger CPRs, rules are organised and enforced through multiple layers of nested 
enterprises281 
 
Ostrom supported her proposal with empirical evidence.282 However, she did not intend to 
propose the principles as compulsory conditions for the long-term success of institutions. She 
intended to indicate that the appropriators would be willing to cooperate by following the rules 
and monitoring system over time if the self-governing organisation is underpinned by all eight 
principles283 mentioned above.   
While the eight design principles by Ostrom are easy to follow in theory, it is quite difficult to 
implement them in practice. This is because the success of each self-governing organisation 
depends on the conditions and situations of each area, community, culture and natural resource.  
 
Ostrom also identified the following eight threats to the organisation and  management of 
CPRs: 
1) Blueprint thinking 
2) Over-reliance on simple voting rules as the primary decision mechanism for making all 
collective choices 
3) Rapid changes in technology, human, animal, or plant populations, in factor availability, in 
substitution of relative importance of monetary transactions, and in heterogeneity of 
participants 
4) Transmission failures from one generation to the next of the operational principles on which 
community governance is based 
5) Turning to external sources of help too frequently 
6) International aid that does not take account of Indigenous knowledge and institutions 
7) Corruption and other forms of opportunistic behaviour 
8) Lack of large-scale institutional arrangements related to reliable information collection, 
aggregation, and dissemination; fair and low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms; educational 
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and extension facilities; and facilities to help when natural disasters or other major problems 
occur at a local level.284 
 
Ostrom suggests three methods for avoiding the threats to sustainable self-organisations: 1) 
organising an association of community governance entities to learn from each other; 2) 
undertaking comparative institutional research on how to control the variables affecting the 
performance of the institution; and 3) developing academic courses on local governance at both 
high school and college levels in order to educate people how to govern themselves at the local 
level. 
    
Although there is much evidence to show that the degradation of natural resources can be 
avoided through multiple methods and through learning from the biological complexity285, 
Hardin suggests that social scientists commonly resolve such problems simply by privatisation 
and expropriation. This then leads to a failure of problem solving. Ostrom and Cox have called 
the situation of over-simplifying problems and applying only one solution to every problem 
‘the problem of Panaceas’.286 In the opinion of Ostrom and other CPR scholars, the solution to 
use ‘panaceas’ is problematic287 as it creates an over-simplification of the problem and generates 
new problems as well. Ostrom’s eight design principles have even been criticised as a 
panacea.288  
 
However, Ostrom and Cox propose a diagnostic approach to analysing social-ecological 
systemic problems,289 suggesting: 
 
 [T]he diagnostic approach seeks to disaggregate environmental issues, identifying elements of 
individual problems that are significant from a problem-solving perspective and reaching 
conclusions about design features needed to address each of the elements identified.290  
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This approach to analysing social ecological systems is called the second generation of CPRM 
theory. 291  The motivation for using the diagnostic approach is to respond to problems 
appropriately, and to avoid the over simplification of the problem, requires working on the 
cause of the problem.292  Normally, the diagnostic approach is undertaken by asking a series of 
questions relating to a particular case with three goals: 1) to identify the cause of the particular 
outcome in a case; 2) to compare this case to others as a means of deriving generalisations or 
theories about a set of cases; and 3) to use this knowledge to formulate a hypothesis or 
prescriptive predictions.293 This focuses on three types of statements: ‘rule, a fact about the case 
and result’.294 The diagnostic approach starts with ‘observing the outcome and conditions that 
lead to the outcome’.295  
 
Ostrom proposes a two-level analytical framework, moving from general to specific.  The first 
level of analysis starts by grouping the relevant features of social and ecological systems into 
four main groups: resource systems, resource units, governance mechanisms and actors.296 The 
second level of analysis contains the attributes of social and ecological systems which relate to 
the previous main groups and are more specific to the subset case.297 Then, the diagnostic 
process can guide people about what kind of questions relating to specific rules are relevant to 
the specific circumstances.298   
 
However, Cox illustrates the weaknesses in applying the diagnostic approach to environmental 
research; namely, 1) environmental policy and management is not open to experimental 
analysis; 2) social ecological systems have a large number of variables; 3) the high cost for 
data collection; and 4) social ecological systems always give low feedback which makes 
learning and adaptation difficult.299 The diagnostic approach to analysing the social ecological 
system is a useful way to understand the cause of a problem and to intervene in order to create 
a better outcome. However, further analysis of this system does not fall within the realm of this 
thesis which is trying to find effective ways to recognise Muang Fai water resource 
management customary law in Thailand.  
 
Ostrom’s eight design principles for long-enduring self-governing organisation, CPR theory, 
and small-scale localised common projects have become the most popular development 
strategies for developing countries. However, some common projects to apply the eight design 
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principles have shown negative results in practice.300 Saunders indicates that research about 
CPRM by CPR scholars focuses the investigation only on the empirical evidence in relation to 
the failure of the projects without investigating in any depth the theoretical dimension. Saunders 
further indicates that CPRM theory 'over simplifies the social contexts of the projects' which 
are always dynamic. Saunders suggests that an understanding of the operation of power and 
conflict, especially in the resource-use context, should be studied along with the participation, 
social capital, social learning and community in the specific context.301  
 
It should be observed here that a self-governing organisation cannot be established just 
anywhere. Indeed, the feasibility needs to be assessed before its establishment.  Moreover, Ruth 
Meizenn argues that it is not useful to seek ‘panaceas’ for irrigational institutions because the 
different circumstances in each context affects whether best practice in one context will work 
effectively or fail in another context.302 Thus, the solution could be a hybrid system.  
 The next section illustrates how CPRM theory can be applied to irrigation systems. The 
purpose is to show how legislation can be designed to support cooperation among appropriators 
in both government-owned irrigation systems and farmer-owned irrigation systems 
implementing customary law.  
3.4.1 CPR Theory & Irrigation system 
 
To understand why people cooperate in an irrigation institution and what rules support 
successful cooperative water use, we must first understand the activities within an irrigation 
system. Uphoff notes that each irrigation system has three sets of activities: 1) activities relating 
to water; 2) activities relating to structure; and 3) activities relating to organisation.303   
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Figure 5 Irrigation management activities matrix (Source:  adapted from Norman Thomas Uphoff, Getting the 
process right: improving irrigation water management with farmer organization and participation (Cornell 
University Ithaca, NY, 1986),  33. 
The activities relating to water comprise its acquisition, allocation, distribution and drainage. 
Water acquisition involves acquiring water from surface or sub-surface sources by creating or 
operating physical structures such as dams, weirs or wells.304 Water allocation refers to the 
process of sharing water among water users by assigning rights to users. 305  The water 
distribution process delivers water from the source to water users at a specified place and time, 
and to a specified quantity.306 The drainage of water refers to the removal of water when it is 
in over-supply. 307 
The four activities also relate to structure, which comprises the design, construction, operation 
and maintenance activities. Design refers to the structures for water delivery. Construction is 
the building of structures to deliver, share and release water. Operation refers to the 
operationalisation of the structures to deliver, share or remove water according to the plan. 
Maintenance refers to the repair and care taking of structures in order to ensure their use for a 
long time.308      
The activities related to the organisational management comprise decision-making, resource 
mobilisation, communication and conflict management.  Decision-making in relation to the 
attempted resolution of  issues regarding water utilisation activities.309 Resource mobilisation 
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refers to the arrangement of funds, manpower, materials, tools, and information for the water 
utilisation activities.310 Communication is in relation to the exchange of information and ideas 
among people within the irrigation institution to achieve the objectives of the irrigational 
activities.311 Conflict management refers to the settling of disputes among water users.312 
Table 8 Modern irrigation system activities and Muang Fai activities 
Types of irrigational activities Activities Muang Fai activities 
Water utilisation activities Acquisition  
Allocation  
Distribution  
Drainage  
Activities to control structure 
 
Design  
Construction  
Operation  
Maintenance  
Organisational management activities Decision Making  
Resource mobilisation  
Communication  
Conflict management  
Source Norman Thomas Uphoff, Getting the process right: improving irrigation water management with farmer organization 
and participation (Cornell University Ithaca, NY, 1986),  
CPRM theory has been applied to institutions that manage water, particularly in irrigation.313 
It can be applied to manage both the quality and quantity of water.314  In an effort to discover 
how to avoid the depletion of water resources through irrigation, CPR scholars have studied 
three types of irrigation systems: farmer-owned irrigation systems (FOIS), government-owned 
irrigation systems (GOIS) and farmer- and government-owned irrigation systems (FGOIS). They 
found that all irrigation systems can be long-enduring self-organisations.315 Ostrom indicates 
that studying institutions is important because institutions shape the pattern of human 
behaviour and the results that individuals achieve.316  Institutions shape human behaviour 
through incentives. 317  Ostrom conducted studies of institutions to explore the  ‘rules that 
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individuals use to order the specific relationship with one another’. 318  319  It should be 
emphasised here that the rules studied by Ostrom are rules in use.320 Rules in use refers to rules 
used in reality by members of irrigation institutions. Rules in use are not similar to legislation 
or written rules. They can be studied only by observation, not from the documents. The failure 
to study rules in use leads to two errors of assumption. First, it is important to understand that 
institutions (rules in use) might not follow written laws. Thus, researchers might underestimate 
the effectiveness of changing behaviours of members in irrigation institutions and focus only 
on the practices governed by legislation. Second, some researchers might think that no 
institutions exist and that institutions can only be established by law.321   
Based on these understandings, crafting irrigation institutions means designing the rules to 
govern individual behaviours and activities relating to the utilisation of water. Then, in order to 
craft the irrigation institutions you also need to understand the incentives that shape human 
behaviour and the special conditions of people, culture, geographical conditions, economics, 
the environment, and the estimated outcomes.322  It should be noted that Ostrom applies two 
meaning in her use the word ‘crafting’. The first meaning involves the design, operation 
appraisal and modification of rules that order behaviour. The second meaning is the ongoing 
nature of ‘getting the process right’.323  The meanings of crafting, as used by Ostrom, are 
compatible with the concept of adaptive co-management, which is discussed later, in terms of 
the never-ending process to improve governance, aiming to fit with the dynamic circumstances.   
Ostrom often emphasised that the most important question for water resource development is 
not the engineering design, but the institutional design.324 She supports her argument with 
abundant examples of large-scale projects which failed because they ignored the institutional 
design.325 Ostrom suggests that ‘rules in use’ concerned with crafting irrigation institutions need 
to consist of Constitutional rules, Collective choice rules and Operational rules:  
1) Constitutional rules determine who are qualified to participate in the system and what 
specific rules will be used to craft the collective choice of rules. 326  
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2) Collective choice rules are used by irrigators, officials or external authorities in making 
management policies. They indirectly affect operational rules.327 
3) Operational rules directly affect the day-to-day decisions by users and suppliers concerning 
when, where and how to withdraw water, as well as who should monitor the actions of others 
and how it should be monitored. They also determine what information must be exchanged.328 
329 
Ostrom observed another two factors relating to changing rules: 1) Changes in the rules used to 
order at one level occur within a currently fixed set of rules at a deeper layer; and 2) Changes 
in deeper rules are usually more difficult and costly to accomplish.330 Rules provide stability 
around expectations. The easier the rules are to change, the less stability the participants can 
expect. The easiest level of rules to change is the operational rules. Planners need not only to be 
concerned about the various rules for designing the irrigation institution, they need to be 
concerned about a range of issues, including: 1) investing in the social capital; 331 2) the multiple 
sources of rules in use; 3) environmental conditions; 4) various cultural traditions; 5) Design 
opportunistic behaviour; 6) crafting, monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution 
mechanisms; 7) crafting multiple layers of rules; and 8) crafting rules in an ongoing process.332 
Ostrom observes that ‘long enduring self-organised irrigation institutions’ always have the same 
characteristics.333  These are: 1) clearly defined boundaries of resources and members; 2) a 
balance between the benefits from and costs of each water user’s experience; 3) that all 
individuals affected by the rules governing them can modify the rules; 4) an effective 
monitoring system; 5) sanctions that are proportional to the seriousness of the fault; 6) quick 
and low cost conflict management in the local area; 7) the right to manage water and arrange 
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local institutions recognised by the State; and 8) proper organisational structure as a nested 
enterprise.334    
The relationship between Ostrom’s eight design principles for long-enduring organisations and 
the activities of irrigation management can be seen and understood simply in Table 9 below: 
 
Table 9 The activities of irrigation system and 8 designed principle rules 
Types of 
Irrigational 
activities 
Activities Ostrom’s 8 design principles for activities 
of an irrigation system 
 
Other rules of Ostrom’s 8 
design principles  
Water utilisation 
activities 
Acquisition 1) clearly defined boundaries of resources 
and members 
7) the rights to manage 
water and arrange local 
institutions is recognised by 
State, 
8) Proper organisational 
structure as a nested 
enterprise. 
Allocation 1) clearly defined boundaries of resources 
and members 
2) a balance between the benefits and costs 
which each water user experiences 
5) sanctions proportional to the seriousness 
of the fault 
Distribution 4) effective monitoring system  
Drainage - 
Activities to control 
structure 
 
Design - 
Construction - 
Operation 4) effective monitoring system  
Maintenance 2) a balance between the benefits and costs 
which each water user experiences 
Organisational 
management 
activities 
Decision Making 3) all individuals affected by the rules 
governing them can modify the rules 
Resource 
mobilisation 
2) a balance between the benefits from and 
costs of each water user’s experiences 
Communication - 
Conflict 
management 
5) sanctions proportional to the seriousness 
of the fault 
6) quick and low-cost conflict management 
in the local area 
(Source:  Norman Thomas Uphoff, Getting the process right: improving irrigation water management with farmer organization 
and participation (Cornell University Ithaca, NY, 1986) and Elinor Ostrom, 'Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation 
Systems' (1991) 
It is evident in Table 9 that most activities of irrigation management can link to six of the eight 
design principle rules outlined by Ostrom. The model of activities in irrigation management 
does not, however, show a clear link to the 7th and 8th rules which are key attributes of long-
enduring self-organisation and governance according to CPR. Building on the eight design 
principles advocated by Ostrom, Tang indicated in his thesis relating to irrigation systems that 
to sustain self-organisation for irrigation, the following measures should be undertaken:335 1) 
the exclusion of outsiders from using CPR; 2) carefully crafted rules; 3) the participation of 
appropriators in devising and modifying rules.; and 4) a monitoring system including the 
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effective enforcement of rules.336 Tang’s study effectively supports the eight design principles 
of Ostrom, principles 1, 2, 3 and 4  in particular (see Table 10 below):   
Table 10 Ostrom's 8 design principles compared with the findings of Tang 
Ostrom’s 8 designed principles Tang’s finding in Institutions and Collective action 
in irrigation systems 
1) clearly defined boundaries of resources and members 1) The exclusion of outsiders from using the CPR.  
1) clearly defined boundaries of resources and members; 
2) a balance between the benefits and costs which each water user 
experiences 
2) Carefully crafted rules.  
3) all individuals affected by the rules governing them can modify 
the rules 
3) The participation of appropriators in devising and 
modifying the rules.  
4) effective monitoring system 4) A monitoring system and the effective enforcement 
of rules. 
(Source: Tang, 1992) 
The eight design principles of Ostrom give more detailed information on how to manage 
institutions to govern water sustainably. For this reason, this thesis will apply Ostrom’s eight 
design principles as a guideline to explore how to effectively recognise Muang Fai customary 
law as part of the water law for the SD of Thailand.   
In terms of water management, each rule has been discussed and tested as follows: 
1) Clearly defined boundaries of resources and members 
Demarcating clear boundaries of resources and identifying the people authorised to use the 
water are the first steps for collective action.337 This demarcation serves to protect the interests 
of the irrigators in order to balance the input contribution which the irrigators have paid to the 
irrigation system. The clearly defined boundaries talked about by Ostrom have two meanings. 
First, it refers to a clear boundary of the resource. Second, it refers to the person who can use 
the water. Furthermore, the second meaning also refers to the right to use water among 
authorised irrigators. This is an important distinction because in irrigation systems a ‘head-end’ 
user is always in a better position than a ‘tail-end’ user. The head-end user might divert too much 
water from the irrigation system and there may not be sufficient water for tail-end users. The 
clear identification of a person sometimes gives them the right to exclude other potential water 
users from utilising water in the irrigation system. This presents a significant problem for CPR 
management; namely, the need to regulate the rate and pattern of appropriation. This is required 
to avoid the over-exploitation, depletion and destruction of the CPR.338 Without clearly defined 
boundaries, the irrigators might not cooperate and follow the rules because they do not gain 
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benefits proportionate to what they have contributed. Ostrom notes that the need for rules to 
regulate and enforce the utilisation of water have emerged in period of water shortages.339   
Tang suggests that when crafting boundary rules it is necessary to consider the physical features 
of the irrigation area by limiting the number of irrigators who can receive water according to 
the amount of water the system can supply. If the number of irrigators is significantly greater 
than the capacity of the system to supply water, this can result in conflict over allocations.340 
The irrigators might also face water shortage problems, allocation problems, and maintenance 
problems. Tang, further indicates that the criteria for limiting the numbers of irrigators are land, 
shares, membership and fees.341 The most common criterion applied to limit irrigators is land. 
However, using land as the sole boundary requirement is not an effective enough method to 
control the number of irrigators within the limits of the CPR.342 
Evidence shows that high-performance irrigation systems have multiple rules to limit the access 
of outsiders and ‘free riders’ to water. In contrast, the rules of low-performance irrigation 
systems in relation to regulating the access to water do not control the access adequately. Low-
performance irrigation systems always apply one simple set of rules, or have no rules, to 
regulate access to water. Multiple rules refer to the many kinds of rules needed to govern the 
CPR under different environmental conditions. Examples of this are the water allocation rules 
for the monsoon season, the rules for seasonal-low water conditions and for drought seasons.343   
It should be observed here that the number of appropriators does not affect the likelihood of 
collective action in irrigation system344 (as long as the number of irrigators is proportionate to 
the capacity of the water resource to supply water).  
2) A balance between the benefits from and costs of each water user’s experiences 
Ostrom indicated that the rules to regulate water allocation need to be compatible with the local 
conditions, rules to recruit labour, and material and financial input.345 In case of ensuring 
balance between the water allocation rules and the physical condition of the irrigation system, 
the number of irrigators authorised to use water must not exceed the water supply capacity of 
the water resource, as indicated in the previous section.346  
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In the case of ensuring balance between water allocation rules and rules to recruit labour, 
material and financial input, Ostrom indicates that the self-organising irrigation system must 
apply different rules to recruit resources for construction and maintenance, and to pay for the 
water guards.347 In long-enduring systems, the people who receive the highest amount of water 
are responsible for paying the highest proportion of costs for the irrigation system. Ostrom 
further notes that no single set of rules defined for all system would have this result and that 
rules must be crafted with the aim to balance the benefits and results needed in accordance with 
the unique attributes of each system.    
In terms of water allocation rules, Tang illustrates three methods to allocate water in FOIS and 
GOIS: 1) fixed percentage; 2) fixed time slots; and 3) fixed order.348 The most popular method 
to allocate water is the fixed time slots method. Tang assumes the reason why this method is 
more commonly used than the other methods is that it is very easy to enforce. This is because 
the farmers can easily regulate the time during which they are allowed to divert water for 
themselves and they are ready to protect their time slot from water theft. The method of 
allocating water by fixed time slot requires lower costs for monitoring. However, the fixed time 
slots method also poses some problems, particularly when the water does not flow as expected. 
This means the irrigator who owns the time slot cannot receive water during that period.349 
Tang reported in his study that one of the essential attributes of a high performance irrigation 
system is to have rules that allocate water to all appropriators equitably.350 On the contrary, the 
water allocation rules in poor performance irrigation system did not always work well. In fact, 
often they have a single set of rules or have no rules. Furthermore, in such system access to the 
irrigation was not regulated sufficiently.351 
The allocation of water is an essential process to create balance between the benefits and costs 
for an irrigator. If all irrigators gain water equitably and in proportion to the costs that they have 
outlaid, then they will be willing to cooperate within the system. Furthermore, effective 
allocation rules and monitoring processes can prevent conflict among the irrigators.352 This 
shows that the effective allocation rule is one significant element of long-enduring 
organisations. This reinforces Tang’s finding that high-performance irrigation systems have two 
kinds of well-crafted rules compatible to the specific conditions of each irrigation system.353 
These are rules for allocating water and for maintaining the irrigation system.354 Maintenance 
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rules are very important to sustain the physical structure of the irrigation system. Ostrom argues 
that the failure of many large-scale irrigation systems is caused by under investment in the 
operation and maintenance areas (O&M).355 This is compatible with the findings of a report by 
the U.S General Accounting Office in 1983356 in relation to USAID-funded irrigation projects 
in developing countries. The report indicated that many irrigation projects were in very poor 
condition because of the lack of maintenance.357  
Tang’s study indicates that low-performance irrigation systems always have low-maintenance 
intensity. 358  Tang explains that low-maintenance intensity can result from the lack of 
cooperation amongst irrigators.359 One of the important issues relating to maintenance is the 
input labour or contribution from irrigators. This should be shared equally among irrigators or 
shared proportionally to the water that each irrigator gains from the irrigation system. Tang 
states that irrigation systems with higher maintenance intensity tend to apply the method that 
shares labour input proportionally; whereas, the systems with low-maintenance intensity are 
apt to apply the equal contribution method.360 
3) All individuals affected by the rules governing them can modify the rules 
Successful, long-enduring irrigation systems need to let the irrigators participate in devising 
and modifying the rules to reflect the physical conditions, resources and demands. When this 
is in place, external enforcement is usually not necessary because the irrigators are willing to 
obey the rules as they provide them with benefits. 
4) Effective monitoring system  
Monitoring processes are also important in relation to the management of CPR. This area links 
directly to the balance between benefits and costs which each irrigator receives and has paid. 
The monitoring processes refers to both the audits inside the irrigation system and those 
external to the organisation. Ostrom concluded that monitors are the people who: 1) examine the 
physical condition of irrigation systems; 2) examine the irrigation behaviour of each irrigator; 
and 3) are responsible for water users.361 Water users also can be monitors.362  
In some irrigation systems, water guards are hired or assigned to monitor the irrigation 
system.363 Tang believed that a guard in farmer-owned irrigation system works more effectively 
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than a guard in a government-owned irrigation system. 364  Furthermore, in farmer-owned 
irrigation systems the guards remain more effective whether or not he is paid a wage or only 
employed part time. 365  In terms of the monitoring processes by external organisations or 
government, it is reported that problems arise from ineffective legal sanctions such as: 1) where 
the police treat the rule-breaker as a trivial case; 2) where there is a delay in court proceedings; 
and 3) where fines are considered too light.366   
5) Sanctions that are proportional to the seriousness of the fault 
Ostrom describes this rule as follows; Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, 
the officials accountable to these users or both.367 Large-scale sanctions in successful, long-
enduring organisations are conducted by water users themselves. They do both the monitoring 
and sanctioning and the levels of sanctions are initially low.368  
In terms of the person who is subject to sanctions under the rules, the application to two other 
categories should be considered: 
1) Anybody who stays in the jurisdiction of self-organising institutions and uses natural 
resources governed by such institution.  
 2) Anybody who stays outside the jurisdiction of self-organising institutions, but use the 
resources governed by the rules of such institution, or related resource, in the way that harms 
or causes negative impacts to the resource under control of such institution. This is because the 
sustainability of the resource comes from the long-term cooperation among water users. If the 
outsiders use the resource and are not governed by the same rules under institution, they can 
exploit the resource. Then, the institution might be not be sustained. The argument in this thesis 
is supported by two cases relating to water conflict in Muang Fai (discussed in the previous 
chapter) and the failure of Village Fono in Samoa before amending the village Fono Act 
(discussed further in Chapter 6)          
6) Quick and low cost conflict management in the local area 
Ostrom describes the need for users and officials of the institution to access a low-cost and 
rapid conflict management mechanism.369 However, she also indicates that having the conflict 
management mechanism cannot guarantee the sustainability of self-organising institutions.370 
Tang considered that the collective action problems in irrigation systems come from the water 
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allocation and maintenance processes.371 This thesis argues that conflict management in an 
irrigation system should have two levels: 1) internal conflict; and 2) external conflict. The main 
types of internal conflict are conflicts among water users and conflicts between water users and 
officials of the institution. The external conflict includes conflicts between water users and 
outsiders who use water from the same source, and conflicts between officials and the outsiders. 
This links to the next topic relating to the recognition of the right to manage water and arrange 
local institutions. The conflicts between outsiders and water users, or outsiders and officials, 
cannot be resolved by applying the internal rules of water users. This is because outsiders are 
not bound by the rules used by water users unless such rules are recognised by State law. The 
management of conflicts between water users or officials and outsiders is an important matter 
because it links to the right to exclude people from water utilisation. This thesis argues that the 
legislation should provide a mechanism to settle disputes between water users or officials and 
outsiders under the Ostrom’s rapid and low-cost principles as well.         
7) The rights to manage water and arrange local institutions are recognised by the State 
The benefits of recognising the rights of local institutions and the rules is that the local people 
can enforce the rules by themselves.372 Ostrom illustrated a number of drawbacks from not 
recognising the rights, institutions and rules of local people in water management. These 
include: 1) that the leader of the water user organisation cannot legally open a bank account for 
their organisation; 2) that the leaders cannot represent the interests of their members before 
administrative or judicial bodies; 3) that decisions made by local institutions might not be 
enforced by police or courts; and 4) that it is difficult to make both officials of irrigation 
organisations and water users responsible for their actions.373 Ostrom also pointed out that the 
failure to recognise the rights to manage water and arrange local institutions can cause the 
collapse of irrigation systems.374 
 8) Proper organisational structure as a nested enterprise. 
Ostrom explained that the activities of irrigation systems are organised in the multiple layers 
of a nested enterprise. The benefit of organising in this pattern is that the structure of the 
organisation can prevent ‘free-riding’ because all irrigators are grouped into small groups and 
they can monitor each other. 375  Tang reinforces this idea, pointing out that creating an 
organisation in the form of multiple layers of a nested enterprise supports the modification of 
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rules to match the physical conditions.376 This means that each sub-group under the same large-
scale irrigation system can modify the rules by themselves.377  
3.4.2 Crafting rules processes 
Tang provides an example of how the Sri Lankan government creates irrigation institutions 
using three steps.378 First, government officials (institutional organisers: IO) go to live in the 
area of the project and make friends with the local people to study the problems in the project 
area.  Second, IOs try to assist local people to organise a local working committee to resolve 
local problems without predefining an organisational format for them.379 Third, IOs assist local 
irrigators to establish an organisation among themselves, including the selection of a leader to 
represent their organisation.380 
3.4.3 Governing water as a common pool resource and interventions by State 
As mentioned earlier, CPRs can be managed sustainably by various regimes from private 
ownership, to State ownership, co-management (CM) and community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM).381 In terms of irrigation, this can be managed by government (i.e., 
GOIS and farmers (i.e., FOIS). It has been argued that both GOIS and FOIS can manage water 
sustainably. However, Tang found that appropriators in FOIS follow the rules created by 
themselves to a greater extent than the appropriators in GOIS.382 It has further been observed 
that the GOIS were always the low-performance irrigation systems.383 However, this does not 
mean that the government should not undertake irrigation system management or refrain from 
intervening in FOIS. The question to be considered is how governments should run irrigation 
systems to prevent the CPR dilemma. Furthermore, it is worth exploring how governments can 
help FOIS, like Muang Fai communities, to ensure sustainable irrigation without depending on 
external aids.  
Generally, interventions by government into FOIS generally target infrastructure improvement, 
and the introduction of a new institutional template.384 Government assistance in relation to 
infrastructure often leads to temporary improvements, but not long-term improvement. 385 
Additionally, the introduction of new institutions very often only takes the form of changing 
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the organisation’s name with corresponding poor performance reviews.386 Data from projects 
in Asia, where governments have intervened into FOIS, show: 1) the government should first 
seek to understand how the FOIS are organised and operated, as well as the environment 
surrounding the projects; 2) farmer participation in the planning, construction, organisational 
development of the system, and working together through the learning process, is very 
important; 3) interaction, coordination and communication between governmental agencies and 
farmers is very important;387 4) intervention projects should be designed and implemented in a 
transparent manner without the status of superior and follower;388 and 5) the design of the 
intervention project needs to consider the social ecological system (SES)389  of each case. 
Furthermore, water users should not compete with each other in water utilisation. On the 
contrary, they should see the benefits of collective action.390 However, the findings from studies 
on government interventions into FOIS indicate that there is no miracle formula for success to 
apply to all cases. This is because of the unique features of each project.391 
Local farmers should have the capacity to manage water sustainably with their own 
organisation, but organisations developed by local people can face all kinds of new challenges. 
After receiving assistance from the government to construct or repair the infrastructure of the 
irrigation system, new operational and collective choice rules always needed to be crafted. 
Additionally, the government should investigate the capacity of local irrigators to govern 
themselves before assisting them, or including them, in the bureaucratic irrigation system. 
Moreover, the government can assist local irrigators to develop the ability to govern water 
resources by facilitating their interaction, but not imposing a blueprint on their interactions.  
Furthermore, the government should provide legal measures to support, organise, and enforce 
the local arrangements of irrigators, allowing for the autonomy of local irrigators to make 
decisions on issues that fall within their jurisdiction. Finally, the rules in use should be crafted 
by local irrigators after each intervention (financial, materials and maintenance assistance by 
the government). If the rules in use are not crafted again, this might impact negatively on the 
level of cooperation among local irrigators.392      
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It should be observed that the rule crafting process, according to Ostrom, is an ongoing 
process.393 This idea is strongly connected to the changeable water management system of 
Louck et al. and is the same idea as the dynamic process of the adaptive co-management 
concept.394 The idea of an adaptive systems is embedded the IWRM process. The changeable, 
adaptive and dynamic nature of a system is a significant success factor for systems that govern 
natural resources. When managing water, CPRM theory is at the root of Co-Management (CM) 
and Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) theory.395 This is discussed 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis. CPRM theory is undoubtedly very useful in the recognition of Muang 
Fai water management customary law in Thailand. This is because it can provide guideline on 
how to design laws to support the customs of governing water by viewing it as a CPR and 
creating long-enduring and self-organisation processes to manage water sustainably. In terms of 
the application of CPRM theory to Muang Fai water management customary law in Thailand, 
this is discussed further in Chapter 7.   
3.4.4 Common property, economic principles and legal principles relating to property 
Commons defines the term property as a forcible power to do something in a specific area.396 
Property rights indicate what individuals can do with other people in relation to a thing. When 
the right-holders have a right to do anything with their property, the other has duties to respect 
such right of the right-holder. 397 Ostrom and Schlager indicate that there are five property rights 
relating to general CPR.398  They are the right to access, withdraw, manage, exclude and 
alienate.399 However, Ostrom and Hess indicate that each type of CPR requires the attribution 
of different property rights. For example, the objects of the rights relating to general CPR 
include water, fish, and forests; whereas, there are seven rights relating to electronic 
information as a CPR: access, contribution, extraction, removal, management, participation, 
and exclusion and alienation. From the empirical evidence Quinn et al. argues that no type of 
property rights regime can work to cover all rights of all people as established in CPRM.400 
However, Ostrom and Hess conclude that common property rights can coexist well with private 
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rights in a modern legal system.401 This can be seen, for example, from the fact that people stay 
in condominiums which encompass two kinds of rights. Each room falls under the private right, 
while the garden, common area and parking area or security activities fall under the common 
property management regime. 
3.4.5 Common pool resource theory and Muang Fai water resource management 
customary law 
Water and land are recognised by the Muang Fai community as a CPR with a limited number 
of people being able to access it. This section analyses Muang Fai to see if it is compatible with 
Ostrom’s eight principles applicable to CPR institutions. This thesis argues that Muang Fai 
customary law in the past was compatible with almost all the principles for self-governance 
outlined by Ostrom. However, Muang Fai customary law in the present Thailand is only partly 
compatible with these principles. This is because Muang Fai customary law is not currently 
recognised by the Thailand legal system and other incompatible development and uses. As 
evidenced in Table 11, customary Muang Fai reflects almost all the CPRM principles outlined 
by Ostrom. This provides a strong basis to argue for the recognition and harmonisation of 
Muang Fai customary law with Thailand national water law and the IWRM process. The 
prospects for recognition and harmonising is examined in the following chapter. A comparison 
can be seen in the table below: 
Table 11 Ostrom's 8 design principles compared to past and present-day activities of Muang Fai 
Ostrom’s 8 design principles Muang Fai  
in ancient time 
Muang Fai in present-day 
Thailand 
Compatible Not 
compatible 
Compatible Not 
compatible 
Clearly defined boundaries     
Congruence     
Collective-choice arrangements   402  
Monitoring     
Graduated sanction     
Conflict resolution mechanism     
Minimal recognition of the rights to organise for 
CPRs that are part of larger systems 
    
Nested enterprise     
Source: Ostrom, Elinor, Crafting institutions for self governing irrigation system (ICS press, 1992); 
 
The decisions in Muang Fai about who can utilise water is made at the annual meeting of all 
people in the Muang Fai community, or at an occasional meeting.  In the case of clearly defined 
boundaries (both water users and water resources), Muang Fai customary law (both in the past 
and present times), has an obvious process to define water users. Additionally, the process to 
accept new members emphasises the public participation of all old members. What is not clear 
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however is whether the Muang Fai community defines the boundary of the water resources. 
Congruence can be seen in the fact that the duties and benefits sharing in the Muang Fai 
community are equitable and reasonable. This is because it is contingent upon the amount of 
land and water each water user has and receives from the Muang Fai system. 
 
In terms of collective choice arrangements, both past and present Muang Fai customary law 
allows all water users to participate in the creation of rules for governing the Muang Fai 
community. This has been the case since the establishment of the community. Muang Fai 
customary law also allows all water users to participate in meetings to allocate water when 
there is a drought. Water resources and water users are always monitored by the Water Manager 
according to Muang Fai customary law. The respective benefits of upstream water users and 
downstream water users are balanced by the process to elect the Water Manager. The fact that 
the Water Manager is always elected from the downstream users creates this balance.  
In terms of sanctions, Muang Fai customary law has an obvious sanction stemming from the 
agreement of all water users when they conclude water contracts. Moreover, sanctions have 
been provided for historically in written laws such as Mang Rai Sart and PIA. The degree of 
sanction in Muang Fai depends on the seriousness of the offence. Muang Fai customary law 
has rapid access to a low-cost dispute settlement mechanism by assigning the responsibility to 
the Water Manager to settle any conflicts among water users in the same Muang Fai 
community. Furthermore, the Water Manager works as a representative of the Muang Fai 
community to negotiate with another Water Managers from other Muang Fai communities to 
also settle their disputes. In ancient times, the Water Manager was recognised as a State officer. 
Thus, they could settle water disputes between people within the Muang Fai community and 
with the people outside the Muang Fai community.  However, the power of the Water Manager 
to settle a dispute was not recognised in the PIA.  
In the case of minimal recognition of rights to organise for CPRs that are part of a larger system, 
it is evident that Muang Fai customary law was once recognised in Mangraisatra code law 
under the government of Lanna Kingdom. The Muang Fai system was recognised and 
supported very well by the ancient rulers of the Lanna Kingdom. This may be one reason why 
Muang Fai customary law has been a sustainable customary law for more then 1,000 years. 
However, Muang Fai customary law is not supported by the present government and law in 
Thailand. 
Muang Fai customary law does not explicitly refer to the issue of nested enterprises. One part 
of Muang Fai customary law which could be deemed a type of nested enterprise is the 
cooperation and negotiation among Water Managers in the allocation of water to each Muang 
Fai community on the same river.    
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the principles and concepts of SD and CPRM theory to determine if 
Muang Fai customary law processes and rules are compatible with the principles of SD and 
sustainable water management. Although both principles of SD and sustainable water 
management are contested concepts, they indicate norms which all actors in water management 
can follow. The core ideas of both SD and sustainable water resource management aim to 
maintain the level of natural resources as a form of capital for the next generation, while also 
allowing the present generation to use and gain well-being from such resources. In terms of law, 
at both the international and the national level, the focus is currently on a State-centric approach 
to the development of water law. This includes IWRM approaches, establishing a water rights 
regime, incorporating market mechanisms, protecting water flow in rivers and other water 
sources for environmental conservation, and using water user organisations in water resource 
management. However, the principles of sustainable water management provide little focus on 
local institutions in water management, collective rules to manage open resources, and how 
these can be included or adapted to SD. 
This chapter also considered the theory and concepts of CPRM. CPRM theory tries to answer 
two basic questions: 1) why do people cooperate in using open resources sustainably, and 2) 
what kind of rules make people use natural resources sustainably? These questions were 
considered though Ostrom’s eight design principles for self-governing organisation.  Like all 
theories, there are limitations in application to complex ecological, economic and social 
circumstances.  
The CPRM theory is also applied to irrigation systems. One significant point arises from 
various studies. It is better to allow local irrigators to craft their own rules to govern water with 
the support of government. 
In the case of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions, this chapter indicated that 
they are compatible with both SD principles and CPRM theory. Muang Fai customary law and 
the working of Muang Fai institution are compatible with IWRM and DSWSD principles. 
Moreover, the rules and workings of Muang Fai institutions reflect the eight design principle 
for self-governing organisations, particularly public participation in the rule-crafting process, 
and the congruence between rules and physical conditions in each area. Furthermore, this 
chapter indicated why previous recognition of Muang Fai customary law in Thailand ultimately 
failed. However, Muang Fai customary law was developed by ancient technologies and 
experience. It does not focus on modern issues such as water quality and global climate change.  
The theoretical knowledge in this chapter is used to analyse, critique the lesson learned about 
sustainable CPR management in the examples of Samoa and Vanuatu in Chapter 5, examine 
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water policy, water law and water management in Thailand (Chapter 6), and create the legal 
framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institution in Chapter 7. 
The next chapter examines the national trends in water management and the legal attempts to 
recognise customary law.
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Chapter four - The application of sustainable development to water management at the 
national level, the role of customary law in water resource management, and the role of 
the community 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided a clear understanding of the meaning, rules and processes of Muang Fai 
customary law, as well as the problems and challenges of Muang Fai in the present day. It 
further illustrated the social conditions that allowed Muang Fai customary law to flourish 
sustainably over the past 700 years. Chapter 3 indicated the principles of sustainable 
development (SD) and sustainable water resource management. It also explained how the 
common pool resource management (CPRM) theory supports the principles of SD and 
sustainable water management. Furthermore, it indicates that Muang Fai customary law 
compatible with both SD principles and the eight design principles proposed by Ostrom. 
This chapter aims to answer the third Research Question: 
What approaches have been taken in other countries to legally recognise customary law in 
natural resource management applicable to water resources? To address this question, it is 
necessary to understand the current trend of water law in national level and the role of 
customary law in water management or analogous areas of natural resource management (such 
as fisheries). Moreover, it is also necessary to understand how other countries recognise 
customary law in their own legal system and why they need to recognise customary law.       
This chapter focuses on how the SD principle is applied in domestic water law, addressing the 
role of customary law in water resource management and the role of the community in water 
management. It starts with the implementation of sustainable water management principles at 
the national level (4.1). It then focuses on the role of customary law in water management and 
the processes needed to recognise customary law, particularly, in the area of natural resource 
management (4.2).  Finally, it considers the legal principles supporting the recognition of 
customary law; namely human rights law and legal pluralism (4.3).  
In order to achieve the objectives of this chapter, the international legal materials (legally 
binding /non-legally binding) and Articles related to domestic water management, human rights 
and the customary law recognition in both northern and southern countries are examined. This 
will reveal the benefits and disadvantages of each of the legal measures in the recognition of 
customary law, particularly the recognition of customary law in natural resource management.  
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4.1 National implementation principles & management process of sustainable water 
management 
Among the various topics relating to modern water law1, it is argued that the national water 
law relating to the recognition of customary rights consists of five common attributes.2 Firstly, 
the State plays a leading role in developing water law. Secondly, the dominant view of water 
management relating to the property governance system of water laws is that only State 
institutions and private institutions can govern water.  Thirdly, the modern water rights regime 
supports the use of a market system for trading water rights and water allocations in order to 
conserve the ecosystem. Furthermore, the modern water rights regime separates water rights 
from land rights, as well as the right to access water from the right to supply water. This is quite 
different from the customary law system which considers water, land and other related 
resources as a single system for the purpose of governance. Another attribute is the recognition 
of customary water rights by the legislation. The final attribute is that the WUO is used as a 
mechanism to let people participate in water management and secure the benefits of water use 
for all people.  However, this thesis considers the following eight topics relating to the 
recognition of customary law in Thailand: 1) integrated water resource management: 2) rights 
relating to water: 3) economic tools to manage water: 4) environmental flow: 5) water for 
irrigation: 6) water user organisations (WUOs): 7) the recognition of customary law; and 8) from 
command and control to governance. This is to provide for the recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law that will fit with Thailand’s context in present day and the global water 
management’s trends that Thailand tries to follow.  
4.1.1   Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) is a concept that has been mentioned 
continuously since the United Nations conference on water at Mar del Plata (MDPA) in 19773. 
It continued to grow in prominence via Agenda 21 4  and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPI).5 The principles of IWRM as a water management approach are evident 
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Assessment requirements, water planning mechanisms, processes and instruments, minimum flow requirements, reserving 
volumes or flows; 3) fostering controlled trading in water rights; 4) Charging for Water Abstraction; 5) Curbing Water Pollution; 
6) User Participation in the Management of Water resources; and 7) growing attention to the interface between statutory and 
customary water rights  See FAO, Law and sustainable development since Rio- Legal trends in agriculture and Natural resource 
management (Legislative Study No. 73, Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3872e/y3872e07.htm#bm07>. 
2 Gachenga, Elizabeth Wanjiru, Integrating Customary and Statutory Laws systems of Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development The case of The Marakwet of Kenya (PhD Thesis, University of Western Sydney, 2012).  
3 Report of the United Nations Water Conference, UN Doc E/CONF 70/29 (1977), Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 29,40,41 of Mardel 
plata action plan.   
4 Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 
1992). Chapter 18, 18.3, 18.5 18.9,18.12 of Agenda 21.  
5 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Agenda item 13, UN Doc A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev. 2, (4 September 
2002), Chapter II, paragraph 26. 
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in Agenda 21 (A21) and the Dublin Statements on water and SD (DSWSD) in 1992.6 Some 
scholars argue that the IWRM approach has been implemented in the United States (US) since 
the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s. It is worth noting that the 
IWRM approach is not mentioned specifically in the Dublin Statement.7 Although, IWRM is 
not the most modern water management approach8, it is still worth studying here. This is 
because Thailand still follows an IWRM approach in water management. Hence, to answer the 
research question of this thesis on how to integrate Muang Fai customary law regarding water 
management into the present water management in Thailand, it is necessary to consider the 
IWRM approach. However, this thesis will not focus only on the IWRM, but also on the benefits 
of using a nexus approach to manage water by including the greening water laws which is 
presently the modern water management approach. 
There are a great variety of definitions of IWRM.9 The definition of IWRM used in this thesis 
is the one defined by the Global Water Partnership (GWP). This definition was selected because 
it is the practiced by the water institutions of Thailand.10 The United Nations also accepts this 
definition of IWRM. That is:  
 'IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the 
resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.'11        
                                                                
6 Easter, K.W., Feder, G., Le Moigne, G., Duda, A.M., and Forsyth, E. Water resources management. (World Bank policy paper. 
United States, 1993.) 24< http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/940261468325788815/pdf/multi-page.pdf> and Mark 
Giordanoa and Tushaar Shah. "From IWRM back to integrated water resources management." (2014) International Journal of 
Water Resources Development 30(3): 364. 
7 Dietrich Borchardt, Janos J Bogardi and Ralf B Ibisch, Integrated Water Resources Management: Concept, Research and 
Implementation, (Springer, 2016) 5.   
8 The most modern approach to manage water is the nexus approach. 
9 The Derde Nota Waterhuishouding defines IWRM as ‘Interrelated water resources policy making and management by 
government agencies responsible for the strategically and management tasks, executed on the basis of the systems concept 
under consideration of the internal functional relationships between quality and quantity aspects of both surface and ground 
water, as well as the external interactions between the water resources management and management of other fields like 
environmental protection, regional planning nature conservation etc.’ <Rijkswaterstaat (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat) 
(1989) Derde Nota Waterhuishouding. Water voor nu et later (in Dutch), SDU Uitgeverji and Gravenhage, cited in Borchardt et 
al., above n 7.  The department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) of South Africa define IWRM that ‘IWRM is a 
philosophy, a process and a management strategy to achieve sustainable use of the resources by all stakeholders at catchment, 
regional national and international levels, while maintaining the characteristics and integrity of water resources at the 
catchment scale within agreed limits’. < Gorgens A G Pegram and M Uys, Guidelines for Catchment Management to Achieve 
Integrated Water Resources Management in South Africa (University of Cape Town, 1998), cited in Borchardt, et al., above n 
7. 
10  See Changed Basin in the Changing World: Training Mnual for Integrated River Basin Management for Sustainability in 
21th Century, (Asian foundation, 2015) < https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IWRMTrainingcurric.pdf > Water 
management, Environnet <http://www.environnet.in.th/archives/1480>,   
11  United Nations, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM): What is IWRM ? (23 June 2018) United Nations 
waterforlifedecade <http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/iwrm.shtml> 
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IWRM has come to prominence since the World Summit of SD in 2002 in Johannesburg, South 
Africa.12 It was announced at that summit that [every country] ‘should develop integrated water 
resource management and water efficiency plans by 2005’. 13  Subsequently, a new water 
management approach was declared at the Berlin conference of 2011 relating to the nexus 
between energy, food and water management.14  
         
The definition of IWRM in the GWP has been criticised as an unclear concept that ignores the 
equality among people. Biswas argues that the IWRM conceptualisation is very broad and 
allows almost anybody to argue that the water management approach they apply is in the realm 
of IWRM. It is for this reason that IWRM is very popular amongst water officials. Biswas 
indicates that there are more than 30 unclear points within the meaning of IWRM’s definition 
as defined by the GWP.15   Furthermore, it is argued that IWRM places too much emphasis on 
water without concern for other resources.16 There is particular concern that IWRM lacks 
consideration of equality among people.17 However, IWRM has been improved continuously 
and social equality is now deemed as one of the goals of IWRM.   
Although, IWRM is critiqued by many scholars, the GWP suggests that there have been many 
examples of successful IWRM projects.18  It is therefore useful to study the IWRM approach. 
This is particularly important in terms of verifying that Thailand follows the correct of IWRM 
design and for exploring whether the Muang Fai community can be harmonised or incorporated 
into Thailand’s water management system. 
 
4.1.1.1 The 4 Principles of IWRM  
It is claimed that IWRM is underpinned by four principles: 1) water is a finite resource and 
should be managed using a holistic approach; 2) water management should place emphasis on 
public participation; 3) gender issues, especially the role of women in water decision making, 
should be emphasised in the management of water; and 4) water should be treated as a 
                                                                
12 Borchardt et al., above n7,4. 
13The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Agenda item 13, UN Doc A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev. 2, (4 September 
2002), Chapter IV, Para 26 of Plan of implementation. 
14OECD, New Perspectives on the Water-Energy-Food Nexus: Forum background note, (Global forum on environment, OECD 
Head quarter Paris, 27-28 Nov 2014), <https://www.oecd.org/env/resources/Global%20Forum%20on%20Environment%20-
%20Background%20Note%20-%2019%20Nov%202014.pdf>. 
15 Asit K. Biswas, ‘Integrated water resources management: a reassessment: a water forum contribution’ (2004). 29(2) Water 
International 249-252 and Asit K. Biswas, ‘Integrated Water Resources Management: Is It Working?’ (2008) 24International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 5,8-13. 
16 David Benson, Animesh K Gain and Josselin J Rouillard, 'Water governance in a comparative perspective: from IWRM to 
a'nexus' approach?' (2015) 8(1) Water Alternatives 756,760. 
17 Barbabra Van Koppen, Tari mo, A.K.P.R.; van Eeden, A.; Manzungu, E. and Sumuni, P.M.  Winners and losers in I WRM in 
Tanzania (2016) 9(3) Water Alternatives:  588, 603. 
18 Hassing, Jan, Niels Ipsen, Torkil Jønch Clausen, Henrik Larsen and Palle Lindgaard-Jørgensen, Integrated water 
resources management in action: Dialogue paper (Unesco, 2009) 16-18 
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commodity (economic goods) for effective management.19 Each of these issues is discussed 
below.     
A holistic approach to manage water 
If water is a finite resource, it then needs effective management … by a holistic approach, linking 
social and economic development with protection of natural ecosystems. Effective management 
links land and water uses across the whole of a catchment area or ground water aquifer.20 
Some scholars argue that the holistic approach to manage water is similar to the ecosystem 
approach of CBD. However, other scholars indicate some differences.21  
In terms of management, Van der Zaag and Savenije argue that four dimensions need to be 
included in the decision making process when IWRM principles are applied. Those are the 
water resource22, water users23, the spatial dimension24 and the temporal dimension.25 In other 
words, a holistic approach needs to be taken with regard to water management. 26,27 
It is argued that the implementation of IWRM requires the sustainable management of water at 
the catchment area level.28 This requires a river basin committee to manage the catchment area.  
Hence, the implementation of IWRM needs to have proper water institutions and mechanisms.  
However, it is important to consider what types of water institutions are best practice and most 
                                                                
19 Cap-Net, Global water partnership and United Nation Development Programme, Integrated Water Resource Management 
Plan Training Manual and Operation Guide March 2005 (10 December 2013) GWP Partner for Africa Development and Water 
Management <http://pawd.pbworks.com/f/IWRM+Planning-Training+Manual+Cap-Net+GWP.pdf > 10-11. 
20 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January 1992). 
21 United States Agency for International Development and International Union for Conservation of Nature, Ecosystem 
apapproach and Integrated Water Resources Management – Interrelated Approaches (Fact sheet No.1, USAID & IUCN) 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/ecosystem_approach_and_iwrm_fact_sheet_0.pdf>. 
22 The water resources include all factors in the whole hydrological cycle. For example, ‘stock and flows of water, water 
quantity, water quality; distinguishing rainfall, soil, moisture, water in rivers, lakes and aquifers in wetlands and estuaries, 
considering also return flows etc.  Pieter Van der Zaag and HG Savenije, Principles of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (Unesco-IHE, 2004) 11. 
23 The water users include all sectoral interests and stakeholders. Ibid.  
24 The spatial dimension includes two factors: the spatial distribution of water and the various spatial scales. Savenije and Van 
der Zaag give the example of spatial distribution and spatial scales as follows: 
• the spatial distribution of water resources and uses (e.g., well-watered upstream watersheds and arid plains downstream). Van 
der Zaag, Pieter and HG Savenije, Principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (Unesco-IHE, 2004) 11 
• the various spatial scales at which water is being managed; that is, individual user, user groups (e.g., user boards), watershed, 
catchment, (international) basin; and the institutional arrangements that exist at these various scales 
25 The temporal dimension is the temporal variation in availability of and demand for water resources, but also the physical 
structures that have been built to even out fluctuations and to better match the supply with demand’. Van der Zaag and Savenije, 
above n 22, 11. 
26 Singh argues that the ground rule of IWRM consists of six rules: 1) conservation; 2) protection; 3) non-degration; 4) 
administration; 5) law and policy; and 6) equitable sharing of benefits. See Jitendra Kumar Singh, Holistic Approach 
towwards Water Management: A Framework for Action <www.tce.co.in/holistic_approach_jitendra_delhi.pdf>. 
27Global water partnership suggests the holistic need to address the following points:  1) water resource yield with a natural 
limit, 2) human activities affecting the quality and quantity of water, 3) the relations of upstream and downstream users and 
the holistic institution approach. See Integrated Water Resources Management TAC Background Paper No 4. 
<https://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/toolbox/publications/background-papers/04-integrated-water-resources-management-
2000-english.pdf>. 
28 Cap-Net, Global water partnership and United Nation Development Programme, above n19, 10. 
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suitable for the implementation of IWRM. Additionally, consideration must be given to whether 
a particular model will fit when applied as a panacea in all countries around the world.  As 
indicated by Biswas, Egypt tried to combine the Ministry of Irrigation and Ministry of 
Agriculture in the 1970s. However, this structure did not work effectively and was ultimately 
abolished.29  Questions in relation to suitable institutions for IWRM remain unanswered as it 
is outside the boundaries of this thesis.  
Public participation and IWRM 
Public participation is another key principle of IWRM. It is argued that public participation 
plays a vital role in improving quality of water management and making plans more effective.30 
It is also argued that public participation helps the people and community to feel like the owners 
of a plan and thus guarantees the success of its implementation.31 
Leentvar argues that the ‘stakeholders’ in IWRM are an agency, organization, group or 
individual who has a (direct or indirect) interest in the project / programme, or who affects or 
is affected positively or negatively by the implementation and outcome of it. 32 There is no doubt 
that WUOs are recognised as one of the stakeholders in IWRM. Moreover, public participation 
is very important in the IWRM process as it provides access to local knowledge for use in water 
management.33  There is no doubt that local people who are affected by the water projects and 
traditional institutions relating to water management should be included in water management 
according to IWRM. The application of IWRM by integrating traditional water management 
into the national water management system is a common process used in Oman. 34  The 
proposals to integrate traditional water management into the national water management 
systems are also often proposed in countries such as in Tanzania35, Iran36 in which local people 
still follow the tradition in water management, as a solution for interfacing between customary 
rights and statutory right but these have not, to date, been successful yet.37 This creates a strong 
                                                                
29 Asit K. Biswas, ‘Integrated Water Resources Management: A Reassessment: A Water Forum Contribution’ (2004) 29(2) Water 
International 254. 
30 Buskirk E Drannon et al, 'Public participation: why get involved in water quality [USA]' (1981) 3 
31 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Public Participation Guide: Introduction to Public Participation (23 Jan 
2018) United States Environmental Protection Agency <https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/public-participation-
guide-introduction-public-participation> 
32 Jan Leentvaar, Stakeholder participation in IWRM (23 June 2018) UN 
Water<http://www.ais.unwater.org/ais/pluginfile.php/79/course/section/127/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-
%202%20Stakeholder%20participation.pdf> 
33 Ibid. 
34 Tarek Majoub, 'Water laws and customary water arrangements' in El-Ashry, Mohamed and Najib Zeitoon Saab, Arab 
environment: water: sustainable management of a scarce resource (2010) 
35Faustin P. Maganga, 'Incorporating customary laws in implementation of IWRM: some insights from Rufiji River Basin, 
Tanzania' (2003) 28(20-27) Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 995   
36 Mohammad Reza Balali, Towards Reflexive Land and Water Management in Iran Linking Technology, Governance and 
Culture, PhD thesis (Wageningen University,2009)  
37 Barbara Van Koppen, et al, Formal water rights in rural Tanzania: deepening the dichotomy? Working Paper No. 71 (IWMI, 
2004) 21. 
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case that local wisdoms relating to water management, like Muang Fai, should be included in 
the water management system of Thailand in accordance with the IWRM approach. 
Gender issues 
This principle comes from the Dublin principles on water and SD. Women play a vital role in 
water management both in terms of domestic water use and in agricultural use. Therefore, the 
role of women in water management should be emphasised through the public participation 
process.38  
Treating water as commodity 
One final principle of IWRM is the notion of treating water as a commodity. The objective of 
this approach is to achieve efficiency, sustainability and the equitable use of water.39 This can 
be accomplished by assigning an economic value to water, while also recognising the human 
right to clean water and the need for affordable pricing.40  It further argues that clear water 
rights and a water rights market should be established. To achieve the financial sustainability 
of water service, user fees should meet, as a minimum, the operational and maintenance (O & 
M) costs.41 The counter argument should be noted however that while IWRM may work in the 
formalised water economies of industrialised countries, they are inappropriate in the informal 
water economies of the developing world.42       
4.1.1.2 IWRM & Customary law 
In the past the GWP materials about IWRM have hardly mentioned the role of customary law 
in IWRM. It has also been argued that water reforms based around IWRM have often ignored 
or even eroded community-based water law, especially when applied in developing countries.43 
However, the most recent version of the ‘tool box for IWRM’, updated on 22 February 2017, 
accepted customary law and advocated for it when drafting IWRM policies and plans.44  The 
benefit of integrating customary law into water management is that customary laws can present 
the new ideas, values and responses to the preservation and protection of water resources, and 
assist implementation of precautionary principles. 45 It is worth observing here that the IWRM 
tool box does not mention customary law institutions in the implementation of customary law 
                                                                
38 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on Water and the 
Environment, (Adopted 31 January 1992). 
39 Mei Xie, ‘Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)–Introduction to Principles and Practices’, Africa Regional 
Workshop on IWRM, Nairobi, Oct (2006)6. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Tushaar Shah and Barbara Van Koppen, Is India Ripe for Integrated Water Resources Management? Fitting Water Policy 
to National Development Context, Economic and Political Weekly 3413-3421, cited in Barbara van Koppen et al, Community-
Based Water Law and Water Resource Management Reform in Developing Countries, CABI.2, (2008). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Global water partnership, The role of customary law in IWRM (A2.03) (22 Feb 2017) Global water partnership 
<http://www.gwp.org/en/learn/iwrm-toolbox/The-Enabling-Environment/Legal-
Framework/The_role_of_customary_law_in_iwrm/> 
45 Ibid. 
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(the relation between customary law and customary law institutions isdiscussed in the next 
chapter). The IWRM tool box outlines how States can treat customary law using three 
approaches: 1) to recognise customary law as a second-order right and to consider it after the 
other claims have been fulfilled; 2) to recognise customary law on a case-to-case basis as a 
normative system not a competing legal system; and 3) to recognise both statutory law and 
customary law on a legal pluralism basis.46  The IWRM tools box further suggests that policies 
and plans should not contradict customary law or disadvantage the minority (weaker groups) 
who use customary law. The reconciliation between States’ IWRM policies and plans and the 
customary law can be accomplished using the Cultural Health Index (CHI), determined by the 
local community and showing the rights and interests they concern.47  Therefore, it can be said 
that accepting and recognising customary law do not contradict the IWRM approach. On the 
contrary, it strengthens the IWRM approach. Therefore, there is no doubt that Thailand should 
recognise Muang Fai water management customary law. 
  
4.1.2 Right relating to water & water rights 
Rights relating to water is another important issue because the rights indicate who the owners 
are, who can manage water, and to what extent they can manage water. Traditionally, rights 
relating to water are classified differently in each legal system. For example, rights in relation 
to water were classified into three kinds according to Roman law: public water, private water 
and water common to everybody. Public water is the water that belongs to a community, 
municipality or public institution. Private water is the water that is owned privately. Normally, 
the land owner is also the owner of water. Water that is common to everybody is water that 
cannot be owned by anybody. However, everybody has the right to use it. All flowing water 
such as water in rivers and the sea belongs in this category. 48 49 
Unlike the regime of water rights in the common law legal system, lawyers have more recently 
developed legal principles from the Roman legal principles into two doctrines. These are the 
riparian doctrine and the prior apportionment doctrine. The riparian doctrine follows the Roman 
legal principle that running water is the res communis. Water in rivers is common to all. 
Anybody can claim a right of access to it, and water may be used in a reasonable manner by a 
riparian landowner.50 The prior apportionment doctrine recognises the right of the first person 
                                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 
48 Dante Augusto Caponera, Principles of water law and administration: national and international, (Taylor & Francis, 2007) 
60. 
49 Actually, the rights related to water of the Roman Empire are different from the period of time . See Caponera, above n 48, 
25-48. However, the classification of rights relating to water in to 3 groups are classiflied simply. 
50 Caponera, above n48, 60. 
147 
 
who takes a quantity of water from a water resource as having priority. Other water users can 
enjoy the right to use only the remaining water.51 
Some customary law systems assert that water belongs to the community.52 Whist in many 
other countries, the ownership of water is not clearly defined.53    
Caponera indicates that the ownership of water in all legal systems can be classified into four 
groups; namely, public water, private water, res nullius and common water, and community 
water.54 
However, the ownership of water is not the right to use water. Caponera differentiates the right 
to use water and water ownership using the example of the owner of a well. The owner of a 
well is only the owner of the structure of the well while other people can utilise the water, 
although he or she is not the owner of the water.55   
In Thailand, water ownership is not clearly defined. However, water seems to be classified into 
two groups; namely, public water 56  and private water.  This does not currently include 
community water, although the concept appears clearly in customary law, like Muang Fai. 
Water rights from the past to the present have developed from using a land-based approach to 
a system that separates water rights from land.57  Traditionally, water rights come from two 
sources: the legal principle from civil law legal systems; and the legal principle from common 
law legal systems.58 The drawbacks of using a traditional land-based approach necessitated the 
move from traditional water rights to modern water rights, particularly in response to the 
environment, the economy, social goals and the finite nature of water.59 
The main difference between traditional water rights and modern water rights is that modern 
water rights come with a clear, specific volume of water,60 under limited time,61 and with 
specific conditions about quality.62 Modern water rights are underpinned by market economy 
concepts to achieve efficient utilisation.63 This is done through administrative instruments such 
                                                                
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 138. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid,139. 
56 Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand (Thailand) Sec 1304. 
57 Stephen Hodgson, Modern Water Rights: Theory and Practice (FAO Legislative Study 92, Food & Agriculture Organization, 
2006)1. 
58 Ibid,9. 
59 Ibid, 21-28. 
60 Ibid, 60-61. 
61 Ibid,61-64. 
62 Ibid, 44,64-68 
63 Although the market economy supports the moden water rights system, it does not mean that all countries which use modern 
water rights system, needs to have the water market. The water market has its own problems. See Stephen Hodgson, Modern 
water rights: Theory and practice, (FAO legal studies No 92, Food & Agriculture Organization,2006) 4. 
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as licenses, authorisations and permissions.64 Modern water rights cover both surface water and 
underground water. Modern water rights start with the following process: 
1) put water into the ownership of the State by legislation and provide administrative 
institutions in relation to water, especially at the basin level; 
2) explore and monitor the quantity, quality of both surface and underground water 
including the recharge level of ground water; 
3) explore the existing usages, ecological or environmental uses, and then register and 
record them; 
4) establish a water rights regime within the conditions of volume, time and fees, with 
protections for minor users to fulfil the domestic use; 
5) emphasise the public participation and democratic process in the administration of 
water because public participation will guarantee that the decisions of the water 
administrative institutions will be followed by local people, on matters of water rights, 
in particular; 
6) secure the water rights according to the license or permission; and 
7) review the water rights periodically to fit the dynamic circumstances.  
 
It should be observed here that modern water rights aim to manage water effectively and 
sustainably.  This is done from the catchment area level by conserving the river-source forest, 
planning water utilisation, and allocating water equitably using an IWRM approach to both 
surface water and underground water.  On the contrary, the traditional water rights systems 
focus only on the questions of who owns the water and who can use the water, without planning 
for water management.  However, water rights systems do not need to be established in every 
country.  It depends on the level of water scarcity and water pollution, which can result in the 
need to allocate water equitably.65    
 
The water rights system is supported by IWRM through a permit system.  It is argued however 
that this system does not support community-based water laws.  This is because the permit 
system stipulates an individual volume-based use right and State owned water. Whereas, water 
in community-based water law is accepted as a common pool resource and needs to be shared 
among water users.66 Furthermore, the permit system promotes individual access to water at a 
fixed cost and impairs the collective activities of community-based water management.67 One 
solution for this problem would be to define ‘collectivity’  and allocate permits according to 
collective activities.   It has been suggested that the process of defining ‘collectivity’  should 
include genuine representatives of the community, not just the elite.  This will help to avoid 
freezing the dynamism of the local arrangement.68   
                                                                
64Hodgson, above n 57, 98.  
65 Héctor Garduño, ‘Making Water Rights Administration Work’ (paper present at International Workshop on African Water 
Laws: Plural Legislative Frameworks for Rural Water Management in Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26-28 January 2005). 
66 Barbara Van Koppen et al. Community-based water law and water resource management reform in developing countries, 
(CABI, 2007) 8. 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid. 
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 4.1.3 Economic instruments for manage water 
The term ‘Economic Instruments’ (EIs) has various meanings. Helegers uses the term EIs to refer 
to three tools: water pricing; tradable water rights/marketable permits; and subsidies.69 Whereas 
Panayotou classifies EIs into seven broad categories.70 EIs are a part of environmental market 
theory. According to the theory of environmental markets, water should be commodified and 
priced in order to manage water demands effectively.71 EIs can be used to ensure cost-recovery 
in water management, a reduction in water demand, improved allocation of water (intra-and/or 
inter-sectoral) and higher productivity.72 To manage water sustainably, concern must be paid to 
the financial resources needed for water development and the sustainability decisions of the 
individual. Hence, EIs provide the proper incentives to ensure that human decisions relating to 
water will be made sustainably.  Further, EIs encourage sustainable consumption and 
production, mobilise investment in capital and technology in connection with sustainable 
activities, and provide adequate incentives that support innovation.73 EIs are not a new idea. 
They have been mentioned at many international conferences relating to water and the 
environment. At MDPA, economic tools were suggested for achieving the social objective (the 
human right to access to water).74 Similarly, treating water as an economic good while ensuring 
the human right to access water at an affordable price was considered at the DSWSD.75 In 
principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 (RDED), authorities 
of the State are encouraged to use EIs to regulate the environment.76 However, Agenda 21 did 
not mention the human right to access to water, although it suggested using a pricing 
mechanism. 77 The use of economic tools to manage water, while still respecting human rights 
to access to water, appear again in JPI of the World Summit on SD as market based tools and 
cost recovery mechanisms for the use of water services. 78  However, it is clearly stated that the 
economic goal of cost recovery in relation to water services cannot be a barrier to the human 
right to water.79  EIs also play an important role in meeting the SD Goals. They do so by 
changing individual behavior towards sustainable decisions, by increasing the efficiency of 
                                                                
69 Petra JGJ Hellegers, The Role of Economics in Irrigation Water Management (2006) 55(2) Irrigation and Drainage 157. 
70 Theodore Panayotou, Economic Instruments for Environmental Management and Sustainable Development, UNEP (1994). 
71 Hellegers, above n 69,158 
72 Ibid 157. 
73  United Nations, The action: Financing and economic instruments in 2015 UN-Water Annual International Zaragoza 
Conference. Water and Sustainable Development  
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/financing_and_economic_instruments.shtml>. 
74 Mar del Plata Action Plan Recommendation B Water Uses and Efficiency 7, 16(n). 
75 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, above n 10, Principle 4; ‘Water has an economic value in all 
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good’ 
76 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF151/26 vol. 1 (1992). Principle 16; “National authorities 
should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution with due regard to public interest and 
without distorting international trade and investment” (UN 1992).   
77  Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 1992), Chapter 18.12.  
78 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Agenda item 13, UN Doc A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev. 2, (4 September 
2002), 26 b. 
79 Ibid. 
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water utilisation, ensuring sustainable water withdrawal, reducing pollution and eliminating 
dumping hazardous or chemicals into water.80 
 
This thesis will focus upon the cost recovery and pricing of water because Thailand primarily 
applies EIs to ensure cost recovery and a reduction in water demand. In fact, Muang Fai 
customary law also applies EIs in the process of managing water sustainably over a long period 
of time.   
In terms of cost-recovery, it is argued that the cost recovery goal can be obtained by the use of 
a pricing mechanism. However, this is a long-term goal. The basic goal should be allowing poor 
people to access to water at an affordable price81 with the motivation to optimise water use and 
social welfare.82 In terms of pricing mechanisms, Delacámara, et. al indicate five types of 
pricing including charges 83 , taxes 84 , tariffs 85 , subsidies on products 86  and subsidies on 
practices.87 However, charges are the only pricing mechanism applied in Thailand.88 
                                                                
80  United Nations Development Programme, Goal 6 targets (23 June 2018) United Nations Development Programme 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-6-clean-water-and-sanitation/targets/> 
81 Carlos Mario Gómez and Xavier Leflaive, Economic and financial instruments for the implementation of the water-related 
Sustainable Development Goals, 2015 UN-Water Annual International Zaragoza conference 15-17 January 2015  
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/financing_and_economic_instruments.shtml> 
82 Ibid.  
83 Price to being paid for a given quantity of water or sanitation service, either by households, irrigators, retailers, industries, 
or other users. Fixing a price is to encourage technological improvements or changes in behaviour leading to a reduction in 
water consumption or in the discharge of pollutants. In addition, it generates revenue for water services or infrastructures.    
84 Taxes is a compulsory payment to the fiscal authority for a behaviour that leads to the degradation of the water environment. 
Applying a tax is to encourage alternative behaviour to the one targeted by the tax; for example, the use of lower-polluting 
techniques and products. See Gonzalo Delacámara, Thomas Dworak, Carlos-Mario Gómez, Manuel Lago, Alexandros. 
Maziotis Josselin Rouillard and Pierre Strosser, EPI-Water Deliverable 5.3: Guidance on the Design and Development of 
Economic Policy Instruments in European water policy. EPI-Water – Evaluating Economic Policy Instruments for Sustainable 
Water Management in Europe (2013) < http://www.feem-project.net/epiwater/docs/epi-water_guidance_v2.pdf > 8. 
85 Charges (or fees) Compulsory payment to the competent body (environmental or water services regulator) for a service 
directly or indirectly associated with the degradation of the water environment. Applying charges is to discourage the use of a 
service. For example, using charges in a licensing scheme may discourage users from applying for a permit. See Gonzalo 
Delacámara, Thomas Dworak, Carlos-Mario Gómez, Manuel Lago, Alexandros. Maziotis Josselin Rouillard and Pierre 
Strosser, EPI-Water Deliverable 5.3: Guidance on the Design and Development of Economic Policy Instruments in European 
water policy. EPI-Water – Evaluating Economic Policy Instruments for Sustainable Water Management in Europe (2013) < 
http://www.feem-project.net/epiwater/docs/epi-water_guidance_v2.pdf > 8. 
86 Subsidies on products are payments from government bodies to producers with the objective of influencing their levels of 
production, prices or other factors. Using subsidies on products leads to a reduction in the price of more water-friendly products, 
resulting in a competitive advantage with comparable products. See Gonzalo Delacámara, Thomas Dworak, Carlos-Mario 
Gómez, Manuel Lago, Alexandros. Maziotis Josselin Rouillard and Pierre Strosser, EPI-Water Deliverable 5.3: Guidance on 
the Design and Development of Economic Policy Instruments in European water policy. EPI-Water – Evaluating Economic 
Policy Instruments for Sustainable Water Management in Europe (2013) < http://www.feem-project.net/epiwater/docs/epi-
water_guidance_v2.pdf > 8. 
87  Using subsidies on practices payments leads to the adoption of production methods that limit negative impacts, or produce 
positive impacts on the water environment. See Gonzalo Delacámara, Thomas Dworak, Carlos-Mario Gómez, Manuel Lago, 
Alexandros. Maziotis Josselin Rouillard and Pierre Strosser, EPI-Water Deliverable 5.3: Guidance on the Design and 
Development of Economic Policy Instruments in European water policy. EPI-Water – Evaluating Economic Policy Instruments 
for Sustainable Water Management in Europe (2013) < http://www.feem-project.net/epiwater/docs/epi-water_guidance_v2.pdf > 
8. 
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At the UN Water Annual International Conference at Zaragoza during 15-17 January 2015, the 
issue of EIs was discussed and it was recommended that: 
 Financing is a source to help people reach their own aspirations (not those of the 
donors, the banks or any other external agent). 
 Financing instruments can’t be better than the development objectives they intend to 
serve.  
 Financing instruments are not a panacea. Each mechanism has their specific 
characteristics and strengths and weakness. However, the mix of all kinds of 
instruments should do 
 Financing water is just one part of financing SD. Financing is required to support 
economic, social, and environmental development.  
 Financing water development can enhance the contribution of water to the three 
dimensions of sustainability.  
 Financing must be made a part of a participatory and inclusive decision making 
process. Consultations with all stakeholders, including civil society and the private 
sector, will enable governments and policymakers to better appreciate the diverse 
needs and concerns of people in the formulation and implementation of SD policies at 
all levels. In this regard, gender equality and the inclusion of marginalized groups, 
such as indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities must be ensured.  
 There is a need to ensure good financial governance and public finance management. 
Combating corruption plays an important part in complementing efforts to improve 
domestic revenue mobilization.  
 Countries should review the efficacy of all subsidies as a matter of sound fiscal 
management. Similarly, countries should correct and prevent trade restrictions and 
distortions in world agricultural markets. Financial auditing and control should be 
complemented by monitoring and evaluation of economic, social and environmental 
impacts, in line with country capacities and circumstances.89 
However, it is argued that the implementation of EIs in developing countries like India have 
experienced many problems. This is because water management depends on the institutional 
arrangements (rules in use of the informal institutions relating to water management) more than 
the institutional environment (water law, water policy and water administration).90  Hence, it 
has been suggested that the governments of low income countries need to focus on the areas in 
which they can produce significant impacts. This includes improving water infrastructure and 
                                                                
89 Carlos Mario Gómez and Xavier Leflaive, Economic and financial instruments for the implementation of the water-related 
Sustainable Development Goals, 2015 UN-Water Annual International Zaragoza conference 15-17 January 2015  < 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/pdf/FinanEconInst_Tool_paper_final.pdf>. 
90 Tushaar Shah, ‘Issues in reforming informal water economies of low-income countries: examples from India and elsewhere’ 
in Babarra Van Koppen, et al., Community-based water law and water resource management reform in developing countries, 
(CABI, 2007)65-95.   
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services, reforming institutions relating to water in the public sector by focusing on the 
incentives, 91  concentration and transaction cost reduction, 92  honing and using indirect 
instruments 93  and strategies for achieving public policy objectives and, emphasising the 
management of water demands in the ares that water law can be applied effectively such as in 
cities excluding slum.94    
In terms of the relationship between the EIs and customary law, it is argued that traditional 
society also applied a number of incentive based instruments for natural resource management, 
particularly in the area of common pool resource management.95 It is clear that the water fee 
collected from water users in Muang Fai communities, in the form of labour, materials and 
tools for weir maintenance, is a type of EI or tool. Hence, it is clear that Muang Fai customary 
law is not in contradiction with the modern principles of water management. On the contrary, 
Muang Fai customary law has always applied EIs to ensure that water was used wisely.     
4.1.4 Environmental flow 
Environmental flow is a concept that has evolved from two other concepts, ‘minimum flow’ 
and ‘instream flow’.96 It aims to provide water for ecological systems and local communities.  
An International Union for Conservation of Nature document defines environmental flow as 
the water regime provided within a river, wetland or coastal zone to maintain ecosystems and 
their benefits where there are competing water uses and where flows are regulated. 97 The 
environmental flow principle is mentioned in many water treaties as crucial for the maintenance 
of water flow in international rivers.98 However, it exists primarily for the benefit of the riparian 
States, not for the benefit of ecological systems.  
In the DSWSD mentions the importance of water flow in rivers as follows: 
Water is a vital part of the environment and a home for many forms of life on which the 
well-being of humans ultimately depends. Disruption of flows has reduced the 
productivity of many such ecosystems, devastated fisheries, agriculture and grazing, 
and marginalized the rural communities which rely on these. Various kinds of pollution, 
including transboundary pollution, exacerbate these problems, degrade water supplies, 
require more expensive water treatment, destroy aquatic fauna, and deny recreation 
                                                                
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Indirect instruments include restricted supply of electricity for pumping, restrictions on financing, cropping restrictions, 
price and procurement policies, and technology policy. V. Ratina Reddy, Regulatory Instruments and Demand Management of 
Water: Potential and Prospects’, Indian Water Policy at the Crossroads: Resources, Technology and Reforms, (Springer, 2016, 
pp. 153-178) 156. 
94 Shah, in Van Koppen, above n 90, 88. 
95 Panayotou, above n 70, 7. 
96  Satinder Ahuja, Chemistry and Water: The Science Behind Sustaining the World's Most Crucial Resource, (Elsevier, 
2016)147-148. 
97 Dyson, Megan, Ger Bergkamp and John Scanlon, 'Flow: the essentials of environmental flows' (IUCN,2003). 
98See the agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of Mekong River Basin 1995, The Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses Systems in the Southern Africa Development Community and the Convention on Co-operation for the Protection 
and Sustainable Use of the Waters of the Portuguese-Spanish River Basins.   
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opportunities. Integrated management of river basins provides the opportunity to 
safeguard aquatic ecosystems, and make their benefits available to society on a 
sustainable basis.99 
Within SD goals, the importance of water to sustain ecological systems has been identified.100 
Caponera also reports on the trend to conserve the environmental flow of rivers in legislation 
at the national level.101 The principle to keep environmental flow is now provided for in the 
water laws of many countries such as France, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, the US and South 
Africa.102 However, it has been claimed that the provision of extra water is not sufficient to 
keep ecosystems and rivers healthy.  Information relating to rivers and ecosystems prior to 
human uses, as well as the quality of water are other critical issues for making rivers and 
ecosystems healthy.103     
This thesis argues that water rights regimes and laws play a vital role in the establishment of 
effective environmental flow. Without water rights regimes, States will not know the exact total 
quantity of water they have, nor will they know how much water the State needs to allocate to 
water users. The monitoring processes to regulate and control water utilisation is another 
significant factor. Without transparent processes, the water for ecological conservation runs the 
risk of being stolen for use in other purposes. One example is the water stolen from the Murray 
Darling River and used for crops in NSW, Australia.104     
In Thailand, Pak Moon dam is always claimed as the main example of environmental flow. 
However, the environmental flow provided by opening the water gate of Pak Moon dam is not 
guaranteed by legislation. It is a resolution from a meeting of the sub-committee that manages 
water in the Pak Moon dam.105  In fact, the committee relevant to each dam has a duty to 
maintain the water level according to the ‘lower rule curve’ and the ‘upper rule curve’ of each 
                                                                
99 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, and Caponera, above n 48. 
100  United Nations Development Programme, Goal 6 targets (23 June 2018) United Nations Development Programme 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-6-clean-water-and-sanitation/targets/> 
101 Caponera, above n 48, 149. 
102 Chang Chun Chen et al., ’Environmental Flows Legislation and Regulations in Foreign Countries and the Enlightenment to 
China’ 295 Applied Mechanics and Materials. Trans Tech Publications (2013). 
103 Max Finlayson, Lee Baumgartner and Peter Gell, ‘We need more than just extra water to save the Murray-Darling Basin’ 
theconversation (online) 30June 2017 <http://theconversation.com/we-need-more-than-just-extra-water-to-save-the-murray-
darling-basin-80188>   
104Michael Slezak and Anne Davies, ‘Murray-Darling water theft allegations: NSW to prosecute irrigators’, The gardain (online) 
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2017<http://www.komchadluek.net/news/regional/280210> 
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dam.106  Furthermore, the power of the River Basin Commission in relation to the duty to 
allocate water for environmental flow is not clearly provided for in legislation.107    
In terms of the relationship between environmental flow and customary law, it is claimed that 
they are compatible particularly in terms of the classification of water users. This is because 
customary law classifies water users by a variety of criteria, and not always equally. This is 
similar to modern water management which gives priority to water utilisation.108 With this 
understanding, customary law could be harmonised with the principle of environmental flow 
where the intention is to maintain water for ecological systems. This would be done by 
classifying customary water usage as one kind of water utilisation, and placing it lower than 
the water for ecological conservation.  
4.1.5 Water for agriculture and irrigation 
Water for agriculture is always a focal point of water conferences. This is because such water 
use is a major form of water utilisation around the world.109 The is also intrinsically linked to 
food security and renewable energy. In some countries, the water used for agriculture accounts 
for 70 percent of all fresh water utilisation,110 while in other countries it can be as high as 90 
percent.111 However, it has been reported that up to 60 percent of this water can be lost during 
delivery to plantation areas.112   
In the Mar del Plata Action Plan 1977,113 water for agriculture was identified as one significant 
issue, with the global food shortage in 1974 given as an example of this.114 The resolution 
passed in response emphasised improving existing irrigation and expanding new efficiencies 
in the irrigation area. 115  Moreover, the MDPA also recommended the establishment and 
improvement of institutions for management, administration and legislative support in order to 
achieve the plan.  
                                                                
106Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, Concept for water managementin Bhoomibhol and Sirikit dams (แนวคิดบริหำร
จดักำรน ้ำ 2 เข่ือนภูมิพลและเข่ือนสิริกิต์ิ, (23 June 2018) Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) < 
https://www.egat.co.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362:article-water-
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107 The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management 2007 (Thailand) 
108  Carissa Michelle Wong and Wu Guo, ‘Water for Whom: Improving Water Governance in Yunnan China through 
Environmental Customary Law’ 15 (2013) Vt. J. Envtl. L.  64. 64. 
109 World Bank, Water in agriculture (12 Jul 2017) The World Bank < http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water-in-agriculture > 
110  Khokhar, Tariq, Globally, 70% of Freshwater is Used for Agriculture (22 March 2017) The World Bank group 
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111 Vibha Dhawan,Water and Agriculture in India, (Background Paper for the South Asia Expert Panel during the Global 
Forum for Food and Agriculture, Global Forum for Food and Agriculture, 2017) 3, 
<https://www.oav.de/fileadmin/user_upload/5_Publikationen/5_Studien/170118_Study_Water_Agriculture_India.pdf>.  
112 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January, 1992). 
113  Report of the United Nations Water Conference, UN Doc E/CONF 70/29 (1977), Resolution 3 water for agriculture use,  
114United Nations Children’s Fund, 1970s the Era of alternative in The state of world’s children 1996 (23 June2018) United 
Nations Children’s Fund < https://www.unicef.org/sowc96/1970s.htm > 
115Report of the United Nations Water Conference, UN Doc E/CONF 70/29 (1977), Resolution 3 water for agriculture use, 
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In the DSWSD, water management for food in response to population growth is mentioned. 
However, emphasis is placed on the fact that water utilisation for food needs to consider other 
kinds of water utilisation as well.116 Similarly, in Agenda21, the focus of water management 
for agriculture still emphasises food security in response to the rising population. However, the 
efficiency of water utilisation is still an obvious point of concern. 117  Furthermore, 
environmental impact assessment is required for new irrigation schemes.118 In addition, the 
principles from the DSWSD have been incorporated into Agenda 21.119 The efficiency of water 
utilisation in irrigation is emphasised again in JPI of the World Summit on SD . 120   
Nowadays, focusing only on water management and irrigation is not enough. A new approach 
(the Nexus approach) has been introduced121 to emphasise the interplay between water security, 
food security, energy security and climate change. Decision-making processes therefore need 
to consider all of these aspects together.122 
4.1.6 Water User organisation (WUO) 
The notion of WUOs has been considered at many water conferences and environmental 
conferences since the MDPA,123 including A21124 and JPI.125 The concept of WUO is the focus 
here because it is a potential way to recognise customary water rights and customary 
institutions of the Muang Fai community in Thailand.     
WUOs are a form of community-based water resource management,126 run and governed in a 
participatory and democratic manner by farmers and others who benefit from and pay for 
                                                                
116 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, United Nations International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, (Adopted 31 January, 1992). 
117  Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 1992). 
118Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120  The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Agenda item 13, UN Doc A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev. 2, (4 
September 2002) 40 (k). 
121 Hoff, H. (2011). Understanding the Nexus: Background Paper for the Bonn 2011 Nexus Conference, SEI. 
122 The guiding principles for Nexus approach base on 1) investing to sustain ecosystem services, 2) creating more with less 
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123 Report of the United Nations Water Conference, UN Doc E/CONF 70/29 (1977),  Recommendation B Water uses and 
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124  Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
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126 Stephen Hodgson, Creating legal space for water user organizations: transparency, governance and the law, FAO Legislative 
Study No 100, (Food and Agriculture Organization,2009)1. 
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services that the WUO provides.127 The concept of the WUO is not new.128 It has been applied 
for more than 500 years in Spain.129 Nowadays, the WUO concept is promoted by many 
international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation 130 , the World 
Bank131  and the Asian Development Bank.132  Many countries such as Egypt, Yemen, the 
Philippines, Nepal, Mexico and Thailand use WUOs as a mechanism to involve local people 
in the water management process or irrigation systems. Generally, governments have three 
choices when it comes to running irrigation systems: 1) where the government manages the 
irrigation system after the water infrastructure construction is completed; 2) where the 
government allows farmers to manage the water; and 3) where the government manages part of 
the irrigation system, such as the main canal, and allows farmers to manage the small canals.133  
The benefits for having a WUO are as follows: 1) the water facilities such as dams, dikes and 
canals are maintained well by the participants; 2) they create social cohesion in the community; 
and 3) they reduce the financial burden of government in terms of operation and maintenance 
of the water facilities.134 In fact, WUOs are compatible with CPRM theory, discussed in the 
previous chapter. CPRM theory indicates that in order to manage common pool resource 
sustainably you need to have rules to govern resource utilisation sustainably. This thesis argues 
that the roles of WUOs in sustainable water resource management are: 1) allowing farmers 
and/or their representative/s to participate in the water decision making and planning; 2) 
managing the water demands of farmers effectively through a market mechanism by collecting 
a water fee; and 3) distributing water equitably according to real needs of farmers. Hence, it can 
be argued that WUOs are one tool for achieving sustainable water management.       
Furthermore, Gachenga135 as well as Caponera propose the use of WUOs as an avenue to 
recognise local customary water laws. 136  Actually, the modern-day concept of the WUO 
originated from the customary WUOs which were developed in European countries such as 
Spain, Germany and Belgium.  Hence, the modern concept of the WUO should harmonise well 
with the water customary law because it comes from the same idea. The main points of 
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129 Ibid.  
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133 A Hamdy and C Lacirignola, ‘Water Users' Associations and Sustainability of Irrigation System’ Prospetcive e proposte 
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difference are evidenced in the fact that customary law reflects some discrimination for water 
utilisation based on gender or social status. As such customary law might have some conflict 
with the modern concept of the WUO, which emphasises the participation of all water users.   
The next issue is how to use WUOs to recognise customary water law.  As indicated in the 
previous chapter, one measure to manage common pool resources sustainably is establishing 
an institution to enact the rules to govern and monitor water utilisation. Hence, WUOs can 
recognise local customary law relating to water utilisation by incorporating such laws into the 
water utilisation rules of the WUO.  However, having a WUO does not mean that water will 
automatically be used sustainably. The next question is how to ensure that the institution 
regulates water resource usage sustainably. Kulkani and Tyagi indicate that the WUO should 
focus less on the effectiveness and the appropriateness of the WUO to support the performance 
of the irrigation systems. Instead the focus needs to be more on the mechanisms for cooperation 
between farmers in the WUO and the other stakeholders in the irrigation structure, as well as 
the mechanisms for cooperation between the WUO and other institutions.137 Furthermore, a 
study by the World Bank138 and the US Bureau for International aid,139 relating to the problems 
of irrigation systems in developing countries, indicated that the one problem of unsustainable 
irrigation systems is under-investment in the costs of operation and maintenance.140The work 
of Oslon reveals a human trend to not cooperate, despite the benefits to be gained from 
cooperation.141  Hence, the question of how to encourage farmers to cooperate sustainably or 
how to sustain the WUO are as important as how to use water sustainably. Answers to these 
questions have been discussed by Ostrom and other CPRM scholars, and were covered in this 
thesis in the previous chapter.  
Another approach towards the creation of effective and sustainable WUOs is proposed by 
Hodgson, who applies Ostrom’s CPRM theory. Hodgson argues that such an approach should 
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be concerned with the following issues: name,142 tasks,143 legal personality,144 source of law,145 
participation, 146  rights and duties of participants, 147  management, 148  financial matters, 149 
                                                                
142 WUO is called by a variety of names such as Water User Association, Farmer Owned Irrigation, Irrigation Council etc. 
However, the name of WUO should avoid using the name which is similar to the legal entity, provided by law such as 
association or company or cooperative, if the missions or duties of the WUO are not compatible with missions or duties of 
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143 Most tasks of the WUO emphasis surface water management activities. The WUO can be the centre for land management, 
poverty eradication and natural resource conservation. However, too many missions for the WUO might creat unclear gaols 
and it would be very difficult to measure their success. TheWUO should have the legal capability, at least to open bank account 
and present case to the Court 
144 The WUO should have status as a special type of legal entity because its missions have both non-profit activities and quasi-
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the duration of lessee who can participate in the WUO should be at least three years or more. Moreover, the water users who 
can participate in the WUO can be a natural person or juristic person. Moreover, legislation should provide the process to be a 
member of and to resign from the WUO. 
147 Hodgson indicated that the rights and duties of water users should be provided in legislation because they are stronger than 
the rights conferred by contract or governing documents. The basic rights which all water users in the WUO should have consist 
of: 1) right to fair share of water; 2) right to benefit from services provided by the WUO; 3) right to vote and elect the WUO 
officials; 4) right to stand for office; 5) right to propose matters for discussion; 6) right to inspect the books or records of the 
WUO.  On the contrary, the basic duties of water users in the WUO consist of: 1) duty to comply with the rules in governing 
documents and operating rules; 2) duty to promptly pay fees and charges; 3) duty to allow water to pass through the land; 4) 
duty to allow officers and other water users access to land for the purpose of operation and maintenance; and 5) duty to comply 
with the decisions of the WUO and staffs. Hodgson, Stephen, Legislation on water users' organizations: a comparative analysis 
(Food & Agriculture Org., 2003) 64-65 
148 Normally, the internal structure of each WUO consists of two parts, general assembly and management board. The general 
duties of the management board are to prepare the meeting of the general assembly to make decisions on important matters 
and to run the work of the WUO between the meetings. 
149 The legislation should provide the clear sources of income for the WUO. The sources of income normally include fees and 
charges of service provided to both member and non-member participants, gifts, grants and subsidies, loans and interest on 
saving. Furthermore, the source of income should come from both member fees and water fees. This is because the incomes 
from member fees might be not sufficient for the operating and management cost if it is collected too cheaply. 
Moreover, the law should separate between the incomes necessary for operation and for maintenance because it can guarantee 
that the WUO can have sufficient funds to operate the system for the next irrigation season. Additionally, the WUO should 
have a reserve or emergency fund by transferring all surplus income to the fund.   
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auditors, 150  dispute settlement mechanisms, 151  supervision of WUO, 152  power to enforce 
rules,153 and liquidation.154 
It is widely argued that the establishment of WUOs using a ‘top-down’ or ‘forced’ approach 
undermines their sustainably.155 In short, it can be said that the legislation required to support 
and regulate WUOs to create sustainability in water use can be developed in four ways: 1) public 
law; 2) recognising WUO as a legal entity with special legal capacity; 3) allowing farmers to 
craft their own internal rules; and 4) assigning power to enforce the law to the WUO.156 
However, Bruns argues that ‘the goal for WUO development should be to avoid unnecessary, 
expensive institutional cost’.157 Furthermore, he argues that the goal of WUOs should be to 
develop the ability of the organisation to meet the specific needs promptly and to keep the 
irrigation systems operating without building unnecessary capacity to deal with unpredictable 
situations.158  
This thesis embraces both points of view, arguing that the legal framework for WUOsshould 
respond to the basic tasks of an irrigation system. Those are: acquiring water, allocation, 
distribution, draining, construction, operation, maintenance, decision-making, resource 
mobilisation, communication and conflict resolution. Moreover, the tasks of the WUO should 
consist of conservation of the water resource, which is one key issue in sustainable water 
management. The legal framework for WUOs should consist of all issues of concern suggested 
by Hodgson. However, the structure and the management of each organisation should be 
effective, not bureaucratic in style, and should try to eliminateany unnecessary work. One 
simple example of this is that meetings of water users should be convenedduring the evening, 
after all farmers have finished their daily works, except in cases of emergency.   
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155 Kulkarni and Tyagi, above n137, 6.  
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In Thailand, the establishment and management of WUOs is according to the Civil and 
Commercial code159 or the Co-operative Act160. There is no specific law to support and regulate 
water user associations.161 The current laws and structures for organisations in Thailand are not 
designed specifically for WUOs and they lack many of the features suggested by Hodgson.  
Further detail on this point is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.1.7. The recognition of customary law 
 
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the local customs used to manage water are recognised by 
States in international law, especially in relation to the treaties that demarcate boundaries. 
International conferences relating to the environment such as RDED 162, A21163 and JPI,164 have 
also recognised customary law and traditional practices.  Although the interface between 
legislation and customary law with regards to water is one aspect of national water law,165 
recognition of water management customary law, water customary rights and local traditional 
institutions to manage water is occurring in both developed and developing countries such as 
Australia, 166  Argentina, 167  Belgium, 168  Canada, 169  Holland, 170  Italy, 171  New Zealand, 172 
Bolivia, 173  Ecuador, 174  Ghana, 175  Indonesia, 176  Nepal, 177  Nigeria, 178  Peru, 179   and the 
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Philippines.180 Even in Thailand, Muang Fai customary law was recognised by the People’s 
Irrigation Act (PIA) between 1939 and 2015.181   
Generally, the role of water customary law in terms water management is to determine: 1) the 
customary legal status of water; 2) the customary water rights distribution and management; 3) 
the customary procedures for the settlement of disputes among water users; and 4) the 
customary water administration.182 Additionally, Caponera argues that customary water rights 
should be recognised for water planning purposes by collecting data and information such as 
the quantity of water employed, the ways it is used, the places of use, and the purposes of use.183 
Furthermore, Caponera claims that water rights, according to the riparian doctrine, should be 
recognised as rights to use water for administrative purposes and the prevention of waste-water. 
It should not be recognised as confering property rights.184 He further argues that water law 
should consist of provisions to recognise and regulate customary water management practices 
and institutions. Those provisions should consist of: 1) the legal regime of water and water 
rights; 2) traditional water management institutions; 3) the relationship with modern laws and 
the government water administration; 4) financial aspects; 5) procedures for the assessment of 
water rates and fees or water service charges; 6) procedures for the settlement of water disputes; 
7) the relationship between the national Courts and traditional water Courts; and 8) the 
procedures to recognise, institutionalise and modernise customary water rights and 
institutions.185 The benefits of water management customary law are well-defined with regard 
to both quantity and quality of water, and contain a clear delimitation of individual rights.186 
 
Ramazotti indicates three issues of concern for dealing with water customary law. Those are: 1) 
the recognition of customary water rights by the state; 2) statutory mechanisms to reconcile 
customary water rights and practices with statutory rights; and 3) statutory and judicial 
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mechanisms to settle disputes between customary water rights and statutory rights. 187 
Furthermore, Van Koppen et al. indicate three questions relating to customary water law: 1) how 
do communities encourage collective action in water resources development and management 
and how can their systems work at scales beyond the community?; 2) How and under what 
conditions does spontaneous innovation, an important strength of community-based water 
arrangements, spread?; and 3) what are the critical weaknesses of community-based 
arrangements where the public sector has a legitimate role in acting to enhance the human 
well-being through better access to water and its beneficial uses?188 
 
In terms of the permit system, Van Koppen indicates in her study relating to successful water 
permit systems in developed countries that successful water permit systems in developed 
countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France and Japan, and even in countries applying 
common law legal systems like the United Kingdom (UK), include customary water boards in 
the permit system.189 On the other hand, the water permit system in developing countries like 
Chile, South Africa and Tanzania has been used as a tool to take water rights away from the 
native people by white colonists.190 So, reconciliation between customary water rights and 
statutory water rights through the permit system must avoid discrimination that may result from 
the establishment of a permit system.      
 
4.1.8 From command and control to governance 
 
The main reasons driving water-sector governance reforms are the increasing demand for water, 
problems accessing water (particularly for poor people) lack of accountability and transparency 
in water management, sector reform, water rights and gender issues.191 Water governance 
relates to the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place 
to develop and manage water resources and the delivery of water services at different levels of 
society.192 Water governance approaches are both shaped by and accepted at many international 
conferences.193 
 
The challenge of water governance is to create a framework (institutional and administrative) 
that all stakeholders and people from all levels with different interests can participate in, discuss 
peacefully, and within which to agree to co-operate and coordinate their actions. However, the 
binding arbitration or judicial system is still needed to settle disputes and conflicts.194 
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However, there is no panacea for water governance that applies to all water problems around 
the world.195 The possible answer for water governance in the present is to adapt the current 
governance approach in response to territorial specificities. Recognising that governance is 
highly context-dependent, it is important to fit water policies to places. It is now accepted that 
bottom-up and inclusive decision-making is the key to effective water policies.196 This then 
leads to decentralisatio to contain water problems. This provides opportunities to customise 
policies to local realities. However, it also raises capacity and co-ordination challenges in the 
delivery of public services.197 
 
Thailand adopts this idea in its attempt to enact water law, although it does not appear to be 
successful. Thailand could be described as on the way to reforming water governance by 
including stakeholders in water planning and decision making processes.   
 
 
In terms of water governance, it is argued by many scholars that the State and the legislature 
play a vital role in modern water governance.198 Although, it is acknowledged that the State 
still plays a vital role in the management of water, this thesis argues that all stakeholders 
connected to water resources need to take part in creating sustainable water management. This 
is because the local community and individuals can do as much as they can to manage water 
sustainably, particularly in relation to managing water demands, if the State fails to conserve 
natural resource due to national-level politics like in US.199  This approach leads to one key 
recommendation of this thesis; namely, to recognise customary law in civil law, created by 
the local people, if Thailand fails to recognise Muang Fai customary law. 
 
In short, the sustainable management of water through the present water laws at the national 
level follows the eight trends mentioned above, particularly Thailand. These are IWRM, 
creating water rights, using EIs to manage water demand, environmental flow, increasing 
irrigation efficiency, using WUOsto reduce the cost of operation and maintenance and to 
encourage public participation, recognition of customary law, and the improvement of water 
law by transitioning from a command and control approach to a water governance approach. 
This shows that the recognition of customary law is one measure to achieve SD because it 
encourages people to access water according to their needs. However, the recognition of 
customary law needs to be accomplished in conciliation with the statutory rights and a 
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commitment to review the usage of customary water rights periodically. It further needs to have 
mechanisms to settle disputes between customary water rights and statutory water rights.          
4.2 Customary law in natural resource management and customary law recognition 
Despite the plethora of materials relating to customary law, this thesis focuses on the customary 
law relating to natural resource management only.  The following questions areanswered 
respectively, 1) why the State recognise customary law; 2) what kinds of customary law should 
the State recognise; 3)  how should the State treat customary law; 4)  how customary law is 
recognised within the common law legal system; and 5)  how to recognise and integrate 
customary law to achieve SD?    
4.2.1. Why States should recognise customary law? 
 
The debate relating to Aboriginal customary recognition in Australia acknowledges the need 
to recognise the customary law of the Aboriginal people as follows: 1) to continue aspects of 
Traditional culture and belief; 2) the consequences of non-recognition; 3) the maintenance of 
order; 4) compensation of Aboriginal people; 5) the intrinsic merits of Recognition; 6) the ability 
to exercise self-management and self-determination.200 It has been argued by some that local 
communities have more faith in customary law than national laws.201  This is because the 
communities believe that customary law is fairer than statutory law. It is quicker, well known 
and cheaper, with flexible sanctions.202 Hence, the status of customary law might be better than 
statutory law in remote areas.203 204 
 
On the other hand, scholars who disagree with customary law recognition defend their 
opposition with the following reasons: 1) the secret aspect of customary law; 2) loss of control 
over the law; 3) unacceptable rules and condition; 4) the position of women; 5) the recognition 
of customary law might create synthetic customary law instead of recognising the real 
customary law; 6) the decline of customary law; 7) the geographical restrictions of customary 
law; and 8) the recognition might create an undesirable form of legal pluralism.205 Moreover, it 
is contended in theoretical terms that customary law is formless, without structure, and 
unwritten making it difficult to define and clarify. Customary law is also diffuse and diverse.206 
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Hence, it is argued that it is unfit to meet the needs of the modern nation State. 207 This is 
because business requires predictability and certainty from the legal system and customary law 
is deemed to be unable to offer this. Lastly, counsel and the judiciary favour easy options and 
the application of certain, tried models.208 
 
4.2.2 What is the sustainable customary law? 
After considering why the State should recognise customary law, consideration should also be 
given to the kinds of customary laws and customary institutions that can govern natural 
resources effectively in relation to water management. Bosselman and Orebech contend that 
customary laws relate to SD because some customary law systems can govern natural 
resources, especially, common pool resources more effectively than statutory law.209  
Although customary law is often accused of being old fashion and too simple to enforce 
effectively in contemporary complex societies, especially in governing environment,210 some 
water management customary laws show that they can manage water sustainably and 
effectively within a complex system. 211  It is too simplistic to say that the traditions and 
attributes of customary law are not suitable for governing the present day environmental 
situations, particularly in relation to common pools resource.   
Bosselman and Orebech indicate that using customary law might not always result in 
sustainability, but studying customary law can provide possible methods for sustainably 
managing resources.212 The core idea of natural resource management is the changes that occur 
in relation to natural resources according to the earth’s ecology, technology and the social 
structure of the present day. Natural resource management systems need to be adaptable to 
respond to the changes. To differentiate normal customs from sustainable customary law (also 
known as resilient customary law), Bosselman argues that the following five criteria should be 
applied: 1) recording a history of adaptation; 2) offering a vehicle for making changes; 3) 
providing feedback mechanisms; 4) encouraging fine-grained rules; and 5) creating a balance of 
rights and responsibilities.213   
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Figure 6 Sustainable customary law by Fred Bosselman 
 
Gachenga argues that customary law contributes to the SD because of the following four 
characteristics: 1) Chthonic nature; 2) Sui Generis Conceptualization; 3) Localism and 4) 
Inherent Sustainability. The Chthonic nature feature means that custom is developed inside the 
community with a bottom-up approach by people at the grass-roots based on their own 
knowledge without interference from the outside.214 This feature makes people feel familiar 
with the law and the owner of the customs. Hence, it always leads to positive results in SD.215 
Sui Generis Conceptualization means that customary law always has its own ideas, which is 
different from the concept in modern law. Customary law has original and unique features, but 
acts quite differently to modern law. Gachenga provides the example that natural resources are 
always considered through an integrated perspective by customary law. Thus, the separation 
between land rights and water rights according to modern law will not be found in customary 
law systems.216 Localism means that customary law is always applied within the local area or 
community and that it is appropriate to the way of life, culture and social aspects of local people 
in a defined area. Using customary laws to govern natural resources is better for local people 
than using a centralised governing system. Lastly, Gachenga explains that Inherent 
Sustainability means that the governing system based on custom can change and be flexible in 
response to the social, economic, cultural, political and ecological situation.217 Hence, it can 
adjust itself to the unpredictable wealth of natural resources in the global climate change era. 
 
Gachenga indicates that some further indicators can be used to analyse whether the customary 
law water management system supports SD. By building on the design principles of Ostrom, 
the indicators identify resilient customary systems for natural resource management as defined 
by Bosselman. The indicators consist of: 1) knowledge management systems; 2) feedback 
mechanisms; 3) inherent rule modification procedures; 4) stratification of norms; 5) a balance of 
rights and duties; and 6) autonomy. 
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Figure 7 Framework for analysing sustainable water resource management customary law by Gachenga 
Knowledge management systems (1) refers to the fact that customary systems used to manage 
natural resources have knowledge management systems to pass knowledge from one 
generation to another. It is similar to Bosselman’s idea that systems must have a record of the 
history of adaptation to new changes. Effective feedback mechanisms (2) means that customary 
systems to manage natural resources need to allow ways of giving feedback to the system in 
order to adjust the system to fit with new changes or challenges. Inherent rule modification 
procedures (3) mean that the system has procedures in place to adjust or modify rules to fit with 
the specific circumstances. Stratification of norms (4) mean that some part of the rules can be 
adjusted according to the physical conditions of the area. Balance of rights and duties (5) is 
similar to the eight design principles for self-organisation in collective action outlined by 
Ostrom. Namely, if the benefits of participation in collective action do not outweigh the duties 
or burdens, nobody will want to participate. Autonomy (6) means the autonomy of resource 
users to define the rules to govern natural resources in their own area. 
 
Gachenga also indicates that the definition of customary is still controversial and it is therefore 
not proper to define customary law through a western lens. For this reason, this thesis looks at 
the meaning of customary law as defined in policy by the International Council on Human 
Rights. The International Council’s policy defines the meaning of the customary law as ‘Norms 
and institutions that tend to claim to draw their moral authority from contemporary to 
traditional culture or customs or religious beliefs, ideas and practices rather than from the 
political authority of the State. We use ‘legal’ to acknowledge the fact that these norms are often 
viewed as having the force of law by those subject to them’.218 Definitions such as this include 
the traditional institution in the meaning of customary law. This is important as the research 
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questions at the heart of this thesis seek to explore and identify the effective prospects for 
recognising both Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community (a traditional 
institution).   
In terms of differentiation between custom and customary law, the New Zealand Law 
Commission reported that this is just a minor issue in society where customs and customary 
law are recognised and applied thoroughly.219 In addition, the High Court of Australia found 
that laws and customs can change, but still remain valid. 220 However, this thesis needs to 
examine the concepts to distinguish custom from customary law in order to select what types 
of customs within Muang Fai water management norms should be recognised as a customary 
law.  Furthermore, Bracey indicates that customary law emphasises the rights of communities 
more than the right of individuals.221 However, customary law also ranges from too simple to 
too complex.222     
Positivist lawyers accept that customs will acquire legal status when they are recognised by 
laws or legal institutions as a law of the nation.223 However, Techera argues that it is difficult 
and unfair to separate customs from customary law using the lens of the western legal system 
rather than the legal system from which they originated. This may create crucial discriminations 
when using western legal concepts to judge another legal system.224 Moreover, some customs 
are applied as law in some societies, even though they are not recognised by law. Additionally, 
the New Zealand Law Commission differentiates custom from customary law by accepting that 
customary law is the ‘values principles and norms that members of a community accept as 
establishing standards for appropriate conduct, and the practices and process that give effect to 
community values’.225 Craig et al. adopt a similar approach to differentiating between custom 
and customary law by defining customary law as ‘a body of rules that a society recognises as 
binding’. Ørebech and Bosselman point out that the criteria to examine whether custom has 
become a customary law is to check ‘a popular perception of valid legal obligation’ or opinio 
necessitates sive obligationis.226 However, it should be questioned here as to how a society can 
indicate that a norm is binding, or indeed how much popular perception can indicate a valid 
legal obligation. 
The positivism concept underpinning common law ensures lawyers do not accept the norms 
outside a legal framework, but they can attempt to harmonise pre-existing norms by recognising 
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customary law with a statute.227 In the case of the Australian Law Reform Commission, there 
are five approaches to recognising the customary law of the Aboriginal people: 1) recognition 
as acknowledgement; 2) the incorporation of Aboriginal customary laws; 3) recognition by 
exclusion; 4) recognition by translation; and 5) recognition by adjustment and accommodation. 
The Commission, however, adopts an approach called ‘functional recognition’. Functional 
recognition is not the general recognition of Aboriginal customary law for all purposes of 
Australian law, but recognition by exploring issue by issue in reference to topics of Australian 
law.228 The recognition of Maori customs in New Zealand and the recognition of customary 
law in the Southern Pacific region are also studied to answer the research questions.  
In the case of Thailand, the civil and commercial code of Thailand accepts customary laws as 
a subsidiary to apply to civil and commercial cases when a statutory law does not exist.229 But 
in only a few cases have judges applied the customary laws. This shows that customary laws 
have their own relevance.230 It has been argued that customary laws can be applied when they 
are used by the State over an extended period, when the custom has been implemented for a 
long duration, or when the customary law does not conflict with a written law subsequently 
enacted. 231  Generally, customary laws are known and exist in practice, but they are not 
documented. Thus, legal practitioners and scholars lack knowledge of customary laws and fail 
to recognise and implement them. 
In the case of water management customs, Muang Fai custom was incorporated into the PIA 
2482 B.E. (1939 A.D.). However, there were several problems regarding implementation. 
Furthermore, the Thai government issued many policies which contradicted the PIA. In this 
thesis, the idea of a legal drafting commission and the real enforcement of these policies are 
explored.     
 4.2.3. How States treat customary law 
Woodman is the earliest scholar to illuso trate the typology of interaction between State and 
Indigenous law by following the features of law as classified by Hart. He indicates that Hart 
separates norms into two types: ‘primary norm’ or ‘rules of obligation’; and ‘secondary norms’ 
or ‘power conferring rules’, which Woodman calls ‘imperative norms’ and ‘norms of 
validation’.232  An imperative norm creates an obligation for people to act or not to act in a 
nominated way; whereas, norms of validation allows people to create something, such as a 
contact or change to the secondary norm. He then classified the act of State to non-State norms 
into two types: negative measures and positive measures. The negative measures consist of the 
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prohibition and denial of validity of customs; whereas, the positive measures consist of the 
admittance as fact, incorporation and acknowledgement. However, the typology of the 
relationship between State and Indigenous law, as classified by Woodman, cover only the data 
in the book which he and others have edited. This means that the typology does not cover all 
measures committed by States. 
 
Figure 8 The typology of interactions between State norms and non-State norms by Gordon Woodman 
Later, Tom’tavala claimed that States have four key options to deal with customary law:233  1) 
to replace customs with new norms based on new values; 2) to reform some parts of customs 
and leave others intact; 3) to conserve the essence of certain customs; and 4) to respect the 
essence of certain customs.  
 
Figure 9 Options of the State to treat customs according to Tom’tavala 
Tom’tavala further contends that a government can take two approaches in relation to 
customary law; namely, negative measures and positive measures similar to Woodman’s 
argument.  Negative measures can be applied when the customary law contradicts the statute 
law or the State law does not recognise the legal consequence of customary law. They include 
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a prohibited observance of customary law and denial of the validity of customary law. On the 
other hand, positive measures include the admittance of customary law as a fact, the 
incorporation of customary law as law, and measures of their acknowledgement. 
Hinz indicates how States in Africa treat customary laws according to five models.234 The 
author uses monism and dualism as criteria to differentiate how States treat customary law. It 
is evidenced as follows: 
 
Figure 10 How States in the African continent treat customary law, by Hinz 
Strong and modern monism - the State does not accept any customary law as a law of the 
nation. All customary laws are abolished by the State’s law. Traditional leaders are generally 
ignored and included only for their political viewpoint. One acceptable law is the State’s law, 
which can be tracked back to Grundnorm235 as it appeared in the concept of law noted by 
Kelsen.    
Unregulated dualism - the State ignores and does nothing about traditional governance and 
customary law. Traditional governance and customary law still exist, but are either not 
recognised or are abolished by the State.  
Regulated dualism (weak or strong) - the State accepts and confirms traditional governance 
and customary law. Each system can operate separately in the same country. The weakness or 
strength of a particular version of dualism can be measured by the degree of autonomy provided 
by the State to traditional governance and customary law.  
Weak modern monism - the State pays attention to traditional governance and customary law, 
but does not acknowledge them. The State might set the criteria to integrate traditional 
authorities and customary law into the State’s legal system. The legitimacy of the traditional 
authority and customary law depends on the legitimacy of the State.  
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235 Grundnorm is the Germany language word, used by Kelsen. It means the foundamental norm.  
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Strong traditional monism - the traditional authority is the government and customary law is 
the law of the nation.236 
In terms of the harmonisation between the State’s law and customary law, Forsyth proposes a 
two-pronged approach of legal pluralism within the jurisdiction. The first step is to reform the 
relationship between the State and non-State system in the specific jurisdiction, and the second 
step is to reform processes and substantive norms of the State and non-State jurisdiction.   
The reformation of relationship between the State and non-State systems can be accomplished 
in three stages as follows. The first stage is to identify every kind of relationship between the 
State and the non-State system. Forsyth illustrates the typology of relationships between the 
State and the non-State system in seven types grouped into formal and non-formal relationships, 
shown below in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 11 The typology of relationships between the State and non-State systems, by Forsyth 
The second stage is to analyse the need for change and the selection of the type of model of 
relationship to apply. This stage can be accomplished in five steps. The first step is to undertake 
research at the whole of society level to explore every non-State system operating in the 
jurisdiction in relation to norms, core principles, procedures and institutions, strengths, 
weakness and the informal relationships of non-State system with other systems in society. The 
second step is to organise the national dialogue to deeply consider the aim of the system 
reformation by considering the conditions and limitations of each society. The third step is to 
undertake further research to identify both the positive and negative features in the relationship 
between the State and non-State system. The fourth step is to organise a national dialogue again 
to select a model of relationship to fit with the conditions and limitations of society and to 
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overcome problems in the future. Forsyth emphasises that the following questions should not 
be ignored: 1) whether the State will recognise the adjudicative power of a non-State power or 
not; 2) whether the jurisdiction of non-state power is accepted by the State; 3) the degreee of 
regulation of the system of a non-State power; and 4) whether the State will provide disciplinary 
powers to non-State systems and to what extent the State will allow a non- State power to 
exercise such power.  The fifth step is to adjust the State bias in the system by creating balance 
between the regulation and the direction for both the State and the non-State system. This means 
that State and non-State systems can regulate each other and that both systems are on board to 
govern the country.237   
The final step is to adapt the relationship of the State and non-State systems via incremental 
processes by defining the practical steps for moving forward to define the changes, and 
evaluating the changes before moving forward to the next step under the guidance of that 
evaluation.  
The reformation processes and substantive norms of State and non-State jurisdictions can be 
accomplished by the modification of both State and non-State systems in order to strengthen 
the linkage between them. The modification consists of stakeholders in both State and non-State 
systems mutually learning the positive aspects of each system. Then, stakeholders in both 
systems can adopt procedures from the other system to apply in both State and non-State 
systems. Additionally, stakeholders are urged to adopt norms and principles from another 
system to apply to both State and non-State systems and use the key players/institutions from 
another system.238 
 
Furthermore, the New Zealand Law Commission proposed a ‘Harmonisation’approach which 
aimed to integrate the human rights principles of modern legal systems into the present 
customary legal systems of Pacific Island countries. Even though this approach does not emerge 
from the concept of legal pluralism, it illustrates how to harmonise new legal principles (human 
rights values) into Pacific customary values. It is worthwhile taking time in this thesis to study 
to the possibilities that harmonisation holds for bringing together customary water management 
law and Thailand’s water management system. This approach aims to overcome the perceived 
conflict between customary law and human rights principles. Harmonisation, according to the 
New Zealand Law Commission, consists of four stages: identifying customary values; relating 
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customary values to other relevant values; reviewing customary practices in the light of those 
values; and developing Indigenous jurisprudence.  
Identifying customary values means identifying the key values of particular customary 
communities, then trying to identify the similarities between human rights and customary 
law.239 For example, the principles of human rights recognise and support the equality among 
people as well as the customary values in South Pacific. In terms of relating customary values 
to other relevant values, this means linking the customary values to common law principles 
and human rights values.240 The New Zealand Law Commission provides examples of this 
process using the African word Ubuntu to teach people about human rights. Ubuntu in Zulu 
language means the code of ethics that supports people to stay together. Reviewing customary 
practices in the light of these values involves reviewing both past and present customary 
practice, customary values and human rights values throughout social changes. This process 
will indicate the incompatible customary practice in the present and how to resolve the conflict 
between customary and human rights. Developing an Indigenous jurisprudence means that the 
Court can develop a type of jurisprudence that is compatible with the Pacific nation’s way of 
life while also respecting human rights. However, the report recommends that the Court should 
intervene in customary decisions only in the cases where the community cannot protect human 
rights. Moreover, the Court should link human rights values with the customary values and 
express clearly such customary values. 
It should be observed that the harmonisation approach outlined here is a way of avoiding 
conflict between the human rights principles and Pacific nation values. It is undertaken by a 
Court to protect human rights while creating Pacific jurisprudence to ensure balance between 
preserving customary law and protecting human rights. This thesis agrees with the proposal of 
the New Zealand Law Commission and argues that this approach could be applied to the 
process of integrating modern idea in relation to water management with Muang Fai customary 
law. 
 
Thailand, or Siam as it was known during the 18th and 19th centuries, argues that it was never 
the colony of a western power during the imperialism era.241 However, Winichakul and Peleggi 
argue that Thailand was a crypto colony.242 This is because Thailand was integrated into the 
colonial economy and was forced to reform as a result of the domination of a western power. 
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In this way, it was not necessary for western powers to colonise Siam.  On the contrary, Siam 
annexed her tributary states on the northern, north-eastern and southern parts of her boundary 
under the control of Bangkok with the view to surviving imperialism. Thailand westernised her 
traditional legal system and implemented a new western style legal system throughout the 
country during that period. However, people still followed the previous local customs. 
Furthermore, the local customs had not been incorporated into the codification process of 
Thailand. This created the situation of legal pluralism, automatically. This is because the 
annexations of the tributary states of Thailand can be deemed as colonisation. 
It is obvious that the process proposed by Forsyth indicates one core principle of SD; namely, 
public participation. This is evidenced in the national dialogue phase, which should be 
organised two times during the analysis process. Even though Forsyth illustrates the large-scale 
nature of the reformation of the relationship between State and non-State system in a country, 
the process could be applied to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in Thailand. The 
application of Forsyth’s proposal is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
4.2.4. Recognition of customary law in the common law legal system: Meaning approach 
and methods  
 
Thailand has recognised customary law and customary law in water management in legislation. 
However, it is useful to study the lessons from common law legal system. This section explores 
customary law recognition in relation to four issues: 1) definition of recognition; 2) approach for 
recognition; 3) methods to recognise customary law; and 4) proving customary law in Court.   
A. Definition of Recognition 
Crawford argues that the word ‘recognition’ has many definitions, but the meaning which 
should be used for the recognition of customary law is ‘at least, (to) acknowledge the existence 
of customary law and take account of it as a phenomenon, if not acknowledge its validity or 
binding force’. Crawford further indicates that the acknowledgement of customary law can be 
done as a fact or as a norm or value. Crawford proposes that the recognition of customary law 
can be undertaken at least in four forms: incorporation; exclusion; translation; and adjustment 
(accommodation).243   
Woodman defines the recognition of customary law as follows: 
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‘Recognition means that state law treats customary laws as if they were an 
institution or norm of state law, giving effect to them and enforcing them in the 
same way as institutions and norms of received law’244 
Woodman further classifies customary law recognition into two types; namely, institutional 
recognition and normative recognition. Institutional recognition means ‘incorporating 
traditional institutions into the state legal system’. 245  Normative recognition means 
‘incorporating traditional norms into the state legal system and enforcing it’. 246247  Phan 
indicates that institutional recognition is accomplished usually by legislation.248   
In the Thai language, ‘recognition’ or Rub-Rong has three meanings: to assure (something); to 
receive (visitors); or to recognise (government). This thesis argues that the use of ‘recognition’ 
in relation to customary law in Thailand should mean: 1) the acknowledgement and taking 
account of the existence of customary law as fact; or 2) the recognition and treatment of custom 
norms or traditional institutions as if they are the norms and institutions in the State’s legal 
system. This is because some problems in relation to customary law can be resolved, even 
though the government chooses to acknowledge customary law as a fact only. For example, the 
problem of road construction in Thailand, which ignores Muang Fai customary law in town 
planning processes, has led to problems of flooding during the rainy season. Problems such as 
this could be resolved by the acknowledgement of Muang Fai customary law and by taking 
Muiang Fai customary norms such as the canals in Muang Fai into account in town planning. 
This could still be accomplished even though the government does not recognise Muang Fai 
customary norms and Muang Fai institutions.     
It should be questioned here whether customary law recognition needs to recognised in terms 
of both norms and institutions, or if it can be accomplished only in part? The Australian Law 
Reform Commission mentions this point indirectly in the 8th research paper in relation to the 
recognition of customary law. It states that this characteristic of customary law makes the 
danger of distortion where it is applied by non-traditional bodies, even more significant.249 In 
other words, in the Australian example there is a danger that Aboriginal peoples might lose the 
control over their own law when their customary law is applied by the Court.250   This thesis 
argues that it depends on the condition and limitations of each country. But the recognition of 
customary law should apply to both the norms of customary laws and the traditional institutions 
to enforce such customs. Recognising only normative customs can undermine the effectiveness 
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of such customary law. This is evidenced from the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in 
Thailand by legislation during the period 1934-2015 (further discussion of this will take place 
in Chapter 5). Recognising only the norms by incorporation into legislation as codification 
might result in the custom becoming a law for lawyers instead of a law of the people.251  
B. Approach for recognition 
Techera argues that the recognition of customary law in common law countries can be 
accomplished via two approaches while still retaining the common law legal system as the 
main legal system of the country. 252  Firstly, customary law can be recognised and stay 
alongside the western legal system in a country as a form of legal pluralist regime.253  Secondly, 
customary law can be recognised and accommodated in the same legal system as the western 
legal system in the various forms (e.g., through constitutional, legislative [statutory], 
administrative and judicial recognition) and legal methods for a specific purpose in a defined 
area.254 This approach is called functional recognition.255 
C. Methods to recognise customary law 
The Australian Law Reform Commission provides some examples of legal methods to 
recognise customary law; namely, acknowledgement, incorporation, translation, exclusion and 
accommodation.    
Recognition as acknowledgement.  
Recognition as acknowledgement consists of the determination to allow Aboriginal people a 
meaningful opportunity to retain their identity and traditional life style. Recognition as 
acknowledgement may lead to legislative and policy reforms to guarantee the freedoms of 
Aboriginal people.256 However, it does not mean that the whole community needs to accept and 
maintain customary law. It means the community should allow Aboriginal people who want to 
follow their traditions to follow them in ways that are harmonious with other principles in the 
present society.      
Recognition as incorporation.  
Recognition as incorporation means the incorporation of customary rules into legislation so 
that customary rules can be enforced as a law. The incorporation of customary rules can be 
accomplished by both general and specific incorporation.  General incorporation is the 
recognition any kind of customary rule in to the legal system. This is evidenced in Article 4 of 
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the Underlying Law Act 2000 of Papua New Guinea257 and Article 95(3) of the Constitution of 
Vanuatu. The general recognition of customary law can be accomplished by the codification of 
customary rules as well through mechanisms such as the Native code of Natal. However, the 
codification of customary rules can result in the freezing of customary rules at the same time. 
Specific incorporation, on the other hand, recognises some area or some part of customary rules 
in the legal system. The specific recognition of customary law can also be accomplished by 
‘incorporation as reference’. Incorporation as reference means the recognition of customary 
rules by mentioning customary rules in the general law without providing specific details.  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission further indicates that the aim of incorporation by 
reference is to protect customary rules from being ‘misstated’ or ‘changed’ in content.          
Recognition as Exclusion.  
The exclusion of specific issues from general law and allowing Indigenous people to apply and 
enforce customary law for such issues is Recognition as Exclusion. However, the legal basis to 
justify the application of customary law is found in general law. An example is evidenced in 
the Indian reserve areas in US, in which most federal laws are excluded.258 However, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission indicates that recognition by exclusion is generally not 
successful because of the ‘encroachment of Federal law and State law’ into the sovereignty of 
indigenous people, creating the situation of a ‘jurisdictional patch work quilt’ and resulting in 
uncertainty around customary law. The Commission points out that this method is partly 
suitable for the recognition of Aboriginal customary law in Australia.259 The weakness of this 
method is that Indigenous people are not protected by general law because it is excluded from 
operating in these matters.260   
Recognition as translation.  
Recognition as translation is to ‘give equivalent effect’ to both customary laws and traditional 
institutions by treating customary law as a ‘foreign law’. This kind of recognition is evidenced 
in the law relating to conflicts of law. However, this method is difficult in terms of 
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‘characterisation’.261 It means that rules or institution of foreign law cannot be recognised by 
local legal systems unless they have the required characteristics which local laws deem 
necessary. 262   It should be observed here that most of the recognition as translation is 
accomplished by the Court. 
Recognition as adjustment or accommodation.   
Adjustment or accommodation recognition is to ‘adjust the law or administration’ by not 
incorporating or translating customary rules into the general law, but ‘allowing for the 
accommodation of customary rules’ in legal system practice. One example is allowing the Court 
to take account the Aboriginal customary law in sentencing Aboriginal people.263   
The recognition of customary law can be accomplished in various forms such as constitutional 
recognition, administrative recognition, legislative recognition and judicial recognition. The 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia provides some examples of the advantages and 
disadvantages of some forms of recognition as follows:  
1) Constitutional recognition 
The constitutional recognition of Aboriginal customary law has been achieved in 
Victoria264, Queensland265 and Western Australian266 by acknowledging that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people are the first people of Australian and that the land and 
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264 Constitution Act 1975: 
1A Recognition of Aboriginal people 
(1) The Parliament acknowledges that the events described in the preamble to this Act occurred without proper consultation, 
recognition or involvement of the Aboriginal people of Victoria. 
(2) The Parliament recognises that Victoria's Aboriginal people, as the original custodians of the land on which the Colony 
of Victoria was established   
  (a) have a unique status as the descendants of Australia's first people; and 
  (b) have a spiritual, social, cultural and economic relationship with their traditional lands and waters within Victoria; and 
  (c) have made a unique and irreplaceable contribution to the identity and well-being of Victoria. 
(3) The Parliament does not intend by this section   
  (a) to create in any person any legal right or give rise to any civil cause of action; or 
  (b) to affect in any way the interpretation of this Act or of any other law in force in Victoria. 
265 Constitution of Queensland 2001 
Preamble 
The people of Queensland, free and equal citizens of Australia… 
  (c) honour the Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the First Australians, whose lands, winds and waters 
we all now share; and pay tribute to their unique values, and their ancient and enduring cultures, which deepen and enrich 
the life of our community; 
266 The Constitution Act 1889 of Western Australia  
Preamble…. 
 …And whereas the Parliament resolves to acknowledge the Aboriginal people as the First People of Western Australia and  
traditional custodians of the land, the said Parliament seeks to effect a reconciliation with the Aboriginal people of Western 
Australia: 
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other natural resources which belongs to them are also shared by the Australian people. 
However, the acknowledgement of Aboriginal people in the Constitution of Victoria does 
not create the right for Aboriginal people to raise a civil case.  It is argued that the 
constitutional recognition is meaningful for Aboriginal people as a whitewashing the bad 
past, showing the foundation respect267 and is necessary for effective governance268. 
  
2) Legislative recognition (Statutory-recognition)  
One advantage of legislative recognition is that the custom is clearly provided for in 
legislation. However, there are disadvantages that come with legislative recognition, 
especially recognition by codification. There are six disadvantages of recognition by 
codification. Firstly, it is difficult to define Aboriginal customs clearly because they are 
unwritten laws and often involve some secrecy. Secondly, it is difficult to codify the 
customs of all Aboriginal clans because of the huge number of them. Thirdly, it is difficult 
to implement Aboriginal customary law, which requires flexible interpretation, especially 
issues in relation to customary law and Australian law. Fourthly, legislative recognition 
means changing the authority of Aboriginal people in relation to the content, application 
and interpretation of customary law. Fifthly, the Court will interpret and apply customary 
law rather than Aboriginal people. Finally, Aboriginal customary law might be distorted 
when applied by non-Indigenous people.      
3) Administrative recognition 
The benefit of administrative recognition is flexibility. It can adapt to changing 
circumstances. Furthermore, it can achieve goals that are difficult to achieve through 
statutory recognition. However, the weaknesses of administrative recognition are related 
the transparency and inconsistency in the application of law. This is because it depends 
on the discretion of officials. Without proper guidelines,  officials might not recognise 
customary law.269 The Western Australian Law Commission observes that non-statutory 
recognition may be successful if officials can be monitored as well as the or service 
outcomes and the accountability of the service. Additionally, the Western Australian Law 
Commission recommends the creation of guiding principles, which must be accessible to 
the public, to regulate the practice of officials. Finally, the application process for 
administrative recognition must be transparent.270   
4) Judicial recognition 
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The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia indicates that the judiciary is at the 
‘forefront’ of recognising customary law, even though ‘the common law does not provide an 
appropriate general basis for the incorporation or recognition of Aboriginal customary law’.271 
This is because the Court, in common law, focuses strictly on the principle of immemorability 
and reasonableness. Furthermore, sometimes the recognition of customary law in Court has 
failed due to the prohibitive nature of evidence rules,  counsel’s failure to raise the issues, 
insufficient evidence to prove customary law or the absence of obligation for the Court to 
recognise customary law. 272  Judicial recognition can only be observed in common law 
countries. This is because judges cannot make law in the civil law legal system. While the Court 
can apply customary law to some cases, Courts cannot declare and recognise customary as a 
law to apply generally to all cases.    
D. Proving customary law in Court 
It is argued that the first question to ask when using custom in Court is whether the custom 
should be treated as a matter of fact or a matter of law?273 The New Zealand Law Commission 
reports that a custom can be treated as a matter of fact, or a matter of law, or both.274 Examples 
of treating customary law as a matter of fact are found in New Zealand, Fiji Tonga and 
Thailand.275 Examples of treating customary law as a matter of law are found in Vanuatu and 
Papua New Guinea276. 
Treating custom as a matter of fact has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage in a 
common law legal system is that the ‘doctrine of precedent’ does not apply to matters of fact. 
This doctrine refers to the Court’s obligation to follow the decision of another Court (in a matter 
of law), which is higher in the same Court hierarchy when the same legal points arise.277  The 
objective of the principle of doctrine of precedent is to achieve consistency and stability of law. 
When custom is treated as a matter of fact, the Court cannot apply the doctrine of precedent 
and the Court also cannot change custom into common law. This means that the custom will 
not become ‘frozen’ and will remain adaptable to social change. On the contrary, the 
disadvantages of treating custom as a matter of fact are firstly that it downgrades custom from 
an official law to a second-tier law, which is regarded as lower status than written law. Secondly, 
the Court cannot raise matters of custom by itself, instead depending seriously on the lawyers 
of both parties to establish and prove custom.278     
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The New Zealand Law Commission indicates the following advantages and disadvantages of 
treating custom as a matter of law in South Pacific countries. Firstly, treating custom as a matter 
of law is logically compatible with the constitutions of Pacific countries which provide that 
custom is an official source of law. Secondly, dealing with custom in Court is not limited to the 
evidence or the submissions of parties. Additionally, the Court can raise issues relating to 
custom for consideration, even when none of the other parties raise it. The Court even has a 
duty to discover customs and to ensure the content of it as it applies to the case. 
Conversely, there are three disadvantages to treating custom as a matter of law. Firstly, some 
judges lack the knowledge and experience to deal with the attributes of custom. They are not 
familiar with how to use legal techniques and processes to prove matters of fact for dealing 
with customs, even though there is a difference in terms of legal techniques and rules to regulate 
how the Court finds the facts and law. Secondly, the law that applies to a case might be unclear, 
especially if an un-codified custom is chosen to be the applicable law. Thirdly, the attributes of 
custom, which are flexibility and fluidity, contradict the principle of ‘doctrine of precedent’ or 
stare decisis in common law. When custom is treated as a matter of law, it must also follow the 
doctrine of precedent. Thus, custom becomes the common law and the community can no 
longer change these customs. This means that the custom becomes frozen by the Court. This 
might cause conflict between the custom as declared by Court and the custom as practiced in 
the community.279 
In Thailand, the issue of custom is treated as a matter of fact in Court.280 Furthermore, the 
principle of ‘doctrine of precedent ‘is not applied in Thailand. This can partly shed a light on 
the research question about the recognition of Muang Fai customary water management law in 
Thailand, but with some limitations. This is because the legal principles relating to judges 
making law and applying the doctrine of precedent cannot be used in Thailand, and the 
judgments can bind only the parties in the case. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.  In 
addition, present-day Muang Fai customary law is contained in a water contract (multilateral 
contract). As such, proving Muang Fai customary law is not as complex as the proof required 
for other customary laws in other countries. 
4.2.5 The recognition of customary law for sustainable natural resource management 
As mentioned earlier, customary law plays a vital role in regulating the management of 
common pool resources sustainably in remote areas.281  This section examines how States 
recognise customary law in natural resource management, particularly in water resource 
management and community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). This is because 
Muang Fai customs in Thailand is a type of community-based water resource management. 
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However, this section will focus on literature relating to how co-management and CBNRM can 
manage natural resources sustainably. Developed countries, such as Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia use co-management approaches to recognise customary rights of Indigenous 
people.282  Further, CBNRM is counted as one type of co-management and it is currently 
claimed that co-management is the best model to manage natural resources.283  The knowledge 
from this section is used to analyse the regimes to recognise customary law, explored in Chapter 
6, and shape the legal framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law, examined in Chapter 
7.   
In terms of the recognition of local customary rights and customary law in relation to water, 
these have been recognised by various methods. One popular method to recognise customary 
rights is the recognition of customary rights as usufruct in the legal system. 284 However, the 
recognition of customary rights of local people as usufruct can only guarantee the right to use 
water, but it does not guarantee that the water is managed in a sustainable manner with public 
participation. Furthermore, the recognition of customary water rights as usufruct is always 
accomplished through a water permit system. It is argued that the water permit system does not 
support collective water management by the community. 285  This is because water permit 
systems support the individual rights of water users more than the collective rights. Moreover, 
the permit system can create conflict among water users in the WUO, particularly in relation 
to the selling of water rights to outsiders. Sometimes usufruct rights are granted by a usufruct 
agreement. However, it is contended that usufruct agreements do not promote long tern 
sustainable objectives in some circumstances because they fail to provide leaseholders or 
recipients adequate incentives to invest time and labour for long-term benefits. Such agreements 
are also easy to cancel.286 
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The legal basis for customary rights to water have appeared in four forms:287 1) Native Title;288 
2) land laws which recognise Indigenous/customary rights;289 3) contractual agreements;290 and 
4) community participation provisions in water law.291 
However, the recognition of water management customary law, as mentioned above, does not 
guarantee that water is used and managed sustainably, particularly if water is managed by top-
down approaches or by centralism under the State. The weakness of natural resource 
management by the State alone through a ‘command and control approach’ is that it always 
causes deadlocks without solutions, as well as a pervasive mistrust of the State and a decline 
in responsibility among the common pool resource users.292 This results in the need for new 
innovations to resolve natural resource problems through cooperation between the State and 
other stakeholders. This is referred to as co-management (CM). CM is offered as a suitable 
approach to recognising customary law in order to create syncretism between modern and 
traditional approaches to management of natural resources. 293  This is largely because: 1) 
experiments to integrate new and traditional approaches to managing natural resources are 
often not successful and really need public participation; 2) most natural resource managers and 
SD practitioners focus only on the traditional wisdom and ignore present day knowledge; and 
3) it is necessary to include all actors in natural resource management.294 
Co-management has various names,295 types296 and definitions.297 It is also contended that CM 
is a contested concept.298 The root of the CM concept emerges from ‘commons theory’ in 
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response to Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ dilemma.299  However, CM is not a new 
paradigm to replace centralised government management, but is a supplementary form of 
decision making for government. The concept of CM has been harmonised with the market-
based economy.300 CM always emerges when there is a crisis in relation to natural resources.301 
The benefits of CM are as follows: 1) CM can include the strengths of all stakeholders to resolve 
problems; 2) CM can be used as a solution for the ‘tragedy of the Common’; 302  3) CM 
decentralises  decision-making processes; 4) CM supports participatory democratic processes; 
5) CM support consensus building and results in less conflict; 6) CM leads to trust building, 
inclusive decision-making and better data collection; 7) CM enhances long-term planning; 8) 
CM supports the allocation of decisions by all stakeholders; 9) CM prevents resources from 
experiencing environmental damage;303 and 10) CM can connect organisations with leadership, 
science and local knowledge.304 However, the variety in CM’s types and definitions can cause 
some disadvantages, particularly for Indigenous people because of the misunderstandings that 
result from each definition of CM.305 Although the word ‘co-management’ can be implied to 
mean equal sharing, it does not mean all parties in the agreement need to have equal power.306 
CM can be categorised variously according to the level of public participation.307 CM projects 
with both strong and weak forms of public participation present their own problems.308  
The CM process includes three stages as per the Figure 12 below: 
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Figure 12 Co-management process adapted from Rashid and  Manzoor,2012, 89 
Most successful CM cases depend on: 1) crafting of new institutions that confer more advanced 
property rights at the local level; 2) the ability to include all actors in the management of the 
environment or natural resources across scales of organisation;309 3) the levels of trust between 
participants;310 and 4) the development of social capital.311 
Co-management has the capacity to recognise customary law, customary rights and traditional 
institutions within the agreement. At the same time, the agreement plan stipulatess the rules in 
use to regulate the utilisation of natural resources, with the consensus of all resource users, as 
well as having effective institutions to monitor resource utilisation. In this way, the customary 
rights and customary laws of the local people become one part of a national legal system. 
Furthermore, customary law can be adjusted or modified by natural resource users to be 
compatible with the local conditions or new situations. With the necessary and sufficient 
information and technical support from the government sector, the CM institution can resolve 
natural resource challenges in a sustainable way.  
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Community-based natural resource management is counted as one type of CM. 312  CM 
emphasises the positive role of the State through the provision of subsidies, large-scale 
technical knowledge, or administrative help. Furthermore, CM focuses on power sharing 
between the State and all actors in natural resource management.313 The advantage of CBNRM 
to natural resource management is the ability to endure and to adapt (CBNRM) to new 
challenges. Both endurance and adaptation are key attributes of any successful CBNRM 
institution. This supports local communities to survive severe ecological challenges. 314 
However, this does not mean CBNRM will fit with all natural resource management 
approaches. Rather, it depends on the relations among people in the community, the knowledge 
of people in the community, and conditions in which people are making decisions.315 
Community-based natural resource management can address both social justice and 
environmental protection problems. 316  The core value of CBNRM is to transform the 
relationship between rural people and the environment to create positive results.317 Although 
CBNRM is quite useful as a cost-saving approach, it can also be the cause of conflict among 
local people, particularly in communities which lack the knowledge to distribute benefits or 
new sources of income from the government or other donors.318 More recently, the concept of 
CM has been combined with the concept of ‘adaptive management’319 in order to respond to 
the required changes. 
Many countries use three legal measures to support CBNRM: 1) laws to recognise local 
ownership or property rights over natural resources; 2) laws that provide mechanisms for 
managing specific sites by delegating power or responsibility to local people; and 3) laws that 
promotes decentralisation of power to local government.320 However, Lindsay contends that 
laws to support CBNRM and CM need to meet two requirements: 1) certainty and 2) 
flexibility.321 Certainty can be achieved by securing the rights, resources, the authority of the 
government agencies that enter into the contract, the rights holders and mechanisms to protect 
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and settle disputes.322 Flexibility can be achieved with the following measures: 1) allowing for 
adjustments to the management objectives in response to the real needs of people; 2) allowing 
for design and rules that support the achievement of the management objectives; 3) recognising 
and giving legal status to traditional institutions without trying to convert them according to 
one blueprint; and 4) allowing local institution to define management groups and areas of 
jurisdiction without following the area under the jurisdiction of local administrative 
authority.323   
Lindsay sets out the guiding principles in order to reform laws to support CBNRM and CM; 
namely, 1) that the design of laws at any level (from national to local level) need to be concerned 
with  the needs, aspirations, insights and capacity of users of the law not the lawyers or donors; 
2) that a capacity-building programme is necessary not only for local users but also for 
government officials, judges and police; 3) that dispute settlement mechanisms should allow 
local managers to use judicial mechanisms (Court) to settle disputes; 4) that changes to law 
should depend on the need of the local communities that use the natural resource not the 
government; and 5) that local community managers and groups need to weigh-up between using 
an imperfect law or changing a law that might not work well in the future.324    
It is clear that the Lindsay’s proposal to reform the law for promoting CBNRM and CM is 
compatible with the eight design principles of Elinor Ostrom, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter.325 Furthermore, Lindsay’s proposal provides clearer insight into how the law can be 
used to promote self-organisation in collective action or CBNRM and CM. 
Table 12 Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law for promoting CBNRM and CM and Ostrom's principle 
Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law for promoting CBNRM and CM  
 
Ostrom’s principles 
C
er
ta
in
ty
 
Rights must be clear 7) The rights to arrange water are 
recognised by state 
Rights must be certainty and cannot be taken away or changed unilaterally 
and unfairly 
7) The rights to arrange water are 
recognised by state 
Rights should be ensured either in perpetuity or for a clearly defined period 
long enough for the benefits of  participation to be fully realised  
7) The rights to arrange water are 
recognised by state 
Rights need to be enforceable against state or local government institutions - 
Rights must be exclusive 7) The rights to arrange water are 
recognised by state 
The legal recognition of the holder of the rights 7) The rights to arrange water are 
recognised by state 
The clear authority of government entities that enter into the agreement - 
The certainty of the subjects of the rights  
The certainty and the boundary of the resources 1) Clearly defined boundary of 
resource 
Legal mechanism to protect of rights and to settle disputes relating to rights 6) Quick and low-cost conflict 
management in local area 
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F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 
Flexibility to decide what the objectives of management should be and rules 
in use  
3) All individuals affected by the 
rules governing them can modify 
rules 
Flexibility to recognise the traditional and local institution 
 
7) The local institutions are 
recognised by State 
Flexibility to define the management groups and areas of jurisdiction 
 
1) Clearly define boundary of 
member 
Source Jonathan Lindsay, 'Designing Legal Space: Law as an Enabling Tool in Comunity Based Management' (2000). 
Gruber argues that there are 12 key organisational principles for effective community-based 
environmental initiatives. He says that should be considered for successful CBNRM 
organisation.326 Even though Gruber does not guarantee that the establishment of CBNRM 
according to these principles will always achieve a successful result. However, the key 
organisational principles of Gruber shed light on how to improve Muang Fai customary law. 
Thus, this section compares and contrasts the compatibility between Gruber’s key 
organisational principles and Muang Fai customary law. The objective is to analyse the 
strengths and weaknesses of Muang Fai customary law for further development. This thesis 
argues that Muang Fai customary law is partly compatible with the organisational principles of 
Gruber’s argument. The compatibility of Muang Fai customary law is evidenced in the table 
below: 
Table 13 Gruber's Key organisational principles and activities of Muang Fai 
Key organisational principles Compatible Not compatible 
Public participation and mobilisation   
Empower citizen and raise knowledge level   
Seek diversity of stake holders   
Provide for participation of stake holder at all stages   
Social capital and collaborative partnerships   
Stakeholder training   
Seek agreement among environmental persons   
Ownership by community   
Resources and equity   
Environmental justice   
Seek to improve local economy   
Recognise need for linkage between conservation and local 
economy 
  
Seek equitable and fair distribution   
Regulated access to natural resources    
Communication and information dissemination   
Openness and transparency   
Promote information sharing among experts and non-experts   
State expectations and limits   
Research and information development   
Decision based on a broad , but systematic body of information   
Integrate all kinds of information   
Economic evaluation of environment  * 
Ongoing research  * 
Devolution and empowerment   
The transferring of political authority and responsibility to a 
local region community  
  
Public trust and legitimacy   
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Monitoring feedback and accountability   
Accountability   
Monitoring and feedback   
Adaptive leadership and co-management   
Participatory decision making   
Problem solving and decision making that includes all sections 
of the community 
  
Including key experts and the community at the table    
Enabling environment -  
Conflict resolution and cooperation   
Source James S Gruber, ‘Key Principles of Community-Based Natural Resource Management: A Synthesis and Interpretation 
of Identified Effective Approaches for Managing the Commons’ (2010) 45(1) Environmental Management52-66 
Muang Fai customary law is partly compatible with the organisational key principle of public 
participation outlined by Gruber. Muang Fai customary law provides for the public 
participation of all stake-holders at all stages. It especially provides for the participation of water 
users through the annual meeting, occasional meetings, and during the ritual to sacrifice to the 
spirit of Muang Fai. However, the public participation process of Muang Fai customary law 
limits participation to only the people in the Muang Fai community. It does not include NGOs, 
government officials, or scientists in the public participation process. This might be because 
Muang Fai customary law originated in ancient times when there were no NGOs or modern 
scientists. In fact, at that time the Muang Fai institution was a government organisation as 
illustrated in a previous section. Hence, there was no need to include government officials in 
the process. Muang Fai customary law does however lack the obvious processes needed to raise 
the knowledge level of local water users. 
In terms of social capital and collaborative partnerships, Muang Fai customary law lacks a clear 
stakeholder training process to develop the capabilities of water users. Muang Fai customary 
law emphasises the seeking of agreement amongst water users in Muang Fai community by 
voting, but does not include people outside the Muang Fai community. However, Muang Fai 
irrigation is owned by the community. Therefore, some aspects of both social capital and 
collaborative partnerships are evident in Muang Fai. 
In terms of resources and equity, it can be said that Muang Fai customary law has a clear 
linkage between natural resource protection and conservation and the recognition of local 
social and economic needs and livelihoods of the community members. This is evidenced in 
the fact that Muang Fai customary law is the irrigation customary law for allocating water for 
agriculture, which supports the community. However, Muang Fai customary law also supports 
natural resource conservation, in particular the river-source forest. This is because the Muang 
Fai community cannot survive without the river-source forest to supply water to them. 
Moreover, Muang Fai customary law distributes water resources equitably and reasonably. This 
is evident in the fact that Muang Fai communities allocate water by looking at the amount of 
land of each water user has as well as the water resource limitations. Muang Fai customary also 
applies sanctions when water users violate the collectively agreed upon water rules. 
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In terms of communication and information dissemination, Muang Fai customary law has an 
effective mechanism for this. The Muang Fai community includes a position of water 
messenger in the organisation structure to guarantee that all water users receive information 
about water and participate in the decision making of the Muang Fai community. In terms of 
research and information development, Muang Fai customary law lacks a mechanism to 
research the activities of Muang Fai and has no clear mechanism to link technical and scientific 
knowledge, the well-being of people, and other form of traditional knowledge to all people in 
the Muang Fai community. However, this thesis suggests that the process of distributing related 
information to Muang Fai members can be accomplished at the annual meeting and at 
occasional meetings. In addition, the government can support researchers to conduct studies on 
how to develop Muang Fai customary law in harmony with the present water laws of Thailand.   
In terms of devolution and empowerment, Muang Fai customary law in the past was well 
supported by the ancient rulers of the Lanna Kingdom. The ancient Water Managers of the 
Muang Fai community were allocated the rank of “noble peoples” [officials]. The rulers also 
allowed Water Managers and water users to manage water by themselves to sustain their lives 
and country. On the other hand, the present Thailand government does not support Muang Fai. 
The government appears to be trying to centralise power to manage water rather than 
decentralising power to the local people. Even though some local officials have tried to support 
the activity of Muang Fai communities, this has not been sufficient to make the Muang Fai 
community as strong as the Muang Fai community in the past.       
In terms of public trust and legitimacy, Muang Fai customary law places emphasis on public 
participation. This makes it easy to build public trust in the legitimacy of the activities of the 
Muang Fai community. However, the propaganda being spread by some officials in Thailand 
against the Muang Fai activities should be prevented.327 Instead, there needs to be an effort to 
raise awareness among all people in Thailand of the value of Muang Fai.    
In terms of monitoring feedback and accountability, Muang Fai customary law in present-day 
Thailand reflects this principle very well. This is because the Water Manager is directly elected 
by all water users. If the Water Manager does not work effectively, a new manager is elected 
by water users every four or five years. In terms of adaptive leadership and CM, Muang Fai 
communities have always been an adaptive leadership institution and the Muang Fai 
community has demonstrated its ability to change according to the dynamics of Thai society. It 
is evidenced in research findings in Thailand that the representatives of the Muang Fai 
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community have tried to cooperate with the government of Thailand and to be acknowledged 
by the government in order to maintain the activities of Muang Fai.328        
In terms of participatory decision making, the processes of Muang Fai reflect clearly the 
principle of participatory decision making by including all water users in the decision-making 
process. However, Muang Fai customary law does not include outsider experts at the decision-
making table. In terms of being an enabling environment, Gruber uses this factor as a 
precondition to create CBNRM organisations. It means that there is no severe conflict among 
local people before creating a new CBNRM organisation. This fact depends on the context in 
each community and as such it cannot be assessed in this thesis. In terms of conflict resolution 
and cooperation, Gruber highlights the possibility of conflict between local communities and 
conservation agencies. He concludes that the CBNRM organisation should have strategies in 
place to resolve conflicts and must seek to cooperate with conservation agencies. The latter is 
achieved by allowing outsider government organisations to meditate and resolve conflicts 
between CBNRM organisations and conservation agencies. However, Muang Fai customary 
law lacks the strategies for conflict resolution and cooperation with outsider organisations. 
Recently, another approach relating to the water management and customary law has just been 
promulgated in New Zealand by giving the legal status as a person to Whanganui River 
according to the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017. The Act comes 
after the long movement from 90s and the agreement between the Parliament of New Zealands 
and Brendan Puketapu of the Whanganui River Maori Trust  on behalf of Whanganui iwi on 
30 August 2012.329 Then, it means that river is now a subject in law and Whanganui River 
enables to enjoy right to protect itself from exploitation by human330, enables to present its own 
needs, its own wellbeing and presents case in court.331 In fact, New Zealand is not the first 
country which gives the legal status as a person to nature, but New Zealand can claim as the 
first country recognizes river as a person. The first country to recognize nature as a juristic 
person was Ecuador in 2008332, followed by Bolivia in 2009.333 Moreover, both Ecuador and 
Bolivia give the status of legal person to nature in her constitutions.334 It means that the nature 
will be protected in the highest level.  Although, Whanganui river is become a legal person, it 
does not mean people cannot use it, the customary rights of native people relating to water 
utilization in Whanganui area have been recognized and the customary rights of native people 
are mentioned 7 times in Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act 2017. 335  Not only New 
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Zealand but France, India and United States of America have also recognised river as legal 
person.336  In Fact, giving personhood have a long root from public trust doctrine in Roman law 
and then giving personhood to nature.337  However, the public trusts doctrine have been used 
for the benefits of human, not for protection of nature. On the contrary, giving personhood to 
nature aims to protect and conserve nature for the benefit of nature by balancing the the rights 
of human with the rights of nature. Without balancing the the rights of human and the rights of 
nature, human can exploit from nature but nature cannot protect itself.338 The result for the 
recognition of nature as a person is still not satisfied.339 This is because it has the problems in 
relation to law implementation, particularly, conflict of interest between state or state’s 
organizations and the representative of nature as a legal entity. For example, the representatives 
of nature might not work well or they are reluctant to protect nature, if they are the state 
officer.340     
4.3 Legal principles supporting to the recognition of customary law 
  
Although, customary law is used in the everyday lives of people, not all countries accept and 
recognise the existence of customary law in society. This section reviews legal principles to 
answer the question of why the State should recognise customary law including human rights 
principles by adopting a human rights based approach341 and legal pluralism concepts.  
4.3.1 Human right Based approach, water resource management and customary law 
This section responds to the claims that the State should recognise customary law. The issues 
are whether: 1) the recognition of customary law is compatible with human rights principles; 2) 
customary law conflicts with human rights principles; and 3) how customary law can conflict 
with human rights principles. In this section, seven human rights issues, mentioned in reports 
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relating to the recognition of customary law, are examined to identify the best approach to 
recognising Muang Fai customary law in Thailand. 
A. Equality or discrimination 
One question always raised about the recognition of customary law is whether the recognition 
of one group’s customary law or the recognition of Indigenous people will result in 
discrimination towards other groups in society. This is important to consider because one 
general principle of human rights law is to treat people equally and to prevent discrimination. 
There must be ‘equality before the law’. This principle is provided clearly in many international 
human right instruments342 and even in the UN charter.343 
At the international level, the concept of discrimination is tested by the criteria of ‘a distinction 
based on a prohibited ground which has an individual or arbitrary effect in preferring or 
excluding particular classes or persons’.344  “Prevention of discrimination” is described as the 
prevention of any action which denies to individuals or groups of people the equality of 
treatment that they may wish. The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Human Rights holds that differential treatment of such groups or of individuals 
is permissible when it was committed for the satisfaction and welfare of community.345 Weiwei 
argues that discrimination consists of three elements: 1) actions that create difference in 
treatment; 2) actions that have that purpose or effect; and 3) actions that are prohibited as 
discrimination.346 However, the Human Rights Committee and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission hold the same belief that the ‘different treatment of some groups can be exercised 
reasonably to achieve the appropriate legal outcome. The reasonable exercise can be justified 
by clear objectives and reasonable criteria for discrimination.347 Furthermore, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission holds that discrimination for the welfare and advancement of the 
community or for Indigenous people can be performed as long as it does not preclude the 
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fundamental rights of Indigenous people.348 Moreover, such discrimination must cease when 
the Indigenous people achieve the advancement objective, as was the aim of law.349  
 
The aim of the recognition of Muang Fai customary law is the well-being of the local people in 
northern Thailand. It does not preclude the right of access to water for other Thai citizens. 
Furthermore, local people in northern Thailand are also citizens of Thailand and are entitled to 
the right of access to water and the right to have sufficient food. Therefore, the recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law is not a form of discrimination and does not limit the rights of other 
Thai citizens. Lastly, Muang Fai was already recognised through the PIA 1939 and the 
requirement that all irrigation systems be managed by local people. However, the PIA was 
abolished in January 2015. Further detail of the PIA is discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
B. Right to self determination 
The word self-determination is typically used in two senses in academic sources. Firstly, it is 
used in international law, especially in human rights textbooks. Secondly, self-determination is 
used in medical textbooks as the theory to explain the motivation of humankind. However, the 
right to self-determination in this thesis is used as a legal concept. It is argued that the right to 
self-determination in international law has come into wider discussion since the World War 
I.350 It is argued that the right to self-determination is the right of people to determine their own 
destiny in terms of politics, economics, social development and culture, according to 
international law. 351  The right to self-determination is accepted in the UN Charter, 352 
International Bills of Rights,353 and all international instruments relating to human rights.  
Although it is argued here and generally accepted that self-determination is a collective right 
rather than an individual right,354 some scholars argue that groups of people also possess the 
right to self-determination.355  In particular, the self-determination of Indigenous people is 
declared clearly in many international instruments, both legally and non-legally binding, such 
as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples356 and the 169th ILO 
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convention357 etc. However, the self-determination of Indigenous people in Thailand is beyond 
the realm of this thesis. 
In terms of customary law recognition, self-determination supports the recognition of 
customary law on the basis that people can choose to follow any tradition or culture that they 
believe in. Hence, it can be argued that the recognition of the Muang Fai water management 
customary law of the people in northern Thailand is a way for the Thailand government to 
respect the human rights of the Thai people.    
C. Rights of Indigenous people 
 
The rights of Indigenous people are another aspect of human rights examined in this thesis. 
This is because it provides the legal obligations of governments to recognise the right to 
culture,358  land rights, and the political institutions of Indigenous people.359  The rights of 
Indigenous people are clearly provided for in international instruments, both legally and non-
legally binding. 360  However, there is no universal definition of ‘Indigenous people’. 361 
Furthermore, many States do not accept that they have Indigenous people in their country. This 
particularly applies to States that follow “the blue water or salt water” doctrine. Moreover, the 
rights of Indigenous people always intertwine with people’s right to self-determination.362 
States are concerned that the acknowledgement of Indigenous people might lead to the 
fragmentation of the country.363 However, the right to self-determination has developed and it 
is generally accepted that the right to self-determination can be achieved by devolution and by 
making agreements with Indigenous people.364       
In this thesis, the definition of Indigenous peoples given by Mr. José Martinez Cobo, the 
Special-Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, is used to examine whether Thailand has Indigenous people. In Cobo’s opinion, 
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“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or 
parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural, social institutions and legal systems.”365  
The inter-American Commission on Human Rights indicates that any definition of Indigenous 
people should have two elements: be objective and be subjective. The objective elements 
include: (i) historical continuity, which means they are societies that descend from groups that 
preceded conquest or colonisation; (ii) territorial connection, which means the ancestors of 
those Indigenous people stay in or inhabit that country or region; and (iii) the people have 
distinctive and specific social, economic, cultural and political institutions which are their own 
and are totally or partially retained.  The subjective element is that they correspond to collective 
self-identification as an Indigenous people.   
However, people in northern Thailand who apply Muang Fai customary law are not indigenous 
people. This is because they have been counted as Siam’s citizens or Thailand’s citizens. 
Furthermore, their land rights are respected and protected by modern Thailand’s law during 
those periods. The annexations of the tributary State in northern Siam was undertaken by the 
power of the Siamese army. Indeed, the Siamese government sent an army with modern 
weapons to suppress the insurgencies in Lanna Kingdom at the request of the King of Lanna 
to ensure the success of the centralisation.366 
D. Right to adequate food  
The right to adequate food is also examined in this thesis because Muang Fai customary law is 
a traditional water management process for agriculture, especially the cultivation of rice. The 
question is whether the State has an obligation to provide sustainable water for producing food. 
If it is so obliged, then the State also has a duty to respect and protect the accessibility to water 
for the food production of local people. If so, then the Thai State should respect and protect 
Muang Fai water resource management and customary law as it is the means to access water 
for food production by the local people. 
The right to adequate food is provided in the international instruments relating to human 
rights.367 Two of the most well-known documents are the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights (UNDHR) 368 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).369 
The core tenets of the right to adequate food are:  
‘The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary 
needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given 
culture;  
The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere 
with the enjoyment of other human rights.370 
It should be noted here that the right to adequate food does not mean accessibility to the 
minimum package of calories. Furthermore, the provision of food needs also adhere to the 
principles of sustainability. The Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicates 
that adequate food must be accessible to both present and future generations.371 Furthermore, 
the State has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food of people. 
This is explained below:    
  ‘The obligation to respect existing access to adequate food requires States parties 
not to take any measures that result in preventing such access. The obligation to 
protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do 
not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. The obligation to fulfil 
(facilitate) means the State must proactively engage in activities intended to 
strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure 
their livelihood, including food security.’372 
Hence, it can be said without doubt that Thailand has a duty to recognise Muang Fai water 
management customary law as a means to strengthen people’s access and to utilise water for 
their livelihood and food security. 
E. Right to water  
The right to water refers to both the rights of individuals and people to access water for 
domestic use and for sanitary purposes.373   
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The right to water was officially recognised by the UN General Assembly in July 2010, and 
later by a resolution of the Human Rights Council. Initially, the right to water was interpreted 
in UNDHR and ICESCR as a part of the right to access a particular standard of living, or the 
right to food.374 However, the ICESCR now defines the normative context of water rights as 
follows:   
‘The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include 
the right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to 
water, and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from 
arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. By contrast, the 
entitlements include the right to a system of water supply and management that 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.’375 
Based on the notion of freedom to maintain the existing water supply, Gachenga argues that the 
water management customary law system of Marakwet area can be maintained or integrated 
into Kenya’s legal system because the water management customary law system supplies water 
to villagers and ensures the right to water of the local people.376 Similarly, Muang Fai water 
management customary law in Thailand can be recognised or integrated into the water 
management system of Thailand. This is particularly the case if further studies indicate that the 
water in Muang Fai is utilised for domestic purposes or the water in Muang Fai systems link to 
water in water well/ground water, used by villagers for the domestic purposes.   
 
F. Right to Culture 
The right to culture is the first dimension of human rights relating to customary law.  The right 
to culture is provided for in many international instruments such as Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,377 Article 15 of the ICESCR,378 Article 5 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,379 Article 13 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,380 Articles 
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30 and 31 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,381 and Article 30 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.382 
The right to culture has three levels. The first level is ‘the right to preserve a comprehensive 
way of life within the larger society without interference under the limitation of harm principle. 
The second level includes the first level of rights and adds the right to recognition of a 
community’s way of life by the general society. The third level of rights includes the first and 
second levels of rights to culture and adds the right to maintain one’s way of life and allow the 
culture to flourish with support from the State's institutions.383 It is also claimed that customary 
law is the main tool to preserve the culture.384 There is no doubt that the State has a duty to 
recognise customary law in support of this right.’ 
 
Figure 13 Three levels of the right to culture 
Questions have been raised as to whether the right to culture is a collective right or an individual 
right.385 Raz indicates that the relationship between rights and duties is as follows: one has a 
right if the interest or reason for that person is important enough to force people to have 
duties.386 Some scholars argue that the right to culture should be a collective right because the 
interest or reason of one person is not strong enough to create duties for other people.387 
At least 200,000-300,000 farmers in northern Thailand still follow Muang Fai customary law. 
This makes it clear that the right to culture is both a collective right and individual right, and 
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that the Thailand government is under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to 
culture of the local people who use Muang Fai customary law.   
G. Women’s rights 
Women’s rights are another issue relating to the recognition of customary law because some 
customary rules violate the rights of women. It is evident in the recognition of Aboriginal 
customary law in Australia and the recognition of customary law of Maori and native people 
in South Pacific countries, especially in the patriarchal societies.  Arguably, some customary 
rules to violate the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination have appeared in 
international human rights instruments388.  The customary rule to genital mutilation in Africa is 
a good example of discrimination by gender.389  
Women’s rights are recognised by many international instruments such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, 
and CEDAW, and Thailand is a party to such international instruments. Hence, there is no doubt 
that Thailand must abide by its international obligation to eliminate discrimination against 
women. It should be questioned whether the recognition of Muang Fai customary is equal to 
supporting discrimination against women. This is because women will not be elected as Water 
Managers according to local norms. The answer is that Muang Fai customary law has not been 
recognised by the PIA from 1939 to 2015 and has no provision to prohibit women from being 
a Water Manager. The new legislation can follow the PIA by not prohibiting women from being 
a Water Manager. Furthermore, the norm to prohibit the selection of a woman as Water 
Manager is not the norm in Muang Fai customary law. However, the norm in daily life prohibits 
women from associating with a man who is not her relative. Hence, Muang Fai customary law 
does not prohibit the selection of a woman as Water Manager directly. Moreover, recognition 
of Muang Fai customary law means pointing a spotlight on it and the opportunity for people to 
critique Muang Fai community as the better organisation. Lastly, recognition of Muang Fai 
opens the door for women to participate in the decision making in water resource management 
by attending the annual meeting of Muang Fai and allowing women to be staff in the Muang 
Fai community. 
H. Right to enjoy a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment 
 
It is expressed clearly in many human rights organisations that environmental degradation can 
and does adversely affect the enjoyment of a broad range of human rights 390, This is despite 
ther being no international agreement to provide clearly for the right to enjoy a safe, clean, 
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healthy and sustainable environment.391 Nowadays, more than 90 countries have adopted this 
right in their respective Constitutions.392 The right to enjoy a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment is also found in many regional human rights instruments.393   
The 16/11 Resolution of the Human Rights Council states that environmental damage can have 
negative implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights.394 
For example, people cannot enjoy the right to live and to access water or food in the polluted 
or contaminated area. Therefore, the right to enjoy a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment is important for people to enjoy other human rights. It is also accepted that 
exercising other human rights such as the right to freedom of expression and association, the 
right to information and participation, and the right to remedy leads to better environmental 
protection and also greater protection of the human rights that may be threatened by 
environmental degradation.395 
Knox, the special rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, recommends that the State should 
have both procedural and substantive duties as follows. 
In term of procedural obligation, States should: (a) Assess the social and environmental impacts 
of all proposed projects and policies that may affect biodiversity; (b) Provide public information 
about biodiversity, including environmental and social assessments of proposals, and ensure 
that the relevant information is provided to those affected in a language that they understand; 
(c) Provide for and facilitate public participation in biodiversity-related decisions; (d) Provide 
access to effective remedies for the loss and degradation of biodiversity.  
Furthermore, States should recognize that defenders of biodiversity are also human rights 
defenders, and implement the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights defenders on providing a safe and enabling environment for human rights 
defenders in general and for environmental human rights defenders in particular. 
 
In terms of the substantive obligations, every State should establish legal and institutional 
frameworks for the protection of biodiversity that: (a) Regulate harm to biodiversity from 
private actors as well as government agencies; (b) Adopt and implement standards that accord 
with international standards, are non-retrogressive and non-discriminatory, and respect and 
protect the rights of those who are particularly vulnerable to the loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services.396 
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Muang Fai customary law provides indirect benefits to the conservation of biodiversity in some 
restricted areas relating to the Muang Fai community, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law therefore means supporting the rights of people to 
stay in a safe, clean and sustainable environment. Furthermore, it means that Thailand’s 
government supports public participation in decision making relating to bio-diversity.  
By exploring the relationship between human rights and customary law, the author found that 
the basic principles of human rights to appear in international instruments provide that the State 
recognise customary law as a part of the right to culture. Customary law should be recognised 
as long as it does not violate fundamental human rights principles. However, a human rights 
based approach cannot be applied to the recognition of customary law in relation to water 
management for the agriculture sector. This is because the right to access to water according to 
the ICESCR is limited to rights of individuals and people to access water for domestic use and 
for sanitary purposes only, excluding water for agriculture.     
4.3.2 Legal pluralism  
As mentioned earlier, there is no universal, acceptable meaning of legal pluralism. However, 
put simply, legal pluralism is where more than one legal system exists in the same geographical 
area at the same time.397 The concept of legal pluralism emerged from debates about law and 
is often promoted by scholars who disagree with State-based law.398 Rose claims that the unique 
aspect of legal pluralism is the objection to centralism or a singularist definition of law as 
defined by legal positivism.399  
Tamanaha argues that legal pluralism has existed since antiquity.400 It can be seen clearly in the 
law of merchants in the Middle Ages such as Lex mercatoria and other rules.401 During the 19th 
century, legal pluralism was reported in colony countries such as Hungary, 402  in African 
colonies, and in colonies in the South Pacific. Coloniser countries attempted to import their 
legal system to the colonies resulting in the emergence of legal pluralism in those colonies. 
Other examples of legal pluralism can be found in modern societies that have refugee and 
migrant populations. Examples of legal pluralism also exist in the international community, 
with countries needing to observe both international and domestic law. Thus, Davies indicates 
three contexts of legal pluralism: 1) legal pluralism in colonial and post-colonial contexts; 2) 
                                                                
397   Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 2(5) Law & Society Review  870. 
398 Justin Rose, The Village and the Leviathan: Law, Environmental Governance and the Local Polity in the Federated States 
of Micronesia Macquarie University, 2007)28 
399 Justin Rose, The Village and the Leviathan: Law, Environmental Governance and the Local Polity in the Federated States 
of Micronesia Macquarie University (2007) 28. 
400 Brian Z Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (2008) 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Gordon R Woodman, 'Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate About Legal Pluralism' (1998) 30(42) The 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 21. 
204 
 
pluralism in the national context; and 3) globalisation and pluralism. The first two contexts 
emerge from the categorisation of Salley Engle Merry,403 and Davies indicates that the third 
context emerged from scholarly studies of the past two decades.404 The typography of legal 
pluralism indicated by Merry, Davies and other scholars is quite useful to illustrate why 
Thailand has legal pluralism, even though she claims that she has never been colonised in the 
same way as other countries in South-east Asia. This thesis argues that Thailand has legal 
pluralism because it annexed and colonised other city States surrounding Bangkok and 
integrated them into its territory.405 However, Thailand has not integrated the legislations and 
customary laws of previous city States into the modern legal system. 
A key point in the discussion of legal pluralism, which is useful for this thesis, relates to the 
nature of law in society. If the law is not the only the State-base legal provision, this implies 
that other norms, such as customs, should be considered as law. This suggests that they can be 
recognised and should also be enforced. The concept of legal pluralism offers a new platform 
to govern natural resources through customary law.406  
The discussion was started by Eugen Ehrlich who disagrees with the meaning of law as defined 
by supporters of State-based law. One such supporter, Kelsen, argues that every norm as part of 
law can be traced back to the ultimate norm (Grundnorm).407 Thus, other norms which cannot 
be traced back to the Grundnorm are not a part of law. Furthermore, law is and should be the 
law of the State.408 On the contrary, Ehrlich argues that legal provisions come from the facts 
and practices of society. It is not that the law has been provided and then it has things later. 
Ehrlich supported his argument with the example of property, possession, succession and their 
management, which all came before the legislation relating to them. 409  Thus, the law is 
considered as a ‘function of society’410 not just a legal provision. Ehrlich further suggests that 
‘it should be considered the whole law in the social relation’.411  
Griffith advocates the idea of State-base law as a form of ‘legal centralism.’412 The author further 
claims that ‘legal centralism’ is a myth; whereas, ‘legal pluralism’ is a reality.413 He points out 
that the idea of centralism is a form of confusion between how the world ought to be and a 
                                                                
403 Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 811. 
404 Ibid, 814. 
405 Tamara Lynn Loos, Subject Siam: Family, Law, and Colonial Modernity in Thailand (Cornell University Press, 2006) and 
Nư̄aʻō̜n Khrūathō̜ngkhīeo, Plot to annex Lanna   Matichon 2016 เน้ืออ่อน ขรัวทองเขียว, แผนยึดลำ้นนำ มติชน, 2016 
406 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the problems of legal theory, (Clarendon press, 2002) 55. 
407 Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Cane, Peter and Herbert Kritzer, The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research 
(OUP Oxford, 2012)    
408 However, Kelsen accepted the plurality of norms which made up a legal system. Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Cane, 
Peter and Herbert Kritzer, The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research (OUP Oxford, 2012)    
409 Eugen Ehrlich and Nathan Isaacs, 'The Sociology of Law' (1922) 36(2) Harvard Law Review. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid, 144. 
412 John Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18(24) The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 3. 
413 Ibid,4. 
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prior assumption about how the world is.414 Social scientists have attempted to follow put the 
idea of centralism into empirical use. On this basis, it has been argued that law was lacking in 
some ancient societies such as in Africa, according to the opinions of social scientists.415 
Griffith further identifies two versions of legal pluralism using the regulations of the State as 
the criteria; namely, a weak version of legal pluralism and a strong version of legal pluralism.416 
The weak version of legal pluralism refers to situations where other norms in societymust stay 
under the regulation of the State; whereas, the strong version of legal pluralism refers to the 
situation where other norms operate in society without the regulation of the State. Griffith came 
across the work of Hooker relating to legal pluralism during the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, 
Griffith argues that law is the self-regulation of a ‘semi-autonomous social field, and Moore417 
asserts that legal pluralism is a concomitant of social pluralism: the legal organization of 
society is congruent with its social organization.418 Tamanaha argues that socio-legal scholars 
advocate for legal pluralism as a form of ‘functionalism’ because they define law in functional 
terms as that which maintains social order.419 Tamanaha, however, points out that one failure 
of legal pluralism scholars is that they cannot differentiate the law from other social norms.420 
This is because their understanding of law is whatever people in social arena conventionally 
recognize as law through their social practices.421 
Because the concept of legal pluralism does not create a legal obligation for the State to 
recognise other kinds of norms in society, the idea of legal pluralism cannot be used as a base 
to recognise customary law. However, this thesis argues that the concept of legal pluralism is 
quite useful to identify what type of norm is applied in the given context. Lawyers can then 
identify the problems and study how to use norms in each context to support the success of the 
project. 
Conclusion 
This chapter answers the third research question by illustrating a number of trends in water law 
at the domestic level to achieve sustainable water resource management. The trends in water 
management in Thailand, including how customary law can support sustainable water resource 
management are given particular focus. Eight trends in water law at the national level are 
considered: 1) applying an IWRM approach; 2) creating water rights; 3) using EIs to manage the 
demand side of water; 4) environmental flow; 5) increasing irrigation efficiency; 6) using WUOs 
to reduce the costs of operation and maintenance and to encourage public participation; 7) 
recognition of customary law; and 8) improving water law by moving away from the ‘command 
                                                                
414 Ibid, 3. 
415 Ibid, 4. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid, 38. 
418 Ibid, 38. 
419 Brian Z Tamanaha, General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (OUP, 2001) 176. 
420 Ibid197. 
421 Ibid. 
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and control’ approach to water governance. Hence, there is no doubt that water customary law 
is part of water law and supports the rights of people to access water and food. Furthermore, it 
recognises water customary rights   
There is no one universal definition of customary law. States can select how to treat customary 
law on a continuum from its recognition to its prohibition. The most effective approach to 
recognising customary law is to recognise the customary rights in the Constitution. Customary 
laws will always be recognised as long as they do not contradict Human Rights principles. 
Moreover, customary law works effectively when it is implemented by customary institutions. 
The legal bases to recognise customary law in the present day are through human rights 
principles and through the concept of legal pluralism. The State must recognise customary law 
to maintain the right to culture, as long as it does not contradict human rights principles. 
However, it remains unclear whether the State has a duty to recognise customary law according 
to the concept of legal pluralism. 
The next chapter explores the lessons learned from developing countries422 and how they 
recognise customary law to manage water sustainably.
                                                                
422 Actually, this thesis studied lessons learned from both developing and developed countries. However, the recognitions of 
customary law in developed country such as Australia Canada and New Zealands do not recognise the customary institution. 
Therefore, this thesis uses the lessons learned from the successful customary law recognition in developing countries . 
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Chapter five - Lessons learned from the recognition of customary law in  
Samoa and Vanuatu 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 addressed the third research question of how other countries recognise customary 
law in natural resource management by focusing on the theoretical aspect. This chapter 
continues to examine the third research question by focusing on the lessons learned from 
successful customary law recognition in developing countries.     
In this thesis, Samoa and Vanuatu 1  were selected as examples of how to accommodate 
customary law within an existing legal system. Both countries are sovereign states and former 
colonies, and there has not been a treaty between the government and the Indigenous people in 
either location.2 Customary law is mentioned in the Constitution as a source of law for the 
nation in both countries.3 In Samoa, the role of government in supporting CBNRM is argued as 
best practice to study.4 In particular, the use of Village Fono (a traditional administrative 
structure) to manage marine natural resources is highly regarded. In contrast, the Vanuatu 
government has declare protected areas, Community Conservation Areas (CCA), with the 
consent and cooperation of the local land owners. It is argued that Vanuatu is one of the 
countries where Agenda 21 has been successfully implemented, particularly in regard to the 
community participation programme.5 
This chapter starts from the lessons learned from customary law recognition for fishery 
management in Samoa and Vanuatu. It then analyses and synthesises how customary law 
recognition in both countries can be applied to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in 
Thailand. 
5.2 Lessons learned from customary law recognition in Samoa 
It is important to understand how Samoa (Western Samoa) recognises customary law as part of 
sustainable fishery management. This section presents basic data about Samoa and its legal 
system, including its policies and legal framework to recognise fishery customary law to 
manage and conserve its fisheries. 
                                                                
1 In fact, New Zealand was selected for study in this thesis it is a single state, similar to Thailand. Moreover, New Zealand is a 
developed country with the Maori people as its native population. Furthermore, New Zealand has a process to recognise Maori 
customary law via Constitutional recognition and treaty. However, the recognition of Maori customary law as a co-management 
approach is quite different from the recognition of customary law and traditional institution of native people in Samoa and 
Vanuatu. Hence, this thesis applies only the lessons learnt from the recognition of customary law in Samoa and Vanuatu to 
apply to the recognition of Muang Fai community in Thailand.  
2 In some countries such as Canada and New Zealand, the settler made a treaty with the Indigenous people. 
3 Western Samoa Constitution 1960, Art. 111; and Vanuatu Constitution, Art. 95.  
4 Hugh Govan, Good Coastal Management Practices in the Pacific: Experiences from the Field (Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme, Apia, 2011). 
5 Erika J Techera, ‘Protected Area Management in Vanuatu’, MqJICEL (2005) 2 109. 
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5.2.1 General background 
 
Samoa in this thesis is the independent state of Samoa or Western Samoa. It is a small 
archipelago state located in the centre of the South Pacific approximately halfway between 
New Zealand and Hawaii.6 Western Samoa is classified as part of Polynesia.7 
Samoa consists of two large islands (Upolu and Savai'i) and eight minor islands (Manono Island, 
Apolima, Nu'ulopa, Nu'utele, Nu'ulua, Namua, Fanuatapu and Nu'usafe'e). The land area of 
Samoa is 2934 square kilometres.8  
 
Figure 14 The Map of Samoa  
Source  
<https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&ved=0ahUKEwi2jauzvOrXAhWBOJQKHYRi
Ao8QjBwIBA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fs3.thingpic.com%2Fimages%2F5J%2FCv1APHC6T5khcXPVw8TABEPe.gif&psig=AOv
Vaw0HLRnzzFYYacyk05JYAKa8&ust=1512274602752250>. 
 
 
The exclusive economic zone of Samoa is 98500 square kilometres9 (see the map below). Samoa 
is classified as the smallest country in the Pacific.10 Most of the Samoan population lives on 
                                                                
6 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Samoa country case study Aus AID Pacific social protection 
series: poverty, vulnerability and social protection in the Pacific (2012) 4. < https://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/samoa-case-study.pdf > 
7  Samoa (Formerly Western Samoa)   
8 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), above n 6. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
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Upolu and Savai'i, both of which have developed basic infrastructures. However, Upolu is more 
developed than Savai'i in terms of both economic growth and human development.11 The rural 
and urban villages are close to the coast and the mixture of rural and urban areas provides a 
unique development pattern all over Samoa.12 
 
Figure 15 Exclusive Economic Zone of Samoa  
Source: <http://fisherymanagement.wikia.com/wiki/American_Samoa>. 
 
Approximately 98 percent of the Samoan population lives on the narrow coastal plains. Apia, 
the capital city, is also located on the coastal plain and its population is approximately 38,000 
people.13 In the 2011 census, the total population of Samoa was 187,820 people. The population 
growth rate was 0.4 percent over the 2006-2011 period. It is estimated to increase to 245,000 
people by 2050.14 
                                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Asian Development Bank, Solid Waste Management in the Pacific Samoa Country Snapshot (23 June 2018) Asian 
Development Bank 1<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42663/solid-waste-management-samoa.pdf> 
14 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015 – 
2020 (2017) the CBD Secretariat< https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nbsap-v2-en.pdf>13. 
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As an island country in the western Pacific Ocean, Western Samoa constantly experiences the 
impacts of climate change and tropical storms in the form of floods, rising sea-levels and 
significant variability in rainfall.15   
Historically, Samoa was ruled by Germany between 1900 and 1914, and then by New Zealand 
between 1914 and 1962, courtesy of the mandatory regime of the League of Nations and the 
trusteeship of the United Nations. The independence of Samoa came into effect on 1 January 
1962 through New Zealand’s Western Samoa Act 1961.  
In terms of administration, Samoa is a parliamentary republic comprising 11 traditional and 
political districts16 and 47 village-based electorates.17 The traditional districts are located in the 
mountains down to the developed coastal plain.18 
 
Figure 16 Samoa's Traditional District.  
Source Australian National University College of Asia & the Pacific, Maps Online, Samoa-Traditional districts (6 
February 2018) Australian National University <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/samoa-traditional-
districts> 
                                                                
15 United Nations Development Programme, Managing floods and enhancing climate resilience in Samoa (23 June2018) 
Climate Change Adaptation <http://www.adaptation-undp.org/Samoa-GCF-video-promo> and United Nations Development 
Programme, Samoa kicks off climate adaptation project to benefit 1 in 3 citizens facing flood risk (23 June2018) Climate 
Change Adaptation <http://www.adaptation-undp.org/samoa-kicks-climate-adaptation-project-benefit-1-3-citizens-facing-flood-
risk>. 
16 Australian National University College of Asia & the Pacific, Maps Online, Samoa-Traditional districts (6 February 2018) 
Australian National University <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/samoa-traditional-districts> 
17 Erika Jane Techera, Law, Custom and Conservation: The Role of Customary Law in Community-Based Marine Management 
in the South Pacific, (PhD. Thesis [Macquarie University], 2009) 240.  
18 The traditional districts of Samoa were established prior to European arrival, and remain in place to this day.  See 
Australian National University College of Asia & the Pacific, Maps Online, Samoa-Traditional districts (6 February 2018) 
Australian National University <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/samoa-traditional-districts> 
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According to the 1962 Samoan Constitution, the Head of State of Samoa, O le Ao o le Malo19, 
is elected by matai.20 Matai is a title recognised by Constitution of the Independent State of 
Samoa 196221 and Samoa’s Lands and Title Act 1981.22 Techera describes the meaning of Matai 
as follows:  
 
 … the Samoan matai are chiefs who are really the heads of large extended families 
(“aiga”). Matai are responsible for village lands and resources and represent the 
clan in the village council (“Fono”). The Fono is responsible for community order, 
the organisation of the village, and development.23 
This is compatible with what is described in the Samoan Fourth CBD report.  The social 
structure in each Samoan village is presented below: 
 
Figure 17 Local social structure in Samoa’s villages. This figure is based on Techera’s description 
Source: 
Today, Samoa’s population is spread across 362 villages24 which can be classified into two 
types: traditional villages and non-traditional villages. More than 98 percent of all villages are 
traditional25  and are governed by the Fono or Council of Chiefs.  
Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015-2020 describes the 
traditional villages in Samoa as follows: 
A traditional village consists of a number of extended families each of which is headed by a 
chief or matai and consisting of close kins (brothers and sisters) and their families, often living 
                                                                
19 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa 1960, Art. 16 
20 Ibid Art. 18. 
21 Ibid Art 100,103. 
22 Lands and Title Act 1981 [Samoa] Art. 20A. 
23 Erika J Techera, 'Samoa: Law, Custom and Conservation' (2006) 10 NZJ Envtl. L. 361.  
24  See South Pacific specialist, Samoa -Culture & Events (23 June 2018) South Pacific specialist 
http://southpacificspecialist.org/culture-events-8/; Samoa, About Samoa (23 June 2018) Samoa <http://www.samoa.net.au/about-
samoa.html and PacificTradeInvest, Country profile – Samoa (23 June 2018) PacificTradeInvest 
<https://pacifictradeinvest.com/resources/pacific-insights/posts/2017/october/country-profile-samoa/>. 
25 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015 – 
2020 (2017) the CBD Secretariat< https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nbsap-v2-en.pdf>13, 
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in a number of houses clustered together on extended family land. Villages are largely 
autonomous of the National Government and may have a population ranging in size from less 
than a 100 to as many as 500 people, sometimes more in larger villages in the peri-urban 
areas26 
The structure of a traditional village consists of three main bodies: (1) the Council of Chiefs 
(Matai) or Fono27; (2) the untitled men or aumaga or malosi o le nu’u;28 and (3) the aualuma ma 
tamaita’i.29 The Village Fono typically meets every month.  The women’s committee also meets 
monthly, but in a separate location. The local government structure in each village is presented 
below:   
 
Figure 18 Western Samoa Local Government Structure 
                                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Fono includes all chiefly title holders and is the paramount authority. The main duties and responsibility of Council Fono 
are: 1) make by-laws and adjudicate on matters of law and order; 2) make rules and by-laws for the maintenance of village 
hygiene, the development and use of village land for the economic development of the village; and 3) regulate and ensure the 
proper allocation and use of communal resources, especially village owned lands; 4) monitor village participation in 
government-led and funded development activities such as the development of physical infrastructure and government services 
such as health and education; and 5) appointing a Sui-o-le-Nu’u6 (village mayor) and a Sui o le Malo or women’s representative.  
See Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015 
– 2020 (2017) the CBD Secretariat< https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nbsap-v2-en.pdf>13. 
28‘Aumaga’ or malosi o le nu’u means ‘the strength of the village”. The main duties and responsibility of Aumaga’ or malosi o 
le nu’u are to enforce Council decisions and the implementers of physically demanding community activities including 
cultivation and fishing. The aumaga is always present whenever the Council is convened to prepare food, prepare the ava and 
participate in the ava ceremony, and generally serve the needs of the Fono. 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015 – 
2020 (2017) the CBD Secretariat< https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nbsap-v2-en.pdf>13. 
29 Aualuma ma tamaitai is often referred to as the women’s committee. The women’s committee assigned the responsibility 
for hygiene, but their more important traditional role is as the weavers of highly valued fine mats (i.e., toga) which is the main 
currency for exchange in traditional occasions including weddings, funerals and the bestowing of chiefly titles and others .  
See Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2015 
– 2020 (2017) the CBD Secretariat< https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nbsap-v2-en.pdf> 13. 
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Figure 19 Village Mayor & women’s representative 
Some non-traditional villages, family units or households are located on freehold lands around 
the outskirts of the urban areas. The households organise themselves around the local church 
as church affiliations or congregations. These villages do not have a Council of Chiefs or Fono. 
30 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter focuses mainly on the recognition of customary law in 
relation to fisheries in Samoa. Fish and shellfish are the major source of protein for most 
Samoan households.31 People in Samoa consume fish most days of the week.32 Furthermore, 
fish and fishing are an important source of foreign income for Samoa. In 2007, more than half 
of all Samoan exports were fishery products and fishing is a source of income for a quarter of 
all households in Samoa.33  Among the various marine resources, tuna stocks in Samoa’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are important fo economic system. This is because frozen tuna 
is an important export commodity and a source of income and employment for the local fishing 
industry. According to government reports, tuna is being harvested at sustainable levels.34 
 
Fisheries statistics indicate however that 86 percent of all fishing in Samoa occurs in the reef 
and inshore areas, which have diverse marine species and sensitive marine resource habitats.35 
Traditionally, adjacent villages, families or chiefs have ownership and control of fishing rights 
in the reef, lagoon and mangrove areas.36 Matai and Village Fono use various and complex 
taboos or “sa” to restrict certain fishing to ceremonial purposes. This includes establishing 
temporary or closed areas for some fish and invertebrate species, and restricted capturing 
                                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Food and Agriculture Organization, Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles The Independent State of Samoa (2018) 
Food and Agriculture Organization <http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/WSM/en>. 
33 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Samoa), above n 25, 19. 
34 Ibid 19-20. 
35 Ibid 19. 
36 Bulow Von W., ‘Fishing Rights of the Native of German Samoa’ (1902) Globus LXX XII, cited in Posa A Skelton et al., 
The Status of the Coral Reefs and Marine Resources of Samoa, International Coral Reef Initiative-Regional Symposium 
<http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers14-11/010032220.pdf>.  
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methods during certain seasons and in certain locations.37 However, the declaration in Section 
104 of the 1962 Constitution of Western Samoa of the foreshore as a public area has created 
some conflict.38 The details of this conflict are presented later in this chapter. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, Samoa has faced the depletion of its fish population39, particularly in the 
lagoons and on the reefs.40 King et al. indicate that the fish crisis in Samoa during mid-1980s 
was due to over exploitation, mangrove destruction, and poison.41 Samoa’s NBSAP 2015-2020 
also indicates that overfishing is the major cause of depletion.42 The lack of regulation of fishing 
in Samoa’s inshore areas and reefs, meant that anyone could fish as much as they wanted. This 
leads to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in Samoa. 43 
 
Problems were identified by the Samoan government and the people in coastal villages who 
realised that their regular fish supply was being depleted.44 Therefore, the Fishery Division of 
Samoa attempted to enforce the Fishery Act more strictly. They also used other techniques such 
as co-management (CM) in an attempt to resolve the problems. However, the problems 
continued.45 The depletion of fish and the unsuccessful fishery management by the central 
government required another solution. With financial and technical support from AusAid,46 the 
Samoan government set up the Community-based Fishery Management (CBFM) Programme in 
1995.47  
 
From the65 villages that introduced the fisheries extension programme, 44  successfully 
developed their own village fishery management plan. 48  The remaining villages failed to 
develop a successful plan. However, the current number of villages participating in the fisheries 
                                                                
37 Jessica S Sanders, Dominique Gréboval and Antonia Hjort, ‘Marine protected areas: Country case studies on policy, 
governance and institutional issues: Japan-Mauritania-Philippines-Samoa’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical 
Paper 556 (2013) I.  
38 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, above n 19, Art.104.  
39 Mulipola, Antonio P., ‘Community based Marine Protected areas in Samoa’(A country report prepared for the Polynesia 
Sub Reginal Workshop on a Community based Marine Protected areas,1999) 
<http://www.botany.hawaii.edu/basch/uhnpscesu/pdfs/sam/Mulipola1999WS.pdf>and Jeff  Young,  Catch shares in Action 
Samoan Safata District Customary User Rights Program (2013) 
<http://fisherysolutionscenter.edf.org/sites/catchshares.edf.org/files/Samoan_Safata_District_TURF.pdf>. 
40 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Samoa), above n 25, 19. 
41 Michael King and Ueta Faasili, 'Community-Based Management of Subsistence Fisheries in Samoa' (1999) 6(2) Fisheries 
Management and Ecology 133. 
42 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Samoa), above n 25, 27. 
43 Ibid 19. 
44 Michael King and Ueta Faasili, ‘Village Fisheries Management and Community-Owned Marine Protected Areas in Samoa’ 
April-June Naga : the ICLARM, 1998 Quarterly 34. 
45 King and Faasili, above n 41, 133. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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extension programme has risen to 120 villages. 49  Furthermore, the present data from the 
partnership of SDGs indicates that the catch per unit efforts in villages within the program 
continues to remain steady to slight increase despite an increase in population and demand for 
fish and shellfish.50   
The success of the Village Fono and CBFM approaches to managing fish sustainably in Samoa 
arguably sheds some light on the recognition of Muang Fai water management customary law 
in Thailand. For this reason, the policies and legal frameworks in managing fish in coastal areas 
of Samoa should be studied to better understand what leads to the successful recognition of 
customary law and traditional institutions.   
5.2.2 Legal system in Samoa  
Originally, laws in Samoa were pronounced orally by the village Chiefs (ali'i). At the time of 
independence in 1962, laws introduced during the colonial period were retained. By virtue of 
its history, the law as it stands today in Samoa is a complex mixture of formal laws made 
locally; that is, the Constitution (which is the supreme law) and legislation enacted by the 
Parliament or made by delegated authority, and common law made by the formal Courts of 
Samoa. In addition, English common law and equity remain in force, so far as they are not 
excluded by any other law and so far as it applies to Samoa.51 Customary law is also formally 
recognised by the Constitution as a source of law.52  
Corrin and Paterson indicate the legal problems attendant upon recognising customary law in 
Samoa’s Constitution.  Art. 111 of the Samoan Constitution offers the following definition: 
Law’ being in force in Samoa; and includes this Constitution, any Act of Parliament 
and any proclamation, regulation, order, by-law or other act of authority made 
thereunder, the English common law and equity for the time being in so far as they 
are not excluded by any other law in force in Samoa, and any custom or usage 
which has acquired the force of law in Samoa or any part thereof under the 
provisions of any Act or under a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction. 
This definition creates two legal problems. Firstly, the recognition includes only those customs 
to have acquired the force of law at the time when the Constitution came to in force in 1962.53  
Corrin and Paterson argue that this constitutes a limited recognition of custom. This is because 
                                                                
49 ‘Long road leads fisheries consultant back to Samoa’ SamoaObserver (online), 09 June 2017 
<http://www.samoaobserver.ws/en/09_06_2017/local/20879/Long-road-leads-fisheries-consultant-back-to-Samoa.htm> 
50 Partnerships For The SDGs Global registry of voluntary commitments & multi-stakeholder partnerships, Samoa 
Community-Base Fisheries Management Program (CBFMP) (23 June2018) Partnerships For The SDGs Global registry of 
voluntary commitments & multi-stakeholder partnerships <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7876> 
51 Australian Agency for International Development, Making Land Work,Volume two Case studies on customary land and 
development in the Pacific, (23 August 2015) Agency for International Development<http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/MLW_VolumeTwo_CaseStudy_10.pdf> 
52 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, Preamble, Art. 100, 101, 103, 111.  
53 Jennifer Corrin and Don Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law (Routledge, 2007) 46. 
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only one Samoan custom in relation to marriage had been recognised by law (see the 
judgement in the case of Samoan Pacific Trustee v Collins).54   The second legal problemis that 
the Constitution does not provided the criteria to determine what types of customs should be 
supported by law. This is evident in Mauletaua v Fata and inMose v Masame. However, the 
judgements in both these cases created new precedents to recognise custom in Samoa. In the 
Mauletaua v Fata case, the judgment indicated that the custom of the village, which 
contradicted a more widespread custom throughout Samoa, could not be recognised. The 
judgement indicates that custom cannot be recognised when it is not compatible with the 
notion of justice in the common law legal system.55 
In terms of human rights, Samoa adopted the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights56 
and is a contracting state to the International Bill of Rights57 including the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.58  
In terms of international environmental law, Samoa is party to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity59, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands60, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 61  and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).62 Regarding customary law recognition in Samoa, customary law is recognised by 
its Constitution63 as one source of law. 64 Techera argues that the political will to synthesise 
customary law and legislation plays a vital role in establishing and making the Indigenous 
common law system possible.65  The recognition of customary law in Samoa offers some useful 
guidance with regard to the recognition of customary law in Thailand. It shows that customary 
                                                                
54 Ibid, 47. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Margaret R Smith, "“Samoanizing” Human Rights: A Generational Comparative of Views on Human Rights in Contemporary 
Samoa" (2009). Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 635.  
<http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/635> and   
<http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?Article=1635&context=isp_collection>. 
57 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Ratification status for Samoa (23 June2018) United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=149&Lang=EN> 
58 In fact, Samoa is party to many international human rights conventions. However, this thesis reports only the conventions 
relating to customary law recognition. See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Ratification status 
for Samoa (23 June2018) United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=149&Lang=EN> 
59 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Samoa country profiles (23 June2018) Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity < https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=ws> 
60 Ramsar Organization, Samoa country profiles (23 June2018) Ramsar Organization < http://www.ramsar.org/wetland/samoa > 
61  Samoa Government, Samoa’s BARBADOS Programme of Action National Assessment Report 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1290SAMOA-NAR-2003.pdf>  22. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, Art. 101.   
64 Ibid Art.111. 
65 Techera, above n 17, 269. 
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law can be secured firmly and can coexist with a modern legal system when it is recognised by 
Constitutional law and when there are clear legal mechanisms to settle disputes between 
statutory law and customary law. The next section presents the legal mechanisms of customary 
law used to govern natural resources (fisheries). 
5.2.3 Policies and legal framework relating to recognise customary law and traditional 
institutions in fishery management 
 
To understand the success of CBFM in Samoa, it is important to study why Samoa has chosen 
to use the CBFM approach to manage fish and marine resources. Techera indicates that the 
CBRM approach in Samoa has been promoted by the government because Samoa lacks 
financial resources.66  Another factor for the successful use of CBFM is the social structure of 
Samoa. As mentioned earlier, 98 percent of villages in Samoa are traditional villages.67 The 
Fishery Act enforced by the central government, which utilised a command and control 
approach, did not work well and ultimately failed to stop the depletion of fisheries.68 There is 
little doubt as to why the CBFM approach was the best choice for Samoa. As Park et al. 
comment, if you want to protect the Samoan environment you must rely on the villagers to do 
the job.69 Hence, this thesis argues that the first lesson to be learnt from the Samoan example 
is that the social structure, administrative regime and financial status are all important factors 
for government to consider when choosing an approach to resolve environmental problems 
sustainably. 
In terms of policy, it is worth noting here that the establishment of Village Fono to conserve 
the fishery resources as a form of stewardship has been implemented under the ‘community’s 
demand approach’.70  This means that the fisheries extension programme is undertaken only if 
the community is willing to join in the programme. The extension programme follows four 
strategies: 1) maximum community participation; 2) motivation rather than education; 3) a 
demand-based extension system; and 4) the development of alternative sources of seafood:71 
There have been active efforts to reverse this situation. With donor and Government 
funding support and enlisting the support and involvement of local Council of Chiefs 
and communities, around 75 coastal villages (~ 30% of all villages) have established 
fisheries reserves with no take zones wherein fish populations are replenished. Many 
                                                                
66 Ibid, 245. 
67Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Samoa), above n 25, 13. 
68 King and Faasili, above n 41, 133. 
69 The International Union for Conservation of Nature, Review of Policy and Legislation Relating to the Use and 
Management of Mangrove Ecosystems in Samoa, (10 May 2016) 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/samoa_policy_and_legislative_review_report.pdf>. 
70 Partnerships for The SDGs Global registry of voluntary commitments & multi-stakeholder partnerships, Samoa 
Community-Base Fisheries Management Program (CBFMP) (23 June2018) Partnerships for The SDGs Global registry of 
voluntary commitments & multi-stakeholder partnerships <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7876> 
71 King and Faasili, above n 41,133. 
218 
 
 
reserves have reintroduced species that have been locally depleted such as trochus and 
giant clams. Developments in aquaculture have also seen tilapia being promoted by 
MAF as an alternative protein source for local consumption and to reduce local 
dependence on marine fish as a protein source.72 
 
King and Faasil describe the process to introduce and undertake the fisheries extension 
programme. They note that the project began by first testing the attitude of the villagers, 
specifically whether they were willing to participate in the programme and were concerned 
about the fishery problems. If the community showed concern about the fishery problems and 
were willing to join in the programme, the Fono meeting was held to discuss how to join in the 
extension process. If the Fono Council accepted the decision to join in the extension 
programme, another village meeting would be held with the village Fono and resource users 
(with untitled men’s and women’s groups). The purpose of this meeting was to indicate the key 
problems, causes and solutions. The process to define the key problems, causes and solutions 
has been simplified by King and Faasil and is presented in the figure below: 
 
Figure 20 Example of a problems / solution tree by a village community (Source: King and Faasili, 1999) 
 
Each group elected members from their group to be on the Fisheries Advisory Committee and 
the Fisheries Management Committee for their village. The Fisheries Advisory Committee then 
                                                                
72 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Samoa), above n 25, 19. 
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drafted a fisheries management plan with assistance from Fishery Division of Samoa. 
Normally, the fisheries management plan would include the following information: 
• the names of all extension staff involved;  
• a background of the village’s marine environment and fisheries; 
• a map of the village and fishing areas (completed by community members); 
• details of tradition-based controls on fishing; 
• undertakings and actions to be taken by the community; and 
• support to be provided by the Fisheries Division.73  
In fact, the village’s fishery management plan is not only a plan, it is also an agreement between 
the community (village) and the government. It includes a list of the resource management and 
conservation measures that the community will undertake (such as the management rules, fish 
reserve area, bans on destructive methods for catching fish and penalties for the infringement 
including fines in cash, mats or food for villages).74 It also includes the servicing and technical 
support the community requires from the Fisheries Divisions.75 The overall process can be 
understood in five stages as seen in Figure 21: 76 
                                                                
73 Michael King, Kelvin Passfield, and Etuati Ropeti, ‘Management of Village Fisheries: Samoa Community-Based 
Management Strategy, Samoa. Fisheries Division- Min. Apia, 2001Samoa. 50pp. < 
http://www.reefbase.org/pacific/pub_A0000003170.aspx>. 
74 The International Union for Conservation of Nature, Review of Policy and Legislation Relating to the Use and 
Management of Mangrove Ecosystems in Samoa, (10 May 2016) 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/samoa_policy_and_legislative_review_report.pdf>. 
75 King and Faasili, above n 41,133. 
76 More detailed information about process can be found in King et al., above n 73.,  
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Figure 21 Village Fono extension programme (Source: King and Faasili, 1999)  
To ensure that the fishery management and conservations rules are enforced and observed by 
the participating village, Samoa’s Fishery Division implements a number of measures after the 
village’s fisheries management plan has been designed. The measures include: 
• regular contact between communities and extension staff; 
• exchange of information between communities; 
• support for developing alternative sources of seafood; 
• support for producing food and income; 
• technical advice and training; and 
• review of fisheries management in participating communities.77 
The strategies as mentioned above continue to be carried out in the present day. They are also 
incorporated into the purpose and strategies of the Samoa Coastal Fisheries Management and 
Development Plan 2013-2016.78 79   
Govan indicates that the success of coastal fishery management comes from the support of the 
Samoan government in term of institutions, legal perspectives and  enforcement mechanisms.80 
                                                                
77 Ibid. 
78 Startegies 5.1-5.7 Samoa Coastal Fisheries Management and Development Plan 2013-2016. 
79 Additionally, the government tried to strengthen Village Fono governance by creating a capacity building programme 
under the Ministry of Women Community and Social Development <http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/commonwealth/governance/principles-for-local-government-legislation/case-study-samoa_9781848591455-
10-en#.WmQ6nq6WbIU#page1> 1. 
80 Hugh Govan, Good Coastal Management Practices in the Pacific: Experiences from the Field – Apia, Samoa: SPREP (2011) 
42  <https://www.icriforum.org/sites/default/files/ICRI%20Best%20Practice%20in%20Coastal%20Management%20-
%20Govan%202011_0_0.pdf>  
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Techera pin-points that the success of community-based marine management in Samoa is 
reliant on the government policy to utilise village-based interests to manage coastal fisheries, 
the empowerment experienced through the Village Fono approach, and the legislative 
recognition of traditional customary and practices by the Village Fono Act and the Fishery 
Act.81  
In terms of the legal framework for fishery management, Samoa has three major laws. These 
include the Constitution,82 the Fishery Act 1988 (Samoa),83and the Village Fono Act 1990 
(Samoa).84  Article 104 of the Samoan Constitution recognises the rights of the Samoan people 
to access the land lying below the high-water mark by legally classifying it as public land.85  
However, Samoan customs of ownership and control of fishing rights indicate that the right to 
fish in reefs, lagoons and mangrove areas is owned by the adjacent villages, families or 
Chiefs.86 This conflict between Constitutional law and customary law has resulted in a huge 
disappearance of custom.87 Now, all people have the right to navigate over the foreshore and 
fish within the limits of the territorial waters of the State.88 However, this causes conflict 
between coastal villages and outsiders who access the foreshore area next to the village to fish. 
                                                                
81 Techera, above n 17, 269. 
82 Western Samoa Constitution 1962, Art. 104. 
83See the Fisheries Act 1988 at <https://www.ofdc.org.tw/components/Editor/webs/files/Samoa_Fisheries_Act_1988.pdf>. 
the Fisheries Act 1988 had been amended by Fisheries (Ban of Driftnet Fishing) Act 1999 
<http://www.ffa.int/system/files/Fisheries_%28Ban_driftnet_fishing%29_Act_1999_%5BREPEALED_BY_FISHERIES_MAN
AGEMENT_ACT_2016%5D_0.pdf>  Finally, the fisheries Act and Fisheries (Ban of Driftnet Fishing) Act 1999 has been 
repealed by the Fisheries Management Act 2016 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/102764/124341/F-2130928892/WSM102764.pdf>. 
84 <http://www.samoaobserver.ws/en/20_12_2015/sunday_reading/491/Village-Fono-Act-Reforms.htm 
<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/sam37645.pdf>. 
<http://www.palemene.ws/new/wp-content/uploads/01.Acts/Acts%202017/%20Village%20Fono%20Act/Village-Fono-
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http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=102764&p_count=3&p_classification=19 
85 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, above n 19, Art.104. and see the meaning of ‘spring and neap tides’  at 
National Ocean and atmospheric administration, Department of Commerce of United States What are spring and neap tides? 
(23 June2018) National Ocean and atmospheric administration <https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/springtide.html> 
86 Bulow, above n 36.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Bell 1985, cited in Skelton, above n 36.  
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Figure 22  Definitions of coastal term (Source: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/21-
31/Ch2.htm>). 
To resolve this conflict, the Fisheries Act 1988 and the Village Fono Act 1990 were repealed 
and amended by the Fisheries Management Act 201689 and the Village Fono Amendment Act 
2017.90 
According to Fisheries Management Act 2016, fishery in Samoa is categorised into two types 
defined by license and vessel. Firstly, there are commercial fishers who must have a license for 
their vessel.91 Normally, commercial fishery is undertaken by a large fleet outside the reefs.92 
Secondly, there are types of fishery that do not need to have a license for their vessel. They 
include fishing for sport, fishing for pleasure, recreational fishing or subsistence fishing. This 
category applies to fishing vessels less than eight metres in length.93 Nearshore fishery is under 
the management of Fono according the Village Fono Act 201794 and Fishery Management Act 
2016.95  
The principles in both the Fishery Management Act 2016 and the Village Fono Act 2017 
resemble the previous Fishery Act 1988 and Village Fono Act 1990.  The main changes in the 
Fishery Act 2016 include: 1) allowing Village Fono to exercise power by enacting rules and 
imposing punishment to govern fishery; 96  2) protecting the rights of disadvantaged 
communities that are close to coastal village communities;97 3) registration of village fishery 
by-laws;98 4) the introduction of maximum punishments and fines for village fishery by law;99 
                                                                
89 Section 93 of Fisheries Management Act 2016 (Samoa). 
90 Samoa Village Fono Amendment Act 2017 No. 3. (Samoa) 
91 Fishery Management Act (Samoa).S. 23. 
92 <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/WSM/profile.htm>. 
93 Fishery Management Act [Samoa] S. 23 (2), (4)  
94 Village Fono Act 1990[Samoa] 
95 Fishery management Act 2016 [Samoa] S. 86-89 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid, S. 22. 
98 Ibid, S. 86. 
99 Ibid, S. 88. 
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5) monitoring processes;100 and 6) the suspension and revocation101 of the village fishery by-
law. The main changes in the Village Fono Act 2017 include: 1) changing the word village rules 
to faiga fa’avae or i’ugafono102 (rules/decision);103 2) adding the faiga fa’avae or i’ugafono104 
registration process; and 3) adding the the rights of alleged offenders.105  In fact, the real 
intention of these amendments to the Village Fono Act is to ensure the freedom of religion,106 
to decrease domestic violence, and to try to follow the human rights standards.107 
In terms of fishery management in Samoa, three measures are applied to ensure the 
sustainability of marine resources: the village fishery management plan; village by-laws; and 
community-owned marine protected areas.108 The village fishery management plan is provided 
in Section 41(4) of the Fishery Management Act 2016.109 However, the role of the village fishery 
management plan as provided in law is much narrower than the roles of the village fishery 
management plan as indicated by King et al.110 The focus of the fishery management plan in 
the Fishery Management Act 2016 emphasises aquaculture authorisation and other conditions 
provided by the Chief Executive Officer. In contrast, the village fishery management plan as 
indicated by King et al. is the agreement between the Samoan government and the village111 as 
mentioned above. 
The village by-laws appear in Section 2 and the eighth part of the Fishery Management Act 
2016 (Sec. 86-89) and Section 5 of the Village Fono Act. However, the village fishery by-laws 
are mentioned as a faiga fa’avae (rules) in Section 5 of the Village Fono Act. To ensure that the 
village by-laws do not contradict the national fishery policies and fisheries legislation, the 
Fisheries Management Act provides the scope112 and the power to the Chief Executive Officer 
to establish guidelines113 for village fishery by-laws to be enacted by each village. The Fisheries 
Management Act also provides the process to approve the fishery village by laws by the 
                                                                
100 Ibid, S. 87. 
101 Ibid, S. 89. 
102 Village Fono Act 2017 [Samoa] S.  5. 
103 National University of Samoa, Cultural factors continue to be a challenge for samoan women to become leaders (22 July 
2015) National University of Samoa <https://www.nus.edu.ws/s/index.php/87-nus/news-events/301-cultural-factors-continue-to-
be-a-challenge-for-samoan-women-to-become-leaders> 
104 Village Fono Act 2017 [Samoa] S.  6. 
105 Ibid, S.  7. 
106 Samoa law reform Commission, Village Fono Act 1990 Report 09/12 <http://www.samoalawreform.gov.ws/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Final-Report-for-the-Village-Fono-Act-1990-and-Freedom-of-Religion.pdf 12> 
107 Samoa to amend Village Fono Act https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/277831/samoa-to-amend-village-
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108 Techera, above n 23, 361. 
109 Fishery Management Act S. 41 (4)   The   village   fisheries   management   plan   must   impose conditions for aquaculture 
authorisation. 
110 King et al., above n 73, 50. 
111 King and Faasili, above n 41,133. 
112 Fisheries Management Act 2016 [Samoa] S.86.    
113 Ibid, S.6.    
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Samoan government.114 Additionally, the Fisheries Management Act provides the maximum 
penalties that the Village Fono can impose for violators of the village by-laws. It is the duty of 
the Chief Executive Officer or the Commissioner of Police and Court to review the penalties.115 
The Court has the power to order the fines to be deposited to the funds of the Village Fono.116 
Lastly, the Chief Executive Officer, with the advice from the relevant village council, can 
revoke or suspend the fishery village by-laws.117 The village by-laws process is presented in 
Table 14 below: 
Table 14 Fishery village by-Laws process of Samoa 
 
Source: Fisheries Management Act 2016 [Samoa] S. 6, 86-89 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are undertaken and developed by two major government 
organisations in Samoa: the Fishery Division of Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery (MAF) and 
the Samoan Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). MPAs in Samoa always 
include the local community in management and are implemented using a community-based 
approach. MPAs also have a fishery management plan and include rules to prohibit the use of 
some fishery methods in the protected area.118 The decision as the whether the MPA is run by 
Fishery Division or the MNRE is based on the size of the protected area. MPAs run by the 
MRNE use an extended marine protected area (MPA) approach (e.g., in the Aleipata and Safata 
Districts). However, this thesis focuses only on the protected areas undertaken by the Fisheries 
Division of Samoa with the fishery extension programme.  
                                                                
114 Ibid, S.86.   
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117 Ibid, S. 89. 
118 Sanders et al., above n 37. 
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Initially, the rules, traditional customs and penalties of the Village Fono Act 1990 (Samoa) only 
applied to villagers. 119  However, the Village Fono faced problems with regard to the 
implementation of the Village Fono’s rules to outsiders. The power of theVillage Fono to apply 
penalties to outsiders was added later through the Fishery Act 2002.120 This meant that the 
Village Fono could punish outsiders who caught fish within the jurisdiction of the Village Fono 
and violated the fisheries rules of the Village Fono. However, the village council cannot enforce 
the village by-laws against outsiders independently. They first must report the case to the fishery 
division and the police.121 Then the Court considers and makes a judgement about the case. 
Finally, the fine from the violator is sent back to the village to assist with the protection and 
conservation of the marine resource.122   
Macfadyen and others indicate the key strength of Samoa’s national policy and legislative 
framework for managing coastal fishery management is that Samoa has a strong village 
government system to enforce the rules. 123  Furthermore, the Village Fono’s fishery 
management rules are supported from the national government right down to lower level 
initiatives. This support is provided through the by-law process and the village’s fishery 
management plan. The law enforcement to protect and conserve fish and marine resources 
through village fishery by-laws is monitored more effectively than the law enforcement 
undertaken by the central Samoan government. Additionally, the village fishery by-laws are 
initiated by villagers and local resource users who have a real interest in the management and 
conservation of the fishery resources in question. Finally, the villages to join the fishery 
extension programme are supported by a special expert unit (the Community Fisheries Support 
Section of the Fisheries Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and 
Meteorology). 124 
Macfadyen and others also indicate the key weaknesses of the national policy and legislative 
framework to manage coastal fisheries in Samoa. They suggest that the fishery extension 
programme may result in conflict between the village perceptions of limited access to marine 
areas and the Constitutional provision for open-access in Section 104 of the Samoan 
Constitution. Furthermore, using the Village Fono to impose sanctions on both Fono members 
and outsiders based on customary law might be effective, but remains essentially 
                                                                
119 Village Fono Act 1990 [Samoa] S 9 .  
120 Fishery Act 1988, amended 2002 [Samoa] S 4(3).. 
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unconstitutional.125 However, the Fishery Management Act 2016 and Village Fono Act 2017 
provide guidance around the maximum punishments and fines, and make explicit the rights of 
an alleged offender. This is to ensure that the adjudication process follows the Samoan 
Constitution and human rights standards. In fact, village councils cannot enforce the village by-
laws to outsidersindependently. They must submit a case to police and the fishery division, and 
then leave it to the Court to rule on how the village by-laws should be enforced.    
 
Based on observations of the community-based mangrove management in Samoa, Boon 
suggests that “Any development project should come from within the community and if it is 
initiated by them they will ensure that the beneficial outcomes of the projects will be for them 
and not to meet international aid stipulations. Local government bodies as well should maintain 
follow up monitoring of any new project to ensure its sustainability.” 126 
While the by-laws work very effectively, there have been problems identified within both the 
village communities and government agencies themselves. In some communities the Village 
Fonos are subject to disruption due to internal differences amongst the Chiefs. When this 
occurs, the Village Fono can no longer function properly and enforcement is not effective. Two 
such cases have been reported to the Fisheries Division since the inception of the village by-
laws. In terms of the government, the process involving other government agencies is not fast 
enough to meet the expectations of village communities. When there is a delay in the process, 
the Village Fono will often go ahead and enforce its by-laws before the legal procedure is 
completed.127 Delays in the approval process of fishery village by-laws is now acknowledged 
as a problem by the Samoan government.128 It now provides a strategy to strengthen fishery 
communities using several village by-laws gazetted and enforced by the community as a 
performance indicator.129 While the by-laws can be enforced on the residents of the village, 
enforcement against nearby villages remains difficult and quite often involves the use of 
physical force. Hence, there is potential for inter-village conflict as a result of delays in the 
process. 130   One problem discovered by the Fisheries Division is the cost involved in 
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advertising the by-laws. If the Fisheries Division is targeting 17 village communities for its 
annual work program, costs exceed $5,100 (Samoan Tala). This is quite a large amount for one 
line item in a divisional budget. However, it is not expensive relative to the expected long-term 
beneficial impact on the marine environment.131 
 
One remarkable point in Samoan fisheries management is that the aim to support local 
communities to manage fishery is deemed as a core mission of Samoa’s Fisheries Division. It 
is provided in Section7 of Fisheries Management Act 2016. 132  The structure of Samoa’s 
Dishery Division is presented in Figure 23 below:  
 
Figure 23 Samoa Fisheries Division (Source: <https://fisheries-gos.gov.vu/docs/regional-seminars/Samoa%20-
Community%20Based%20Coastal%20Resource%20Management_10_2014.pdf>). 
 
The customary rights of the Samoan people to access land and coastal areas for fisheries are 
recognised in the Constitution of Samua.133  Furthermore, the rights of the Village Fono are 
recognised by both the Village Fono Act 134  and the Fishery Management Act. 135  The 
registered rules of the Village Fono can govern both people inside and outside the villages. 
Thus, Samoa has the mechanism to reconcile customary rights and statutory rights. Finally, 
yet importantly, the Court can review the decision of the Village Fono. Hence, it is clear that 
Samoa has a dispute settlement process between customary rights and statutory rights. 
Table 15 Current status of customary law recognition in Samoa 
Recognition of 
customary rights 
Reconciliation between customary rights 
and statutory rights 
Dispute settlement process between 
customary rights and statutory rights 
Yes Yes Yes 
 (Source: This table is adapted from Marco Ramazzotti, 'Customary Water Rights and Contemporary Water Legislation' 
(2008) 76 FAO Legal Papers Online <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bb109e.pdf>). 
 
                                                                
131 Ibid, 99. 
132 Fisheries Management Act 2016 [Samoa], S. 7.  
133 Constitution of Samoa 1960, Art 104.  
134 Village Fono Act 1990 S.5 Village fono Amendment Act 2017 ()S. 5. 
135 Fishery Management Act 2016 [Samoa], S. 86. 
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It is clear that the community-based fishery management of Samoa is compatible not only with 
the principles in international law, but also with Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles for 
institutions to govern common property. This is presented in the Table 16: 
Table 16 Ostrom's 8 design principles and Samoan coastal fishery management by Village Fono 
Ostrom’s principle Samoan coastal 
fishery management 
by Village Fono  
1 .The CPR has   clearly-defined   boundaries (effective   exclusion   of external 
unentitled parties). 
 
2 .There is congruence between the resource environment and its governance structure 
or rules . 
 
3 .Decisions are made through collective-choice arrangements that allow most 
resource appropriators to participate. 
 
4 .Rules are enforced through effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or 
accountable to the appropriators. 
 
5 .Violations are punished with graduated sanctions  
6 .Conflicts and issues are addressed with low-cost and easy-to-access conflict 
resolution mechanisms 
 
7 .Higher-level    authorities    recognise    the    right    of    the    resource appropriators 
to self-govern. 
 
8 .In the case of larger common-pool resources :rules are organised and enforced 
through multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
 
(Source: Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990)  
 
With regard to the demarcation of resource boundaries, the jurisdiction of each community to 
plan and manage fisheries in Samoa is defined clearly in Section 19 of Fishery Management 
Act 2016 (FMA) 2016.136 Furthermore, Section 22 of the FMA 2016 reflects more progressive 
improvement by providing for the rights of disadvantaged communities.137 
Congruence between the resource environment and its governance structure or rules is evident 
in the case of Samoan fisheries. It is clear that the process to establish the extension programme 
in Samoa includes the process called ‘a village stroll through environmental assessment’. This 
is a process to survey and identify the key and environmentally critical areas in each village 
and to understand the real physical features of that village.138 Furthermore, the area is surveyed 
by the scientific expert in the Fishery Division of Samoa as part of the process. The rules to 
govern fishery are then enacted by the Village Fono under the guideline of the Fishery 
Management Act of Samoa139 and with the technical assistance of staff from the Fishery 
                                                                
136 Fisheries Management Act 2016 [Samoa], S 19.   
137 Ibid, S. 22.   
138 King and Faasili, above n 41,133. 
139 Fisheries Management Act 2016 [Samoa], S 6 and 86. 
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Division.  This guarantees that the rules are congruent with both the physical features of the 
area and Samoa’s Fishery Management Act.   
In terms of decisions making, all resource users in each of Samoa’s village can participate at 
two stages. Firstly, each Aiga (family) can express their own needs and concerns through Matai. 
Then each Matai will express the needs and concerns of their own family and discuss this in 
the Village Fono council. All resource users can participate in the meeting to consider the 
village fishery management plan. 
In terms of rules enforcement and monitoring, in Samoa this is done by the resource users. 
Furthermore, the rules govern both people in the village and those from outside the area who 
catch fish within the jurisdiction of a Village Fono. 
Each village provides punishments and sanctions according to the offence. However, the 
punishments and sanctions are limited by Section 6 of the Village Fono Act 1990. 140 
Furthermore, persons convicted by the village council can submit the decision to the Court to 
review the punishment and sanctions.141 The Village Fono can consider and settle disputes 
relating to fishery management independently. This makes it economical and easy for resource 
users to access the settlement process. Furthermore, the amended Village Fono Act 2017 added 
processes to ensure that the judgement and punishment of the village council would conform 
to human rights standards and Samoa’s Constitution.142 
The Village Fono is also recognised by higher-level authorities. The power of the Village Fono 
is recognised in Samoan law and it has a legitimate right to exercise its power. For example, 
the Village Fono can prohibit outsiders from fishery within its jurisdiction. In addition, 
according to Fishery Act 1988 (Samoa), the sanctions imposed by the Village Fono for fishery 
by outsiders can be applied to those outsiders. These facts are compatible with Ostrom’s rule 
that the community should be accepted by outside authorities. Higher-level authorities 
recognise the right of the resource appropriators to self-government. Without the acceptance 
and recognition from outside authorities, the Village Fono cannot enforce its rules on outsiders. 
This is important as the absence of recognition may lead to the collapse of the regime.  Lastly, 
the Village Fono has the ability to enact different rules for each area. The rules can be enacted 
to suit to a variety of physical conditions and situations to ensure that fishery is managed 
sustainably.  
                                                                
140 Village Fono Act 1990 [Samoa] S 6  
141 Ibid, S 8.  
142Ibid, S8. and Samoa to amend Village Fono Act https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/277831/samoa-to-
amend-village-fono-act 
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In terms of sustainable fishery management, it can be said that the present legal 
framework in Samoa partly reflects Lindsey’s proposal to reform the law to also promote 
the CBNRM and CM. This is evidenced in Table 17: 
Table 17 Lindsay's proposal for reforming law and Samoa's current situation 
Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law for promoting CBNRM and CM  Samoa’s current situation 
C
er
ta
in
ty
 
Rights must be clear Partly S 87 
Rights must have certainty and cannot be taken away or changed unilaterally and 
unfairly 
 Art .104 of Samoa’s 
Constitution,   
Rights should be ensured either in perpetuity or for a clearly defined period long 
enough for the benefits of participation to be fully realised  
Not clear S 87 
Rights must be enforceable against State or local government institutions Not clear S 87 
Rights must be exclusive  
The legal recognition of the holder of the rights  
The clear authority of government entities that enter into the agreement  S 19 
The certainty of the subjects of the rights  
The certainty and the boundary of the resources  S 19 
Legal mechanism to protect of rights and to settle disputes relating to rights  S 19, S 88 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Flexibility to decide what the objectives of management should be and rules in 
use  
 S 86 
Flexibility to recognise the traditional and local institution 
 
 S 3 of Village Fono Act 
Flexibility to define the management groups and area of jurisdictions  S 19 
(Source, Lindsay, Jonathan, 'Designing legal space: law as an enabling tool in community-based management' (2000)). 
As is evidenced in the Table above, one weakness of the Samoan ‘by-law process’ is the unclear 
fishery rights. This is because Article 100 of the Samoan 1962 Constitution recognises the 
customary land143 and Article 104 of Samoan 1962 Constitution recognises the land under the 
high-water mark (foreshore area) as public land that all Samoans can access to fish.144  In 
practice, it is argued that ‘The part of the ocean which is adjacent to the land is owned by such 
particular village. All land and sea resources are managed and controlled by the village council 
of chiefs, who are known as matais.’145   This can lead to challenges in Court146  because 
Customary Marine Tenure (CMT) is not legitimate, and Article 104 can no longer be 
implemented. Therefore, Macfadyen and others have observed that it result in Constitutional 
conflict.147 
 
 
                                                                
143 Constitution of Samoa 1960, Art 100.   
144 Ibid, Art 104.   
145 Anon., Customary Marine Tenure in Samoa (Samoa Fisheries Division - Min. 1995) 7. 
146 Robert E Johannes, 'The Renaissance of Community-Based Marine Resource Management in Oceania' (2002) 33(1) Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics 321, 
147 Macfadyen et al., above n 123, 24. 
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Table 18 Legal proposals for supporting fishery co-management projects by Macfadyen et al. and Samoa's context 
 Legal proposals for supporting fishery co-management (CM) project by Graeme Macfadyen, 
Phillippe Cacaud and Blaise Kuemlangan148 
Samoa’s 
situation 
Non-fisheries specific legislation should be considered for its support or hindrance to fisheries CM, as well 
as for its relationship to specific fisheries legislation )either in place or being developed (that is supportive 
of CM. 
- 
A legal framework supportive of CM, and supported by stakeholders, is more likely when a wide range of 
stakeholders are involved in the process to develop legislation itself. 
 
CM initiatives should ideally ensure that fisheries legislation is supportive of them and of decentralisation 
of fisheries management before commencing. 
 
Fisheries legislation should contain dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with user conflicts, and to 
ensure that local rules/regulations do not conflict with national-level legislation and policy. 
 
Fisheries legislation should specify the extent to which local autonomy in developing management 
rules/legislation is accepted. 
 
National fisheries legislation should provide for a broad and flexible legislative framework that enables a 
choice over CM arrangements and rules, with detailed mechanisms set out in regulations that can be 
changed if necessary. 
 
National fisheries legislation should contain specific reference to CM or provide indirect support to key 
success factors that need legislative support. (Decentralization, definition of boundary, use rights and 
community-based rules) 
 
Fisheries legislation needs to ensure that the legal framework clearly states 
• roles and responsibilities under decentralisation policy/legislation; 
• how CM areas and CM partners are to be defined; 
• security and enforceability of a right; 
• the ability and opportunity for rights holders to seek redress for violation of security and 
interests in the rights allocated; 
• the nature and extent of recognition of locally promulgated rules; 
• rules for interaction between stakeholders; and 
• rules for interaction with the state, including the limits and conditions for state intervention and 
protection of individuals against abuse of “local” power. 
 
(Source: Macfadyen, G., et al., Policy and legislative frameworks for co-management. APFIC Regional Workshop on 
Mainstreaming fisheries co-management in Asia Pacific, Siem Reap, Cambodia 2005) 
 
As evidenced in the table above, the process for a village to join the fishery extension 
programme is compatible with Macfadyen et al.’s proposal. 
To summarise, 
1. There are no clear provisions in either the Village Fono Act or the Fishery Management 
Act for obligations to include all stakeholders in the protection and conservation of 
marine resources. However, the process to assess the village before joining the fishery 
extension programme includes all villagers in the decision-making process. The 
participation of stakeholders in the village is not only limited to Matai in the Council 
of Chiefs. It also includes the untitled men’s and women’s committee. The process also 
aims to check that all villagers are aware of and concerned about the fishery and marine 
resource problems and that they are willing to do something to help resolve these 
                                                                
148 Ibid, 37-41. 
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problems. Moreover, the officials from the Samoan Fishery Division can participate in 
the activities of coastal villages by providing technical support and training to the 
villagers.  
 
2. Both the Samoan Fishery Management Act and the Village Fono Act are supportive of 
the activities of villages to protect and conserve fish and marine resources and of the 
decentralisation of fisheries management.   
 
3. Both the Samoan Fishery Management Act and the Village Fono Act contain dispute 
resolution mechanisms to deal with user conflicts. They also ensure that the local 
rules/regulations do not conflict with national-level legislation and policy.  
 
4. The Samoan Fishery Management Act specifies the extent to which there is local 
autonomy in developing management rules/legislation to protect and conserve fish and 
marine resources.  
 
5. The Samoan Fishery Management Act provides for a broad and flexible legislative 
framework that enables a choice over CM arrangements and rules, with detailed 
mechanisms set out in regulations that can be changed if necessary.  
 
6. Both the Samoan Fishery Management Act and the Village Fono Act contain specific 
reference to CM arrangements or provide indirect support to key success factors that 
need legislative support (e.g., decentralisation, definition of boundaries, user rights and 
community-based rules). 
 
The success of the Village Fono in the management of coastal fisheries provides some 
important lessons in terms of the recognition of Muang Fai water management customary law 
in Thailand. In particular, it shows that Muang Fai water management customary would not 
manage water effectively if Muang Fai institutions were not recognised in Thailand’s law. In 
terms of recognition, there would need to be recognition of both the institutions of Muang Fai 
and the rules relating to Muang Fai customary law. Moreover, the enforcement of Muang Fai’s 
rules must be applied to the people outside Muang Fai. 
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5.3 Lessons learned from customary law recognition in Vanuatu 
5.3.1 General background 
Vanuatu is a Y-shaped archipelago state in the Southwest Pacific Ocean149 in the Melanesian 
region. It consists of 82 islands of volcanic origin.150  It has a total area of 12,300 square 
kilometres. The distance from the most northern island to the most southern island is about 
1,300 kilometres. Because Vanuatu was a colony and due to its geographical features, it is 
known as ‘New Hebrides’. 
In 2015, the population of Vanuatu was about 264,600 people. 151  Most are Melanesian 
indigenous people, known as ‘Ni-Vanuatu’152 This population consists of over 110 different 
groups153 with their own customs154 and languages.155 Vanuatu is characterised by different 
tribal affiliations and social structures that include matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance 
systems.156  Further, traditional customary chiefs still play a vital role in leadership. 157  The 
social structure of Vanuatu differs from that in Samoa. Cox et al. indicate that the social structure 
of Vanuatu can result in corruption and the fragmentation of political bodies in which no group 
can control resources absolutely. 158  Some have observed that the governance problem of 
Vanuatu is that the ‘unfinished element of the state-building project in Vanuatu is the limited 
reach of the state outside the capital’.159 It is worth noting here that in terms of population social 
                                                                
149 Francis R Hickey, 'Traditional Marine Resource Management in Vanuatu: Acknowledging, Supporting and Strengthening 
Indigenous Management Systems' (2006) 20(11) SPC Traditional Marine Resource Management and Knowledge Information 
Bulletin 11.  
150 Ibid. Some document indicates that Vanuatu has 83 islands. See  Australian Council for Educational Research, Research into 
the financing of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) in the Pacific <https://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/financing-of-tvet-in-vanuatu.pdf> 
151 Food and Agriculture Organization, Vanuatu AQUA STAT 2016 (17 Nov 2017) Food and Agriculture Organization 
<http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/VUT/> 
152 Miranda Forsyth, 'Beyond Case Law: Kastom and Courts in Vanuatu' (2004) 35 Victoria University Wellington Law 
Review 427. 
153Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation (Vanuatu), The Republic of Vanuatu Fifth National Country 
Report to the conference of the parties to the convention on the Biodiversity National Report 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/vu/vu-nr-05-en.pdf> 2. 
154 Forsyth, above n 152, 427. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Marcus Cox et al., ‘The Unfinished State: Drivers of Change in Vanuatu’, cited in Government of Vanuatu, Vanuatu 
National Assessment Report :5 Year Review of the Mauritius Strategy for Further Implementation of the Barbados 
Programme of Action for Sustainable Development <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1380Vanuatu-
MSI-NAR2010.pdf>. 
157United Nations Children’s Fund, Children in Vanuatu: An Atlas of Social Indicators 2011 (Dec2017) United Nations 
Children’s Fund <https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/Vanuatu_Equity_Atlas.pdf>. 
158 Cox et al., above n 156. 
159 Ibid. 
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structures, Vanuatu differs to Samoa in that the majority of Samoans are Polynesian; whereas, 
the majority of Vanuatu people are Melanesian.160   
 
Figure 24 Physical map of Vanuatu (Source: <https://www.ezilon.com/maps/images/oceania/Vanuatu-physical-map.gif>). 
Approximately 74 percent of the population of Vanuatu lives in rural communities.161 The 
population density is 22 inhabitants/km². The average annual rate of population growth between 
2005 and 2015 was 2.4 percent. Most people live along the coast and the internal areas of many 
islands are almost uninhabited.  
Vanuatu’s principal domestic exports in 2011 and 2012 were copra, coconut oil and kava. The 
economy is based primarily on subsistence or small-scale agriculture, which provides a living 
for over 60 percent of the population. Fishing, offshore financial services and tourism (with 
321,404 visitors in 2012, and 248, 868 visitors in 2011) are other mainstays of the economy. 
Vanuatu is also culturally diverse with over 110 distinct languages and cultural groups 
according to the Vanuatu National Statistics Office 2012.162 Vanuatu classifies itself as a small 
developing island country. 163  
Vanuatu has been selected for study in this thesis because of the successful CBNRM used in 
declaring the Community Conservation Area (CCA) through the Environmental Management 
                                                                
160 Laurence Cordonnery, '12 Environmenatal Law Issues in the South Pacific and the Question for Sustainable Development 
and Good Governance' (2003), in Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton Cain, Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance in 
the Pacific (ANU E Press, 2010) 239-240. 
161 Food and Agriculture Organization, Vanuatu AQUA STAT 2016 (17 Nov 2017) Food and Agriculture Organization 
<http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/VUT/> 
162Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation (Vanuatu),  above n 153, 2. 
163  Government of Vanuatu, Vanuatu National Assessment Report 5 Year Review of the Mauritius Strategy for Further 
Implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action for Sustainable Development.  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1380Vanuatu-MSI-NAR2010.pdf>  6. 
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and Conservation Act 2002. However, this thesis focuses on data from the fishery sector 
because the fishery industry is one of the most important business sectors in Vanuatu. It is 
estimated that 78 percent of households in Vanuatu engage in the fishery sector.164 
Historically, Vanuatu was first inhabited by the Melanesian people. The Spanish expedition led 
by the Portuguese navigator Fernandes de Queiros then visited the largest island of Vanuatu in 
1606 and claimed it as a colony of Spain.  In 1880, Great Britain and France claimed parts of 
the archipelago. In 1906, Great Britain and France agreed to govern Vanuatu as a Condominium. 
Common law was applied to British subjects; whereas, French law was applied to French 
subjects. In 1980, Vanuatu declared its independence and renamed the country as ‘the Republic 
of Vanuatu’.165 Vanuatu has a democratic Westminster system of government. Elections are held 
every four years. Vanuatu has a central government and six provincial governments with two 
urban municipalities.166 
Fish and marine resources are important for Vanuatu in terms of food security and as a source 
of income. This is domestically as well as from exports to other countries in the Pacific region. 
The important marine products for Vanuatu are trochus, tuna and beche-de-mer (sea-
cucumber).167 Trochuses are used as material for making buttons and ornaments.  
Coastal and marine resources in Vanuatu are under threat from global warming, rising sea 
levels, pressure from commercial fishing, marine pollution, and changing land use.168 Vanuatu 
developed a revised Tuna Management Plan in 2009 that lays out the operational parameters 
for implementing sections of the Fisheries Act of 2005. The Fisheries Department conducts 
trochus re-seeding experiments, assesses stocks of beche-de-mer (sea-cucumber), coconut crabs, 
lobsters and giant clams, and undertakes seaweed farming trials. All of the above will result in 
better knowledge and experience to address the pressures on coastal marine resources. 
                                                                
164 Food and Agriculture Organization, Vanuatu fishery data (17 Nov2017) Food and Agriculture Organization 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/VUT/en> 
165 Techera, above n 5, 108. 
166 United Nations Children’s Fund, Children in Vanuatu: An Atlas of Social Indicators 2011 (Dec2017) United Nations 
Children’s Fund 
<https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/Vanuatu_Equity_Atlas.pdf>.<https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/Vanuatu_Equity_At
las.pdf>. 
167 Food and Agriculture Organization, The Republic of Vanuatu (23 June2018) Food and Agriculture Organization 
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/VUT/profile.htm> 
168 Government of Vanuatu, above n 163, 12. 
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Figure 25 the exclusive economic zone of Vanuatu169 
 
5.3.2 The legal system in Vanuatu 
As mentioned above, Vanuatu was colonised by both the British and the French. Therefore, the 
present legal system in Vanuatu is a mixture of civil law, common law and customary law.170 
                                                                
169This photo is available from https://sau-technical-
reports.s3.amazonaws.com/548_Zylich%20et%20al_2014_Vanuatu_FCRR.pdf?Signature=vZt6jeHiO7WGQ42KFSR9NU69hs
U%3D&Expires=1518051054&AWSAccessKeyId=ASIAIW4N7TBB5RC3DWMQ&x-amz-security-
token=FQoDYXdzELL//////////wEaDNdcx%2Bii9FDZoVqO5yK3A9onz61AjOJaCTTlqfH7jTH8LEN2RhJ/LZm/eMOQZ900W/
shWL77fTKYigEaHMjCfeCnypjnqMZAqzLUwp67gpAThpZUNGrtC8UNhXGPZpOhGkyTZ0rHuVliPvK5AK0YJhf9uBC
dxLFnhav8GXHRbkeOWXcUo%2BZErcYOWiWnZJ5CPBwdlhooC7DR3q6GnHnPkXrI9rcPcLmJxKl1JTJFJAmqcqw4GA
30eLujRGnqLBzfxmzmwpVDJ3mdnzBwVNj3JRaAD9Vgq7sILgjdCuRVsNocCFkGpwJ9%2BGW4oy%2BwiZfqOQiJb7i%2
BOuTMOQ%2BWrlO%2B6IWxUmiI0PIQc8aABIb2qGGUbgjqx9F5Xk2JynCkMUo%2B39pJdsaf23ImNJ3BhlBZfpHlAzTv
iMxbOKWaZ/IhYE7ieh3gSaCR5ccYx9r1zJ2ySr/ljxUwhkaRGsAA/RMTMv6saoauA/P73wXmVCDpWcGU4ClqJWXBeFV
oanrrfH6yaSr4B2oZx5zStn3uAg4LuhwGL%2Bwz64ryTLpx5GvrTkULFo%2BIBd43bL09lZ7vMy12LGca4B6wkv1tmyCqz
PlFGnx0WXa8vM0oiZjp0wU%3D 
170See Paterson, Don, Vanuatu - Sources of Law (23 June 2018) Pacific island Legal information institute 
<http://www.paclii.org/vu/sources.html> and JC Corrin, 'Sources of Law Under the Constitution of Vanuatu' (1985) 1 
Queensland Institute of Technology law Journal 225. 
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British and French laws continue to be applied according to Article 95(2) of the Constitution;171 
whereas, the customary law of Vanuatu continues to have affect according to Article 95 (3) of 
the Constitution.172 Techera argues that Vanuatu applies the Constitutional approach173 and 
general recognition approach to recognise customary law.174  
Custom or ‘Kastom’ (in Bislama/English) is recognised in Vanuatu’s Constitution.175 Custom in 
Vanuatu is treated as a matter of law in Court.176 The population in Vanuatu consists of many 
ethnic groups, each with their own customs. This can lead to conflict in matters of customary 
law. In such cases, as Senior Magistrate Lunabek pointed out in the case of Waiwo V. Waiwo, 
when both parties are Vanuatu native citizens (Ni-Vanuatu) from different customs, the Court 
should identify the common basis or foundation and turn that shared foundation into the rule.177 
However, Vanuatu’s community has no traditional Village Fono structure as was seen in 
Samoa. 
In terms of human rights law, Vanuatu has adopted the UDHR178 and International Bill of 
Rights,179 including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.180  
Regarding international environmental law, Vanuatu is party to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),181 the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD),182 
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).183 Vanuatu is 
                                                                
171 (2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, the British and French laws in force or applied in Vanuatu immediately before 
the Day of Independence shall on and after that day continue to apply to the extent that they are not expressly revoked or 
incompatible with the independent status of Vanuatu and wherever possible taking due account of custom. 
172 (3) Customary law shall continue to have effect as part of the law of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
173 Techera, above n 17, 306. 
174 Ibid, 281. 
175 See Chapter 12 and of Vanuatu Constitution. 
176 Vanuatu Magistrate Bench Book (July 2004), ch. 2, para 1.3 ‘Inquiring Into Questions on Customary Law 
All questions regarding the existence, application or relevance of customary law are questions of law and you may raise them 
yourself, even if no party has raised them’. 
177 However, this decision was reversed late on appeal. Jenifer Corin and Don Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law 
(Routledge, 2007) 55.  
178 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Usage by Countries 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng>.  
179 Ratification status for Vanuatu 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=190&Lang=EN>. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Vanuatu - Country Profile (23 June2018) Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity < https://www.cbd.int/countries/default.shtml?country=vu> 
182 United Nations Convention for Combat Desertification, Vanuatu date to ratify the UNCCD (23 June 2018) United Nations 
Convention for Combat Desertification Knowledge Hub < http://knowledge.unccd.int/countries/vanuatu > 
183 Republic of Vanuatu Nation Adaption Programme for Action <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/vut01.pdf>. 
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in the process of joining the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.184 Techera observes that the 
advantages of Vanuatu’s legal system is that it is rich in environmental legislation and that it 
aims to implement international environmental conventions to resolve domestic environmental 
problems.185 Vanuatu does however have a problem in terms of environmental law enforcement 
by the central government similar to other countries in the Pacific region.186 
The next section focuses on the successful community-based fishery management system in 
Vanuatu. It is slightly different from that of Samoa because of the different social structure. 
Although both are successful community-based fishery management models, the by-law 
approval process by the local administrative authority as applied in Samoa would not work 
well in Vanuatu.187  
5.3.3 Policies and legal framework and relating to recognise customary law & traditional 
institutions in fishery management in Vanuatu 
 
Lessons learned from Vanuatu in relation to the recognition of customary law are evidenced in 
the successful story for using CM approaches to recognise customary law to manage and 
conserve coastal marine resources. As mentioned above, the food security and income of 
Vanuatu comes from marine resources. However, Vanuatu faces problems of over-exploitation, 
climate change and population growth; problems they share with other Pacific countries. 
Clearly, Vanuatu needs to resolve these problems.  
 
 
CMT in Vanuatu has been applied traditionally for a long time, long before Vanuatu was 
colonised by the British and French. The native people were displaced from the land during the 
colonial period. After Vanuatu declared its independence, Chapter 12, Articles 71-81 of the 
Constitution of Vanuatu recognised the customary land rights of Indigenous people. The 
customary land tenure in Vanuatu also includes marine areas from the shore up to the outer 
edge of the reef.188 Therefore, the near-shore areas up to the coral reef flats are not open to the 
                                                                
184  Ramsar Organization, Vanuatu makes progress towards joining the Ramsar Convention (20 February 2017) Ramsar 
Organization < http://www.ramsar.org/news/vanuatu-makes-progress-towards-joining-the-ramsar-convention> 
185 Techera, above n 17, 298. 
186 Cordonnery, above n 160, 238-239. 
187 Ibid 246.  
188 Moses Amos, 'Traditionally Based Marine Management Systems in Vanuatu' (1993) 2 SPC Traditional Marine Resource 
Management and Knowledge Information Bulletin 14. 
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public.189 This is different from the Samoan Constitution which recognises the foreshore area 
as a public area.190 
 
Today, the legal frameworks for managing fisheries in Vanuatu consist of Vanuatu’s 
Constitution, the Fishery Act 2014, the Environmental Management and Conservation Act 
2002 (EMCA) and the Decentralisation and Local Government Regions Act 1994 (DLGRA). 
Vanuatu’s Constitution has two functions: 1) to recognise and guarantee the customary rights to 
fish and custom marine tenure of Ni Vanuatu191; and 2) to conserve natural resources for 
people.192 At the same time, the Fishery Act focuses on fisheries management, development 
and conservation, foreign fishing vessels, and locally-based foreign fishing vessels.  
 
In 2010, the EMCA was renamed as the Environmental Protection and Conservation Act 
(EPCA).193 One aim of the EPCA is to implement conventions of biodiversity in Vanuatu194 not 
focusing on the marine resource conservation. Provisions of the EPCA deal with three areas: 
environmental impact assessments, bio-prospecting, and conservation areas.195 The legislation 
is described as an “Act to provide for the conservation, sustainable development and 
management of the environment of Vanuatu, and the regulation of related activities:.196 The 
DLGRA provides the legal framework to allow each province to enact the fishery by laws, like 
in Samoa, in their own jurisdiction for up to six nautical miles.    
 
Govan summarises the laws and institutions of Vanuatu that govern marine resource in each 
area in Table 19 below:  
 
                                                                
189 Amos, M. 1995. Combination of Fisheries Management Regulation, Traditionally Based Management and Wild stock 
Enhancement using Hatchery Reared Trochus Juveniles as Precautionary Management Principle for Trochus Niloticus 
Resources in Vanuatu. In Workshop Proceedings on the Management of Pacific Inshore Fisheries, Noumea, New 
Caledonia, 26 June - 7 July 1995, Volume II. Noumea: FFA/SPC 169-179. 
190 Constitution of Samoa 1960 Art. 104.  
191 The Constitution of Vanuatu Article 73. All land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous custom owners and 
their descendants. 
192 The Constitution of Vanuatu Article 7(d) “Every person has the fundamental duty to himself and his descendants and to 
others…. to protect Vanuatu and to safeguard the national wealth, resources and environment in the interests of the present 
and of future generations.” 
193 Environmental Management and Conservation (Amendment) Act 2010, Sec1.  
194 Justin Rose, ‘Chapter 10 Community-Based Biodiversity Conservation in the Pacific: Cautionary Lessons in 
“Regionalising” Environmental Governance’ in Biodiversity Conservation, Law and Livelihoods: Bridging the North-South 
220. 
195 Ibid. 
196 The preamble of Vanuatu’s Environmental Protection and Conservation Act. 
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Table 19 Jurisdiction, institutions and legislation in Vanuatu  
  
Source Hugh Govan Area-Based Management Tools for Coastal Resources in Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga And 
Vanuatu. Volume 2: Country report p. 12 
 
The institutions governing marine resources in Vanuatu consist of various organisations, 
similar to Samoa. They adopt the same approach; namely, community-based fishery 
management (CBFM), and recognise fishery customary rights and custom marine tenure. The 
fishery management in Vanuatu is important and interesting, however the main mission of this 
thesis is to identify how to recognise and manage Muang Fai customary law sustainably. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses mainly on the Community Conservation Areas (CCAs) which can 
be applied to the recognition of Muang Fai community in Thailand. 
 
It is important to first understand why Vanuatu uses the CBFM approach in fishery 
management and how many organisations are employed. As mentioned earlier, the people of 
Vanuatu depend heavily on marine resources, like the Samoans. Similarly, marine resource 
depletion was also a major problem in Vanuatu. Initially, the government of Vanuatu attempted 
to enforce the Fishery Act of 1983 to manage the problem. This attempt was not successful 
however because of the ineffectiveness of the central government mechanisms. They lacked 
sufficient officials and experienced significant levels of corruption. There was also a lack of 
cooperation from local communities.197 Vanuatu then tried to apply the by-law approach, as 
                                                                
197 Cordonnery, above n 160, 239-240.  
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was effectively used in Samoa, by incorporating it in Section 20(9) of the DLGRA.198  However, 
the law is rarely implemented. Cordonnery concludes that the reasons for the failure of the by-
laws approach in Vanuatu were: 1) legislation focuses on protected areas designation more than 
the management of resources; 2) local government structures are ineffective; 3) enacting rules 
for governing resources is not common at the local government level of Vanuatu and; 4) 
Vanuatu legislation has been drafted by law makers without the commitment of the 
communities.199 
 
The Vanuatu Fisheries Department then adjusted its approach to CM. In the 1990s, the Trochus 
rehabilitation programme was set up in response to the decline of trochus. The programme is 
always referred to as a success and became the model for CBFM in Vanuatu.200 In reality, it is 
not only the Trochus rehabilitation programme that has been undertaken in Vanuatu. Raubani 
et al. identify many programmes that have become the basis for present-day CBFM in 
Vanuatu.201 Both the strengths and weaknesses of the programme provide useful lessons for 
future CBFM projects. This shows that fishery management is an adaptive form of governance 
and must be resilient in response to the changes, challenges and facts of society. Programmes 
to further explore in this thesis for what they offer to the recognition of the Muang Fai 
community are Trochus rehabilitation programme and the Wan Smolbag programme. 
 
In the case of the Trochus rehabilitation programme, the Vanuatu Fisheries Department tried 
to support the communities that requested it, without forcing them to follow the 
recommendations. The success of the Trochus rehabilitation programme led to further studies 
of the strengths and weaknesses of a CM approach. Moreover, it indicated that knowledge alone 
was not enough to achieve management outcomes with communities, and that further capacity 
must be built around community engagement.   
  
In regard to the Wan Smolbag programme, a theatre group called Wan Smolbag started a 
campaign to reduce turtle mortality and egg harvesting during the “Year of the Sea Turtle.” They 
performed a play in schools, villages and communities throughout the country. The aims of the 
campaign were to raise awareness and promote the conservation of marine turtles.  The success 
                                                                
198 Decentralization and Local Government Regions Act 1994 Part 5 S. 20. As from the dates they are established, Local 
Government Councils are empowered to make by-laws, on the matters listed below:  
…(9) Outline, create and draw up regulations governing the environmental protection zones (natural parks, natural reserves or 
tourist-attraction areas) subject to any legislation creating environmental protected areas in the national interest;… 
199 Cordonnery, above n 160, 246. 
200 See Erika J Techera, 'Protected Area Management in Vanuatu' (2005) 2 Macquarie Journal of International and 
Comparative Environmental law and Robert E. Johannas, Government supported, village-based   management   of   marine   
resources   in   Vanuatu.  (1998) 40 Ocean and Coastal Management Journal: 165-186. 
201 Jason Raubani et al., Past Experiences and the Refinement of Vanuatu’s Model for Supporting Community-Based 
Fisheries Management SPC Traditional Marine Resource Management and Knowledge Information Bulletin #38 – June 2017 
5. 
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of the campaign led to turtle monitoring initiatives by villagers.  Furthermore, the Wam 
Smolbag group arranged annual meetings for people to exchange their experiences of turtle 
monitoring. Later, the turtle monitoring initiative in each village became a network that 
advocated conservation for both protected land and sea resources. The Wan Smolbag 
programme indicates the important role of education for SD,202 as well as the effectiveness of 
making networks of collective organisations to exchange experiences in the way described by 
Ostrom.203   
 
After various programmes and over a period of seven years, including extensive consultation 
with a broad range of stakeholders, 204  the EPCA was developed and enacted. The EPCA 
emerged from the lessons of all stakeholders with experience in fishery management 
programmes. However, the CCA is not applied only to fishery management. It can be applied 
to all sites which meet the criteria to register as a CCA.    
 
The criteria to register a CCA is provided in Section 35 of the EPCA. CCAs can be registered 
if a site meets the following criteria: 1) unique genetic, cultural, geological or biological 
resources; 2) constitutes the habitat of species of wild fauna or flora of unique national or 
international importance; and 3) areas that merit protection under the World Heritage 
Convention.205 Vanuatu’s National Advisory Board (NAB) on Climate Change and Disaster 
Risk reduction concludes the following with regards to the features of a CCA: 1) any size (big 
or small) of land can be registered as a CCA; 2) a CCA can be the site to manage and conserve 
land and/or marine resources; 3) the site can be both private or community-owned land; 4) the 
land use is cooperatively managed with other organisations after it is registered as a CCA; 5) 
the land owner or community can use and harvest resources inside the CCA; 6) the land is used 
as a CCA on a short-term, periodic or permanent basis according to the will of the land owner 
or community; and 7) the CCA must support both Indigenous and non-Indigenous local 
practices in management.206 It is clear that the establishment of CCAs depends on the agreement 
of customary landowners. Furthermore, the land owners can cancel the registration of a CCAs, 
                                                                
202 Ibid,5. 
203 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Design Principles and Threats to Sustainable Organizations that Manage Commons’, Paper for Electronic 
Conference on Small Farmer's Economic Organizations, organized by Julio A. Berdegue. Santiago, Chile. 
204 Rose, above n 193. 
205 Environmental Management and Conservation Act (Amendment) 2010 (Vanuatu) S.35. Identification of sites having 
national biodiversity significance. The Director may negotiate with custom landowners for the protection and registration of 
any site as a Community Conservation Area where he or she is satisfied that the site: 
(a) possesses unique genetic, cultural, geological or biological resources; or 
(b) constitutes the habitat of species of wild fauna or flora of unique national or international importance; or 
(c) merits protection under the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage    
 See Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, Setting Up Community conservation area Training Series 
on Agrometeorology and Climate Change Adaptation, Series 00 No.00, 4 
206 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, Setting Up Community conservation area Training Series on 
Agrometeorology and Climate Change Adaptation, Series 00 No.00, 4 
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or any part of such area any time.207 Therefore, CCAs are established on a voluntary basis 
similar to villages that join in the fishery extension programme in Samoa.  
 
The benefits of being in a CCA are: 1) the land owners and the site are promoted; 2) land owners 
and site can be considered by aid donors for conservation and development projects; 3) land 
owners can access important conservation information; 4) land owners  become members of 
national networks and programs; 5) the site can be nominated for international awards and 
recognitions; 6) land owners can participate in capacity building exercises, national workshops 
and meetings; 7) the land owners will receive administrative support for management activities; 
8) land owners can participate in site visits and exchanges with other communities; 9) land 
owners will become hosts to national and foreign researchers; and 10) land owners will receive 
assistance from Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation (DEPC) to improve 
and make management of the CCA sustainable.208 
 
The process to establish CCA is presented in Table 20 below:  
Table 20 Process to establish Community Conservation Area in Vanuatu 209 
 
                                                                
207 EPCA s. 38. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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Source: Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, Setting Up Community conservation area Training 
Series on Agrometeorology and Climate Change Adaptation, Series 00 No.00, 4 
 < http://www.nab.vu/sites/default/files/nab/documents/23/08/2013%20-%2016%3A30/6_cca.pdf > 
 
The Director of the Environment Unit may then provide assistance to: review the natural 
resource situation; identify and evaluate the area; verify land rights; and identify and evaluate 
the conservation, protection and management options proposed.210 Furthermore, the EPCA 
provides duties to the Director before registering the land as a CCA.  The Director must 
ensure that: 
a) the objectives of the proposed CCA are identified, and are in accordance with sound 
conservation practices;  
b) the boundaries of any proposed CCA are accurately identified;  
c) consent and approval are obtained from all persons having rights and interests in any 
land that is to be included in the proposed CCA; and 
d) an appropriate conservation, protection or management plan is developed for the area 
to ensure the achievement of identified conservation objectives.211 
In the EPCA amendment Act 2010, the EPCA provides the duties of the management 
committee. They are to be responsible for: 
a) the development, implementation and enforcement of the management plan established 
for a registeredCCA;  
b) ensuring that procedures are followed for solving disputes over breaches of CCA 
management rules under any alternative dispute resolution process provided for in the 
management plan; and  
c) providing annual reports to the Department. 212  
It is worth to noting here that the duties of the CCA management committee are partly similar 
to the management committee of a village, as seen in the fisheries extension programme of 
Samoa. The only difference from the village’s fishery management committee in Samoa is in 
the power to settle disputes. This is because the power to adjudicate the case belongs to the 
Village Council in Samoa, not the fishery management committee. 
Techera observes that the EPCA provides a duty to develop an appropriate conservation, 
protection or management plan before registration. This is to ensure that the conservation 
objectives are achieved.213  Techera further indicates the advantage of the process for CCAs in 
                                                                
210 EPCA [Vanuatu] S. 36.   
211 Ibid, S. 37.   
212 EMCA 2004 [Vanuatu] S. 39 and EMCA Amendment 2010 S. 47. (See Appendix) 
213 Techera, above n 17, 296. 
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Vanuatu: 1) the establishment of a CCA is the formal recognition of community-based 
conservation areas; 2) the approach allows the community to play a significant role in 
determining the form of the conservation plan and then considering traditional landholders’ 
issues; 3) the establishment of a CCA permits active conservation management whilst providing 
for sustainable livelihoods; 4) local people can still have control over the land and  the Chiefs 
can still make decisions about the CCA; 5) the EPCA provides a mechanism for the government 
to use to preserve remote areas of land which exceed the regulatory capacity of the Vanuatu 
Environmental Unit by allowing the local people to do it214; and 6) the management of a CCA 
provides room to incorporate traditional knowledge and practices into conservation and 
management plans thereby preserving them for the future.215  
It is also argued that the CCA system may decrease the status and power of the Chief by 
transferring area management power to a government department.216 Therefore, protected areas 
become an open access area because Vanuatu’s government has no capacity to control wide 
areas.217 However, Techera indicates that resistance to the Chiefs’ rule was only a matter of 
time. Such resistance is already evident in many areas, particularly in the villages closer to 
towns where the police enforce customary law instead of the traditional system. 
 
Techera further observes, in terms of the process to develop and implement the management 
plans in CCAs, that the system is collaborative and inclusive, and that it is designed to leave 
primary responsibility with the community and government aids. However, it cannot guarantee 
the goals will be achieved because it depends on national resources which are limited in 
Vanuatu. Additionally, Techera indicates that the EMCA does not include a detailed 
mechanism for implementation of the provisions. The wording is general and does not provide 
specific regulatory mechanisms.218  Actually, the EMCA was amended in 2010219, especially 
in terms of the CCA management committee’s power, and the power of the Court to transfer 
fines to the trust. The EPCA 2010 also added the words ‘CCA’s management plan’ and 
‘management rules’. However, it is not made clear how they should be enforced. 
In fact, it appears from the evidence that the Vanuatu Department of Environment Protection 
and Conservation Unit wants to use a village fishery by-laws system, similar to Samoa, in the 
CCA. This is evidenced in “the Information Booklet on the registration of Community 
Conservation Areas (CCAs) as stipulated in the The Environmental Protection and 
Conservation Act CAP 283 Part 4- Biodiversity and Protected Area Division 2- Community 
                                                                
214 Ibid, 296. 
215 Ibid, 297. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Techera, above n 5, 113. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Environmental Management and Conservation Act (Amendment) 2010 (Vanuatu)   
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Conservation Areas”, 220 which is the handbook for registration and for sending the annual 
report. 
In the booklet, the EPCA states: 
Section 8. Enforcement of CCA Management Rules/By-Laws 
According to section 39 (1) of the EPC Act, 
the applicant and/or the CCA management committee/coordinating body is 
responsible for the development, implementation, and enforcement of the 
management plan established for a registered Community Conservation Area. 
In other words, the ultimate responsibility for enforcement of management rules/by-
laws lies at the local CCA level. All CCA rules and by-laws set by the management 
committee/coordinating body should be enforced by existing local or customary 
governance structures. 
In most Ni-Vanuatu community cases, there is a well-established hierarchy for 
dealing with offenders who disregard local or customary rules and norms. In many 
cases, local governance structures are very effective, and should be fully utilised, 
strengthened and supported. However, there is an emerging concern among many 
Ni-Vanuatu communities that local rules and by-laws are not always respected by 
all residents. 
This disregard for local or customary rules and laws may be due to: 
  Eroded customary governance systems 
 Inability of communities to control external agents (i.e., neighboring 
villagers) 
 Low, soft, or inappropriate fines and penalties enacted at the community 
level 
 Religious beliefs (for example, that God provides resources for unlimited 
human use and enjoyment) 
 Mental attitudes (for example, that closures should only be temporary) 
 Poverty and lack of available resources to meet basic human needs 
 Poor cooperation or disputes among individuals or groups 
 No recognition of local rules by modern law and legislation 
                                                                
220 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, Information Booklet on the Registration of Community 
Conservation Areas (CCAs) as stipulated in the the Environmental Protection and Conservation Act CAP 283, Part 4 - 
Biodiversity and Protected Area Division 2 - Community Conservation Areas 27 
<https://environment.gov.vu/images/Forms/EMC%20Information%20Booklet%20Final.pdf>. 
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Many communities have specifically requested assistance from the national 
government to enforce the management rules and by-laws that pertain to 
Community Conservation Areas. In order to meet the requests of local communities, 
the Section 39(2) of the EPC Act enables and strengthens existing local or 
customary rules and governance by confirming: 
“CCA management rules and by-laws are legally binding and enforceable” 
Section 41 (f) of the EPC Act further stipulates: 
“A person who contravenes any term or condition of a registered Community 
Conservation Area is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction to a) a fine of 
not less than 50,000,000 vatu for corporate offenders, or b) a fine of not more than 
50,000,000 vatu for individual offenders, or c) to imprisonment for a period of not 
more than 5 years, or to any combination of the above" 
Section 42 states: 
Where an offence under this Act is committed or continues on more than one day, 
the person who committed the offence is liable to be convicted for a separate offence 
for each day on which the offence is committed or continues.221 
The latest version of the EPCA, published in the Gazette, does not include Section 39(2) as cited 
in the booklet. 
Table 21 Vanuatu's Environmental Protection and Conservation Act 2004 and the Amendment in 2010 
EPCA 2004222 EPCA 2010223 
S.39. Effect of registration 
 
(1) The landowners, or the management committee formed 
by the landowners or Director for the purpose, are 
responsible for the development and implementation of any 
conservation, protection or management plan established for 
a registered Community Conservation Area. 
 
(2) The Director may provide technical or financial support 
to the landowners or any such management committee for 
the purpose of developing or implementing an appropriate 
conservation, protection or management plan. 
 
(3) If a registration is cancelled under sections 38 or 40, the 
Director must provide no further technical or financial 
support to the landowners. 
S.47 Subsection 39(1) 
Repeal the subsection, substitute 
“(1) A management committee is responsible for: 
(a) the development, implementation and enforcement of the 
management plan established for a registered Community 
Conservation Area; and 
(b) ensuring that procedures are followed for solving 
disputes over breaches of Community Conservation Area 
management rules under any alternative dispute resolution 
process provided for in the management plan; and 
(c) providing annual reports to the Department.” 
 
S.48 Subsection 39(2) 
(a) Delete “landowners or any such” 
(b) Delete “or implementing an appropriate conservation, 
protection” or substitute “implementing or enforcing the” 
 
                                                                
221 Ibid, 13-14. 
222 Environmental Management and Conservation Act 2004 (Vanuatu) 
223 Environmental Management and Conservation Act (Amendment) 2010 (Vanuatu)   
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Therefore, the legal mechanism of the CCA remains unclear. 
 
Lastly, Techera observes that lack of financial and human resources might be the main problem 
for the CCA system in Vanuatu. Similarly, Govan raises these issues in his report in 2015.224 
However, the Biodiversity and Conservation Division in the DEPC is responsible for the 
CCA.225 Furthermore, Léopold et al. indicate that most community rules were short-lived and 
the CBFM systems in Vanuatu depend heavily on the support of external government or non-
government agencies.226 Although it cannot totally be said that the CBFM in Vanuatu is the 
most sustainable institution to govern fishery, at least it can govern fisheries effectively and 
harmoniously within real social contexts. 
 
 
Figure 26 Organisation chart of Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation in Vanuatu   
(Source: <https://environment.gov.vu/index.php/about-us/organisational-structure#scrolldown>). 
 
In terms of an overview of the CBFM in Vanuatu, Macfadyen and others assert the following 
key strengths of the national policy and legislative framework of Vanuatu:  
1) Vanuatu has a Constitution that is the foundation for decentralisation, land 
ownership (including marine area ownership), and its custom perpetuates 
decentralisation and CM;  
2) The Constitution recognises or accommodates and guarantees traditional units 
of governance; and 
3) Traditional villages and leaders in Vanuatu are one part of the basis for socio-
political organisation which contributes effective monitoring and enforcement 
of village based conservation and management measures.  
 
                                                                
224 Hugh Govan, Area-Based Management Tools for Coastal Resources in Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands,Tonga And 
Vanuatu. Volume 2: Country Report. 
225 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation (Vanuatu), Organisational Structure (1 April 2018) Department 
of Environmental Protection and Conservation <https://environment.gov.vu/index.php/about-us/organisational-
structure#scrolldown>. 
226 Marc Le´opold, Jennifer Beckensteiner, Jeremie Kaltavara, Jason Raubani and SophieCaillon, ‘Community-Based 
Management of Near-Shorefisheries in Vanuatu: Whatworks?’ (2013) 42 Marine Policy 167, 172. 
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However, Vanuatu’s national policy and legislative framework also has weaknesses: 
1) It has an overlap and conflict of mandates for resource conservation between 
government agencies responsible for fisheries and the environment, and 
between the decentralised government units and the villages; and  
2) Vanuatu has no legal recognition for village-based management measures so as 
to ensure enforcement against non-members of the village. 227  
 
5.3.4 The CCA System in Vanuatu and CPRM and CBNRM Approaches theories 
 
When compared to Ostrom’s eight design principles, the legislation and undertaking of CCAs 
in Vanuatu is more than 80 percent compatible with these principles, as follows: 
1) Section 37 of the EPCA provides the process to define the boundaries of 
resources and areas. It does this by including all persons having rights and 
interests in any land that is to be included in the proposed community CCA, as 
well as other stakeholders in the CM regime of the CCAs that are established. 
This ensures the success of the CM regime. Furthermore, the process of 
discussing issues with community and interested parties before submitting the 
application is aimed at creating public participation in the decision-making 
processes for the CCA.   
  
2) It creates congruence between the resource environment and its governance 
structure or rules. Vanuatu has legal mechanisms to create balance between the 
resource environment and its governance structure. For example, the Director 
of the Environment Unit can assist the applicant to review and evaluate the 
nature of any proposed CCA.228 Then, the CCA Management Committee can 
create a management plan or rules compatible with the scientific data. 
Furthermore, Vanuatu has projects to promote fresh water aquaculture in order 
to substitute the marine resource, while applying rules to prohibit fishery and 
limit the size of marine resources in fishing.  
 
3) Public participation in CCA-related decision making is evidenced in the process 
of creating a management plan. The DPEC recommends applicants include all 
groups of people in the community, especially women and youth, in the 
                                                                
227 Macfadyen et al., above n 123, 29. 
228 EPCA 2004 S. 36 (a). 
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management plan making process.229 Furthermore, the applicants can ask for 
assistance from NGOs and the Biodiversity Officer.230  
 
4) CCA rules are monitored and enforced effectively by resource users. The rules 
govern resource users through a customary system. Although it is not clear how 
effectively the CCAs rules can stipulate to outsiders, the EPCA provides legal 
mechanisms to protect the rights of resource users from outsiders. 
 
5) Violators of CCA rules can be punished by customary law or through the 
offences provided in the EPCA. Each CCA can provide punishment and 
sanctions according to the offence. However, the punishment and sanctions are 
under the limitations of Section 41 of the EPCA.  
 
6) Each CCA can consider and settle disputes relating to natural resources 
among resource users in the CCA independently through custom. This makes 
it economical and easy for resource users to access the settlement process. 
However, disputes between the CCA and outsiders must be reported to police 
and presented in Court.  
7) Each CCA has been recognised by the EPCA (higher- level authority) .  This 
indicates that the power of the CCA management committee is recognised by 
the EPCA.  Therefore, the CCA can prohibit outsiders from fishing in the 
jurisdiction of the CCA.  This is similar to the sanctions process in the Village 
Fono system in Samoa. These facts are compatible with Ostrom’s principle that 
the rules of the community should be accepted by outside authorities [Higher-
level authorities recognise the right of the resource appropriators to self-govern].  
Without this acceptance and recognition by outside authorities, the CCA cannot 
enforce rules to outsiders and this may lead to the collapse of the regime.  
8) Each CCA can enact different rules to respond to what is being experienced in 
each area. This means that the rules can be enacted to in a way compatable with 
the physical conditions and situations in each area to ensure sustainably. 
 
 
 
                                                                
229 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, above n 220, 26-27. 
230 Ibid. 
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Table 22 Ostrom's 8 design principles and coastal fishery management in Vanuatu 
Ostrom’s 8 design principles for self-collective action Coastal fishery management   in 
Vanuatu 
1. The CPR has clearly-defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external 
unentitled parties). 
 
2. There is congruence between the resource environment and its governance 
structure or rules.  
 
3. Decisions are made through collective-choice arrangements that allow most 
resource appropriators to participate. 
 
4. Rules are enforced through effective monitoring by monitors who are part of 
or accountable to the appropriators. 
Partly; the Chief has no power to enforce 
Tabu to outsiders. They must request 
assistance from the police.  
5. Violators are punished with graduated sanctions.  
6. Conflicts and issues are addressed with low-cost and easy-to-access conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
 
7. Higher-level authorities    recognise    the    right    of    the    resource 
appropriators to self-govern. 
 
8. In the case of larger common -pool resources: rules are organised and enforced 
through Multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
 
Source Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) 
When the regime to manage fisheries in Vanuatu, in particular the CCA, is measured by the 
criteria proposed by Ramazotti, Vanuatu has a full legal framework to contain the interface 
between customary law and written law. The details are presented simply in Table 23: 
Table 23 Current situation of customary law recognition in Vanuatu 
Recognition of 
customary right 
Reconciliation between statutory right 
and customary right 
Dispute settlement process between 
customary right and statutory right 
Yes Yes Yes 
Source This table is adapted from the description of Marco Ramazzotti, 'Customary Water Rights and Contemporary Water 
Legislation' (2008) 76 FAO Legal Papers Online <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bb109e.pdf> 
Clearly, the rights of Ni-Vanuatu people to access to fish and marine coastal resources depends 
on the CMT recognised in the Constitution of Vanuatu.  
In terms of the reconciliation between statutory rights and customary rights, the CMT and the 
right to access fish of Ni-Vanuatu are recognised and have become statutory rights. Therefore, 
there is no conflict between statutory rights and customary rights in this regard. Furthermore, 
the EMCA provides the process of prior consultation between the Director, the land owners, 
and other interested parties before registering such land as a CCA.231 Hence, this can prevent 
and reconcile the interests between statutory rights and statutory rights.  
In terms of dispute settlement processes relating to customary land between customary rights 
and statutory rights (actually, statutory rights and statutory rights because the customary rights 
                                                                
231 EPCA [Vanuatu] S. 38.  
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are recognised in legislation), Vanuatu applies the dispute settlement mechanism provided in 
the Custom Land Management Act 2013. 
When measuring the CCA against Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law to promote CBNRM 
and CM, it is evident that the CCA regime is mostly compatible with the proposal of Lindsey. 
As mentioned earlier, the CCA in Vanuatu includes customary land tenure and the CMT 
already recognised in the Constitution through the Land Reform Act 1980 [CAP 123] and 
Custom Land Management Act 2013.  Furthermore, the CCAs are established on a voluntary 
basis for the landowner/community. The boundaries of the CCA are also demarcated under 
prior consultation between the Director, the landowner and other interested parties. Lastly, the 
dispute settlement mechanism is clearly provided.  The only weakness of the CCA is that the 
landowner or community cannot enforce natural resource utilisation rules independently with 
regard to outsiders, as can be accomplished in the Village Fono’s by-laws of Samoa. However, 
the landowner/s or the Chief can ask the police to arrest the rule violator. The details are 
provided in Table 24 below: 
Table 24 Lindsey’s proposal for reforming laws promoting CBNRM and CM and Vanuatu's situation 
Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law for promoting CBNRM and CM  Vanuatu’s situation 
C
er
ta
in
ty
 
Right must be clear.  
Right must be certainty and cannot be taken away or changed unilaterally 
and unfairly. 
 
Right should be ensured either in perpetuity or for a clearly defined period 
long enough for the benefits of participation to be fully realised.  
 
Rights must be enforceable against state or local government institutions.  
Rights must be exclusive. Partly 
The legal recognition of the holder of the rights.  
The clear authority of government entities that enter in to the agreement.  
The certainty of the subjects of the rights.  
The certainty and the boundary of the resources.  
Legal mechanism to protect of rights and to settle disputes relating to 
rights. 
 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 
Flexibility to decide what the objectives of management should be and 
rules in use. 
 
Flexibility to recognise the traditional and local institution.  
Flexibility to define the management groups and area of jurisdictions. 
 
 
Source Jonathan Lindsay, 'Designing legal space: law as an enabling tool in community-based management' (2000) 
When measuring the CCA against the legal proposals supporting fishery CM projects 
proposed by Macfadyen et al., the CCA regime is arguably the mostly compatible with the 
EPCA. 
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Table 25 Macfadyen et al.'s legal proposals supporting fishery co-management project and Vanuatu's situation 
Legal proposals supporting fishery co-management (CM) project by Macfadyen et al.232 Vanuatu’s 
situation 
Non-fisheries specific legislation should be considered for its support or hindrance to fisheries CM, as well as for 
its relationship to specific fisheries legislation (either in place or being developed) that is supportive of CM. 
 
A legal framework supportive of CM, and supported by stakeholders, is more likely when a wide range of 
stakeholders are involved in the process to develop legislation itself. 
 
CM initiatives should ideally ensure that fisheries legislation is supportive of them and of decentralisation of 
fisheries management before commencing. 
 
Fisheries legislation should contain dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with user conflicts, and to ensure that 
local rules/regulations do not conflict with national-level legislation and policy. 
 
Fisheries legislation should specify the extent to which local autonomy in developing management 
rules/legislation are accepted. 
 
National fisheries legislation should provide for a broad and flexible legislative framework that enables a choice 
over CM arrangements and rules, with detailed mechanisms set out in regulations that can be changed if necessary. 
 
National fisheries legislation should contain specific reference to CM or provide indirect support to key success 
factors that need legislative support. (Decentralisation, definition of boundary, use rights and community-based 
rules.) 
 
Fisheries legislation needs to ensure that the legal framework clearly states: 
• Roles and responsibilities under decentralisation policy/legislation; 
• How CM areas and CM partners are to be defined; 
• Security and enforceability of a right; 
• The ability and opportunity for rights holders to seek redress for violation of security and 
interests in the rights allocated; 
• The nature and extent of recognition of locally promulgated rules; 
• Rules for interaction between stakeholders; 
• Rules for interaction with the State, including the limits and conditions for State, intervention and protection of 
individuals against abuse of “local” power. 
 
Source Macfadyen, G., et al., ‘Policy and Legislative Frameworks for Co-Management’ (Workshop paper, Global Partnership 
for Responsible Fisheries (FishCode) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, APFIC Regional 
Workshop on “Mainstreaming” Fisheries Co-Management in Asia Pacific, 9–12 August 2005) 37 - 40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
232 Macfadyen et al., above n 123, 37-40. 
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5.4 Lessons learned from Samoa, Vanuatu and the recognition of Muang Fai customary 
law 
Table 26 Approaches, methods, strengths and weaknesses of customary law recognition in Samoa and Vanuatu 
Country 
 
Topic 
S
a
m
o
a
 
V
a
n
u
a
tu
 
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
 
a
ft
er
 2
0
1
5
 
Relating  
legislations 
Constitution of the Independent 
State of Samoa 1960 (Samoa) 
Village Fono Act 1990 (Samoa) 
Fishery Act 1988 (Samoa) 
 
Constitution of Vanuatu 1980 
Land Reform Act [Cap 123] 
(Vanuatu) 
Land Acquisition Act [Cap 215] 
(Vanuatu) 
Environment Management and 
Conservation Act 2002 [Cap 283] 
(Vanuatu) 
Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand,  
Civil and commercial 
code of Thailand,  
 
Penal code of Thailand, 
Definition of 
Customary law 
Not defined clearly in law Not defined clearly in law Not defined clearly in 
law 
Topics to recognise Land law 
Marine tenure  
Village council  
Land law 
Marine tenure 
Using civil cases when 
there is no written law.  
Approach to 
recognise 
customary law 
Constitutional recognition 
General incorporation 
Constitutional recognition 
General incorporation 
Limited Constitutional 
recognition 
Special process to 
recognise natural 
resource 
management 
customary law 
relating to CPRM 
Community-based approach 
Using Village Fono (traditional 
administrative structure) to 
manage natural resource 
Co management approach 
Community-based approach 
Declaring the Community 
Conservation Area CCA to 
manage natural resource 
Co management approach 
No 
Reasons for using  
customary law to 
manage natural 
resource 
Social structure 
Insufficient budget 
Ineffective of environmental law 
enforcement  
Lack officials to enforce the law 
Social structure 
Insufficient budget 
Ineffective of environmental law 
enforcement  
Unsuccessful attempt to follow 
by-laws model of Samoa  
Lack officials to enforce the law 
No official recognition 
Approach to 
include 
community/village 
Community demanding approach Voluntary-land owner/ community 
approach 
No 
Institutions Village Fono CCA committee No 
Tools for creating 
sustainable 
utilisation of 
natural resource 
and sustainable 
institution 
Fishery management plan/ 
faiga fa’avae (rules) or i’ugafono 
(decisions)233 
Capacity building programme 
Seeking alternative sources for 
food 
Focus on the livelihood 
development not only fish and 
marine resource management and 
conservation 
Problems and solution 
identification by the resource 
users with the assistances from 
the Fishery Division Research 
CCA plan 
Tabu with the assistance of police 
Capacity building programme 
Seeking alternative sources for 
food 
Focus on the livelihood 
development not only fish and 
marine resource management and 
conservation 
Technical and financial support by 
officials 
Review and monitoring of fishery 
management plan implementation 
No 
                                                                
233 National University of Samoa, Cultural factors continue to be a challenge for samoan women to become leaders (22 July 
2015) National University of Samoa <https://www.nus.edu.ws/s/index.php/87-nus/news-events/301-cultural-factors-continue-to-
be-a-challenge-for-samoan-women-to-become-leaders> 
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making by external researchers 
or experts 
Including all groups of 
population in village 
Technical support by officials 
Review and monitoring of 
fishery management plan 
implementation  
Wan Smolbag travelling theatre 
group 
Cooperate with NGOs  
 
Recognition the 
right to use 
resource 
Yes Yes No 
Define clear 
boundary of 
resource 
Yes Yes No 
Conciliation 
mechanism 
between customary 
rights & statutory 
rights 
Yes Yes Not clear 
Dispute settlement 
Mechanism 
between resource 
users in the same 
institution and 
between the 
institution member 
and the outsiders 
Yes Yes Not clear 
Strengths Strong village government to 
enforce the rules 
Special process to recognise 
Village rules (by-laws process) 
Effective monitoring by 
community/ users 
Special units in Samoa 
government organisation to 
support this programme and 
communities (Community 
Fisheries Support Section of the 
Fisheries Division of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fisheries and Meteorology) 
Clear policies support the Coastal 
fishery management by 
community 
Clear legal framework and legal 
issues to devolve power to 
Village Fono 
Special legislations support the 
activities of fishery management 
by community 
The Constitution as the foundation 
for decentralisation, land 
ownership (including marine area 
ownership) and custom 
perpetuates decentralisation and 
CM. 
Recognition or accommodation of 
traditional units of governance is 
also guaranteed under the 
Constitution. 
Traditional villages and leaders 
continue to be the basis for socio-
political organisation which 
contributes effective monitoring 
and enforcement of village based 
conservation and management 
measures. 
Clear policies support the Coastal 
fishery management by the 
community 
Special legislations support the 
activities of fishery management 
by community 
The rights of 
community to conserve 
and practice customs 
have been recognised in 
all Constitutions since 
1997, 2007, 2017 
 
Having practices or 
administrative 
regulation to integrate 
traditional water 
utilisation organisation 
into the  national water 
management system 
Weaknesses Conflicts between village 
perceptions of limited access to 
marine areas and the 
Constitutional provision for 
open-access.  
Overlap and conflict of mandates 
for resource conservation between 
government 
agencies responsible for fisheries 
and the environment, and between 
the decentralised government units 
and the villages. 
No legal recognition for village-
based management measures so as 
to ensure enforcement against non-
members of the village. 
No subordinate law to 
define how to recognise 
the customs of local 
community. 
The practices or 
administrative 
regulation can be 
changed according to 
the changes of policies 
and governments. 
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This chapter focused on the recognition of customary law in Samoa and Vanuatu.  The case 
studies of these countries offer valuable lessons about how to recognise Muang Fai as follows: 
In term of the method to recognise customary law, the strongest way to secure the rights of 
indigenous people or the customary rights of local people is to recognise them within the 
Constitution. This is because; 1) it is difficult to amend and 2) the indigenous people’s rights will 
be secured when they compete with other statutory rights. This can be seen in the constitutions 
of both Samoa and Vanuatu.234  In fact, the recognition of customary rights in constitution can 
be seen in both developed countries235 and the developing countries.236 However, it is not a 
good idea to recognise customary laws, by providing in the constitution, a process to enact a 
subordinate law later. This is because the subordinate law may never be enacted, or it may take 
a long time to enact the new law to recognise customary law, customary rights and customary 
institutions of native people. The failure to recognize community rights by 1997 Thailand’s 
constitution can be a good example for this case.237 It is worth to note here that the constitutions 
of Thailand have always been changed by the cycle of coup d'état (the average age of a 
constitution in Thailand is around 10 years). Although, the constitutional recognition is not the 
best way to secure customary rights of water users in Muang Fai system, it is better than doing 
nothing.  
 
Furthermore, the successful community-based NR management regimes in both Samoa and 
Vanuatu use the same approach. Those are devolutions of power to the local authority to govern 
the natural resources in the protected area. They also both have clear policies and legislations 
to recognise the coastal fishery management community and CCA.238 Thus, the recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law process need to have the clear policies, laws and regulations to 
devolve power to local institutions (Muang Fai institution/ WUOs) as well. It is also a good idea 
to provide in law that the customary rights of local people will prevail over statutory rights, 
especially, when local people acquire customary rights before the promulgation of statutory 
rights. It is the just rights of people in Muang Fai, according to the principle of Qui prior est 
tempore potior est jure (the right of the first taker), which are applied in Thailand’s legal 
system.239 Thus, water rights of people in the Muang Fai community must also be respected 
                                                                
234 See Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa 1960 (Samoa), the Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, Constitution 
(Recognition of Aboriginal People) Act 2004 Victoria, AUSTRALIA, Section 35(1) of Canada's Constitution Act 1982, 
235 See Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No. 31 (1986); 
  Marco Ramazzotti, 'Customary Water Rights and Contemporary Water Legislation' (FAO Legal Papers No 76, Food and 
Agriculture Organization,2008) ;   Dante Augusto Caponera, Principles of water law and administration: national and 
international, (Taylor & Francis, 2007) 54-55.  
236 For example, Argentina, Nigeria, Ecuador, Peru, Philipines. 
237 See the failure to recognize community rights in Thailand by the constitution of Thailand 1997 in 1 .2.2 c of Introduction 
Chapter  
238See topic 5.2.3 and 5.3.3 in this Chapter  
239 Sec.1322of the civil and commercial code of Thailand  
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and protected by Thai Water Laws. There must not be discrimination between people in Muang 
Fai and outsiders.240 Moreover, this thesis argues that the sustainable way to recognise Muang 
Fai is by the promulgation of new legislation to recognise Muang Fai customary law or for 
recognition of Muang Fai to be included in the new Water Act of Thailand. However, it should 
prioritise the devolution of power to the local community and allow local people to participate 
in the rule-crafting process. Furthermore, allowing the local community to enforce the rules of 
water and land utilisation is vital to guarantee the successful and effective recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law. Allowing the local community to enforce the rules of water and land 
utilisation means to delegate the power to apply rules of Muang Fai to outsiders who fall within 
its jurisdiction in order to govern the water utilisation and land use.  Without the power to apply 
and enforce Muang Fai rules to outsiders, the legislation to recognise Muang Fai will fail again 
as did the recognition of Muang Fai by the PIA during 1939-2015241 or the failure of Village 
fono in Samoa before village fono has an authority to punish the outsiders who violate the law 
of village fono.242  Remarkably, the managements of fisheries in both Samoa and Vanuatu are 
undertaken by many organisations. Although their roles sometimes overlap, their results are 
acceptable because all government organisations work under the same approach; that is, 
community-based marine resource management.243 This is a good sample to show that the 
successful community-based fishery managements and CCA need to have a coherent policies 
and law to support it. Furthermore, both Samoa and Vanuatu, the fishery divisions have special 
units244 to deal with community-based fishery management. Last but not least, the results from 
the various research studies, programmes, and projects are incorporated into the process to 
improve and develop policies, strategies and legislation. Furthermore, this is the focus of study 
by related organisations to improve their mission and legal instruments. Thus, it can be said 
that both use the adaptive governance for fisheries.245 Notably, both governments of Samoa 
and Vanuatu cooperate with NGOs to promote the sustainability and livelihood of 
communities. This contradicts with the position of government in Thailand to NGOs. 246 
Therefore, it has no doubt to say that the situations in both Samoa and Vanuatu is similar to the 
                                                                
“Section 1322. If a wild animal which is wounded and pursued by one person is caught by another person or 
falls dead on another person's land, the first person becomes its owner.” 
240 Normally, the farmers will be prohibited to grow rice during drought in order to save water for large city  < https://th-
th.facebook.com/biothai.net/photosสูบน ้ำท ำนำไม่ใช่อำชญำกรรมภำพข่ำวกองก ำลงัทหำรจ ำนวนมำกเดินทำงไปควบคุมมิใหช้ำวนำสูบ/
943938215644700/ > 
241 See 3.4.5 Common pool resource theory and Muang Fai water resource management customary law in Chapter 3 and  
Table 35 in Chapter 7 for the reasons why the recognition of Muang Fai system during 1939-1935 was a failure. 
242 See 5.2.3  of this chapter p.224 
243 See Samoa’s 5thNational Report 2014 (https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ws/ws-nr-05-en.pdf) and table 19 in this chapter. 
244 Regional Seminar on Community based Coastal Resource Management Project for Promotion of Grace of Sea in Coastal 
villages Phase 2 <https://fisheries-gos.gov.vu/docs/regional-seminars/Samoa%20-
Community%20Based%20Coastal%20Resource%20Management_10_2014.pdf> 
245 Jason Raubani et al, above n.201, 5. 
246  Techera, ‘Samoa Law custom and conservation’(2006) 10 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, 375; Jason 
Raubani et al., ‘Past Experiences and the Refinement of Vanuatu’s Model for Supporting Community-Based Fisheries 
Management’ SPC Traditional Marine Resource Management and Knowledge Information Bulletin #38 – June 2017, 5. 
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situation of water management in Thailand. That is the water management is undertaken by 
various organizations. Then, all of them should work together with the same approach under 
the coherent policies and laws. Furthermore, Thailand should have special unit to support 
promote and work with the local traditional institution and the researches relating to Muang 
Fai system and the community based water resource management or water user organization 
should be incorporated into the policies, strategies and working plan of water institutions in 
Thailand. Lastly, Thailand officials should change their attitude to NGOs and try to cooperate 
with NGOs for the benefits of Thai people.   
 
 
 In term of Public participation, all local people or groups of native people are included in the 
sustainable natural resources’ management processes in both Samoa and Vanuatu. Moreover, 
native people need to be included in the sustainable water resource management in both north 
and south countries according to the IWRM approach247 by recognising their customary rights 
to use water. Then, there is no doubt that farmers in the Muang Fai community and the Muang 
Fai community itself in Thailand should be counted and included in the process of water 
resource management under the community / farmers(water users)’s demand base as well as the 
successful natural resource management regimes in Samoa248 and Vanuatu.249  
 
In term of the tools to create co-management between state officials and local people, both 
successful regimes in Samoa and Vanuatu use the community’s fishery management plan or 
CCA plan to provide the framework to enact rules for the management and conservation of 
fisheries.250 At the same time, the community’s fishery management plan and CCA plan are 
also used as an agreement that provides the roles of the government and community/ landowner 
in the CM. Then, the recognition customary law, customary rights and customary institutions 
of Muang Fai system can be accomplished by CM with an agreement approach through water 
management plan as well. Hence, the new legal framework to recognize Muang Fai needs to 
provide the power to local officials to make a co-management agreement in form of water 
management plan with local water users too.  However, it needs to be concerned that both 
regimes in Samoa and Vanuatu do not focus only on the fishery governance; they also focus 
                                                                
247Global water partnership, The role of customary law in IWRM (A2.03) (22 Feb 2017) Global water partnership 
<http://www.gwp.org/en/learn/iwrm-toolbox/The-Enabling-Environment/Legal-
Framework/The_role_of_customary_law_in_iwrm/>  
248 See Michael King and Ueta Faasili, ‘Village Fisheries Management and Community-Owned Marine Protected Areas in 
Samoa’ April-June (1998) Naga : The ICLARM Quarterly 34 
<https://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/Countries/Samoa/153.pdf> ; Department of Environmental Protection and 
Conservation, above n 220, 10. 
249 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, above n 220, 26-27. 
250 See Michael King and Ueta Faasili, 'Community Based Management of Subsistence Fisheries in Samoa' (1999) 6(2) 
Fisheries Management and Ecology 133 and Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, above n 220, 26-27. 
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on the livelihood of local people in the community/protected area.251 Hence, the regime to 
recognise Muang Fai customary law should not focus on only water management, but it also 
needs to focus on the livelihood development for local people. Furthermore, both successful 
natural resource management regimes in Samoa and Vanuatu do not only limit the catch of 
fish, they also seek alternatives to fish as a food source for people.252 Thus, the regime to 
recognise Muang Fai customary law should not point out to only allocate water equitably and 
settle dispute quickly, it should look for the additional water harvesting and the economic crop 
that use less water to cultivate too.  Another remarkable point is that the extension fishery 
programme in Samoa has a process to ensure continuing community commitment. Whereas, 
the EMCA of Vanuatu has the provision to stop technical and financial support to the 
landowner of a CCA, including cancelling the registration of the CCA, if it does not implement 
the protection and management plan in the agreed time. 253  Then, the process to ensure 
continuing community commitment,  the monitor method and the power of the officer to stop 
technical and financial assistances should be provided in the new law to recognise Muang Fai 
customary law. Moreover, the 8 designed principles by Ostrom and other CPR scholars’ opinion 
relating to water management need to be incorporated in law to recognize Muang Fai 
community as well as law to recognize village fono in Samoa and CCA in Vanuatu. 
 
 
In relation to the dispute settlement of Muang Fai system, a lesson, how to apply customary 
law to native people who come from different clan and customary laws in Vanuatu by of Senior 
Magistrate Lunabek254 shed a light to apply customary law to the water conflict of people in 
Muang Fai community.  As mentioned in Chapter 2255 and in the next chapter, Thailand has no 
clear law to settle water dispute, especially water dispute between water users in Muang Fai 
community and the outsiders who use different laws to claim their water rights. The conflict 
can be seen in three scenarios as follows:  
 
Model A - conflict among people from different Muang Fai communities and use different to 
allocate water.  (For example, Mr. A form Nam Phung Muang Fai community has water conflict 
with Mr. B from Nam Khan Muang Fai community. Both Nam Phung Muang Fai community 
and Nam Khan Muang Fai community are on the same river.) 
                                                                
251King et.al, above n 73, 13 ; Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry , Fisheries and Biosecurity Vanuatu national 
fishery sector policy 2016-2031,7. 
252 King et.al, above n 73, 13; Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries and Biosecurity Vanuatu national 
fishery sector policy 2016-2031,15. 
253 Department of Environmental Protection and Conservation, above n 220, 23. 
254 See topic 5.3.2 The legal system in Vanuatu (Waiwo V. Waiwo)  236. 
255 See the problem of Muang Fai in Chapter 2 Topic 2.2.3 Muang Fai norm before and after the recognition by ARCWD 
1934 and PIA 1939  
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Model B - conflict between villager/s in Muang Fai community and people outside Muang Fai 
community. (For example, Mr. A form Nam Phung Muang Fai community has water conflict 
with Mr. B who are in the city at the lower of the river and use water from the same river.) 
Model C - conflict between villager/s in Muang Fai community and people outside Muang Fai 
community in the area of such Muang Fai community. (For example, Mr. A form Nam Phung 
Muang Fai community has a water conflict with Mr. B who owns the land close to a dike of 
Nam Phung Muang Fai community and a river, but Mr. B is not a member of Nam Phung 
Muang Fai community.) 
 
This thesis agrees with the opinion of Senior Magistrate Lunabek that the law applied to 
conflict should be the common basis justice, translated into rules.256 However, the Thailand 
Court has no power to discover such rules to apply in the case of a conflict. So, this thesis argues 
that the Court should have access to legislation to apply the law to the water and land conflicts 
in the three scenarios mentioned above. In the case of Model A and B, the law to apply to these 
cases is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of water. This also underpins SD 
because it supports the principle of intra-generational equity.  In the case of Model C, the law 
to apply for this case should be related to the eight design principles to govern common 
property. According to Ostrom’s principles, members of institutions that govern common 
property should be considered as a priority. The members of these institutions should have the 
power to exclude outside people from utilising water in Muang Fai community in order to 
manage water sustainably.  
 
Another lesson learned from Vanuatu for incorporating traditional knowledge and practices 
into conservation and management plans of each CCA to preserve traditional knowledge and 
practices, can be applied to Muang Fai customary law in Thailand. The situation of traditional 
knowledge in Vanuatu is like the situation of Muang Fai custom in Thailand. While traditional 
knowledge in Vanuatu is under threat from modernisation, urbanisation, reduced respect for 
Chiefs, and the imposition of western laws,257 Muang Fai custom, traditional knowledge and 
practices relating to Muang Fai are also threatened by modernisation, urbanisation, labour 
migration and the command and control approach according to western law style, with the later 
showing little understanding of the social context in the Muang Fai community. Hence, 
preserving traditional knowledge and cultural practices by combining them with sustainability 
principles management, strategies, and putting them in conservation and management plans 
should be accomplished in Thailand. Additionally, the process to select and embed traditional 
knowledge into conservation and management plans is to follow the knowledge management 
criteria for sustainable customary law argued by Gachenga.258 
                                                                
256 Jenifer Corin and Don Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law (Routledge, 2007) 61. 
257 Techera, above n 17, 297. 
258 Gachenga, above n 77, 235. 
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Last but not least, lessons relating to social structures of Samoa and Vanuatu which have the 
effect to the method to conserve natural resource sustainably. Although both Western Samoa 
and Vanuatu are located in the Pacific Ocean, each is located in a different region. Therefore, 
the social structures of both countries are different. As such, the legal approach to implementing 
environmental law to manage fisheries must be different too.259 Both regimes for community 
fishery management in Samoa and Vanuatu reflect the claim in CPRM theory (also mentioned 
by Ostrom) that there is no ‘blueprint thinking’ or ‘Panacea’ to govern common pool resources.260 
This is evidenced in the fact that the by-law model in Samoa did not work in the context of 
Vanuatu. Then, Vanuatu needed to seek and develop a model to govern fishery that fits its 
context.  As well as the recognition of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions, 
the lessons learned from Samoa and Vanuatu might not work well in Thailand if the lessons 
are applied without concern for the social context of Thailand.261 Moreover, social structure in 
each Muang Fai system  is diverse and it needs to use different tools and measures to recognise 
it.  
 
 5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the recognition of customary law, especially the customary law to 
manage natural resources in Samoa and Vanuatu. The purpose was to study whether and how 
natural resource management and customary law can be recognised in reality.  By studying this 
topic, the author found that the present-day roots of the problems stem back to colonisation, 
unequal treatment and discrimination in the past. The current major problems are related to 
Indigenous land rights, Indigenous peoples’ rights to utilise natural resources, and public 
participation in the decision-making processes for environmental management and 
conservation. Customary law recognition can resolve these problems and leave room for 
Indigenous people to enjoy their rights as humans with a focus on well-being. This chapter 
addressed the third research question and indicated that the most progressive and firm present-
day measure to recognise the customary law of people is to recognise and accommodate 
peoples’ customary rights and customary institutions in the Constitution, as well as the 
decentralisation of power to local people for natural resource management. Furthermore, the 
legislation needs to be supported with policies. The ongoing research programme and the 
incorporation of research results into policy development, legislative development and 
organisational development are other factors which contribute to the successful story of both 
Samoa and Vanuatu.  
                                                                
259 See topic 5.2.1 and Topic5.3.1 in this chapter 
260 Ostrom, above n 203, 6-8.  
261 Cordonnery, above n 160, 239-240. 
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Although Thailand does not accept that she has Indigenous people in her country, she accepts 
that people in some areas still apply customary law in real life. The lessons learned from both 
Samoa and Vanuatu in this chapter are very useful to apply to the recognition of natural 
resource management in Thailand. The application of lessons learned from this chapter is 
discussed further in the next chapter along with suggested recommendations.
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Chapter six - Sustainable development, water management and customary law:  
laws and practice in Thailand 
 
Chapter 2 provided an explanation of Muang Fai customary law, Muang Fai institutions, the 
historical background of Muang Fai, and the problems and challenges of Muang Fai in the 
present day. Chapter 3 presented the theoretical context of sustainable development (SD) and 
the present challenges of SD. Also provided was an overview of sustainable water management, 
an outline of the legal obligations of each state relating to SD, and the theoretical context 
relating to common pools of resource management (CPRM) relating to water. Chapter 4 
discovered how the principle of SD is applied in domestic water management and how states 
treated and recognised customary law, particularly, the customary law within natural resource 
management. Chapter 5 then explored examples of successful customary law recognitions for 
fishery managements in Samoa and Vanuatu.  
This chapter aims to address the fourth and the fifth research questions; namely, whether the 
Thai legal system recognises Muang Fai customary law in water resource management and role 
customary law plays in the Thai legal system for natural resource management applicable to 
water.  As such, there are four research components to be examined: 1) how the principle of SD 
is recognised and implemented within Thailand’s legal system, particularly in terms of water 
management; 2) what water laws and water management systems are applied in present-day 
Thailand; 3) the extent to which the water laws in Thailand are compatible with the global water 
management perspectives as provided in the previous chapter; and 4) how customary law has 
been treated by States in present-day Thailand. This chapter aims to identify how to incorporate 
and harmonise Muang Fai customary laws into the water management laws of Thailand. 
This chapter starts with the principle of sustainability in Thailand’s legal system (6.1). It then 
presents the current situation with regards to water laws and water management in Thailand 
(6.2). The focus then shifts to a discussion of the extent to which the present water management 
system for irrigation in Thailand is compatible with global water management perspectives 
(6.3). The status of Muang Fai in the current water laws in Thailand is also analysed (6.4). In 
addition, the treatment of customary law by the various States in Thailand is examined (6.5). 
Lastly, the legal principles supporting customary law recognition in Thailand are analysed (6.6).  
6.1 The principles of sustainable development in Thailand’s legal system 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the official declaration regarding SD was made in the Brundtland 
Report in 1987. From this starting point, it has spread around the world. The Thailand 
government’s awareness of SD  was first evidenced in the national report to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in1992.1 Statements relating to the 
                                                                
1 Thailand National Report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, June 1992). 
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depletion of the environment as a result of economic development have also been incorporated 
into the National Economic and Social Development Plans: (NESDP) since 1987.2   However, 
the concept of SD was not incorporated into the NESDP until 1997.3 
In terms of law, the principle of sustainability was first mentioned in Section 79 of the 
Constitution of Thailand (B.E. 2540) in 1997. It was mentioned again in Section 78 of Thailand’s 
Constitution (B.E. 2550) in 2007. Even after the coup d’état on 22 May 2014, the interim 
Constitution promulgated on 22 July 2014 mentioned the term ‘Sustainable Development’ in 
Article 27.  
In the present Constitution of Thailand, promulgated on 6 April 2017,SD has been mentioned 
five times in Sections 564, 655, 726, 2507and 257.8 Hence, there is no doubt that Thailand has 
SD as one of its goals. Furthermore, legal principles such as ‘polluter pays’ and ‘treatment of the 
environment as an economic good’, which fall under the principle of SD, are incorporated into 
Thailand’s legal system 9 , especially in relation to the water laws and water policies in 
Thailand.10 This is evidenced in Table 27 below: 
Table 27 Sustainable development obligation relating to water in Thailand's legal system  
Sustainable development legal 
obligations 
Provision in Thailand’s law 
Duty to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resources 
Constitution of  Thailand11 
Equity and eradication poverty Constitution of  Thailand12 
Common but different responsibility Constitution of  Thailand13 
Precautionary principle Constitution of Thailand14, 
Enhancement and Conservation of 
Environmental Quality Act 
 
Public participation Constitution of Thailand,15 Rule of the 
Office of Prime Minister on Public 
                                                                
2 National Economic and social development board of Thailand, The Sixth national economic and social development plan 
1987-1991, National Economic and social development board of Thailand 
<http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3781> 
3 National Economic and social development board of Thailand, The Eighth national economic and social development plan 
1997-2001, National Economic and social development board of Thailand 
<http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3783><http://www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3783>. 
4 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 56. (See Appendix) 
5 Ibid, S 65. (See Appendix)   
6 Ibid, S 72. (See Appendix) 
7 Ibid, S 250. (See Appendix) 
8 Ibid, S 257. (See Appendix) 
9 Pollution control department (Thailand), Document for public consultation to draft Environmental code law (เอกสำรประกอบกำร
ประชุมสมัมนำเพ่ือรับฟังควำมคิดเห็นโครงกำรรวบรวมบทบญัญติักฎหมำยดำ้นส่ิงแวดลอ้มเพ่ือจดัท ำประมวลกฎหมำยส่ิงแวดลอ้ม)  2012, 2-14 
<http://infofile.pcd.go.th/law/Environmental%20law55_1.pdf?CFID=2542240&CFTOKEN=78832869 > 
10 Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535 [Thailand]. 
11 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 57. (See Appendix) 
12 Ibid, S 55, 56, 75. (See Appendix) 
13 Ibid, S 50. (See Appendix) 
14 Ibid, S 58. (See Appendix) 
15 Ibid, S 43,58, 59. (See Appendix) 
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Consultation 2005,16 Royal decree on 
the principles and methods for good 
administration,17 the Official 
Information Act 1997,18 Town and City 
Planning Act,19 Land Consolidation for 
Agricultural Purpose Act20  
Good governance Constitution of  Thailand,21  Royal 
decree on the principles and methods 
for the good administration,22  Rule of 
the office of Prime Minister on creation 
of the good administrative system23  
Integration and inter-relationship among 
social, economic and environmental 
aspects 
Constitution of  Thailand24 
  
6.2 Water laws and water management in Thailand 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the present-day scope of national water laws in Thailand includes 
legislation, customary laws and water laws, which all emerged from preceding policies.25 
Therefore, this section examines water policies, legislation, and customary laws relating to 
water in Thailand. The aim of the examination is to determine whether water laws in Thailand 
are compatible with the principles of sustainable water management and the trends of national 
level water laws as indicated in Chapter 3. It also aims to explore how Muang Fai customary 
law can be incorporated into the current water laws of Thailand.      
6.2.1 Present water policies in Thailand 
Water policy is an important part of sustainable water management. This is because water 
policy harnesses and directs the trends in water management.  Water policies in Thailand are 
reflected in many documents such as the Constitution of Thailand (directive principle of 
fundamental state), speeches of the Prime Minister, national water plans, and the strategic plans 
of government water institutions in Thailand. The details of Thailand’s water policies contained 
in each of these documents are outlined in the following section. 
A. The present Constitution of Thailand 
As mentioned earlier, Thailand’s policy relating to water is provided in Section 72(4) of the 
present Constitution of Thailand 2017. It indicates that Thailand follows the principle of 
                                                                
16 Rule of the Office of Prime Minister on Public Consultation 2005 [Thailand].  
17 Royal decree on the principles and methods for the good administration [Thailand].  
18 The Official Information Act 1997, [Thailand]. 
19 Town and City Planning Act [Thailand]. 
20 Land Consolidation for Agricultural Purpose Act[Thailand]. 
21 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 65, 76. (See Appendix) 
22 Rule of the Office of Prime Minister on Public Consultation 2005 [Thailand].  
23 Rule of the office of Prime Minister on creation of the good administrative system (Thailand) 
http://www.publicreport.opm.go.th/uploading/uploadfile/files/2007101132856regulation3.pdf 
24 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 75. (See Appendix) 
25 Dante Augusto Caponera, Principles of Water Law and Administration: National and International (Taylor & Francis, 
2007) 136. 
266 
 
sustainable water management, with the duty of the State to provide both quality water and a 
sufficient quantity of water to people and other sectors.26  
In terms of the recognition of Muang Fai water resource management customary law, 
Thailand’s Constitution provides in Section 43 that a person and community shall have a right 
to conserve, revive or promote wisdoms…, tradition and good customs.27 Furthermore, a person 
and community have the right to manage, maintain and utilise natural resources, environment 
and biodiversity in a balanced and sustainable manner… .28  The State also has a duty to 
conserve, revive or promote wisdoms …, tradition and good customs … .29 Muang Fai customary 
law is regarded as a form of SD customary law and is compatible with the principle of 
sustainable water management and the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable 
Development (DSWSD) as indicated in Chapter 1. Therefore, local people and communities that 
apply Muang Fai customary law have the right to do so under the Constitution. Thailand’s 
government also has a duty to conserve, revive and promote Muang Fai customary law in order 
to manage water resources.  
B. National Economic and Social Development Plan  
The National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) is the guideline for developing 
Thailand. Itis prepared by the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board. 
The first NESDP was declared in 1959 and is reviewed every five years. The present-day 
NESDP is the 12th plan and covers the period from 2017-2021. This plan illustrates the current 
problems of Thailand for the term of plan, as well as provides an assessment of past 
developments and guidelines for developments in the future. 
The 12th NESDP focuses on water management as one of the goals in the fourth strategic area 
relating to eco-friendly, economic growth for SD. The goal is to create water stability and 
effective management of both surface water and ground water by optimising water resource 
management. The measures proposed to optimise water management include accelerating the 
approval of the Water Bill, accelerating the creation of an integrated water resource 
management (IWRM) plan for all 25 major river basins, promoting the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) process, improving the efficiency of water storage, and increasing water 
efficiency and water allocation in the manufacturing sector.  
The current NESDP does not mention the present-day legal problems relating to water 
management, or the weaknesses in the legal mechanisms to manage natural resources as 
                                                                
26The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 72. (See Appendix) 
27 Ibid, S 43. (See Appendix)  
28 Ibid. (See Appendix) 
29 Ibid, S 57. (see Appendix) 
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mentioned in the 11th NESDP.30 Both the 11th and 12th NESDPs contain compelling evidence  
that Thailand’s government realises there are institutional problems relating to water 
management and challenges for Thailand in terms of water management. Moreover, Thailand 
is trying to include public participation in the water management process. 
In terms of the recognition of Muang Fai customary law, the NESDP does not mention 
customary water rights and how to deal with them.  Furthermore, the NESDP remains silent 
about the legal issues relating to the water rights of people. However, it is clear that Thailand 
has tried to follow the principle of sustainable water management by emphasising in the policy 
the need to strengthen local water utilisation organisations and to encourage local people in the 
area to participate in water management. This can be seen clearly in the 11th NESDP.31 
C. Speech of Prime Minister to the National Assembly32 33 
                                                                
30 …The present management of natural resources and the environment is still not effective. It lacks the integration 
between the relevant authorities. Therefore, mechanisms to manage natural resources and the environment are 
piece meal. 
The data base management systems relating to natural resources and environment are not yet covers all aspects. They 
do not link to economic and social data. Legislations relating to resource management are scatter in the sectoral 
approaches. They lack effectiveness in implementation, fairness and transparency.  
It also has the problem of corruption and injustice in the allocation of natural resources such as land, water and forests.  
These cause distrust in the natural resource management by state. The huge impacts of development project by 
state and private companies come from 1) the gap of the environmental conservation policy and economic 
development policy, 2) the weakness of environmental management, and 3) the weakness of law enforcement… 
31 The 11th National Economic and Social Development Plan (Thailand) 104-109 
<http://www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/news/plan/p11/plan11.pdf>. 
… 5.1.6 To accelerate the integrate water resource management process in order to promote the food security, energy security 
and to mitigate the impacts from flood and drought problems.  The mission should be done by the reformation of water law, 
strengthening the river basin organization and local water organization, making integrated water resource management plan 
in each river basin by including river-source forest management, water demands management, sewage management and link 
all above to the local development plan in both provincial level and group of provinces level for the effectiveness of water 
management.  … The economic activities and ecosystems conservation should be done by the participation of local 
administrative authority, local communities and local educational institution in the planning and managing process by using 
local wisdom, local culture with the water management technology… 
32 The Constitution of Thailand 2007, S 75 and 76.  
 Section 75 Provisions in this Chapter express the intention to the State to legislate and direct policies in 
administering the State affairs. 
In the policy statement  to  the  National  Assembly,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  which  is to assume the 
administration  of  the  State  affairs,  shall  expressly  declare  to  the National Assembly what activities  are  
to  carry  out  in  what  associated  timeframe  in order  to  administrating  the  State  affairs  in  compliance  
with  the  Directive  Principles of  Fundamental  State  Policies,  and  shall  prepare  a  report  of  performance  
progress, including problems and obstacles encountered before the National Assembly once a year. 
Section 76 The Council of Ministers shall prepare the national administration plan to present the measures 
and details of direction of official performances for each year of administration, which   shall   be   in   
compliance   with   the   Directive   Principles   of Fundamental State Policies. 
In administration of the State affairs, the Council of Ministers shall prepare a plan to enact the necessary 
legislation for the execution of the administration policy and program. 
33 The 2014 Interim Constitution of Thailand did not provide the duty for the Council of Ministers to declare their plan to the 
National Assembly. However, the government of General Prayuth declare their plan to the National Assembly.  
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Thailand’s Prime Minister traditionaly delivers a speech to Parliament on inauguration day after 
being sworn in as a government. The speech addresses the policies the government intends to 
focus on during its term in office. Even though the speech includes the general policies related 
to the development of Thailand, integrated water management policy has been emphasised in 
both the speeches of Ms. Yingrak Shinnawatra (ex-Prime Minister)34 and General Prayutha 
Chanocha (the current Prime Minister).35 In fact, both speeches reflect the major annual water 
problems experienced in Thailand; that is, water shortage and flood. In addition, both leaders 
emphasised the need for integrated water institution management and to extend the irrigated 
land by building more reservoirs. However, the speech of General Prayutha expressed more 
obvious concerns about the need for water institution reformation through the integration of 
water plans and the fiscal management of all water institutions. It should be noted here that this 
speech did not mention public participation; whereas, the speech of Ms. Yingluck placed 
emphasis on this aspect.    
In short, the Thai government arguably realises there are problems relating to water 
management, the lack of connection among water institutions in particular, and understands 
the need to unify and to integrate all water institutions in water resource management processes.  
However, the water rights of people and customary rights were not acknowledged in the 
speeches of past and present Prime Ministers of Thailand. 
D. National Strategic plan for water resource management (2016-2026)  
The national strategic plan for water resource management was developed by the National 
Committee on Water Policy and Management. Thailand’s cabinet approved this strategic plan 
on 7 May 2015.36 The plan plays a vital role in water management processes by setting the 
frameworks for water management. The plan for water management consists of six strategies: 
1) to manage water for consumption and utilisation purposes; 2) to create stability of water 
supply for productive sectors (agriculture and industry); 3) to manage floods and water disasters; 
4) to manage the quality of water; 5) to conserve the river-source forest and prevent the soil 
erosion; and 6) the strategy for water management. 
In terms of the strategy for water management, this consists of 10 sub-strategies including: the 
strategy to reform water laws and water institutions, the strategy to support and strengthen 
water user organisations (WUOs), domestic and international basin organisation, and the 
strategy for public relations and public participation. However, neither water management 
customary law nor traditional water institutions have been included in the water management 
                                                                
34 Yingrak Shinnawart, ‘Thailand government’s policies’ (Speech delivered at the parliament House of Thailand, 23 Aug 
2011)<http://prachinburi.go.th/newsinfo/m7/yingrak.pdf> 13. 
35 Prayutha Chanocha, ‘Thailand government’s policies’ (Speech delivered at the National Assembly of Thailand, 12 Sep 
2014)<http://www.opdc.go.th/Law/File_download/law19957.pdf> 10, 16. 
36  Cabinet’s Resolution on National Strategic plan for water resource management B.E. 2558 - 2569    (Thailand) 
<http://www.cabinet.soc.go.th/soc/Program2-3.jsp?top_serl=99313540>. 
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process, even though the people in northern Thailand still use Muang Fai water management 
customary law. This plan does not mention the plan for traditional water management in 
Thailand, or other such plans.     
E. Strategic plan of Royal Irrigation Department 
The Royal Irrigation Department (RID)37  formulated annual strategic plans in 2008 38  and 
2009.39 Since then, the RID has delivered strategic plans every four or five years. The first plan 
was a four-year strategic plan from 2010-2013.40 The present RID strategic plan covers the 
period 2017-2021.41  In the present strategic plan, the RID vision is to be “a leading organization 
in water resource development and integrated water management with the present irrigated 
area ranked in the world top ten”.42 RID has four missions: 1) to develop water resources and 
to increase the irrigated areas according their potential and natural balance; 2) to manage 
water allocation in an equitable and sustainable manner; 3) to prevent and mitigate water 
hazards; and  4) to encourage people’s participation in water resource management and 
development.43 It is clearly evident that the principle of sustainability is incorporated into the 
mission statements of the RID, in particular the principles of intra-generational equality and 
public participation.  
 
Between 2017 and 2021, the RID set 10 goals with the following five strategies to facilitate 
their achievement: 
  1) To develop water resources and increase the irrigation area according to the basin based 
approach; 
 2) To enhance the effectiveness of integrated water management according to the purpose of 
water use;  
3) To create protection from water damage and develop support for water-related relief; 
4) To empower the people by creating networks and involving people from all sectors in the 
networking, collaboration and participation around irrigation management; and 
                                                                
37  Royal irrigation Department (Thailand), Strategic plan and Comittment (Nov 2016) Royal irrigation Department 
<http://www.rid.go.th/2009/index.php?option=com_content&view=Article&id=87&Itemid=19>. 
38 Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Royal irrigation department’s strategic plan 2009 (Dec2013) Royal Irrigation 
Department <http://www.rid.go.th/2009/_data/docs/planerid/strategy51.pdf>. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Royal irrigation department’s strategic plan 2010-2013 (Oct 2014) Royal Irrigation 
<http://www.rid.go.th/2009/_data/docs/planerid/strategy53-56.pdf>. 
41 Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Royal irrigation department’s strategic plan 2013-21016 (Nov 2016) Royal Irrigation 
<http://www.rid.go.th/2009/_data/docs/RID%20Plan56-59.pdf>. 
42 Ibid, 8. 
43 Ibid. 
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5) To turn RID into an intelligent organisation. 
It is worth to noting here that the principles of sustainable water management are also 
incorporated into the strategic issues of the RID, in particular the principle of public 
participation in IWRM.  However, the RID plan remains silent on the water rights of water users 
and customary water rights. It does not mention the processes required to reconcile customary 
water rights with the statutory water rights. Additionally, it does not mention dispute settlement 
processes to resolve conflicts between customary water users and statutory water users.  
Notably, the RID goal to include local people in public participation is based on allowing 
people access to decision making in water management processes.44 In this sense, including 
Muang Fai communities in the water management processes is not contradictory with RID 
policy. On the contrary, including Muang Fai communities in water decision-making process 
should help the RID achieve its goals more quickly and effectively. However, one issue worth 
mentioning is that the RID is biased against NGOs. One of the RID strategies is to provide 
information to people before the NGOs start a project.45    
 
F. Strategic plan of the Department of Water Resources  
The present strategic plan of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) is for 2016-2021, 
following revision of the previous plan in June 2015. The goals of the strategic plan are to: 1) 
have IWRM mechanisms with public participation across all sectors; 2) conserve, develop, 
improve and restore water resources and wet lands by seeking water resource costs and adding 
capacity to store and release water for maintaining  the natural balance of ecosystems; and 3) 
to develop, install and empower the warning system for natural disasters and in response to 
global climate change.46 It is also clearly evident that the principle of sustainability is partly 
incorporated into the strategic plan of the DWR, especially the principle of intra-generational 
equality and public participation. In terms of intra-generational equality, the DWR attempts to 
extend the number of villages which have water for households47 and the number of water 
resources which are improved and developed for storing water.48 This  is evidenced in the key 
performance indicators (KPIs) relating to the conservation and development of water resources. 
Moreover, it should be observed here that the KPIs relating to public participation ensure that 
people, officers, river-basin commissioners, and scholars take part in the working group for 
drafting legislation relating to the river basin and WUOs.49 However, it is not clear as to what 
                                                                
44 Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Royal irrigation department’s strategic plan (2012-2016) 
45 Royal irrigation Department (Thailand), Strategic plan and Comittment (Nov 2016) Royal irrigation Department 
<http://www.rid.go.th/2009/index.php?option=com_content&view=Article&id=87&Itemid=19>. 
46  Department of Water Resource (Thailand), Strategic & Operation plan 2016-2021 (Revised 2015) 
<http://www.dwr.go.th/contents/images/text_editor/files/plandwr2015.pdf>  38. 
47 Ibid, 87. 
48 Ibid, 81. 
49 Ibid, 64. 
271 
 
criteria are applied to select people to participate in the working group. In terms of Muang Fai 
customary law, the DWR strategic plan does not mention Muang Fai customary law and 
traditional water institutions. Therefore, it can be said that the DWR plan, like the RID plan, 
remains silent about customary water rights and the processes to reconcile the statutory water 
rights and customary water rights. It also does not mention the dispute settlement processes 
between water users according to customary water rights and water users according to statutory 
water rights.    
 
G. Strategic plan of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants50 
The present strategic plan of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants (DNPWP) 
is for 2016-2021. The plan does not directly relate to water management, but focuses on the 
conservation of forests at the river source and biodiversity.51 The principles of SD such as 
public participation, biodiversity and conservation appear in this plan. The plan does not 
however mention Muang Fai, but it indicates that the participation of local people is a KPI for 
the success of the DNPWP.52 
In short, it is clear that water management is a critical issue in Thailand.  All levels of Thai 
government pay attention to it. The ultimate goal of water management in Thailand is to achieve 
sustainability. The IWRM approach is accepted in Thailand’s water policies by both major 
water institutions in Thailand (RID and DWR).  Furthermore, Thailand is clearly trying to 
establish a permit system for water in its water policies through the enactment of the Water Act 
(see further details on this Act in the next topic). Moreover, Thailand is attempting to extend its 
irrigation area and to prepare itself for climate change. The nexus between water for food and 
energy is considered in the water policy of Thailand.  However, it is not clear whether Thailand 
accepts the principle of environmental flow and the customary water rights of people, even 
though policies relating to water in Thailand mention sustainability and public participation. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the water policy of Thailand is compatible with global 
perspectives on how to manage water. However, Thailand’s water policy does not mention how 
to deal with the water rights of people and water customary law / water customary rights and 
traditional water institutions. Moreover, the approaches to public participation in the water 
policies focus on ways to make people understand what the government is doing more than 
listening to what the people think about current practices.  Lastly, the strategic plans of the 
                                                                
50Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants (Thailand), Summary of the Workshop on Strategic plan of the Department 
of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants 2016-2021 (1 January 2018)  
<http://portal.dnp.go.th/DNP/FileSystem/download?uuid=fb04efb2-00d5-47cb-b846-cf7662d5482c.pdf>. 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants (Thailand) , Map of the Strategic plan for the Department of National Parks, 
Wildlife and Plants 2016-2021 (1 January 2018) <http://portal.dnp.go.th/DNP/FileSystem/download?uuid=ba0768fa-6604-43bd-
81d7-bf01525fbe5e.pdf>. 
51 Ibid, 3-4. 
52 Ibid, 4. 
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major water institutions in Thailand (RID and DWR) do not include a plan for managing the 
forests at the river source because these forests are under the regulation of the DNPWP. 
6.2.2 Present water laws in Thailand 
 
Water resources in Thailand are governed by various laws and many organisations.53 Chaiyuth 
argues that there are more than 48 laws relating to water resources in Thailand. Most of the 
water laws were drafted and enacted after the Second World War to support water development 
projects.54 Chaiyuth further indicates that matters of water ownership are not clarified in law. 
However, it can be assumed from the interpretation of laws relating to water such as Articles 
1304 and 1305 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand that the water belongs to the 
State.55 On the contrary, the ownership of public water resources provided in the Water Bill, is 
res communis.56 The water laws in Thailand appear in many pieces of legislation from  the 
Constitution to customary law. However, this thesis focuses on water laws relating to 
agricultural use, especially the laws for managing surface water quantity and quality. This is to 
address the research question around the present water laws in Thailand and how Muang Fai 
customary laws relate to these existing water laws. The details of each of the present water laws 
are as follows. 
A. Constitution of Thailand 
The present Constitution of Thailand57 includes the Stateduty to provide both quality water and 
a sufficient quantity of water to people and other sectors. This means that Thailand must 
manage water sustainably and equitably to respond to the actual needs of the present generation 
without compromising the needs of future generations under the natural law of the limitation 
of natural resources.   
B. The 85th Order of National Council for Peace and Order58 
The 85th National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) came into effect as law on 3 July 2015. 
It was enacted by the group who led the coup of Thailand. Its intent was to establish a national 
committee for determining water policy and how water was to be managed. This order 
effectively repealed three regulations of the Prime Minister’s Office relating to water 
management: 1) the regulation  on the strategies for reconstruction and creation of future 
development (2011); 2) the regulation on the strategies to create water management systems 
                                                                
53 D.J. Bandaragoda, 2006 Status of Institutional Reforms for Integrating Water Resource Management in Asia: Indicate from 
Policy Review in Five Countries <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/91908/2/WOR108.pdf>  34. 
54Chaiyuth Suksri, Thailand’s water law (12 December 2014)<http://tnmckc.org/upload/document/bdp/2/2.7/Legal/Thailand/T-
waterresources-law-DEDP-JICA.pdf> 2. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Section 7 of Water Bill <http://division.dwr.go.th/waterboard/prb.pdf>. 
57 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, Section 72  
58 The 85th Order of National Council for Peace and Order (Thailand) 
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(2011); and 3) the regulation on water management during national floods.59 In Thailand, the 
orders of the group who led the coup are deemed as law at the level of an Act.60 The 85th Order 
provides the national committee with the power to make water policy, to manage water, to 
make decisions on water related issues and to give commands to the related water institutions 
of Thailand.  This resolves the institutional problems relating to water management in Thailand.  
It should be observed here that water management is treated as a national agenda under the 
present military government of Thailand.61 Moreover, the Prime Minister of Thailand attends 
all meetings of the national water resources committee.62 Therefore, the Prime Minister can 
command the water institutions in Thailand to follow the national water resources plan 
effectively. This may shed light on the role of the civilian government of Thailand in the future 
regarding how to achieve successful water management.  
 
C. State Irrigation Act 2485 B.E.63 
The State Irrigation Act (SIA is a major law providing measures to manage water in the 
irrigation waterways. The measures provided in the SIA are: 1) to zone the irrigation canal;64 2) 
to access and use land for the purpose of irrigation with prior notification;65 3) the collection of 
water fees;66 4) the approval of water users to make a small ditch across the land close to the 
irrigation waterways;67 5) the expropriation of land for irrigation project purposes;68 and 6) the 
powers of the irrigation officer to maintain the irrigation waterways.69  The SIA consists of 42 
sections in five chapters; namely, introduction, construction, maintenance, penalties and the 
charge, control and execution of the Act. The SIA has been amended four times to ensure it is 
up to date. These versions are respectively known as the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th State Irrigation Acts.   
 
Some principles contained in the DSWSD appear in the SIA.  Such principles include the 
principle to treat water as an economic goods by collecting water fees.70  However other 
principles contained in the DSWSD such as integrated water resources management, public 
                                                                
59 The 85th order of National Council for Peace and Order (Thailand), Sec 1.  
60  See the judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand before Thailand has a Constitutional Court.  Court decision number 
45/2496, 1662/2505, 1234/2523 and 6411/2534.   
61  The 85th Order of National Council for Peace and Order (Thailand) 
<http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_ncpo/ncpo-order85-2557.pdf>. 
62 Prime Minister of Thailand are the chairman of the national water resource committee. 
63 State Irrigation Act B.E. 2485 (Thailand) 
64 Ibid, Chapter 1 
65 Ibid, Chapter 2. 
66 Ibid, Sec.  8. 
67 Ibid, Sec.9 
68 Ibid, Chapter 2. 
69 Ibid, Chapter 3. 
70 Ibid, Sec. 8. 
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participation, and the role of women do not appear in the SIA. They do, however, appear in 
other legislation such as the National Park Act, the Wildlife Sanctuary Act and the Forest Act. 
It is worth noting that the provision relating to water fees in the SIA is not as a result of the 
DSWSD. In fact, the provision relating to water fees in Thailand was first enacted in 1942. 
However, the collection of water fees from the agricultural sector only commenced in 2017.71 
In terms of Muang Fai, the SIA does not relate to the Muang Fai irrigation system directly 
because it controls only the State-run irrigation projects. In cases where the lands of Muang Fai 
communities are close to irrigation canals however, the SIA may relate to the Muang Fai 
irrigation system.   
D. Land Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes 72 
The Land Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes was introduced in 1974. In 2015, the 
new Land Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes replaced the 1974 Act. The Land 
Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes 2015 provides new measures with which to 
manage water and a water management system for agricultural purposes.73 This means that the 
government, with the cooperation of land owners, can set up water management systems for 
agricultural purposes in areas which are not part of the land consolidation area. Officers from 
the Office of Land Consolidation for Agriculture Purposes or other people can now ask for 
water management systems for agricultural purposes to be established in these areas.74  
In terms of water management, land consolidation results in a more effective irrigation system 
because all farmers can access water equally. Both the farmers whose land is close to the 
irrigation canal and the farmers whose land is located far from the irrigation canal can receive 
water from irrigation canals. However, the land consolidation process cannot be accomplished 
without the consent of the land owners.75 
E. National Park Act76, Wild Life Reservation and Protection Act B.E. 2535 (1992) 77, 
National Reserved Forest Act78 
These Acts relate to the forest at the river source and do not relate to Muang Fai directly. All 
of them combine to create the protected area and prohibit certain activities within the protected 
area. 
                                                                
71  See the example for the Ministery’s regulation for collecting water fee in the irrigation zone from 
<http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2558/A/105/3.PDF>. 
72 Land Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes 2015 (Thailand) <http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/law2/%a815/%a815-20-
2558-a0001.pdf>. 
73 Land Consolidation Act for Agricultural Purposes B.E. 2558 (Thailand), Sec. 18 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, Sec. 37.   
76 National Park Act B.E. 2505(Thailand).  
77 Wildlife_Preservation_and_Protection_Act_ B.E._2535(Thailand). 
78 National Reserve Forest Act B.E. 2507 (Thailand). 
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F. Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 253579   
The Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality (ECNEQ) Act was 
enacted on the 29 March 199280 and is the major law to manage the quality of the environment 
in Thailand.  The Act establishes the National Environmental Board (NEB), the Environment 
Fund (EF), the Pollution Control Committee (PCC) and the Environmental Impact Assessment 
process (EIA). In terms of water management, Section 32 of the ECNEQ assigns the NEB with 
the mandate to set up water quality standards81 for the water in: 1) rivers, canals, swamps, 
marshes, lakes, reservoirs and other public inland water sources according to their use 
classifications in each river basin or water catchment; 2) coastal and estuarine water areas; and 
3) groundwater quality standards. Moreover, Sections 35-36 of the ECNEQ provide that the 
Minister shall, with the approval of the NEB, formulate an action plan called the Environmental 
Quality Management Plan (EQMP) for the implementation of the national policy. This plan 
considers the enhancement and conservation of air, water and environment quality in the areas 
concerned. The EQMP binds all  government agencies to take action to ensure the plan 
isimplemented effectively.82 In addition, Section 69 of the ECNEQ provides that the Minister 
has the power to identify sources of pollution to be controlled in regard to the discharge of 
waste-water or waste into public water sources. This included the environment outside the limits 
of such pollution sources to conforms with the effluent standards.83 
Although the EQMP does not relate to Muang Fai management directly, it does relate to the 
water quality in Muang Fai communities. 
G. Regulations and Orders of Prime Minister Office 
Thailand does not have a Water Act or Water Code Law. Therefore, Thailand’s former 
government enacted executive orders in the form of Regulations of the Prime Minister’s Office 
(RPMO) or Orders of the Prime Minister (OPMO) to manage water. The weakness of executive 
orders is that they bind only the State officers, and not the general public, to comply with their 
requirements.84 
                                                                
79 Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E._2535 (Thailand) 
80 Pollution control Department (Thailand), Information about Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental 
Quality Act (17 Jan 2015) Pollution control Department <http://www.pcd.go.th/info_serv/en_reg_envi.html>. 
81 Pollution control Department (Thailand), Information about Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental 
Quality Act (17 Jan 2015) Pollution control Department <http://www.pcd.go.th/info_serv/en_reg_envi_32.html>.  
82 Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535(Thailand), S 35. 
83 Ibid, S 69.  
84 See TNAMCOT, “Disclose Water bill for the integrity of water management เปิดร่ำง พ.ร.บ.ทรัพยำกรน ้ำ เพ่ือเอกภำพกำรบริหำรจดักำรน ้ำ)” 
Youtube video (2 Mar 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7GyXZ0oN8HY>; National Broadcasting Services of 
Thailand, ‘Water Resource Act for sustainable water management’by (Mr. Orasart Apaipong, Deputy director of Department 
of Water Resource of Thailand), Clear cut, Obviously clear (เคลียร์คดั ชดัเจน... พ.ร.บ. น ้ำ เพ่ือกำรบริหำรจดักำรน ้ำอยำ่งย ัง่ยืน), Youtube video (Jul 
14, 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLQDxPAVNBg&feature=youtu.be> and Thai PBS, “Pick up news matters: the 
water bill and future of Thai farmers (พลิกปมข่ำว : พ.ร.บ.ทรัพยำกรน ้ำกบัอนำคตเกษตรกรไทย)” Youtube video (9 August 2017) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9461LY3PDI> 
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G.1 The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management 2007 
This RPMO played a vital role in water management in Thaliand between 2007 and 2014. This 
is because the National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) was formed to comply with the 
2007 RPMO. The NWRC mission is to develop a national water resources management plan 
and to coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector in water 
management.85 The River Basin Committee and Sub River Basin Committee were also formed 
to comply with the 2007 RPMO.86 87 The last chapter in the 2007 RPMO assigns responsibility 
to the local administrative authorities to collect data and register all the small size reservoirs in 
their jurisdiction.88  However, the status of the 2007 RPMO remains unclear after the 2014 
coup d’état in Thailand. The military government declared the OPMO no. 185/ 2558 B.E. (2015) 
to establish a new NWRC with new powers (see further details below). 
In terms of Muang Fai customary law, the 2007 RPMO does not mention Muang Fai customary 
law directly, even in the Article regarding the River Basin Committee and Sub River Basin 
Committee. It should be observed here that the local people or the representatives of the 
traditional water institutions were not included in the decision-making process for water 
management in Thailand under this RPMO. 
G.2 The regulation of the Prime Minister’s Office on water management during national 
floods 89 
(Note: Some parts of this PMO were abolished by the 85th NCPO.) 
Under the RPMO on water management during the national floods of 2012, the National Water 
Policy and Flood Committee, Water Management and Flood Committee and the Office of 
National Water Policy and Floods (ONWPF) were formed. However, the National Water Policy 
and Flood Committee and the Water Management and Flood Committee were abolished by the 
85th NCPO. At this time, the ONWPF was also changed from one unit under the Secretariat of 
the Prime Minister to be one unit under the office of the Permanent Secretary in the Prime 
Minister’s Office.90 Moreover, the duties of the ONWPF were changed to only coordinate with 
the government agencies to collect climate data and water data in river basins and dams or 
reservoirs, for analysis and to report to the NCPO.91 
                                                                
85 Regulations of Prime Minister Office on Water Management 2007 (Thailand), Sec. 6. 
86 Ibid, Sec. 12.  
87 Ibid, Sec. 15. 
88 Ibid, Sec. 17. 
88 Ibid, Chapter 3 Sec. 17.     
89 The Regulations of Prime Minister Office on water management and flooding management B.E.  2555 (Thailand) 
90 The 85th Order of National Council for Peace and Order (Thailand). 
91 Ibid. 
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G3. Order of the Prime Minister Office no. 185/ 2558 B.E. (2015) to appoint the National 
Water Resources Committee 
The Order of the Prime Minister Office (OPMO) no. 185/ 2558 B.E. is a key piece of legislation 
relating to water management following the appointment of the National Water Resources 
Committee (NWRC) in 2014.  The responsibilities and powers of the NWRC, according to the 
OPMO no. 185/ 2558 B.E, are broader than the responsibilities and powers of the NWRC 
according to the RPMO on Water Resource Management 2007.  
It should be observed here that Section 1.22 of the OPMO 185/2015 allows the Prime Minister 
to appoint up to six people as representatives from the Basin Committee and the WUOs to be 
on the committee under the NCWR. This is an improvement on the previous NCWR which 
consisted of the officers only. However, the order to appoint representatives from the Basin 
Committee and the WUOs has not yet been enacted. 
H. Water rights in Thailand 
As mentioned above, the water laws in Thailand do not appear in a single Act and to date the 
Water Bill has not been approved by Parliament. There is not yet a law to provide the water 
rights system.92  However, Thai law does follow the riparian doctrine.93 Using water from the 
river requires a license from the Department of Harbors to ensure safety and to ensure that 
transportation will not be blocked. 94  However, this license is not for water management 
purposes and has no special procedural provision to settle conflicts between the various water 
rights holders. Furthermore, it is not clear whether water rights can be separated from land 
rights. In addition, no legislation defines clearly the right to use water.95 Hence, the right to use 
water indicated by Caponera96 is not provided for in Thai water law because only laws can 
create real rights.97  There are six rights according to the Civil and Commercial Code of 
Thailand, but these do not include the right to use water. The six identified rights are the rights 
to ownership,98 possession,99 servitude,100 habitation,101 superficies,102 usufruct103 and charge 
                                                                
92 Netherlands Embassy in Bangkok, Factsheet Water Sector in Thailand, (Fact sheet, Netherlands Embassy in Bangkok, May 
2016)<https://www.netherlandsworldwide.nl/documents/publications/2016/05/18/factsheet-water-sector-in-thailand>    
93 The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, S 1355, ‘The owner of a piece of land along or through which a water-way 
passes is not entitled to draw more water than necessary for his reasonable needs to the prejudice of any other piece of land on 
the water-way’ 
94  The 63 th ministerial rules for construction in water way B.E.2537 (Thailand)  
95 Even the new water bill does not mention and separate the right to use water and the ownership of water. See Water Bill 
(Thailand), approved by the Council of State number 1427/2558  <http://division.dwr.go.th/waterboard/prb.pdf>. 
96 Caponera, above n 25, 139.  
97 Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, Sec. 1298. 
98 Ibid, S 1308-1366.  
99 Ibid, S 1367-1386. 
100 Ibid, S 1387-1401. 
101 Ibid, S 1402-1409. 
102 Ibid, S 1410-1416. 
103 Ibid, S 1417-1428. 
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on immoveable property.104 Of these, the one closest to the right to use water according to 
Caponera’s description is the ‘usufruct’ right according to Thailand’s Civil and Commercial 
Code.  
I. New Water Bill105 
Thailand has since 2000 been in the process of drafting a new Water Bill, but it remains 
unfinished. NGOs have consistently opposed the formulation of a Water Bill, arguing that it 
will result in the deterioration of the rights of local water users in water management, create 
conflicts of interest in the allocation of water, and that there has been a lack of public 
participation in the drafting of water laws.106 
Although nothing can guarantee that the Water Bill is promulgated as the Water Act, it is worth 
analysing the existing Water Bill of Thailand to explore whether it can resolve the existing 
water problems, and to what extent it can be adjusted to incorporate Muang Fai customary law. 
The Water Bill referred to in this thesis is the Bill which was approved by the Council of the 
State of Thailand in 2015.107 The Bill consists of 100 sections divided into 10 chapters: 1) public 
water resources; 2) water rights; 3) water resource management organisations; 4)water 
allocation; 5) droughts and floods; 6) the conservation and development of public water 
resources; 7) the officials; 8) civil responsibility for causing damage to public water resources; 
9) punishment; and  10) provisional causes.108  
An examination of the Bill reveals that Thailand follows the IWRM approach to the 
management of water and supports the use of WUOs to increase public participation. 
Furthermore, Thailand is attempting to establish a water rights system. This is clear because the 
Water Bill has provisions in the 3rd chapter in relation to water rights, a national water resource 
commission,109 the river basin commission110 and WUOs.111  
As mentioned earlier, Muang Fai customs and Muang Fai institutions continue to operate as 
modern WUOs. In this light, the Water Bill takes into consideration the role of WUOs, which 
in turn may suggest that the new law supports the recognition of Muang Fai.  To explore this 
                                                                
104 Ibid, S 1429-1434. 
105 The Water Bill has passed the general assembly of Thailand with a majority vote on 4 October 2018. It has been 
promulgated and published as the Water Resource Act B.E.2561 (2018) in Thailand’s Gazette Vol 135, Section 112 Kor on 28 
December 2018 after this thesis had been submitted to the School of law. 
106 Seub Foundation, Water bill of Thailand (Oct 2015) Seub Foundation 
<http://www.seub.or.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=Article&id=1377:seubnews&catid=5:2009-10-07-10-58-
20&Itemid=14>. 
107 See Water Bill (Thailand), approved by the Council of State number 1427/2558 <http://www.dwr.go.th/news/2/news-2-0-
55101.html>. 
108 Ibid. 
109  Ibid, S 9-23.  
110 Ibid, S 24-36.  
111  Ibid, S 37-38. 
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question, the three issues outlined by Marco Ramazzotti and identified in Chapter 3 are used 
to analyse the Water Bill of Thailand.  The issues are: i) the recognition of customary law; ii) 
statutory mechanisms to reconcile customary water rights and practices with statutory rights; 
and iii) statutory and judicial mechanisms to settle disputes between customary water rights 
holders. 
 
The first point to consider is the recognition of customary water rights. Water rights appear in 
Chapter 2, Sections 7-8, of the Water Bill as follows: 
Section 7 - Public water resource belonging to the public. A person has right to use 
or store water as much as it is beneficial to his or her activities in his land but not 
causing the nuisance or damages to the others who may use such water, unless this 
act or ministerial rule, declaration or regulation enacted according to this act or 
other legislation provides differently. 
Section 8 - the owner or the possessor of the land, which has a fountain or is close 
to a watercourse naturally no matter if it is surface water or ground water, has the 
right to use or store water as much as it is beneficial to the land but not causing the 
nuisance or damages to the others. 
As above, there is no mention of the water rights of the community or the customary water 
rights associated with the concept of water rights in the Muang Fai community.     
However, the Water Bill provides two sections on WUOs which could lay the platform for 
recognising Muang Fai customary water rights and for incorporating the Muang Fai community 
into the water management process. For example: 
Section 37 - A person who uses water in the same area and river basin has a 
right to unify and register as a water user organization for the mutual benefits 
in relation to the utilization, development, management, maintenance, 
restoration and conservation of water resources among the members of water 
user organization         
Objective, power and activities of water user organization, including rules, 
process and the establishment of water user organization shall be enacted by 
the ministerial rule. 
 
 Section 38 - The ministerial rule according to section 37 can provide the 
different rules for the establishment, missions, authorities and duties of water 
user organization in each river basin by giving consideration to the various 
of hydrological, geographical, and ecological situations, cultures, customs 
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and folk ways of local people in water utilization and the management 
aspects.      
The ministerial rule according paragraph shall pass the public hearing 
process before the promulgation.’     
   
As evidenced in these sections of the Water Bill, although it does not mention customary water 
rights and customary water institutions, it allows the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment to enact the ministerial rules in relation to the rules of establishment, missions, 
activities and powers of WUOs. This is done by focusing on the hydrological, geographical, 
ecological situation, culture, custom and folk way of local people in water utilization and the 
management aspect of each area. Hence, it may be argued that the Bill is flexible and can be 
used as a method to recognise Muang Fai customary law and customary institutions. In this 
way, the Water Bill of Thailand has provisions relating to the reconciliation between the 
registration of Muang Fai communities as WUOs and the water management process.  
Additionally, as a WUO the Muang Fai community can gain access to the dispute settlement 
processes according to Section 34 of the Water Bill.112 However, a problem may occur if all 
farmers in the Muang Fai community choose to follow customary law without registering as a 
WUO. In this case, they might not have access to the reconciliation and dispute settlement 
processes. Lastly, the Water Bill has been drafted for more than two years and has not yet 
passed the Parliament. Hence, as yet it is not law. 
 
Table 28 Water Bill of Thailand and the recognition of customary law in 2017 
Water Bill of Thailand 
Issues of concern to the State as proposed by Marco Ramazzotti 
Recognition of water 
customary right 
Statutory mechanisms to reconcile 
customary water rights and practices with 
statutory rights 
Statutory and judicial mechanisms to 
settle disputes between customary 
water rights 
Not mentioned Not clear Partly 
     
Furthermore, Section 39 provides the following:  
Use of Public Water Resources has three types. 
(1) The first type of water utilization from public water resources are for 
livelihood, household consumption, agriculture or animal husbandry; household 
industry and the use of small amounts of water. 
                                                                
112 Water Bill (Thailand), S 34   
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(2) Secondary type of water utilization from public water resources are for 
agriculture or animal husbandry, for commercial purposes, industry, tourism, 
hydroelectric power generation, water supply and other businesses. 
(3) Third type of water utilization from public water resources are for large 
enterprises which use large amounts of water, or it might cause a significant inter-
basin impact or water utilization which covers a wide area. 
Details of each type of water utilization (1), (2) and (3) shall be prescribed in the 
Ministerial Regulations’ 
Thus, it is not clear whether water utilisation by Muang Fai communities require a license 
according to Section 39. This is because the second and the third forms of water utilisation 
require licenses according to Sections 41 and 42.113   
If water utilisation by Muang Fai communities does not require them to have a license, it needs 
to be asked how irrigation officials will have the necessary data relating to the water demands 
of each Muang Fai community to plan water management for the whole basin. However, if 
water utilisation by the Muang Fai community requires a license, how will farmers in Muang 
Fai communities pay for the costs of implementing the water management plan according to 
Section 44 of the Water Bill? 
Furthermore, if water utilisation by Muang Fai communities does not require a license, how 
can the customary water rights of Muang Fai communities be guaranteed?  Additionally, if the 
water utilisation of Muang Fai communities does not require a license, what is the dispute 
settlement process for conflicts between the customary water rights of Muang Fai communities 
and statutory water rights? This thesis argues that those drafting the Water Bill in Thailand 
should concern themselves with issues relating to the interface between customary law and 
statutory law, as indicated by Ramazzotti. The Water Bill should include legal measures to 
recognise customary rights, mechanisms to reconcile customary water rights and practices with 
statutory rights, and processes to settle disputes between customary water rights and practices 
with statutory rights. This thesis further recommends that all Muang Fai communities should 
be recorded and enlisted to collect data necessary for developing a sustainable water plan.   
However, the WUOs established according to these ministerial rules might not be able to 
resolve existing problems and challenges of the Muang Fai community effectively. This is 
because the Water Bill does not recognise:   
1) WUOs as a legal entity. Such organisations have no rights to present a case to the Court 
or to speak to officials on its own behalf.    
2) the head or director of the WUO as the representative to petition officials or the Court 
on behalf of the WUO. 
                                                                
113 Ibid. S 41 and 42. 
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3) the power of the WUO to enforce the rules of each WUOto outsiders in its jurisdiction. 
This is a big problem and has led to the failure of the People’s Irrigation Act (PIA) in the 
past. 
4) the tax burden of WUOs. This might lead to taxation problems in the future, if the Water 
Bill does not provide a provision about the tax burden of theWUO. In fact, the water 
supplier for agriculture is a service which needs to be taxed as mentioned in Chapter 3.   
5) the auditing and the regulation of the WUOs by the government. 
 
In addition, the Bill does not provide details of the water rights of the community and the 
dispute settlement processes relating to conflicts over water rights. 
 
J. Customary law 
Water management customary law is another norm which governs water management in 
Thailand, particularly in remote areas in the north where Muang Fai customary water rights are 
the norm as mentioned in Chapter 2. Thailand has traditionally accepted the customary water 
laws and customary water institutions, particularly the Muang Fai community, as demonstrated 
through the PIA 1939.114 However, the customary water rights of local people were not defined 
in the PIA. Additionally, the PIA was abolished in 2015. Thailand’s current legal system does 
not recognise customary water rights and customary water institutions. Furthermore, statutory 
mechanisms to reconcile customary water rights and practices with statutory rights, as indicated 
by Ramazzotti, are not provided clearly in the water law of Thailand. Neither are statutory and 
judicial mechanisms to settle disputes between customary water rights and statutory rights. The 
farmers who follow Muang Fai customary law always settle their disputes with the outsiders 
by submitting their petition to the chief of the district.115 However, it is not clear what farmers 
should do if the chief of the district cannot settle a dispute. Some evidence indicates that the 
water conflict between farmers in Muang Fai communities and outsiders can lead to violence.116  
Given these considerations, the situation in Thailand relating to customary water rights can be 
represented simply in Table 29 below: 
                                                                
114 The People’s Irrigation Act 1939 (Thailand). S 11-29.   
115 Modern water war: When the investors join hand with State to steal water from farmers in Mae Ai   (11, July 2005) 
<https://prachatai.com/journal/2005/07/4799> and Farmers in Mae Wang River Basin protested, accused elephant camp for 
water conflict and asked Internal Security Operations Command to destroy 15 weirs. (7 Mar 2017) 
<http://www2.manager.co.th/QOL/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9600000023523> 
116  Pornpilai Lertwicha, Supachai Methin and Nonthachai Namdhep, Muang-Fai: The Water Resource and the Human 
Resource Managements on the Geographical and Cultural Base (Tarnpanya Press, Chiang Mai, 2009). 
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Table 29 Water customary law in present-day water law of Thailand 
Issues that should be of concern to the State as proposed by Marco Ramazzotti 
Recognition of water 
customary right 
Statutory mechanisms to reconcile 
customary water rights and practices with 
statutory rights 
Statutory and judicial mechanisms to 
settle disputes between customary 
water rights 
No No Partly 
   
In the case of water rights within Muang Fai communities, all water within the Muang Fai 
community  belongs to the community (the ownership of water belongs to the community) until 
water is allocated and delivered to each paddy field according to the customary law. 117 
However, Thailand’s legislation does not accept such principles of customary law. It should be 
observed here that the management of water in Muang Fai is similar to the management of the 
co-ownership of property according to the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand.118 This is 
because the management of water is done under the rules accepted by all water users in the 
Muang Fai community.119 120 Moreover, each farmer can sell their rights to use water to other 
farmers.121 The application of this water market concept has emerged in local villages of 
Thailand according to customary law, but has not yet been recognised in legislation. 
This is quite anomalous and different from global water management principles. The global 
trends in water management try to incorporate all kinds of water management norms to govern 
the management of water effectively in terms of both water quantity and water quality. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that Thailand should recognise and incorporate into its water 
management system the relevant water management customary law to govern water 
management equitably and sustainably.  
K. Water and Human Rights law in Thailand122 
Thailand is a signatory to many human rights treaties, many of which provide the right to access 
water and sanitation. Such treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention 
on the Rights of Child, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                                
117 Patcharin Bualoi, Diversity of and Debates on Water Management: A Case Study of Water User Groups at Fai Wang Hai, 
Chiang Dao Sub-District, Chiang Dao, Chiang Mai Province, (Master of Art [Social development] Thesis, University of Chiang 
Mai University, 2006). 
118 Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, S 1356-1366.  
119 Ibid, S 1358. 
120 Lertwicha et al., above n 116, 82. 
121 Ibid, 77. 
122 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Thailand: Striking contrasts in access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation - UN expert urges establishment of independent water and sanitation regulator (23 June2018) United 
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner < 
http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12975&LangID=E > 
and<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12976&LangID=E>. 
284 
 
Discrimination. Thailand has also voted in favour at the United Nations on the Declaration of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  This 
implies that Thailand agrees with and accepts the human right of access to water. Therefore, 
Thailand’s government has the obligation to provide quality, available, accessible and 
affordable water to all people for domestic and sanitary purposes.  However, the water law in 
Thailand does not mention or define the right to access to water clearly. Only the 1997 and 2017 
Constitutions of Thailand provide that it is the duty of the State to supply sufficient water to 
farmers and other sectors.123 
With regard to the situation in Thailand, the United Nation’s special rappoteur on the right to 
access water reported that ‘Thailand does not have a comprehensive water law. The draft of 
Water Act has been under discussion since 1992’. Moreover, the priority of water for 
consumption over other water uses is not provided clearly in the draft of the Water Act.124 With 
unsafe water practices, including inappropriate management of human faeces and a lack of 
hygiene practices, the number of diarrhoea cases increased between 2000 and 2009. Only 40 
percent of municipal water and 20 percent of water provided by sub-district authorities is 
safe.125  Water pollution is worsening due to faecal coli, large scale industry, mining, and 
agricultural projects. A review of EIAs was undertaken recently by the relevant Ministers but 
contained insufficient data about water quality and did not include the prior examination of 
water bodies. Licenses continue to be granted. In addition, there is a disconnect between laws, 
regulations and actual implementation. There is no independent monitoring of the water and 
sanitation service providers to ensure that they comply with the human rights provisions.126 
In terms of Muang Fai customary law, it cannot be said that Muang Fai customary law supports 
the rights of people to access water in accordance to their human rights. This is because water 
management in customary law is for gardening and cultivation in agricultural work, not for 
domestic use. Moreover, there is no clear evidence to indicate that water from Muang Fai links 
to the ground water which people use for domestic purposes. It should be observed here that 
Muang Fai customary would likely be supported by the Thailand government if there was clear 
evidence that Muang Fai customary law supported people to access water for domestic and 
sanitary purposes. 
In short, it can be said that Thailand has no law to recognise or reconcile both customary water 
rights and statutory water rights, although some Muang Fai communities have been 
                                                                
123  The Constitution of Thailand, Art. 72, ‘The State should take actions relating to land, water resources and energy as 
follows… 4) to provide quality water resources which are sufficient for consumption by the people, including for agriculture, 
industry and other activities. 
124 Press Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation Ms . 
Catarina de Albuquerque Mission to Thailand 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12976&LangID=E 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
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incorporated into the water management processes unofficially as a water user group (see 4.3). 
Lastly, Thailand has no obvious and specific legislation for the settlement of water disputes 
between customary water rights and statutory water rights holders. 
6.2.3 Present water institutions in Thailand 
  
Water management in Thailand is currently undertaken by organisations established according 
to a sectoral water user approach (irrigation, hydroelectric, household, industry). Moreover, 
because many organisations are involved in the water management processes, a complex water 
management structure is created.127  This complex structure causes conflict amongst the water 
agencies as to how the water should be managed. An example is the conflicts to take place 
among water agencies in relation to the floodwater forecasting during the flood disaster in 
Thailand in 2011.128 The Thai government became aware of the problems and tried to reform 
this institutional structure as far back as 2005 by proposing the Water Resources Bill. However, 
political turmoil stopped the reformation process. In this thesis, only water institutions relating 
to agriculture are explored. This is because of their links to Muang Fai customary norms.         
A. The National Committee to Make Water Policy and to Manage Water (NCMWP & 
MW)   
The National Committee to Make Water Policy and to Manage Water NCWP&MW) was 
established in the 85th NCPO. The aim was to ensure the effectiveness of the water management 
processes and to prevent and mitigate disaster brought on by droughts and floods. The important 
powers of the committee are as follows: 
1) To make policies and water management plans that can prevent and properly respond tor 
floods, droughts and water quality problems for the unity and integration of national water 
resources management; 
2) To propose plans, projects and measures relating to IWRM to the NCPO for consideration 
and approval; 
3) To support public participation in and to promote public understanding of national water 
resources management; and 
4) To integrate decision making relating to water resources management by issuing a 
command to government organisations in terms of water management and to cooperate 
with the national committee to prevent and mitigate public disasters during disaster 
periods.129 
 
                                                                
127  Kunthanakulwong, Sucharit, Water resources: the need to manage (20 June 2017) Senate of Thailand 
<http://www.senate.go.th/w3c/senate/pictures/comm/1829/water-02.pdf>. 
128 Tsuruyo Funatsu, ‘Organizational Reformation of Water Resources Management After “the 2011 Thailand Floods”’ (2015) 
<http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Report/2014/pdf/C42_ch7.pdf>. 
129 85th Order of National Council for Peace and Order (Thailand) 
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The fourth power of the committee reflects the attempt by the Thailand government to resolve 
the problem of institutional conflict by assigning power to the NCWP&MW to issue 
commands to other water institutions.  
The strategic plan for water management (2016-2026) has now come to an end. However, the 
NCMWP&WM still has a duty to supervise the implementation of the strategic plan for water 
management (2016-2026) and for supporting the mission of the National Committee on Water 
Resources.130 
There are a number of similarities and differences between the NCMWP&WM and the 
NCWR. Namely: 
1) The NCMWP&WM has the power to issue commands to other water agencies to 
implement a plan or to do something; whereas NCWR has no such power; 
2) The NCMWP&WM has clear power to support public participation and promote good 
understanding relating to water resources management; 
3) The NCWR has different components and has no soldiers on the committee. 
Mostcommittee’s members in the NCWR are permanent government officials; and 
4) Both the NCMWP&WM and the NCWR have the power to develop policies and plans. 
The NCMWP&WM consists of high-level soldiers, high-level civil servants and 
representatives of the professional organisations as follows: 
                                                                
130 Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board of 2015 (Jan 2016) Deaprtment of water 
resources <http://www.dwr.go.th/waterboard/National_Water_Resources_Board/2558/1-58.pdf> 5. 
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Table 30 Elements of the National Committee to Make Water Policy and to Manage Water 
Soldier Civil Servant Professional organisations 
- Gen. Chatchai Sarikulya 
- Lt-Gen.Supakorn 
Saguanchartsornkrai 
- Director of Civil Affair 
- Chief of  Engineer Department 
- Secretary of National Economic and 
Social Development Board 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Interior 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperative 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Transport 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Natural resources and 
Environment 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Information and Communication 
Technology 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Science and Technology 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Energy 
- Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Industry 
- Secretary of Council of State 
- Secretary of the Royal Development 
Project Board  
- Director of Bureau of the Budget 
- Secretary of Research Council of 
Thailand 
- Director of National Statistical 
Office 
- Governor of Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration 
-  Director of Hydro and Agro 
Informatics Institute 
- Director General of Royal Irrigation 
Department 
- Director General of Department of 
Water Resources 
- Director General of Department of 
Public Works and Town & Country 
Planning 
- Director General of Department of 
Marine 
- Chairman of the Engineering 
Institute of Thailand 
 
 
It should be noted here that: 1) the Chairman of the Committee is a soldier who has no 
knowledge of water management; 2) all Committee members are permanent government 
officials; and 3) representatives of NGOs, the private sector, WUOs, and the local people 
connected to water management are not represented in the committee, even though one of the 
powers of the Committee is to promote public participation. 
  
 The 85th/2557 NCPO does not mention anything about Muang Fai customary law directly. 
However, the power of the NCMWP&WM means that it can include Muang Fai customary 
law in national water resource management policies and plans, promote the activities of Muang 
Fai communities, provide rules for governing Muang Fai communities and give commands to 
relating water institutions in Thailand to support Muang Fai communities. However, the 
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NCMWP&WM is not concerned about the water management in relation to customary law 
and Muang Fai customary law. This is evidenced in the fact that Muang Fai customary law 
was not mentioned in the water resource management strategic plan, even though the strategic 
plan includes sections about public participation in water resource management.   
B. National Water Resources Committee (NWRC)1 
The NWRC was established via a regulation of the PMO in 1989.2 The structure and powers 
of the NWRC have been changed three times since then. Firstly, the regulation was amended 
in 2002 to add the River Basin Committee (RBC) and Sub-Basin Committee (SBC) as a part of 
the National Committee on Water Resources. Secondly, one component of the Committee was 
amended in 2007 3  by assigning the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Cooperative and the Minister of Science and Technology as 
members of the Committee. Lastly, the regulation was amended after the coup d’état by the 
order of the PMO 185/2558 (2015 A.D.).4 Now, the primary duty of the NWRC  is to implement 
the Strategic Plan for Water Management (2016-2026) with the support of the NCMWP&WM. 
Notably, the NWRC has no power to issue commands directly to government agencies in terms 
of water management. The power of the NWRC is limited to giving advice, and evaluating and 
monitoring the work of government agencies only. The most powerful tool of the NWRC is its 
ability to advise the Prime Minister on what  commands to issue to the government agencies.5 
C. River Basin Committee6 
The RBC consists of 35members who are representatives of the government organisations, 
local administrative organisations, WUOs, and scholars who have knowledge about and 
experience in water management. The RBC has 12 powers as follows: 
1) To advise the NCWR on policy, plans, projects and solutions relating to water 
management, including issues in regard to the activities of government organisations, 
local administrative authorities and private sectors in river basins; 
2) To make water resource management plans for river basins; 
                                                                
1 Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board (Jan 2016) Deaprtment of water resources 
<http://division.dwr.go.th/waterboard/index.php/home>. 
2 The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management B.E.2532 (Thailand)  
3 The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management B.E. 2550 (Thailand) 
4  Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board (Jan 2016) Deaprtment of water 
resources.<http://www.dwr.go.th/waterboard/National_Water_Resources_Board/2558/185-2558.pdf>;  
Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board (Jan 2016); Deaprtment of water 
resources.<http://www.dwr.go.th/waterboard/National_Water_Resources_Board/2558/212-2558.pdf>; 
Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board (Jan 2016) Deaprtment of water 
resources.<http://www.dwr.go.th/waterboard/National_Water_Resources_Board/2559/248-2558.pdf>  and Royal Irrigation 
Department (Thailand), the order to assign the National Water board(Jan 2016) Royal Irrigation Department 
 <http://irrigation.rid.go.th/rid3/oe3/data/2558/oe582559.pdf>. 
5 Deaprtment of water resources (Thailand), National_Water_Resources_Board (Jan 2016) Deaprtment of water resources 
<http://www.dwr.go.th/waterboard/National_Water_Resources_Board/2558/185-2558.pdf>. 
6The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management 2007 (Thailand)Sec. 12  
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3) To coordinate with government organisations and local administrative authorities 
within river basins for the development of action plans and financial plans in order to 
follow the water management plan in such river basins; 
4) To prioritise water usage and the quantity of water for each sector and to propose 
water allocation measures according to the principles of water supply equitably and 
efficiency; 
5) To evaluate and monitor the performance of government organisations in relation to 
water in the river basin; 
6) To promote, support and advise the local administrative authority to manage water 
resources in the local area equitably;    
7) To request documents, information and facts relating to water in order to collect 
statistical data and opinions relating to water resources in the river basins; 
8) To conciliate, meditate and resolve problems in regard to water resources in river 
basin;  
9) To coordinate with the other RBCs of other river basins in water resource 
management; 
10)  To publicise and access the public opinion, including helping people to understand 
water resource management; 
11)  To appoint a sub-committee or working group to work on relevant issues; and 
12)  To work on the issues assigned by the NCWR. 
 
D. Working group on tributaries7  
The working group on tributaries is appointed by the RBC to work on matters relating to the 
river basin’s tributaries. Their mission and power are outlined by the appointment RBC. The 
question should be asked here as to whether local people and members of the Muang Fai 
community have ever been included as Committee members. 
E. Royal Irrigation Department  
The RID is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative. The RID has 
played a vital role in supplying water to the agricultural sector in Thailand for many years. 
Moreover, the RID had traditionally been the organisation to regulate the activities of the 
Muang Fai community prior to the abolition of the PIA. For this reason, the power and activities 
of the RID are studied in this thesis.  
According to the Ministerial Regulation ‘Organising the Royal Irrigation Department, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives B.E. 2554’, the mission of RID is to develop water resources 
according to the potential of each water resource and to allocate the water to all types of water 
users throughout Thailand equitably, as well as providing protection against damage caused by 
                                                                
7  Office of Natural Resource Environmental Policy and planning (Thailand), Mechanism for River Basin Commission (Oct 
2016) Office of Natural Resource Environmental Policy and planning <http://www.onep.go.th/nrem/index.php/ping-river-basin-
rightmenu-03>. 
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water. The same legislation provides the duties and responsibilities of the Royal Irrigation 
Department as follows:  
1. Implementation of activities aimed at achieving, collecting, storing, controlling, distributing, 
draining or allocating water for agricultural, energy, household consumption or industrial 
purposes under irrigation laws, ditch and dike laws and other related laws;  
2. Implementation of activities related to prevention of damage from water; safety of dams and 
appurtenant structures; safety of navigation in commanded areas and other related activities 
that may not be specified in the annual plan;  
3. Implementation of land consolidation for agriculture under the Agricultural Land 
Consolidation Act; and    
4. Implementation of other activities designated by laws or properly assigned by Cabinet or 
Minister.8 
Thus, the RID mission according to ministerial regulation reflects the principles of intra-
generational equality and sustainability by providing that water allocation is done equitably for 
all types of water users.     
However, the RID mission only includes the management of surface water, the prevention of 
damages from water and land consolidation, but not conservation of the forest at the river 
source.  This means that implementation of the IWRM approach and the conservation of forests 
at the river source needs to be coordinated with other organisations. Hence, the RID cannot 
implement the IWRM approach and create sustainable water management without the 
cooperation of other organisations.       
Prior to 2015, all Muang Fai communities were required to register with the RID as part of the 
PIA. However, the PIA was abolished and there is currently no legislation to control the 
activities of Muang Fai. 
F.  Department of Water Resources 
The Department of Water Resources is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment. It was established under the Bureaucratic Reform Act 2002 on 3 December 
2002. The departmental targets are to establish basin-based water resource management systems 
to supply adequate water for consumption and production, to conserve and rehabilitate water 
resources, and to provide surveillance and warning systems for water disaster, with an emphasis 
on the participation of all stakeholders in all sectors. The DWR mission is to implement the 
                                                                
8  Royal Irrigation Department (Thailand), Duties and Responsibilities (Jan 2017) Royal Irrigation Department 
<http://www.rid.go.th/eng/duty.php>.  
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basin-based IWRM method with participation from all sectors to achieve efficiency, 
equitability and sustainability.   
In brief, the DWR mission differs from the RID mission. This is because the RID has a duty to 
implement the water development project and supervise the irrigation canals and irrigation 
areas; whereas, the DWR has a duty to conserve and rehabilitate water resources within the 
natural resource area. However, the DWR does not have its own law to provide authority. The 
powers of the DWR in the present are embedded in the Bureaucratic Reform Act 2002 and the 
Regulations of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management 2007. 
                           
G. Local Administrative Organisations 
In present-day Thailand, the local areas are governed by one of four types of local 
administrative organisations: sub-district council;9 municipality;10 sub-district administrative 
organisation;11  and provincial administrative organisation.12    The type of organisation to 
govern each area depends on the size of the population and the income of the organisation.13 
All local administrative organisations have a duty to make a local development plan compatible 
with the NESDP and the government policy.14 
In terms of water management, all types of local administrative organisations have the power 
to supply water to people for household and agricultural purposes. 15  However, it is not 
compulsory to do so. This is because some areas fall within the coverage area of the provincial 
waterworks authority. Generally, the local administrative organisation has four choices for 
seeking the water to supply for the household and agriculture purpose. Firstly, local 
administrative organisations in the irrigated area can buy water from the RID. Secondly, the 
local administrative organisation can use water from the reservoir in their regulated area under 
the regulation of the DWR. Thirdly, the local administrative organisation can use water from 
natural water resources under the regulation of the DWR. Finally, the local administrative 
organisations can seek water from the ground water with the assistance and regulation of the 
Department of Ground Water Resources. The local administrative organisation has the power 
to enact local ordinances to provide water rights to local people. This is evidenced in the local 
                                                                
9 Sub-District Council and Sub-District Administrative Organization Act 1994 (Thailand)  
10 Municipality Act 1953  (Thailand) 
11 Sub-District Council and Sub-District Administrative Organization Act 1994 (Thailand)  
12 Provincial Administrative Organization Act 1997(Thailand)  
13 Sub-District Council and Sub-District Administrative Organization Act 1994 (Thailand) Sec. 40. 
14 Plan and the Process of Decentralization to Local Government Act 1999, Sec. 17 
  and Regulation of Ministry of Interior on Development Plan of Local Administrative Organization 2005, Art. 4   
15 Sub-District Council and Sub-District Administrative Organization Act 1994 (Thailand), Sec. 23, 68 and 
Municipality Act 1953 (Thailand), Sec. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56 and  
Provincial Administrative Organization Act 1997(Thailand), Sec. 45   and   
Ministerial Regulations According to Provincial Administrative Organization Act 1997 (Thailand),  
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ordinance of Lom Rad Sub-district, Lam Pang.16  In terms of technical knowledge for the 
establishment of water supply, the DWR has a duty to support the local administrative 
organisations.  In terms of water quantity regulation, the local administrative organisations are 
supported and facilitated with technical knowledge by the Bureau of Food and Water 
Sanitation, Ministry of Public. The plan for water supply needs to also be included in the local 
strategic plan. However, the local administrative organisation can transfer the management of 
water supply construction to the Provincial Waterworks Authority, particularly when the local 
administrative organisation manages the water supply works for local people at a loss.17 
Reports suggest that some Muang Fai is supported with financial aid by local administrative 
organisations. However, there are no reports of the recognition of Muang Fai by local 
ordinances.  This may be because Muang Fai was previously recognised by the now defunct 
PIA. There is now no need to recognise Muang Fai customary law in local ordinances. However, 
this does not mean that Muang Fai cannot be recognised in local ordinances.  A similar example 
of a local ordinance relating to water management is that to establish a local committee to 
regulate the water supply by an electric water-pumping station of a sub-district administrative 
organisation. It should be observed here that the local authority can only enact new laws if they 
fall within the mandate of the main law. In addition, new laws can only be implemented in the 
area governed by the local authority. It is not compulsory for the local authority to enact laws 
to recognise customary law. Therefore, it cannot guarantee that the local authority will enact 
local ordinances for the recognition of Muang Fai customary law when there is no government 
policy to directly recognise water management through customary law. 
H. Private companies 
Presently, Thailand is attempting to privatise the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority and the 
Provincial Waterworks Authority.18 However, it has only privatised the water supplier sector 
to date by establishing two pilot water supply companies: the East Waters Public Company 
Limited; and 2) the Pathum Thani Water Company Limited.19 
Thailand’s Provincial Waterworks Authority holds 100 percent of the total shares in East Water 
Public Company Limited. In the case of the Pathum Thani Water Company Limited, Thailand’s 
Provincial Waterworks Authority holds two percent of the total shares, and the other 98 percent 
                                                                
16 Local Ordinance on the Management of Water Pumping Station (Thailand)  
17 <http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1433923416>. 
18 Montree Chantawong, Water Privatisation in Thailand (2002) Foundation for ecology recovery 
<http://www.terraper.org/web/sites/default/files/publications/1258352013_en.pdf> and Wararit Ruangyosawat, Infrastructure in 
Thailand Privatisation and Increasing Private Sector Participation (23 June2018) Warrington College of business   
<http://warrington.ufl.edu/centers/purc/purcdocs/papers/9907_Ruangyosawat_Infrastructure_in_Thailand.pdf>.   
19World bank, Thailand Infrastructure Annual Report 2008 (2010) World bank 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1234408105311/chapter5-water-sanitation-and-low-income-housing-sector.pdfAlin> and 
Chintraruck Walsh and John Walsh, ‘Water Privatization During Rising Demand: The Case of Southern Thailand’. 
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is held by the TTW Public Company.20 However, the mission of these companies is to supply 
water to the city and industrial estate zones.     
I. Water User Organisation 
In terms of water management for agriculture, the RID promotes public participation in water 
management by establishing many types of WUOs. According to the RID of Thailand, WUOs 
can be divided into 2 types: 1) WUOs comprising non-juristic persons; and 2) WUOs comprising 
juristic persons.21 Non-juristic WUOs consist of a ‘water user group’ and an ‘integrated water 
user group’. Juristic person WUOs consist of ‘farmer groups’, ‘Water Users Associations’ and 
‘Water Users Co-operatives’. The details of each group are as follows. 
‘Water user group’ 
Water user group refers to WUOs that use water from the irrigation projects and manage 
irrigated land not bigger than 395.369 acres. The irrigated land under the management of one 
water user group covers one irrigation canal. The water user group consists of one group leader, 
assistant and water users.22   
‘Integrated water user group’ 
Integrated water user group refers to WUOs that use water from the irrigation projects and 
manage irrigated land not bigger than 7907.3722 acres. The irrigated land under the 
management of one integrated water user group covers one major irrigation canal or one water 
zone in an irrigation project. The integrated water user group consists of many water user 
groups in the same major irrigation canal. The management is done by a committee, elected by 
water users.23 
‘Farmer group’ 
Farmer group refers to WUOs registered with the Provincial Agricultural Office according to 
the Royal Decree on Farmer Groups B.E. 2004. The registered farmer group is a juristic person. 
The main objectives of farmer groups are to support all farmers in the group in terms of 
agriculture. Farmer groups can trade, provide services and conduct other business to make a 
profit. The management of the farmer group is done by a committee, elected by the members.24 
                                                                
20 Thai Tap Water, the share holders (23 Dec 2015) Thai Tap Water http://ttw.listedcompany.com/faq.html 
21 Royal Irrigation Department, Handbook for water delivery and maintainance with the farmers’ participation in 14 stages, 
(Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department, 2009)  9. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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‘Water Users Association’ 
Water User Association refers to a WUO registered with the Ministry of the Interior according 
to the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand. The main objectives of Water User Associations 
are to do business relating to water utilisation without making a profit. The management of 
water user associations is undertaken by a committee, elected by the members.25 
‘Water Users Co-operative’ 
Water Users Co-operative refers to WUOs registered with the Cooperative Promotion 
Department according to the Co-operative Act B.E. 2542. The main objective of a Water User 
Co-operative is to manage irrigated water in order to make a profit. The management of a Water 
User Association is done by a committee, elected by the Association members. 
All WUOs have a representative in the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC). The 
JMC consists of the representatives from the WUOs in that area, irrigation officers, 
representatives from the local administrative organisation, representatives from the private 
sector and officers from the related State organisations such as the officer from the Department 
of Agricultural Extension, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives.26 The JMC 
is responsible for allocating water and to plan the water delivery method, water calendar, water 
zone, public relations approach, maintenance plan, and maintenance calendar to distribute 
water equitably and effectively.27 Moreover, the JMC also has a duty to conduct other business 
relating to the promotion of agricultural production and loans for agriculture.28 
It should be noted here that the Muang Fai community is not included in the WUOs according 
to the definition of the RID. This means that water users from Muang Fai cannot participate in 
the JMC. Moreover, it is not clear how many representatives of the WUOs can have a seat on 
the JMC. It may not reflect real public participation, particularly if the representatives of the 
WUOs cannot represent their own needs or if nobody listens to them when they express their 
opinions. In addition, Patcharin argues that because the JMC does not meet regularly it is quite 
difficult for farmers who want to change the pattern of water delivery according to their needs.29 
6.3 Current surface water management for agriculture in Thailand and the global water 
management perspective. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Thailand’s government is attempting to convert the Muang Fai 
community to manage water using the modern water management systems.  Most activities are 
                                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 9. 
27 Ibid, 11. 
28 Ibid, 12. 
29 Bualoi, above n 117. 
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undertaken by the RID.  In light of this, we should study how the RID and the DWR manage 
water for agriculture. In particular, we must identify the weaknesses of the water management 
system for agriculture conducted by the RID. Finally, we must consider how Muang Fai can 
fulfil the needs of local farmers.   
6.3.1 Water Management by Royal Irrigation Department 
As mentioned earlier, the water management of Thailand is conducted by more than 30 
organisations. This thesis focuses only on the water management of the DWR and the RID, 
which supply water to the agricultural sector. 
The RID distributes water from dams or reservoirs to farmers through irrigation canals under 
the management of the JMC, as mentioned above. The process starts seasonally with a meeting 
of the WUOs (both juristic persons and non-juristic persons). The discussions focus on the 
species of plant they want to grow and agreements are made with the irrigation officials to 
deliver water. The irrigation officials then calculate the water stored in the dams or reservoirs, 
call for a meeting with farmers to explain the calculation, and then arrange for farmers to 
receive water from irrigation canals.   
The RID can however only release water to farmers whose lands are close to the irrigation 
canals. The RID then needs to use land consolidation as a mechanism to allow all farmers in 
the irrigation area to access water. It appears that the land consolidation project in Thailand has 
not been successful because farmers often refuse to join in the land consolidation projects. As 
a result, some paddy fields located near, but not close to, irrigation canals cannot access water. 
This is quite different from the Muang Fai irrigation system which always includes a small 
ditch from the main canal to the paddy fields, no matter what the shape of the paddy field. It 
has been reported that the RID had attempted to encourage the Muang Fai community within 
the irrigation area to register as a WUO under the RID in order to also participate in the public 
water management systems. 
In the public irrigation system, the officer delivers water to paddy fields using three methods: 
1) continuous flow; 2) demand; and 3) rotational.30   The RID prefers however to deliver water 
                                                                
30 The meanings of each method are as follows: 
A. Continuous flow method 
Continuous flow method means the officer will deliver water with the exact quantity each time, except when the rainfall is 
sufficient for the farmers. The advantages of this method are: 1) inexpensive; and 2) easy to maintain and uses small number of 
the officer to manage water. On the contrary, the drawbacks of this system are: 1) the quantity of water is not compatible with 
the real needs of plant requirement; 2) it always results in conflicts over water among water users; and 3) water cannot be 
releases to farmers when there is water shortage.   
 B. Demand method 
Demand method mean the officer will deliver water according to the demands of each farmer and the planned period . The 
advantages of this method are: 1) farmers can water the plants according to the needs of plants in terms of time and quantity; 2) 
water users receive as water as much as they want; and 3) it promotes water utilisation planning.  On the other hand, the 
drawbacks of this method are: 1) both officer and farmers need to have specific knowledge about irrigation and planting; 2) it 
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using the rotational method because there being so many water users.  Although the supervisor 
of each zone monitors the water delivery, he has no power to settle water disputes among water 
users in the government irrigation system. The supervisor can only report matters to the 
irrigation officer. In an irrigation zone that includes a water user group, the Chief of the group 
has a duty to settle conflicts among water users. 
It is claimed that water delivery by the RID is different from water delivery in Muang Fai 
because the latter system in some areas such as in Mae Kahn river basin can deliver water all 
the year round. However, the RID system in the same area can only deliver water during the 
rainy season or when it has sufficient water in the reservoir.31 The RID system always suffers 
from a water shortage during the summer.32 Furthermore, it is claimed that the water delivered 
by the RID arrives to each water user according to the queue, with the exact date through the 
irrigation canal. However, water in the canal will often have disappeared when it is not the date 
to deliver water.  This is quite different from the water delivery process used by the Muang Fai 
system.33 
Moreover, the Gae Fai (Water Manager) can settle water conflicts in the Muang Fai system; 
whereas, there is no mechanism to settle water disputes directly in the irrigation area overseen 
by the RID, except if it contains a water user group. This is because the supervisor or volunteer 
of the RID has a duty to monitor the water level in the paddy fields of each water user, but has 
no authority to settle water disputes. This is contrast to the authority to settle disputes given to 
the Water Manager in the Muang Fai system.34 
In terms of water fees, Mole argues that the idea to collect water fees was first proposed to the 
Thai government over 100 years ago by western experts, but it was not implemented. The water 
fee collection policy was again proposed under the first NESDP, but again, it was not 
implemented. Water fees were finally incorporated into the State Irrigation Act and by 
Ministerial regulation. The water fee rates for industry and agriculture are around 0.02 AUD 
dollars /1 cubic meter.  Water fees have just recently (2017) been applied to farmers in some 
areas, but there has been no report as to their effectiveness. It is worth noting that farmers must 
                                                                
requires the storage a huge quantities of water in order to supply all demands of farmers; 3) it require close cooperation between 
irrigation officer and water users; and 4) it is very expensive to construct a large dam or reservoir to keep water. 
 C. Rotational method 
Rotational method means the officer will deliver water according to quantity and period which is planned in advance . The 
officer will seek the water demands of each land area and the time to deliver water. Then, the officer will arrange the schedule 
to deliver water to each land Area. The advantage of this method is to deliver water to meet the plant and time requirements. 
Moreover, it decreases the potential for conflict over water among users. However, the drawback of this method are: 1) it 
requires an elaborate plan to deliver water; 2) the water delivery plan may not reflect the real needs of users; and 3) it requires 
close cooperation between irrigation officer and water users. 
31 Pornpilai Lertwicha and Aroonrat Wicheankaeo, Villages and Communities of Mae Khan River basin: Dynamic Economic 
System of 3 River Basins in Thailand Research Project 2000-2002 (Thai Research Fund, 2003) 241. 
32 Ibid, 241. 
33 Ibid, 259. 
34 Ibid, 243. 
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also  pay membership fees to the WUOs, electricity fees to pump water to the paddy fields, and 
fines for not participating in the maintenance of dikes.  
In terms of environmental flow, Thailand has no law to regulate the water levels in rivers 
directly, although some studies of how to maintain environmental flow have been undertaken 
in Thailand since 2010.35 
The RID manages water in dams and reservoirs by maintaining the water level according to 
the lower-rule curve and upper-rule curve.36 The maintenance of water according to the lower-
rule curve can also sustain the minimum flow in river. 
6.3.2 Water management by Department of Water Resources 
The DWR regulates and restores the water in natural resource such as lakes, rivers and creeks. 
Some rivers are under the supervision of both the DWR and the RID. The DWR uses the RBC 
and working groups on tributaries as tools to manage water. The DWR also uses the WUOs as 
a platform for public participation in water planning along with the RID. The WUOs, under 
the patronage of the DWR, has no legal status.  Some Muang Fai communities are 
incorporated into the water planning process through the WUO under the patronage of the 
DWR as well.37   
In terms of the economic tools to manage water, the present RBC of Thailand has no power to 
issue permits to use water and no power to collect water fees.38  However, the Water Bill of 
Thailand, mentioned earlier in this chapter, provides the RBC with the authority to issue 
permits to use water and to collect water fees. 
In terms of conflict management, the RBC has the power to mediate conflicts among water 
users. Administrative officials in each local area also have a duty to meditate conflicts among 
water users. In addition, each water user group under the patronage of the DWR has its own 
rules to settle conflicts over water.    
In terms of the environmental flow, the RBC has the power to allocate water to each sector 
reasonably and equitably, including the environmental flow.39 
                                                                
35 David Blake et al., ‘E–Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin’ Chiang Mai Thailand: Unit for Social and Environmental 
Research (USER)-Chiang Mai University, (2010).  
36 prridnews2014, “The principles to manage water in dam” (หลกักำรบริหำรจดักำรน ้ำในเข่ือน) YouTube video Jul 7, 2014   
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gaKVTZN_jHM> and Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, Concept for water 
managementin Bhoomibhol and Sirikit dams, (23 June 2018)Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (แนวคิดบริหารจัดการน า้ 2 
เข่ือนภูมิพลและเข่ือนสิริกิต์ิ) <https://www.egat.co.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362:article-water-
management&catid=38&Itemid=323 >.  
37 Department of water resource, Water resource office Zone 1 set up water management course for local water users at Ban 
Faihin (ส ำนกังำนทรัพยำกรน ้ำภำค 1 ฝึกอบรมหลกัสูตรกำรบริหำรจดักำรทรัพยำกรน ้ำกลุ่มผูใ้ชน้ ้ ำห้วยฝำยหิน)  (23 June 2018) Department of water resource 
http://www.dwr.go.th/news/2/news-2-0-26325.html 
38 The Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Water Resource Management 2007, S 15  
39 Ibid, S 15(4). 
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This all means that even though the major water institutions of Thailand (RID and DWR) 
accept the existence of the Muang Fai community and Muang Fai customary law, Thailand 
has no clear legislation to recognise Muang Fai customary law.   
To evaluate whether the water management processes of the RID and DWR in present-day 
Thailand follow sustainable water resource management principles as provided in Chapter 3, 
this thesis applies the criteria outlined in the DSWSD. 
Table 31  Present-day Thai water laws and Dublin principles on water and sustainable development 
Dublin principles Present-day water management in 
Thailand 
IWRM on catchment area Partly 
Public participation Yes 
Emphasis on women’s roles  Not clear 
Using economic tools Partly 
  
As reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis, IWRM in catchment area refers to integrated surface 
water management, ground water management, river-source forest management and land 
management. The integration is supported through cooperation on planning and 
implementation among the different institutional structures.40  Upon examination, the IWRM 
approach in Thailand is arguably true IWRM because the cooperation among water-related 
organisations remains problematic, with Thailand having both a National Water Resource 
Commission and River Basin Commissions. However, the presence of organisational structures 
to support the IWRM approach is better than having no structures at all. So, the next question 
for Thailand is how to adjust the mission and management styles of existing water-related 
institutions to be compatible with an IWRM approach to achieve sustainable water 
management. This question is quite important, but out of the scope of this thesis. The important 
point for this thesis is that the traditional water institutions such as the Muang Fai community 
are not included in the IWRM approach in Thailand.   
The public participation processes of the RID and the DWR include only the WUOs established 
and supported by government, and some Muang Fai communities. This arrangement cannot 
create real, sustainable water management because it does not reflect the real needs of all 
people. The government can only know the needs of WUOs under the patronage of the RID 
and the DWR, which, in turn, does not include the Muang Fai community. 
In addition, there are no direct laws or policies to encourage women to have a greater role in 
water management. The present Constitution of Thailand recognises equality between men and 
women.41 Furthermore, Thailand enacted the Gender Equality Act in 201542 and established 
                                                                
40 See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
41 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 27. (See Appendix) 
42 The Gender Equality Act 2015 (Thailand) 
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the Gender Equality Promotion Committee43 and the Committee on Consideration of Unfair 
Gender Discrimination.44 Both Committees promote gender equality and aim to eliminate 
gender discrimination in government agencies and private organisations.  
Lastly, Thailand has recently applied economic tools to manage water demands in the 
agricultural sector.  Water fees have long been collected from water users in the industrial sector 
and in households. As such, it could be said that Thailand partly follows this measure in the 
IWRM approach. This issue is interrelated to water rights, but will remain unresolved for as 
long as Thailand does not have clear legislation relating to water rights.       
6.4 Muang Fai and current water laws and water management in Thailand 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the PIA was abolished on 31 January 2015 and no new legislation 
has been introduced to replace it. This is significant as the PIA included important governance 
and support activities for the Muang Fai community. At least 300,000 people still apply Muang 
Fai customary law in their daily life.45 Furthermore, the customary rights of people of Muang 
Fai are not included in Thailand’s water laws. In fact, water rights as set out in the present 
legislation in Thailand are not clear. The licensing system to regulate water users or WUOs in 
each river has not been established because Thailand does not have a Water Act in place. People 
are able to freely use water from the rivers.  Furthermore, Thailand does still not have legislation 
to regulate the WUOs, even though the government water institutions in Thailand encourage 
water users to establish such WUOs.  
Lastly, the Muang Fai community is not officially included in the water management processes 
of Thailand, although some Muang Fai communities have been encouraged by irrigation 
officials to register as a non-juristic person WUO.46 In this way some Muang Fai communities 
are incorporated into the water management processes of Thailand. However, the problems and 
challenges of Muang Fai remain unresolved. This is because the Muang Fai community cannot 
present a case to the Court or submit a petition to State officials when there are conflicts over 
water use. Only Muang Fai communities that register as a juristic person, such as a cooperative, 
can have the right to seek resolution for water conflicts from the Court.  Notwithstanding this 
option, problems over water rights remain for Muang Fai even if it registers as a WUO because 
water rights in Thailand are neither clear nor secured by legislation. Hence, the Muang Fai 
community and customary laws can arguably be recognised and incorporated into water 
management process in Thailand by both public law as suggested by Hodgson, and with limited 
capacities in private law as is done in Thailand now.           
 
                                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.    
45 Lertwicha, above n 116. 
46 Please see the example of certification for the WUO, issued by RID at the addendum of this thesis. 
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Table 32 Similarities and differences among Muang Fai, non-juristic and juristic Water User Organisations in 
Thailand 
Topic / Types of WUO  Muang Fai Non-Juristic person WUO Juristic  person WUO 
Objectives Manage water equitably 
and share it responsibility 
using traditional methods 
Construct, operate and 
maintain the weirs and 
dikes 
Conserve the river source 
Manage water sustainably 
and share profits equitably 
Operate and maintain the 
irrigation infrastructure 
Conserve the river source 
Manage water sustainably 
and share profits equitably 
Operate and maintain the 
irrigation infrastructure 
-Conserve the river source 
Legal personality Non-Juristic person Non-Juristic person Juristic person 
Capacity Crafting its own rules in use  
Open bank account47 
Crafting its own rules in use 
Participate in the water 
management process 
Open bank account48 
Crafting its own rules in use 
Open bank account49 
Present case to the Court 
Participate in the water 
management process 
 Management One Chairman (with 
assistant) and General 
Assembly 
One Chairman (with 
assistant) and General 
Assembly 
Chairman 
Board of Management 
General Assembly 
Monitoring process and 
punishment 
Chairman and Chairman’s 
assistant 
Violator is fined by 
Chairman 
Chairman  and Chairman’s 
assistant 
Report to the police 
Chairman and Chairman’s 
assistant 
Report to the police 
Supervision by external 
body 
NO NO The Registrar of 
cooperative 
Related legislation NO Internal policy & 
regulations of Royal 
Irrigation Department  
the Royal Decree on Farmer 
Groups B.E. 2004 
Cooperative Act 
Civil and Commercial Code 
Conflict management Consider, judge or 
mediation by Chairman 
No legal mechanism for the 
conflict between water users 
in the Muang Fai 
community and outsiders 
Consider judge or mediate 
by Chairman 
 
Consider judge or mediation 
by Chairman 
 
6.5 Customary law within Thailand’s legal system 
The study of the principles of customary law in Thailand's legal system a crucial research 
component of this thesis. This is because it indicates the legal status of customary law within 
Thailand's legal system and how customary is implemented in present-day Thailand. Therefore, 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law must be accomplished in harmony with the existing 
legal system. This section starts with a discussion of the status of customary law in Thailand's 
legal system.  It then explores the definition of customary law within the system.  
      
Thailand has a long history of customary law because most ancient code laws in Thailand such 
as the Three Seals Laws (กฎหมำยตรำสำมดวง) and the Muang Rai Satra Code evolved from the 
                                                                
47 The regulation of Bank of Thailand Sor Nor Sor 7/2559 (Thailand) 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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codification of ancient customary laws and the judgements of ancient Courts.50 51 Nowadays, 
customary law is mentioned in three major legislations of Thailand: the Constitution of 
Thailand; the Penal code of Thailand; and the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand.  
A. Customary law within Thailand's Constitution 
  
Customary law is mentioned in Thailand’s Constitution in two ways: as a legal method to fill 
the gap in Constitutional law; and in relation to the rights of people and community to preserve 
and conserve their traditions and customs.52 In the case of the former, all Constitutions of 
Thailand have mentioned it as a ‘Constitutional convention’.53 However, this kind of customary 
law does not relate to customary law in the daily lives of people and Muang Fai customary law. 
In the case of the latter, the rights of people and communities are mentioned in Sections 43 and 
57 of the current Constitution of Thailand 2017.54 This then means that the Thai State accepts 
local customary law, although it has no general legal framework to recognise it. 
 
In terms of Muang Fai customary law during the period 1939-2015, Muang Fai as a traditional 
custom of a traditional community was recognised by legislation in Thailand through the PIA. 
Even though it may be argued that Muang Fai was recognised improperly by the PIA, it 
nonetheless had a place in the water management system of Thailand. Today, the PIA has been 
abolished and there is no provision in the present Constitution to recognise local customary 
water laws. The status of Muang Fai in the present water management system of Thai land is 
thus unclear.  
B. Customary law within Thailand's penal code 
  
In the legal system of Thailand, Thailand’s penal code does not explicitly mention customary 
law. It is, however, mentioned in the commentary on criminal law; namely, that offences 
according to customary law cannot be applied to people, but the customary law is accepted as 
an excuse or provide an exception from the offence according to written law. This is based on 
the universal principal of criminal law, Nullum crimen Nulla poena sine lege. Notably, Thai 
Courts also often apply this principle without a clear definition of customary law. This prompts 
the question of whether the customary law being used to excuse someone for an offence 
                                                                
50  Swang Boonchalernvibhass, The Thai Legal History Krung Thep (Samnakphim Winyuchon, 2006). 
51 Thailand or Siam in the past is described as the group of many small city States under the leadership of Bangkok. Each city 
State had its own legal system and judicial organisation. However, the legal history studies relating to the legal system in 
each city State is quite poor, even in the present day. The most progressive legal history studies of ancient Thai Kingdoms in 
present-day Thailand are those of the legal system of Bangkok and the legal system of the Lanna Kingdom. (This evidence 
mat be useful to support the argument about legal pluralism.) 
52 Custom was mentioned in both 1997 and 2007 Constitution of Thailand.  See S 46 of the Constitution of Thailand 1997, 
and S 66, 67 of the Constitution of Thailand 2007. 
53 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 5. (See Appendix) 
54Ibid, S 43,57. (see Appendix) 
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according to the penal code is in fact the local customary law of a certain area or the customary 
law which the majority of people in Thailand accept. 
 
In terms of Muang Fai, farmers who stole water from Muang Fai are warned for the first crime, 
fined for the second crime and expelled from the group for the third crime. One therefore might 
wonder whether Muang Fai customary law can be used as an exemption for the offence 
according to written law on whether the water was stolen.  
 
C. Customary law within Thailand's Civil and Commercial Code 
 
The words ‘customary law’ are included in Article 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code of 
Thailand. 55  In this Code, customary law is used as a subsidiary term to fill the gap in the law 
when there is no written law to apply to the case. There is no definition of customary law 
provided in the Civil and Commercial Code, however Thai judges apply criteria to indicate 
whether the custom is a customary law (please see the next section for further explanation of 
this point).   
The customs applied in a civil case can be local customs, 56  a custom which is generally 
accepted by people, or a custom relating to a profession, for example, the custom practiced by 
a merchant.57 The judge can claim and apply some types of customs without proof from other 
parties.58 However, some customs need to be proved by the party who claims the existence of 
these customs.59  
 D. The definition of customary law within the Thai legal system  
A definition of ‘customary law’ has not been provided in legislation in Thailand. However, some 
judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand indicate the components of customary law as 
follows:  
                                                                
55 Civil and Commercial Code [Thailand] S 4: 
     The law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit of any of its provisions. 
     Where no provision is applicable, the case shall be decided according to the local custom. 
     If there is no such custom, the case shall be decided by analogy to the provision most nearly applicable, and, in 
default of such provision, by the general principles of law.’ 
56 Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, S 4, and the judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand number 9/2501 However, 
one Thai scholar has described all areas of Thailand as one local area. See Wanikkakul, Boonchoui, Description on civil and 
commercial code Book I-II, Sections 1-241 (Thai Phittaya printing, 1966) 26 cited in Kumtorn Kumtornprasert and Mullika 
Pinijjan, ‘Principles of Private Law’ <http://e-book.ram.edu/e-book/l/LA102(LW102)54/chapter4.pdf>. 
57 The judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand No. 845/2497 and the judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand 
number 1375/2505. 
58 The judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand No. 594/2472;  In this case, the Court ruled that the custom to indicate 
the authority of parent over the child is one part of law. Therefore, it is a legal matter that the Court can consider without the 
proof by party cited in Prasit Kovilaikul, Description on civil and commercial law sections 4-14. (Nitidham, 2002) 30-31. 
59 Osot Kosin, Description and comparison between Thai law and foreign law on evidence. (Amarin printing, 1986) 41. 
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“Customary law which can be applied in case should have a long usage, be appropriate (to 
apply to case), clearly provide (rights, duties and sanction) and not be contrary to the written 
laws.”60  
It is clear that the word ‘customary law’ in this judicial opinion is partly similar to the concept 
of customary law in common law in terms of ‘long usage’.  The concept of ‘customary’ in 
common law requires ‘immemorial usage’. 
In addition, some lawyers in Thailand argue that a ‘custom’ which can be applied in civil cases 
should have the following five elements: 1) be a local custom followed by all people in the local 
area; 2) have a long history of practice; 3) be not in contrary to legislation, public order and 
good morals; 4); be well known among the people; and 5) be a reasonable and equitable 
custom.61 The next point contributing to the development of a definition is that a ‘custom’ 
should be known by all parties in Court.62 Furthermore, Yud Sanguthai has argued that a 
‘custom’ applied in a civil case in Thailand when there is a gap of law should be compatible 
with justice, be able to be described to people, and be something that people cannot deny.63 
It should be noted here that the components of a custom, according to the opinions of Thailand 
scholars, will have points of conflict with Muang Fai customary law. This may particularly be 
the case in relation to the sacrificing of food to the spirit of Muang Fai. This is because the spirit 
of Muang Fai is a belief localised to people in northern Thailand, not a general belief. It can be 
difficult to explain to people why Muang Fai community members must bring food to sacrifice 
to the spirit, especially in light of contemporary scientific beliefs. In addition, it is not clear that 
the definition of customary law, as handed down in Thai Court decisions, may or may not be 
used in criminal cases because customary law when used to exempt criminal punishment is 
always contrary to the common law legislation.  
 
E. The recognition of customary law processes within Thailand’s legal system  
There is currently no direct legislation providing a legal framework to recognise customary law 
in Thailand. However, customary law can be implemented as a law in Thailand custom is 
applied by judge to fill a gap of civil or criminal law and when it is recognised by legislation. 
However, the recognition of customary law in criminal cases is not within the focus of this 
thesis. 
                                                                
60 The judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand No. 104/2462 . 
61 Notebook for lawyer, How to fill the gap of law (23 June 2018) Notebook for lawyer 
<http://llbtogether.blogspot.com.au/2012/09/blog-post_17.html> (in Thai language) 
62  The judgements of the Supreme Court of Thailand No. 2122/2499 
63 Yud Sanguthai, Introductioon to law, (Prakraypreuk press, 1995) 
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1) Recognition of custom by a Court as a subsidiary means for settling a dispute 
This is the legal method for filling a gap in the law according to Article 4 of the Civil and 
Commercial Code of Thailand. Each case must start with the claimant asserting the customary 
law which applies to the case. The judge will treat it as a factual problem within which the 
claimant needs to prove the existence of customary law. The judge will apply customary law to 
the case only when convinced that no other legislation applies to the case.  
While it may appear that Muang Fai communities can use this process to protect their rights 
according to Muang Fai customary law, ultimately it may not be effective. This is because 
customary law will only be applied when no other legislation applies to the case. Moreover, the 
Court’s decisions on cases in Thailand can only bind parties in that specific case. The decision 
is not binding for future cases or for people outside that case. Therefore, water users in Muang 
Fai communities would need to present a case to the Court for each specific instance of having 
their water rights violated by people outside the Muang Fai community. Additionally, previous 
Court decisions can only be used as evidence, not as law.  This can be simply understood with 
the following example. 
Example A.  
Farmers in a Muang Fai community are suffering from the new landowner who has blocked 
the ditch which passes through his land. The previous land owner had been one of water users 
in the Muang Fai community. If farmers in the Muang Fai community present their case to the 
Court and claim the use of Muang Fai customary law, the judge may determine as follows: 
i. Farmers cannot claim the use of Muang Fai customary law because the land of the new 
land owner falls under the property rights according to Article 1336 of the Civil and 
Commercial Code of Thailand.64 Hence, the rights of the land-owner supersede the 
rights of farmers in the Muang Fai community. There is no gap in the law that can be 
filled with customary law. 
ii. Only in the case where the ditches or canals in the Muang Fai community were 
registered as public canals or public ditches according to Thailand’s land law codes can 
the farmers claim rights according to the land law to stop the new land owner from 
blocking the ditch.  
 
2) Recognition by the promulgation of new written law  
Another method to recognise customary law in the Thai legal system is to legislate for the 
recognition of customary law.  Historically, Thailand has only ever recognised three customary 
                                                                
64 Civil and Commercial Code [Thailand] S 1336: 
 Within the limits of law, the owner of property has the right to use and dispose of it and acquires its fruits; he 
has the right to follow and recover it from any person not entitled to detain it, and has the right to prevent 
unlawful interference with it.  
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laws through legislation: 1) the recognition of Muang Fai by Muang Fai and Panang Regulation 
Act 1934 and PIA 1939; 2) the recognition of Islamic law by the Act for Exercising Islamic 
Law in Pattani Yala Narathivas and Satun 1946; and 3) the recognition of the custom to use the 
forest by local villages within the Community Forest Act. However, the Community Forest Act 
was repealed by a judgement of the Constitutional Court.65  
It should be observed here that Thailand’s Constitution has no provision to compulsorily require 
the government to recognise customary law. The nearest provision is Section 57 of the 
Constitution of Thailand66 that provides for the duty of the State to conserve, revive and 
promote local wisdom, arts, culture, traditions and good customs at both local and national 
levels. However, the criteria to determine ‘good customs’ are not clear.   
The advantage of recognition by incorporation into legislation is that the recognised customary 
law would be applied to all people, not only the people in the areas which have customary law. 
The weakness of this option is that the recognition customary law by promulgating a new Act 
takes time; sometimes more than 10 years. This is evidenced by the drafting process of the new 
water law in Thailand. One final danger is that legislated recognition of customary law might 
make customary norms more rigid and less able to adjust and be resilient to new challenges. 
This is especially true if the legislation is not designed properly.   
Based on the appearance of customary law in the Thai legal system, it appears that Thailand 
treats customary law with positive measures including admittance as fact, and incorporation 
and acknowledgment according to the typology of interaction between State norms and non-
State norms as suggested by Woodman.67 
  
F. The recognition of customary law for natural resource management in Thailand       
The recognition of customary law for natural resource management in this thesis focuses only 
on the recognition of customary law to govern natural resources at the community level. This 
is because “community-level governance systems, which regulate natural resources, are always 
referred to as ‘custom’ or ‘customary law’”.68 The concept of CBNRM was reviewed in the 
                                                                
65 Secretariat of the cabinet, The cabinet acknowledge the constitutional court’s judgement for the community forest act (23 
June2018) Secretariat of the cabinet <http://www.cabinet.soc.go.th/soc/Program2-3.jsp?top_serl=222913>  and the judgement 
of the constitutional court of Thailand number 15/2552 
<http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/occ_web/download/Article/file_import/center15_52.pdf>. 
66 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 57. (See Appendix) 
67 See How States Treat Customary Law, Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.   
68 Pepe Clarke and Stacy D. Jupiter, ‘Law, Custom and Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Kubulau District 
(Fiji)’ (2010) 37(1) Environmental Conservation 98-106. 
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Chapter 4 of this thesis as an important concept underpinning water management in rural areas 
around the world.69  
As mentioned in the previous section, Thailand has no general legal framework to recognise 
customary law. However, the present Constitution of Thailand recognises the rights of 
communities to conserve, revive or promote … tradition and good customs70 … and the duty of 
State to conserve, revive and promote … traditions and good customs … .71 This means that 
Thailand needs to recognise both the traditions and good customs of local people, irrespective 
of whether it is a custom relating to natural resource management.   
Furthermore, Section 57 of the present Constitution of Thailand provides the duty of the State 
to conserve, protect, maintain, restore, manage and use or arrange for utilisation of natural 
resources, environment and biodiversity by allowing local people and local community to 
participate in and obtain the benefit from such undertaking as provided by law. 72  Hence, it is 
clear that applying CBNRM approaches to managing natural resources is not contradictory 
with the highest law of Thailand. However, it is not clear which level of public participation in 
Thailand best allows people to participate in natural resource management.   
Historically, the recognition of customary law relating to natural resource management in 
Thailand has been accomplished three times; namely, 1) the recognition of Muang Fai water 
resource management customary law between 1935 and 2015; 73  2) the recognition of the 
customary rights of local villages to manage forest by the Community Forest Act  between 
2007 and 2010;74 and 3) the recognition of the customary rights of local villages to manage 
Marine and Coastal Resources by the Promotion of Marine and Coastal Resources Act B.E. 
2558 (PMCR). This demonstrates that all previous recognitions of customary law or customary 
rights relating to the management of natural resource in Thailand has adopted the incorporation 
method. Notably, there is no general legal framework to recognise customary law or customary 
rights relating to natural resources management in a single Act. Laws recognising customary 
rights to use forests, as well as Muang Fai customary laws, have been abolished and repealed 
in 2010 and 2015, respectively. 
As is evidenced in the previous section, Thailand has demonstrated the ability to apply positive 
measures to customary law. However, it also appears that Thailand is attempting to replace 
customs with new norms requiring new values for Muang Fai water management customary 
                                                                
69 Barbara Von Koppen, Mark Giordano and John Butterworth (eds.), Community-Based Water Law and Water Resource 
Management Reform in Developing Countries’ vol. 5. CABI (2008).    
70 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 43. (See Appendix) 
71 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 57. (See Appendix) 
72 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 57. (See Appendix) 
73 The People’s Irrigation Act 1939, S 3 and Act to Repeal the People’s Irrigation Act 1939 2558 [B.E.] , S 3  
74 ILaw editor, The third community forest bill under the national reform and steering assembly; the answer which has not 
responsed the community’s needs (ร่ำงกฎหมำยป่ำชุมชนยกท่ีสำม ในยคุสภำปฏิรูปแห่งชำติ ยงัคงไม่ตอบโจทยชุ์มชน ร่ำงกฎหมำยป่ำชุมชนยกท่ีสำม ในยคุสภำปฏิรูป
แห่งชำติ ยงัคงไม่ตอบโจทยชุ์มชน) (23 June 2015) ilaw <https://ilaw.or.th/node/7328>   and The judgement of constitutional court of 
Thailand No.15/2552 <http://www.law.cmu.ac.th/law2011/journal/e1378955302.pdf> 
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law. This is demonstrated in the abolishment of the PIA, which recognised Muang Fai 
customary law, and the convertion of Muang Fai communities to water user groups.75 Thailand 
appears to be treating Muang Fai according to the weak modern monism approach outlined by 
Hinz.76  It is attempting to convert Muang Fai communities into the service area of the RID and 
DWR in order to deal with them as water user groups. However, Muang Fai communities are 
not water user groups and are therefore not recognised officially by law.  
 
6.6 Legal principles which support the recognition of customary law in Thailand 
The legal principles which support customary law recognition in Thailand include human rights 
principles and legal pluralism, as well as legal principles which support the customary law in 
other countries. Therefore, this section explores how human rights principles and legal 
pluralism apply to present-day Thailand. This is to examine whether both can be applied as legal 
principles to support customary law recognition.  
6.6.1 Human rights obligations and the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in 
Thailand 
Thailand is both a member of the United Nations and party to many international human rights 
instruments.77 Furthermore, Thailand’s Constitution recognises and defines the duties of the 
State with respect the rights of Thailand citizens and other people living in Thailand. Therefore, 
there is no doubt that Thailand is obligated by both international and domestic laws to respect, 
fulfil and protect human rights. 
Non-discrimination 
The principle of non-discrimination is recognised in Section 27 of Thailand’s 2017 
Constitution.78 From studying the arguments for and against the recognition of customary law 
in other countries, it is a common claim that the recognition of  customary law may lead to 
discrimination against people who apply customary law by  people who do not follow 
customary law. Hence, this thesis should consider whether legislative recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law may result in inequality and discrimination in Thailand. If it is found to do so, 
Muang Fai should then not be recognised in this way because it would violate the basic 
principle of human rights provided in Thailand’s Constitution. However, if recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law does not violate basic principles of human rights, it suggests that 
Muang Fai should be recgonised. 
                                                                
75 See How State’s Treat Customary Law, Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.   
76 Ibid. 
77  The international instruments relating to human rights that Thailand is the party include ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, 
CRC. 
78 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 27. (See Appendix) 
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In the case of recognition of Muang Fai customary law, such recognition does not deprive the 
water rights of other people in Thailand. Moreover, recognition of Muang Fai supports local 
people who cannot currently access water equitably and efficiency through public irrigation 
systems. Furthermore, water users who unify as a WUO can enjoy rights, resulting in people in 
the Muang Fai community being recognised by law. The recognition of Muang Fai will also 
provide important data to the government relating to water management. Such data can inform 
strategies to achieve more sustainable and effective water management, thereby increasing the 
well-being of people in Thailand on the macro scale. Hence, it is clear that the recognition of 
Muang Fai does not discriminate against a person on the grounds of differences in origin, race, 
language, sex, age, disability, physical or health condition, personal status, economic and social 
standing, religious belief, education, or political view. Conversely, the failure to recognise of 
Muang Fai continutes to perpetuate the inequality between people who access to water from 
the public irrigation system and people within the Muang Fai community.  
 
Right to adequate food  
In Thailand, the right to food has not been recognised directly in the Constitution. However, it 
is argued that Thailand recognises the right to food through the right to the means necessary to 
live a dignified life.79 Although the right to adequate food is not guaranteed directly in the 
Constitution of Thailand, Thailand is still obliged to respect, fulfil and protect the right of local 
people to adequate food. Indeed, Thailand has duties in these areas according to its international 
obligations. Muang Fai customary law aims to provide water for agricultural purposes and the 
local peasants always use water for food production. Hence, the promotion and recognition of 
Muang Fai is one way for the Thai government to fulfil its obligation to ensure the right to 
adequate food for local people. This provides yet another argument in favour of recognising 
Muang Fai customary law.       
Right to water 
As well as the right to adequate food, Thailand’s Constitution does not recognise people’s right 
to water. However, the duty of the State to provide both quality water and a sufficient quantity 
of water to people and other sectors80 are contained in the present Constitution of Thailand. 
This suggests that the government must make every effort to provide good quality and a 
sufficient quantity of water to people.  Recognition of Muang Fai customary law is one method 
to fulfil these obligations with regard to water rights.  
                                                                
79 Lidija Knuth and Margret Vidar, ‘Constitutional and Legal Protection of the Right to Food around the World, Right to 
Food Studies, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ (Rome, 2001) 22. 
80 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 72. See Appendix 
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Right to culture 
As mentioned in a previous section,  Section 43 of Thailand’s Constitution provides that a 
person and community shall have the right to conserve, revive or promote wisdoms …, tradition 
and good customs. 81  Furthermore, a person and a community have the right to manage, 
maintain and utilise natural resources, environment and biodiversity in a balanced and 
sustainable manner.82 The State also has a duty to conserve, revive or promote wisdoms …, 
tradition and good customs.83 There is no doubt that Muang Fai customary law, when regarded 
as a form of SD, can be practiced and conserved by local people and communities under the 
Constitution. Thailand’s government also has a duty to conserve, revive and promote Muang 
Fai customary law in order to manage water resources. 
Furthermore, local people, groups of people, communities or organisations in the private or 
public sectors can unify as a ‘cultural network’ with the aim to exchange data relating to 
conserving and reviving the customs, local wisdoms, good local culture and national culture.84 
Each cultural network could unify with other cultural networks to establish a provincial cultural 
council, district cultural council or sub-district cultural council in order to develop Muang Fai 
customary law into a cultural master plan for Thailand. They could then coordinate with other 
organisations to conserve and promote Muang Fai customary law.85 
Womens rights 
 In Muang Fai customary law there is no customary rule to prohibit women from being a Water 
Manager of Muang Fai. However, the Lanna people’s customary rules prohibits a woman from 
associating with men who are not a relative. Thus, male Water Managers are traditionally 
elected by water users because the Water Manager needs to, with the Water Manager assistant, 
check water levels in all canals and paddy fields every day. Furthermore, it might be not safe 
for a woman to be the referee when there is a conflict over water among water users.  The 
                                                                
81 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 43. (See Appendix) 
82 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 43 (2) (See Appendix) 
83 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 57. (See Appendix) 
84  Section 1 of Ministry Regulation on  
‘Cultural Network’ means a combination of persons, groups, individuals, communities, organizations or entities, both public 
and private. Voluntary exchange of information, information, or joint activities. With the common purpose of preserving or 
restoring custom, local knowledge, fine art of locals and nationals have been listed as a cultural network by the Department 
of Cultural Promotion. 
85 National Culture Act 2010 [Thailand], S18 
The Council of Culture at all levels shall have the following duties: 
(1) presenting comments or recommendations to the Committee on National Culture Policy and Master Plan. 
(2) It is a center for exchanging knowledge, experience and ideas in cultural operations. By linking together as 
a cultural network. 
(3) mobilize resources, personnel and resources from various agencies and organizations; For cultural 
operations 
(4) Encourage, support and co-ordinate activities of party organizations and cultural networks for the 
conservation, rehabilitation, development, cultural exchange and cultural heritage. 
(5) disseminate the activities and performance of partner organizations and cultural networks; 
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highest level of female water staff in Muang Fai community, seen within research to date, is 
the water messenger.   
However, this thesis suggests that the role of women within Muang Fai customary rules should 
be improved given they can work as effectively as men. This can be seen in a number of 
successful projects. Many best-practice community-based water management projects have 
been led by females.86 Furthermore, if a woman is elected as  Water Manager, it demonstrates 
that people in the community admire and accept her capabilities. This thesis agrees with the 
approach of the PIA 1939-2015 which did not block women from being Water Managers.  
Additionally, providing opportunities for women is compatible with the principles of Human 
Rights and Thailand’s Gender Equality Act 2015, as mentioned earlier.  
 
Right to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment 
In Thailand, the right to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment is 
not expressed explicitly in the Constitution. However, this right may come under the procedural 
obligations of the State, as suggested by Knox. Such obligations include undertaking EIA for 
all proposed projects and policies that may affect biodiversity,87 allowing people to access 
information relating to the environment,88 providing for and facilitating public participation in 
biodiversity-related decisions,89 and providing access to effective remedies for the loss and 
degradation of biodiversity.90 The 2017 Constitution of Thailand stipulates that the duty of the 
State is to complete EIAs, but not social impact assessments (SIA).  
Although people have right to practice Muang Fai customary law according to Section 43 of 
Thailand’s Constitution, it is clear that Thailand also needs to recognise Muang Fai customary 
law in order to respect, fulfil and protect the right of people to a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment.  
In short, it is clear that Muang Fai customary law does not contradict the principles of human 
rights law in Thailand. On the contrary, the customs of Muang Fai are largely compatible with 
and supportf human rights in Thailand.   
                                                                
86  See Imrana Jalal, ‘Woman, Water and leadership’ (ADB BRIEFS No 24, Asian Development Bank, December 2014) 3 . 
<http://www.womenforwater.org/uploads/7/7/5/1/77516286/2016_adb_women-water-and-leadership.pdf> and  
Bruce Gross, Christine van Wijk and Nilanjana Mukherjee, ‘Linking Sustainability with Demand, Gender and Poverty: A Study 
in Community-Managed Water Supply Projects in 15 Countries’ (Water and Sanitation Program The World Bank, 2001) 
<https://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/global_plareport.pdf>. 
87 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 58 Para. 1. (See Appendix)  
88 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 41, 58 Para. 2 (See Appendix) 
89 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 43(3), 57, 58 (See Appendix) 
90 The Constitution of Thailand 2017, S 58 Para. 3 (See Appendix) 
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6.6.2 Legal pluralism in Thailand 
Currently, the Thai government accepts legal pluralism under three conditions: 
1) Family and succession matters of Muslim families. Islamic law can be applied in a civil case 
relating to family and succession matters in which both plaintiff and defendant are Muslims 
and living in Pattani, Narthiwat, Yala and Satun provinces.91  
2) In gaps of law. Customary law can be applied as a subsidiary means when there is a gap in 
the law in civil cases and there is no provision in written law to apply.92  
3) Customary law in criminal cases. Customary law can be used to waive the fault and sanction 
of the defendant in criminal law.93   
Somchai argues, however, that customary law may never be applied in civil cases in Thailand’s 
Courts because almost all legal matters have been provided for in legislation, especially with 
regards to natural resource management.94 In addition, claims by each party using customary 
law might be illegal in terms of legal method. Narongdecha also claims that the majority of 
lawyers in Thailand agree with the definition that law is the command of sovereign. This 
definition is based on the teachings of John Austin, a leading scholar in the school of legal 
positivism.95 The influence of legal positivism can be seen in the judgments relating to the 
legitimacy of the revolutionary group’s declaration. 96 Thus, other norms which are not State 
laws, are not regarded as law by Thailand’s lawyers because the norms do not emerge from 
sovereign command. 
                                                                
91 After Thailand regained complete independence on the legal matter of jurisdiction and taxation in 1938, only two legislations 
to incorporate other norms into Thailand’s legal system had been enacted. One was the law to recognise Muang Fai water 
management customary law (the Act to control Muang Fai and Panang [barrage] 1934 and the The People’s Irrigation Act 1939) 
and the Act for Exercising Islamic Law in Pattani, Narthiwat, Yala and Satun 1946, allowing applying Islamic law in southern 
area of Thailand. Another attempt to recognise customary right, but not successfully, was the Community Forest Bill. This Bill 
was proposed to the National Reform Council of Thailand under the protest of NGOs in 2015. It is argued that the Community 
Forest Bill did not assign power to the local people, lacked of public participation, depleted the inherent right of local people 
and eliminated the local customs. Finally, the Bill was revoked from the consideration of national reformation council on 6 
July 2015. Actually, the policy to conserve local customary laws had never been provided in the 1997 Constitution and 2007 
Constitution as a community’s right, but they were abolished after the coup d’état in 2006 and 2014, respectively. Indeed, the 
community’s right was a problem in Thailand because it is not clear how to define the subject in law; what is the community 
and who will be the representative of the community? However, Thailand’s Constitutional Court, Administrative Court, and 
Justice Court accept the plaint, submitted by the community for the environmental damage.   
92 The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, Book I, Art. 4. 
93  Nattawatra Sutthiyothin, Theory of Criminal Liability (23 June 2018) Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University 
<http://www.stou.ac.th/Schools/Slw/upload/41716_2.pdf> 31. 
94  Somchai Preechasinlapakun, Legal pluralism (17 June 2005) midnight university 
<http://v1.midnightuniv.org/midnight2545/document9622.html>. 
95 Narongdecha Sarukositha, ‘Law is the Command of Sovereign’ 
<http://www.senate.go.th/lawdatacenter/includes/FCKeditor/upload/Image/b/K39_jun3_6.pdf>. 
96 Please see the judgement of the Supreme Court of Thailand 45/2496 B.E., 1162/2505 B.E., 1131/2536 B.E.; the judgement of 
the Constitutional Tribunal 1/2513 B.E.; the judgement of the Supreme Court; and the judgement of the Court of first instance 
1805/2558 B.E. 
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Thus, legal pluralism in Thailand is the weak97 whereby customary law must stay under the 
regulation of Thai State. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed two research questions including whether the Thai legal system 
recognises Muang Fai customary law in water resource management and the whether the role 
of customary law in the Thai legal system for natural resource management is applicable to 
water.  
As such, it investigated the presence of SD in the legal system of Thailand with a focus on the 
application of SD concepts in water resource management. In terms of water law, the principles 
of SD are incorporated into both the general policies and legislation of Thailand, as well as 
appearing in water policies and water legislation. Although the water laws and water institutions 
in Thailand are fragmented, they demonstrate that Thailand obviously tries hard to follow the 
principles of sustainable water management and IWRM to achieve its SD goals.  
This chapter indicates that customary laws around managing water and customary water rights 
are not included in water law in Thailand as they are in the water laws of other countries as 
suggested by the Food and Agriculture Organization. Furthermore, the application of IWRM in 
Thailand does not include water management according to customary law and customary 
rights, although the customary water law such as Muang Fai customary law is still a vital tool 
to manage water for farmers outside the government irrigation zone.   
The human right to access to water is a legal concept, but not written into law in Thailand. 
Therefore, it cannot be argued in a Court or to State officials. Moreover, the legislation to 
provide a modern water rights system and a licensing system to use water from the public water 
resources has not been enacted in Thailand since it was first drafted in mid 1990s.98,99 Public 
participation in water management processes remains a problem in Thailand. However, 
conservation of the forest at the river source is emphasised by the present militarily 
government.   
In terms of customary recognition, Thailand now accepts the application of custom to cases as 
a legal technique to fill the gap in the law when there is no written law. Additionally, the present 
Constitution of Thailand recognises the rights of people and local communities to conserve, 
revive or promote tradition and good customs, while also providing a duty of the State to 
conserve, revive or promote tradition and good customs. However, there is no clear meaning of 
‘good customs’ at present. Furthermore, Thailand needs additional mechanisms to allow local 
people and communities to participate in natural resource management. Hence, while the legal 
                                                                
97 See How State’s Treat Customary Law, Chapter 4 s 4.3.2. 
98   World Bank, Thailand Environment Monitor Integrated Water Resources Management: A Way Forward (2011), 
39.<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/367151468303847751/pdf/633680ESW0P1080RM00June020110Final0.pdf > 
99 Thailand has promulgated the Water Resource Act B.E. 2561 on 28th December 2018 after this thesis had been submitted in 
July 2018  
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system in Thailand accepts both customary law and the concept of CBNRM, it lacks the 
legislation to allow people to participate in natural resource management. 
With respect to the legal principles that support the recognition of customary law, it is clear 
that Thailand is a signatory to human rights treaties which oblige the State to respect, fulfil and 
protect the rights of people to practice their own customs and the rights of people to access 
water and adequate food. This provides a further argument for Thailand to recognise customary 
law, particularly Muang Fai customary law that supports the right to adequate food. 
  
In the case of legal pluralism, the situation of legal pluralism in Thailand is the weak version 
of legal pluralism.     
The next chapter provides a legal framework for the recognition of Muang Fai customary law.
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Chapter seven - The prospect of recognizing Muang Fai customary law 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented the meaning, processes, benefits and limitations of Muang Fai.  It also 
addressed how Muang Fai can support sustainable water management. Chapter 3 indicated the 
meanings and legal principles of sustainable development ( SD)  and sustainable water 
management.  It also established that Thailand is at risk of breaching international obligations 
to protect biodiversity provided by Article 8 j. of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)1 
if it does recognise Muang Fai customary law Chapter 3 also revealed how local people can 
cooperate and manage natural resources sustainably observing rules according to the Common 
Pool Resource Management (CPRM) theory. Chapter 4 examined the trends in domestic water 
law for sustainable water management and the ways of recognising customary law for 
managing natural resources sustainably. Chapter 5 studied the lessons learned from Samoa and 
Vanuatu in managing natural resources sustainably. 
The previous chapter illustrated the present situation in Thailand in terms of water law, as well 
as the legal principles relating to customary law recognition in Thailand.  The principles of SD 
and sustainable water management are incorporated into the Constitution, water legislation, 
and water policies in Thailand. Furthermore, Thailand has attempted to implement an Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach. However, Thailand does not accept customary 
law as a source of water law, even though many people still follow customary law.  Hence, 
customary water rights are not recognised officially.  Currently there is no mechanism to 
reconcile customary water law and statutory water law.  Neither is there a clear dispute 
settlement mechanism for settling conflict between customary water rights and statutory water 
rights.   Additionally, water rights in general in Thailand are not clear, even in relation to 
statutory water rights. It is not clear whether the right to use water can be separated from water 
ownership.  Furthermore, it is unclear as to which right would prevail in a conflict between 
customary water rights and statutory water rights.    
This chapter aims to address the sixth research questions; namely, the law reform approaches 
required to improve the recognition of Muang Fai customary law for the SD of water resources 
in Thailand.  That is to propose a legal framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law for 
SD in Thailand.  It does so by combining theory with legal principles and lessons learned from 
other countries.  The chapter then considers the current problems and legal conditions for the 
Muang Fai community in Thailand, as considered in the former chapters, to suggest a new legal 
framework for recognising Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions in Thailand.  
                                                                
1 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) Art. 8(j).  
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It is evident, through the lessons learned from both Samoa and Vanuatu, that a legislation-only 
approach is not enough to create local institutions to govern natural resources sustainably. The 
approach must also have clear policies to support the implementation of any legislation.  The 
policy required for the recognition of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institution 
include: 1) maximum community participation; 2) motivation rather than education; 3) a demand-
based approach; 4)  the development of alternative sources of water for agriculture and 
cultivation instead of asking farmers to limit water utilisation; and 5)  a focus on the 
development of livelihoods of water users, not just on creating and enforcing the water 
utilisation rules.    
To understand how a new legal framework can improve existing problems relating to Muang 
Fai communities to support and promote sustainable Muang Fai communities to govern water 
resource in Thailand, it is important to first understand the present-day problems of Muang Fai. 
These problems are outlined in Table 33 below:   
Table 33 Present-day problems of Muang Fai community 
Problems of Muang Fai community relating to 
the sustainability 
Problems in the People’s Irrigation Act (PIA) and 
problems resulting from its abolition 
Migration of people from rural areas to urban areas 
causing a labour shortage and no knowledge 
transfer.  
 
Government intervention 
( Blueprint to convert Muang Fai communities to 
Water User Organisations [WUOs] with one style) 
Blueprint idea for Muang Fai structure  
Land use changes and impacts on Muang Fai Canals and ditches in Muang Fai community are 
blocked  
Bias of State officers - 
No clear water rights for both statutory water rights 
and customary water rights 
 
Rules do not obligate outsiders  
No provision to include the Muang Fai community 
in town and city planning processes 
 
 Legal status of local Water Management Committee, 
appointed according to the PIA 
 Legal status of the Muang Fai communities and 
representative of Muang Fai community 
 Offences relating to Muang Fai communities 
 Power and duties of the Water Manager and his 
assistant  
 Status of water customary rights according to Muang 
Fai customary law  
 No reconciliation process between the statutory 
water rights and the customary water rights 
 No clear dispute settlement process for resolving 
conflict between statutory water rights and 
customary water rights 
 
From the critical review of CPRM theory, it became clear that the common problem for CPRM 
is how to create sustainable institutions to govern common pool resources.  Furthermore, the 
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question of how to encourage local people to participate in the institution to share the benefits 
and duties equitably needs to be explored. In short, the questions for CPRM are: 1) how to create 
the game and set the rules; 2)  how to encourage local people to play the game; and 3)  how to 
encourage people to follow the rules.2     
Recognition of Muang Fai community is about creating the game for water management and 
recognising the process to create the rules for the game. Establishing a sustainable governance 
regime for water use is about finding ways to encourage people to play the game and to follow 
the rules of the game. This raises the question, what activities should be covered by legislation 
to promote the recognition of Muang Fai in a way that is effective and sustainable?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
2 Elinor Ostrom et al., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (University of Michigan Press, 1994).  
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Table 34 Activities that can create sustainable institutions to govern common pool resources. 
Questions relating 
to natural resource 
management 
Answers from 
CPRM theory 
SD principles Suggestions from CPRM 
research and success stories 
Activities that can create 
sustainable institutions to govern 
common pool resources 
1) How to create 
the game and set 
the rules 
Legal recognition of 
the rights of 
resource users and 
the regime to 
govern resources 
Defines boundary of 
resource clearly 
 Capacity building 
Multiple rules of using natural 
resources in that area to 
ensure compatibility with the 
natural conditions 
Allow people to craft their 
own rules 
Use a voluntary approach 
Understand how local 
regimes manage natural 
resources  
Provide clear scope for local 
institutions to enact rules to 
ensure the compatibility 
between national rules and 
local rules 
Study the traditional /local regime to 
manage natural resources 
Recognise the rights of institutions to 
manage natural resources 
Recognise the rights of resource users 
to use natural resources 
Recognise the institutions 
Recognise the processes used by 
institutions to create rules for 
managing natural resources 
Provide the process to define resource 
boundaries 
Connect the natural resource 
utilisation regime of institutions with 
the national management of natural 
resources  
Provide a clear scope that local 
institutions can enact rules to ensure 
the compatibility between national 
rules and local rules 
2) How to 
encourage local 
people to play the 
game effectively 
Balance between 
the resource 
environment and its 
governance 
structure or rules 
Balance between 
the benefits of each 
resource user and 
the duties  
Decisions are made 
through collective-
choice arrangements 
that allow most 
resource 
appropriators to 
participate.  
Principles 10, 20, 
21and 22 of Rio 
Declaration [public 
participation] 
Principles 15, 16 
and 17 of Rio 
Declaration 
(Precautionary 
principle/ Using 
economic tools / 
Environmental 
Impact Assessment) 
Chapters 23-32, 36 
and 37 of Agenda 
21 
The future we want 
Do not use natural resources 
beyond the natural limitation 
Decentralisation and the 
inclusion of stakeholders in 
using natural resource are 
success factors 
Crafting rules is an ongoing 
process. 
Mobile theatre to inspire 
people to act collectively for 
sustainability and for their 
own benefits 
Post the process after 
establishing the programme 
Review management plan 
continuously 
Create a feasibility study process to 
determine the quantity of natural 
resources in each area and to ensure 
that natural resource utilisation does 
not overrun the supply of natural 
resources  
Create a capacity-building programme 
Guarantee the natural resources users 
can access information relating to 
natural resources management in each 
institution equally 
Recognise the decision-making 
processes of institutions that ensure 
the participation of all natural 
resource users 
Educate the next generation on how 
collective action institutions work 
3) How to 
encourage people 
to follow the rules 
Rules are enforced 
through effective 
monitoring by those 
who are part of, or 
accountable to, the 
appropriators 
Violations are 
punished with 
graduated sanctions 
Conflicts and issues 
are addressed with 
low-cost and easy-
to-access conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms  
 Encourage people with a 
successful model 
Use interested people to 
monitor the enforcement of 
rules 
Enforce rules to both 
members and outsiders who 
use the natural resources in 
the jurisdiction of the 
common pool resources group 
Post the process after 
establishing the programme 
Support the community with 
alternative resources 
Review the management plan 
continuously  
Use a monitoring system 
Recognise the sanctions of 
institutions 
Allow institutions to enforce their 
own rules to both water users in the 
institution and to outsiders 
Recognise the authority of institutions 
to settle disputes in order to guarantee 
inexpensive and easy access to 
conflict management processes 
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The next question to answer relates to the types of legal measures or actions required for the 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community to create a sustainable 
Muang Fai community.  This thesis applies the lessons learned from the recognition of 
customary law and customary institutions in Samoa and Vanuatu.  Their legal measures and 
actions are compared to the legal measures used in the PIA of Thailand which failed to 
recognise Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community (see Table 35).     
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Table 35 Effective measures to use to govern common pool resources 
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No Yes Yes 
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No Yes Yes 
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Recognise the processes of institutions to 
create rules for managing natural 
resources  
No Yes Yes 
Provide the process to define resource 
boundaries 
Yes Yes Yes 
Connect natural resource utilisation 
regime of institutions with the national 
management of natural resources  
Partly Yes Yes 
Provide clear scope for local institutions 
to enact rules to ensure compatibility 
between national rules and local rules 
No Yes Yes 
2
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e 
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l 
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 p
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e 
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- Balance between the 
resource environment 
and its governance 
structure or rules 
- Balance between the 
benefits and duties of 
each resource user  
- Decisions are made 
through collective-
choice arrangements 
that allow most 
resource appropriators 
to participate  
Create a feasibility study process to 
identify the quantity of natural resources 
in each area and to ensure that their 
utilisation does not overrun the natural 
supply 
No Yes Yes 
Create capacity-building programmes No Yes Yes 
Guarantee resource users can access 
information relating to natural resources 
management in each institution equally 
No No No 
Recognise the decision-making processes 
of institutions by ensuring the 
participation of all natural resources users 
No Yes Yes 
Educate the next generation on how 
collective action institutions work 
No No Yes 
3
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s. 
- Rules are enforced 
through effective 
monitoring by those 
who are part of, or 
accountable to, the 
appropriators 
- Violations are 
punished with 
graduated sanctions 
- Conflicts and issues 
are addressed with 
low-cost and easy-to-
access conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms  
Monitoring system Yes Yes Yes 
Recognising the sanctions of institutions Partly Yes Yes 
Allowing institutions to enforce their own 
rules to both water users in institutions 
and to outsiders 
No Yes Yes, with the 
assistance of 
police 
Recognising the authority of institutions 
to settle disputes to guarantee easy access 
to inexpensive conflict management 
processes 
Partly Yes, the 
dispute is 
settled by 
Village 
Fono 
Yes, the 
dispute is 
settled in 
Nakamal. 
 
Table 35 makes explicit why the recognition of Muang Fai communities provided in the PIA 
did not facilitate Muang Fai to become a sustainable institution. By comparison, the recognition 
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of traditional customary law and customary institutions in Samoa and Vanuatu was 
accomplished successfully.    
Two further questions relate to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law. Firstly, what legal 
approach should be used to recognise Muang Fai customary law public law or private law and 
secondly, to what extent can new legal measures in the recognition of Muang Fai customary 
law resolve the present problems of the Muang Fai community?  
To answer the first question, this thesis uses legal analysis from Chapter 6 which indicates that 
Thailand does not have a law to which define water rights clearly.  However, the nation has 
attempted to apply an IWRM approach to sustainable water management.  Furthermore, water 
institutions in Thailand have attempted the Participatory Irrigation Management ( PIM) 
approach to include local people in water management processes via the creation of water user 
organisations (WUOs). WUOs in Thailand can be both juristic persons and non-juristic persons. 
They also be established by both public law and private law.  Therefore, the legal approach to 
recognising the Muang Fai community, addressing the current problems of the Muang Fai 
community, and leading the Muang Fai community towards becoming a sustainable 
organisation can be undertaken both in public law and private law.  However, recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions should be undertaken in collaboration 
with members of the Muang Fai community and apply the approaches utilizes in community-
based fishery management in Samoa and Vanuatu.  The blanket recognition of all Muang Fai 
communities however, without regard to their individual readiness, will only result in the 
failure of Muang Fai community recognition once again. 
This chapter illustrates the merits of the various approaches to recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law and the Muang Fai community. 
7.2 Legal approach to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law 
In the exploration of sustainable water management and CPRM theory provided in Chapter 3, 
Dante and Gachenga proposed the use of WUO to recognise customary law.  This approach 
works because it recognises both customary law and customary institutions.  Hodgson further 
suggests that sustainable WUOs can be achieved through recognition in public law because the 
WUOs must apply power delegated by the State to manage water, especially when water is 
classified as a public resource. Lindsay argues that the co-management approach should be used 
to create institutions such as community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) , to 
govern natural resources3 when there are no traditional institutions in place.   
This thesis argues that Thailand should recognise Muang Fai communities as WUOs.   In this 
case, it is not necessary to create a new regime or institution to govern water because the Muang 
Fai community is already well established.  Muang Fai customary law has been applied in 
                                                                
3 Jon Lindsay, 'Designing Legal Space: Law as an Enabling Tool in Community-Based Management' (2000). 
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northern Thailand for a long time.  The Thai government already promotes WUOs and tries to 
persuade farmers to unify as a water user group or WUO to participate in the water management 
process.  As indicated in Chapter 6, Thailand currently does not have a specific water law to 
recognise the legal status and authority of water user groups and WUOs.  The Cooperative Act 
1999 and the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand are applied to recognise WUOs and some 
Muang Fai communities.  However, the weakness of the existing approach to recognising 
Muang Fai community and WUOs is the lack of legislation underpinning the recognition. 
Hence, the present recognition of Muang Fai customary law is not stable.  It could be changed 
when a new approach to manage water is introduced into Thailand.  This thesis argues that 
Thailand should introduce a special law to recognise Muang Fai customary law.  This leads to 
the question, what type of law is needed to properly recognise Muang Fai customary law and 
the Muang Fai community.  The answer to this question is that Thailand could adopt either a 
public law approach or a private law approach to properly recognise Muang Fai.   The details 
and merits of each approach are presented below.   
7.2.1 Approaches to the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in Thailand  
a. Public law approach 
Using public law to recognise Muang Fai customary law in Thailand, as suggested by 
Hodgson,4 could be accomplished at two levels of public law as indicated below: 
1) Recognition by statute  
As indicated in the examples of Samoa, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand, and even in 
Thailand (explored in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6) , recognition of customary law for governing 
natural resources can be accomplished by legislation.  This suggests that the recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community may also be accomplished by statute. 
Muang Fai customary law has already been recognised by the People’s Irrigation Act (PIA) 
between 1939 and 2015.  The advantage of recognising customary law using this approach is 
that it provides security to the Muang Fai community.  Recognition of Muang Fai customary 
law could not be changed based on shifts in water management policy in Thailand. Furthermore, 
statutory recognition of Muang Fai customary law would obligate all related government 
organisations to apply the law.  This would resolve the problem of Muang Fai customary law 
not being incorporated into the city and town planning processes as mentioned in Chapter 2.  
However, provision for the incorporation of the Muang Fai community into the city and town 
planning process must be expressed clearly in the statutes because the community has not 
previously been incorporated into these processes, even though PIA recognised it between 1939 
and 2015.  Additionally, the exploration of the recognition of customary law in Chapters 2, 4 
                                                                
4 Stephen Hodgson, Legislation on Water Users' Organizations: A Comparative Analysis (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 
2003).   
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and 6 of this thesis indicated that a key barrier is the legal idea of positivism and its State-
centric emphasis.  This means that laws must only be norms that emerge from the State or are 
recognised by the State.  Moreover, the internal colonisation in Thailand which is long-rooted 
in Thailand’s history has led to the denial of local history, local customs and to the refusal to 
recognise local customs in the legal system.5 However, such notions are not compatible with 
the social realities and hinder the adaptation of customary law.  
This thesis suggests that the definition of law in Thailand could be redefined to include 
customary law as one source of water law, as long as it does not contradict justice and human 
rights principles, as indicated in Chapter 4.6  The Water Resource Bill of Thailand is already 
poised to accept the existence of the Muang Fai community as a WUO.7 Therefore, it is possible 
to recognise Muang Fai through this approach.  The next question is what would be the legal 
framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law and Mung Fai community through this 
approach.  The details of a legal framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law and the 
Muang Fai community are provided in section 7.1.2. 
2) Recognition of Muang Fai by Municipal ordinance 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a local administrative authority can enact a local ordinance to 
recognise Muang Fai customs as well as enact a local ordinance to provide rules for governing 
the electrical water pump station. This method is easier than enacting a new statute to recognise 
customary law.  It can be enacted immediately in the area where Muang Fai customary law is 
being applied. However, the limitations to this approach are outlined as follows: 
i) Local ordinances can be enforced only in the jurisdiction of the local administrative authority. 
This may create a problem if the land of a particular Muang Fai irrigation system falls under 
the jurisdictions of two or more local administrative authorities. It cannot be guaranteed that all 
local administrative authorities will recognise Muang Fai customs in the same way. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether local administrative authorities can come to a joint 
agreement to cooperate on the management of water.  
ii)  Local ordinances cannot enforce other water institutions, the Royal Irrigation Department 
(RID) and the Department of Water Resource (DWR), to cooperate with the local administrative 
authority on water management. This may cause conflict if the area under Muang Fai customary 
law and the irrigated areas under the State Irrigation Act overlap.   However, the local 
administrative authorities normally cooperate with the RID through the Joint Committee to 
manage water in reservoirs.8 Hence, there may not be a conflict.  
                                                                
5 See Topic 4.3.1 C in Chapter 4 and Topic 6.6.2 in Chapter 6.  
6 See Topic 4.3.1 Chapter 4. 
7 See Topic 6.2.2 I in Chapter 6. 
8 See Topic 6.2.3 in Chapter 6. 
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iii)  Local authority ordinances cannot force other government organisations to accept Muang 
Fai customs.  The customs may or may not be linked to the town and city planning process.  If 
the Muang Fai area falls outside the jurisdiction of the local administrative authority to have 
enacted a local ordinance to recognise Muang Fai customary law, then problems relating to 
conflicts over changes to land use may be difficult to resolve. 
iv)  Local authorities may recognise Muang Fai by a codification process which leads to the 
freezing of Muang Fai customs and prevents the adaptation of Muang Fai customs to new social 
changes. This is particularly important in terms of the water quality maintenance, global climate 
change adaptation, and water management during natural disasters.        
b. Private law approach  
Recognition by private law (Civil Law)  is also a legal measure for sustaining Muang Fai 
institutions and Muang Fai customary law under Thailand’s legal system. Although, this method 
cannot resolve all present problems and challenges of the Muang Fai community, it creates 
room for the Muang Fai community in present- day society and the water management 
processes.  This approach can be undertaken through the registration of Muang Fai as a juristic 
person under Thailand’s law.  Muang Fai would become a juristic person with the ability to 
present cases to the Court.  Furthermore, Muang Fai would be recognised as a WUO and thus 
incorporated into the water management processes in Thailand. This thesis suggests registering 
Muang Fai as a cooperative.  In fact, water users have the freedom to choose any type of legal 
entity according to Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code of law.  However, cooperatives are 
exempted from many types of tax burdens.  This would allow Muang Fai to avoid a tax burden 
if they register as the cooperative.  The next step would be for all farmers who are members of 
the cooperative to sign the consent form.  This would allow staff and members of the Muang 
Fai cooperative to access their own land to maintain the Muang Fai dikes and to give servitude 
over their own land to the Muang Fai cooperative.  It would also guarantee that the dikes or 
canals of the Muang Fai community are not blocked by new land buyers.  
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Figure 27 Process to recognise Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai community via the private law approach 
However, the private law approach may not guarantee that land use in the Muang Fai 
community is incorporated into the town and city planning processes. Furthermore, using land 
for the construction of canals may be not allowed, particularly if the land use by the Muang Fai 
community contradicts existing town and city plans.  The strengths and weaknesses of each 
method are outlined in Table 36 below:     
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Table 36 SWOT analysis of the recognition of customary law via public law and private law approaches in Thailand 
Sources of law Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat 
P
u
b
li
c 
la
w
 v
ia
 s
ta
tu
te
 
- Secure the water rights of 
Muang Fai 
- Resolve all legal 
problems of Muang Fai 
- Farmers are confident to 
participate as members 
- Have the relevant State 
agencies support and 
supervise  
-It is difficult to 
amend the law 
-If the law is not 
drafted properly it 
may be too rigid and 
ultimately degrade 
rather than support 
Muang Fai  
 
-  Could encourage 
farmers in other parts of 
Thailand to unify as a 
WUO and manage water 
sustainably 
- Muang Fai is accepted 
and supported by the 
government as one 
organisation in the water 
management process  
-It is difficult to pass law in 
parliament if it has the 
provision to collect water 
fees from farmers  
P
u
b
li
c 
la
w
 v
ia
 m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l 
o
rd
in
a
n
ce
 
It is easy to enact and amend 
Muang Fai falls under the 
supervision of the municipal 
authorities 
- The jurisdiction of 
Muang Fai covers 
only the land under 
the jurisdiction of one 
municipal authority, 
unless the municipal 
authorities agree to 
jointly manage the 
water resource 
- It cannot guarantee 
the water rights of 
Muang Fai 
- The Muang Fai 
community has no 
legal status 
- It provides no 
exemption from the 
tax burden   
- Could encourage 
farmers in other parts of 
Thailand to unify as a 
WUO and manage water 
sustainably 
- Muang Fai is accepted 
and supported by the 
government as one 
organisation in the water 
management process, if it 
is established under the 
cooperation of the 
municipal authority and 
the related water 
agencies 
- Muang Fai may be 
affected by changes in 
policy by the government 
P
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v
a
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- Farmers can do it by 
themselves and need not 
wait for assistance from 
government 
-Easy to modify and adjust 
the organisation  
-  Farmers, as members, can 
participate fully in the 
decision making of the 
organisation  
-Muang Fai community can 
protect their water rights by 
presenting cases to the Court 
on their own behalf 
   
- It cannot guarantee 
the water rights of 
Muang Fai. 
Muang Fai 
community have no 
special legal status to 
use water.  It can use 
water as one person, 
but they cannot 
allocate water 
internally among 
their members. 
- It is not exempted 
from the value-added 
tax burden 
-The power of Muang 
Fai covers only the 
areas in which the 
owners participate in 
Muang Fai or that are 
rented by Muang Fai 
-There is no guarantee 
that the Muang Fai  
community will be 
included in city 
planning process 
-  Muang Fai may be 
affected  by the changes 
of policies by 
government 
 
 
Table 36 shows that the most efficient method for recognising Muang Fai communities is via 
a private law approach because farmers can implement it themselves.  However, this cannot 
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guarantee that the Muang Fai community, registered as a legal entity, will be incorporated into 
the water planning or the and city and town planning processes in Thailand.  This depends on 
the relationship the community has with officials in the related government organisations. This 
thesis proposes then that a public law approach is the preferred approach to the recognition of 
Muang Fai customary law. 
Another important question is how to create a new legal framework that can resolve the current 
problems of the Muang Fai community and support an ongoing sustainable approach to Muang 
Fai customary law and a sustainable Muang Fai community.   This thesis proposes a new legal 
framework as presented in Table 37 below: 
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Table 37 Problems relating to the Muang Fai community, the People’s Irrigation Act, and its abolition:  The new legal 
framework proposed by this thesis 
Problems of Muang Fai 
community relating to 
sustainability  
Problems with the PIA and its 
abolition 
The new legal framework proposed by this thesis 
Migration of people from rural 
areas to urban areas causing 
labour shortages and limiting 
knowledge transfer  
 Knowledge management, developing a data base, the 
transfer of knowledge to the next generation, and social 
education 
Government intervention 
( Blueprint idea to convert 
Muang Fai community to a 
WUO with one style) 
Blueprint for the Muang Fai 
structure.  
Recognise the autonomy of each Muang Fai community 
to create its own institutional structure and rules for 
governing irrigation activities 
Land use changes and impacts 
on Muang Fai 
Canals and ditches in Muang Fai 
community are blocked  
Improve law enforcement. 
Register canals and ditches in Muang Fai community as 
the servitude or usufruct. 
Bias of State officer  Recognise Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai 
community. Create guidelines for officials who must work 
with the Muang Fai community.  Publish and circulate 
guidelines to people in the Muang Fai community. 
Lack of clear statutory water 
rights and customary water 
rights 
 Reform the water rights system in Thailand 
Rules do not obligate outsiders  Allow the Muang Fai community to enforce their own 
rules to outsiders who stay in the jurisdiction of Muang 
Fai 
No provision to include the 
Muang Fai community in town 
and city planning processes 
 Acknowledge Muang Fai customary law and the Muang 
Fai community in town and city planning legislation and 
processes 
 Legal status of the local water 
management committee, appointed 
according to the PIA 
Recognise the Muang Fai Community as a legal person 
and recognise the authority of the local water management 
committee 
 Legal status of the Muang Fai 
communities and the Muang Fai 
community representative 
Recognise the Chief of the irrigation system 
 Offences relating to Muang Fai 
communities 
Recognise the autonomy of the Muang Fai community to 
create its own rules including fines and punishments 
relating to governing irrigation activities 
 The power and duties of the Water 
Manager and water manager 
assistants.  
Recognise the authority of the Water Manager and water 
manager assistants 
 Status of water customary rights 
according to Muang Fai customary 
law  
Recognise customary water rights in law and provide 
mechanisms to reconcile customary water rights and 
statutory water rights in law 
 No reconciliation process between 
statutory water rights and water 
customary rights 
Provide mechanisms to reconcile customary water rights 
and statutory water rights in law 
 No clear dispute settlement process 
for resolving conflicts between 
statutory water rights and water 
customary rights 
Provide clear mechanisms and processes regarding 
dispute settlement to resolve conflicts between statutory 
water rights and customary water rights.  Provide the duty 
to make agreements between the Muang Fai community 
and outsiders who use water from the same source as the 
Muang Fai community.  Prioritise the water user system 
and water rights 
 
It is not within the realm of law to resolve some problems such as the migration of people from 
rural areas to urban areas.  This is because the freedom of transportation is a principle of basic 
human rights.  This thesis applies the criteria developed by Gachenga relating to knowledge 
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management9 to propose the following indirect mechanisms to support the sustainability of the 
Muang Fai community:  
1) Identify the traditional knowledge and modern scientific knowledge useful for water, natural 
resource and environmental management; 
2) Create a data base that is accessible to all people to study this knowledge; and 
3) Incorporate compulsory natural resource management subjects into the study programmes 
of students in the provinces which have Muang Fai communities.  
In this way, traditional knowledge relating to Muang Fai water management would be 
transferred to the next generation.  Although nothing can guarantee that Muang Fai will last 
forever, with some thought and effort Muang Fai traditional knowledge and the current 
scientific knowledge can be transferred to the next generation.         
 The legal framework and approach to recognising Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai 
institutions proposed by this thesis is outlined in the mind map below: 
 
                                                                
9 Elizabeth W Gachenga, Integrating Customary and Statutory Law Systems of Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development: The Case of the Marakwet of Kenya (University of Western Sydney, 2012) 158. 
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Figure 28 Points of concern regarding the sustainable recognition of Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai 
institutions 
The legal mechanisms in Figure 28 above are designed to resolve the existing problems of 
Muang Fai community as indicated in the Table 37 above. 
7.2.2 Legal framework for recognition 
Conversion of the Muang Fai community to a legal entity is easy, but it cannot guarantee the 
sustainability of the community as a juristic person in the long term. This is because a successful 
WUO requires more than just legal status. It also needs good management. In fact, recognition 
of the Muang Fai community is only acknowledging the game that local people play for 
equitable water sharing and to allow all people to participate fairly for their own benefits.10 
Therefore, the legal framework to recognise Muang Fai community is another significant issue 
to ensure the sustainability of the institution.  
The legal framework should address two issues: 1) the topic of concern and the provision in law 
and legislations; and 2)  the process to recognise Muang Fai customary law in each area 
irrespective of whether the recognition is through public law or private law. 
A. Topics to address and provide for in law, legislation or the contract to establish the 
Muang Fai system 
1) Activities of Muang Fai  
The legislation to recognise Muang Fai customary law or the clauses in the Muang Fai contract 
should have provisions relating to the activities of Muang Fai customary law and institutions. 
They should include the following three elements:  i)  organisation management activities; ii) 
controlling structure activities; and iii)  water utilisation operations.  The Thai government can 
ensure that the water utilisation rules of the Muang Fai community are compatible with national 
water laws by providing clear scope over which the Muang Fai community has the power to 
enact rules. An example of where this arrangement has worked is the Fishery Management Act 
2017 of Samoa.  
2) Capacity-building programme  
Irrespective of whether the Muang Fai community is recognised by public law or private law, 
the government should support all water users via the implementation of a capacity-building 
programme to ensure all water users have adequate knowledge before allowing irrigators to 
craft their own rules.  However, the programme should avoid all unnecessary meetings and 
should be run during a suitable time; namely, after all water users have finished work. 
                                                                
10  Ostrom et al., above n 2.  
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To support the Muang Fai community to work effectively, the capacity-building programme 
should train local people to identify local water problems and solutions. Then, each Muang Fai 
community should have its own plan to resolve water problems, supported by academic and 
technical advice from the government.  The process to define water problems and to create a 
plan to resolve them is illustrated in Figure 29 below:  
 
Figure 29 Process to define water problems in each Muang Fai Community (source: adapted from King, M., K. Passfield 
and E.  Ropeti, Management of village fisheries:  Samoa community- based management strategy Samoa.  Fisheries 
Division- Min. Samoa,2001) 
This allows local people to exchange traditional knowledge relating to water management and 
to ensure the Muang Fai community works effectively and to resolve its problems. 
Furthermore, the government should support the Muang Fai community with knowledge in the 
following areas: 
a. The relationship between surface water and underground water and how to 
manage them in terms of quantity and quality; 
b. Global climate change adaptation; 
c. The water level required to conserve the ecological system; 
d. Water data collection and management; and  
e. Data and information regarding the amount of water supply in each water 
resource with a view to ensuring enough reserve water to maintain the 
ecological system as a priority.  The surplus water can then be allocated among 
irrigators without overestimating the capacity of a water source to supply water. 
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If possible, the Thai government should establish special organisations to support the 
capabilities of people in the Muang Fai community.  The government should also organise 
seminars to bring together Water Managers and water users in Muang Fai communities to learn 
of examples of other successful Muang Fai communities.  
3) Adjustment mechanism 
Adjustment mechanism refers to the feedback and permission mechanism to allow water users 
to participate in the decision-making and rule-improvement processes when the institution faces 
new problems or challenges.  The adjustment mechanism is a strength in the collective action 
of organisations which facilitates more effective responses to issues compared to the 
bureaucratic system.  This is because the feedback via the bureaucratic systems is often too 
slow, and the system is too rigid and inflexible. It does not easily allow users to adjust systems 
to the realities and contingencies of each area.  The adjustment mechanism should be linked to 
crafting the institutional process, which is ongoing.  The rules in use, particularly operational 
rules, should be adjustable to the dynamics of the environment.   
 
4) Autonomy  
The autonomy of the Muang Fai community is considered in relation to its capacity to design 
(craft) and enforce its own rules compatible with the natural resources, the physical 
conditions, the climate, and the number of members. Furthermore, the Mung Fai community 
must have the capacity to enforce its own rules against members (irrigators), outsiders and 
even the State. It also means that the government must not try to convert these traditional 
institutions to institutions according to a standard model.  No one ‘best practice’ model for 
irrigation institutions and rules should be applied to all institution because of the differences 
in physical, cultural, economic and social conditions in which they operate. Legislation 
should allow local people to design and adjust the rules in use to fit with the local conditions. 
To afford the Muang Fai communities with such autonomy, the decentralisation of 
governance needs to be provided for clearly in both water legislation and the water policies of 
Thailand. 
5) Legal protections or legal issues to observe in contracts 
As mentioned by Ostrom and other CPRM and legal scholars, the creation of enduring 
institutions to govern natural resources requires legal measures to protect the following: 
- Resources  
Laws should provide clear legal methods to demarcate clearly the boundaries of the resource. 
This is to allow the Muang Fai community to enforce rules in clear jurisdictions and to not 
violate other people’s right to water. To achieve this goal, the method to demarcate boundaries 
must consider issues relevant to other communities, including disadvantaged communities, as 
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evidenced in the Fishery Management Act of Samoa.  For example, public participation 
processes such as public hearings must happen before the demarcation of the boundaries of 
resources. 
 
Furthermore, the rights of communities to use resources and the right of each water user in 
Muang Fai to use water must be clear and secured in terms of quantity, place and time.  Only 
then will water users be prepared to invest in the Muang Fai community as it will work to their 
own benefit. Shah indicates that the water license system does not support the collective action 
system of water use.  The author proposes that a special license for collective action be 
designed.11 This thesis agrees with Shah and proposes that the special license should state the 
quantity and quality of water for the Muang Fai community, especially during the dry season. 
It should also state the periodic review process, amendment process, expiry date of the license, 
the clause relating to each user’s transfer rights to use water, and  the special process for water 
allocation during drought.  The quantity of water allocated by the licence for each Muang Fai 
community must not, however, exceed the capacity of the water supply in each area. 
Furthermore, the number of water users in each Muang Fai community must not exceed the 
capacity of water supply in each area.  
 
Additionally, the Thai government should secure the water rights of all water users in the 
Muang Fai community by allowing them to exclude outsiders from water sharing in the same 
river unless both the Muang Fai community and the outsiders establish a water sharing 
agreement. The water sharing agreement between a Muang Fai community and outsiders should 
be facilitated and regulated by a government organisation.  Finally, the right to access water 
according to the license must be secured and guaranteed by the government.  If the Thai 
government prefers to use water for other purposes rather than to supply water to the Muang 
Fai community, then it must pay the costs to stop the supply of water to the Muang Fai 
community. 
  
- Right to use water/ownership of water  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the legal status of water in Thailand is not clear.  The right to use 
water and the ownership of water are not differentiated clearly.  Furthermore, water in the 
Muang Fai system is considered to be communally owned according to Muang Fai customary 
law.  The legal status of water after passing through the wood water gate to the paddy fields of 
local farmers is also unclear.   However, it is reported that local farmers have a local custom of 
selling the right to use water to other water users. This indicates that Muang Fai customary law 
accepts a form of water market system. Hence, water laws, or the laws to recognise Muang Fai 
customary law, should clearly define these issues as well as recognise the right of the Muang 
Fai community to sell water.       
 
Although the recognition of Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community is 
satisfied via the private approach, the contract to establish a Muang Fai community or the 
contract to create a legal entity should include clauses regarding water rights and the ownership 
of water.  This is to prevent problems in future.  Furthermore, including explicit statements 
                                                                
11 Barbara CP Koppen, Mark Giordano and John Butterworth, Community-Based Water Law and Water Resource 
Management Reform in Developing Countries (CABI, 2007). 
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relating to the right to use water and the ownership of water supports the water market system 
and its aim to enhance water utilisation efficiency.   
 
- Groups/institutions 
The law in Thailand should allow the Muang Fai community to define how its recruits water 
users as members of the Muang Fai community. However, the law should recognise such rules 
and agree to enforce such rules when there is conflict between the Muang Fai community and 
people applying to become members of a community.  As reported by Hodgson in Chapter 3, 
there are many types of water users in WUOs, with some having the right to use water, but not 
the right to vote and express their opinion in meetings.  However, the role of water users in the 
Muang Fai community is not complex as it is for water users in other WUOs. In the Muang Fai 
community, all water users have the right to use water and the right to vote and express their 
opinions.  Allowing the Muang Fai community to craft their own rules for recruitment of 
members and for classifying members supports the development of the Muang Fai community. 
In the future, the Muang Fai community may have many types of water users and official rules 
to transfer the right to use water, which support the water market in Thailand.  This is because 
a Muang Fai community operates in a way similar to a WUO.Furthermore, the law should allow 
water users in the Muang Fai community to create their own organisational structure and 
numbers to fit with the irrigation activities in each community.  It is important that the Thai 
government does not attempt to convert all Muang Fai communities to the same organisational 
structure.    
 
- Information 
The law in Thailand should guarantee the rights of Muang Fai water users to access information 
relating to the quantity and quality of the water supply, as well as the balance sheet of the 
Muang Fai community.  This will support water users in the Muang Fai to participate in the 
decision-making processes of their community and to more effectively protect their interests. 
Equal access to information will encourage sustainable collective action and a willingness to 
participate because each water user in the Muang Fai community will be treated equally and 
fairly in the community.   
- Rights and duties 
Thailand law should allow Muang Fai communities to define the rights and duties of each water 
user as members of the community.  The law must also recognise the right of each member to 
use water upon its receipt from the Muang Fai system and to establish this as a transferable 
right. However, the law should recognise such rules and agree to enforce such rules when there 
is conflict between the Muang Fai community and each water user, or conflict between water 
users.  Furthermore, the Thai government should recognise the power of the Water Manager of 
the Muang Fai community as follows: 
a. To settle conflicts among water users in the Muang Fai community; 
b. To exclude outsiders from using water from the Muang Fai system; and  
c. To be a representative of the Muang Fai to present a case/cases to the Court or 
related government organisations. 
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- Rules in use 
Thailand law should recognise the rules in use (i.e., rules of Muang Fai community)  and allow 
the enforcement of such rules to all people in Muang Fai and to outsiders who have land and 
use water in the jurisdiction of the Muang Fai community.  There may be may more than one 
set of Rules in use in each Muang Fai community, particularly for water allocation.  The law 
should recognise all such rules in use for the allocation of water. This aligns with Tang’s work 
which notes that successful farmer-based irrigation systems have many rules regarding the 
allocation of water to ensure compatibility with the physical conditions of the area, the weather, 
and the quantity of water supplied during each period of the year.12 Furthermore, rules in use 
relating to the water utilisation and land management of each Muang Fai community should 
have legal effect and be mandatory for all people in the jurisdiction of the Muang Fai 
community.  The term ‘all people’  refers to water users in the Muang Fai community and to 
people outside Muang Fai who use water or have land in the Muang Fai jurisdiction. 
Additionally, rules in use must be declared to the public as well as municipal ordinances.  
 
- Fines and punishment 
The law in Thailand should recognise and allow for the enforcement of Muang Fai community 
rules relating to fine systems and the nature of the punishment for water users including 
outsider who violate Muang Fai community rules.  This is to support the effective 
implementation of Muang Fai community rules. However, the law should provide a channel for 
members to appeal the decision of the Muang Fai community dispute settlement body.    
 
- Dispute settlements 
Thai law should provide a clear legal process to settle disputes relating to water and land use 
among three potential conflict groups:  water users in the same Muang Fai community; water 
users from different Muang Fai communities; and water users in the Muang Fai community 
and people outside the Muang Fai community.  Furthermore, the law must recognise the 
decisions of the dispute settlement body of the Muang Fai community.  This is normally 
conducted by the Water Manager in conflicts between water users in the same Muang Fai 
community. 
 
- Connecting Muang Fai into the present irrigation management and town planning system 
The Muang Fai community uses water from two sources; namely, natural water resources such 
as rivers and creeks, and man-made water sources such as dams and reservoirs.  Hence, it is 
necessary to connect the Muang Fai community into the present water management system in 
Thailand. Furthermore, official recognition of the rights and management system of the Muang 
Fai community by the high-level authorities such as the RID and the DWRs is one of Ostrom’s 
eight design principles to support sustainable self- governing organisations.  Thailand’ s 
government should acknowledge the Muang Fai Communities and include them in the planning 
process.  
                                                                
12 Shui Yan Tang, ‘Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems’ (1994), in Elinor Ostrom et al., Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resources (University of Michigan Press, 1994), 234. 
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B. Processes to recognise Muang Fai customary law in each area 
This thesis recommends that the following five stages be undertaken to recognise or create a 
new Muang Fai community:  1)  feasibility studies or studies of the physical, social and 
ecological conditions; 2)  capacity training and partnership creation; 3)  establishing contracts 
and agreements; 4) implementing plans and adjustments; and 5) the post-recognition process. 
1) Feasibility studies or studies of the physical, social and ecological conditions 
A study of the physical conditions should be the first stage in the process to recognising Muang 
Fai water resource management.  This emerges from CPRM theory which states that not every 
CPR can be established as a collective action organisation.  Some places do not have sufficient 
CPRs to share among users.  Therefore, the physical conditions relating to the project area must 
be studied and reported on before establishing new Muang Fai communities.  Similarly, the 
physical conditions of the area in existing Muang Fai communities must be studied before 
recognition because the government and the Muang Fai community need to know the real 
capacity of the water supply from natural or man-made water resources in order to avoid over-
exploitation. Furthermore, the physical data relates to the operation and maintenance plan. 
As indicated by many CPR scholars, heterogenous groups and excessive conflict in the social 
ecology make collective action near impossible.  This thesis therefore proposes that the 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law must be accomplished on a voluntary basis.  This 
means that recognition will only eventuate for the Muang Fai Communities that are willing to 
be recognised and enlisted in the programme.  This is similar to the way in which recognition 
occurred for the fishery community in Samoa.  This prevents the government from wasting 
money and labour in the process to recognise the Muang Fai Community, which has its own 
internal conflicts.  The traditional regimes to manage water and the related natural resources in 
each area should be studied clearly to ensure that the recognition of Muang Fai customary law 
and Muang Fai institutions does not contradict them.  Finally, the successful recognition of a 
Muang Fai community in one area will likely provide a model and increased demand for 
recognition by other Muang Fai communities.  
2) Capacity training and partnership creation 
The capacity building and partnership creation stage of the process has developed from the 
combination of CPR research and the concept of co-management (CM) .  Many CPR scholars 
indicate that people with local knowledge and skills can create institutions to manage natural 
resources sustainably.13 This does not mean however that all local people can manage natural 
resources sustainably.14 Therefore, capacity-building programmes still play a vital role to ensure 
that local people can achieve this outcome. Even in existing Muang Fai communities, capacity-
                                                                
13  Edella Schlager, ‘Common Pool Resource Theory’ in Robert F Durant, Environmental Governance Reconsidered: 
Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities (MIT Press, 2004, Chapter 4). 
14 Ibid. 
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building programmes serve to transfer success stories and to sharing modern knowledge and 
technology with local people.  In fact, capacity-building programmes should be organised not 
only for local people, but also for the related stakeholders in the water management process.   
3) Making agreements and water resource management plans 
Like the community-based approaches to water management in Samoa and Vanuatu, and other 
CM projects, the Muang Fai community should make partnership agreements with government 
water institutions, forest rangers and local authorities to facilitate sustainable water 
management in those areas.  The government water institutions and local authorities should 
support the Muang Fai community by providing technical knowledge to, and by supporting 
capacity building by, people in Muang Fai.  At the same time, government water institutions 
and local authorities can gather data from Muang Fai communities to guide future planning for 
water management, town planning processes, and social and economic development.  In the 
case of Muang Fai communities located and established across jurisdictions under two or more 
local authorities, the Muang Fai community should engage in partnership contracts or 
agreements for sustainable water management with all relevant local authorities.  The 
partnership agreement should consist of the roles required to support sustainable water 
management (including the rights and duties of each party) , the water resource management 
plan of each Muang Fai community, the planned revision process, and the dispute settlement 
process.  
 
The water resource management plan of each Muang Fai community could consist of the 
following matters: 
 Common problems for water management in the area, solutions, and activities that 
community members plan to do; 
 The names of all government staff involved in projects;  
 Background of the community’s water resource and relating resources; 
 A map of the Muang Fai community which includes it canals, weirs and dikes 
(completed by water users);  
 Details of tradition-based controls on water utilisation, undertakings and actions to be 
taken by the community; and 
 Support to be provided by the related government organisations. 
 
The process to approve the plan should be stipulated by consensus rather than a vote and should 
be undertaken by all people in the community.      
4) Implementing the plan and adjusting 
After implementing the plan, all stakeholders should assess its goals and achievements.  They 
should also take note of any problems, obstructions and challenges during the implementation 
process to adjust the plan and the roles of stakeholders. These are key processes contributing to 
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the effectiveness and dynamism of the CM project and its capacity to respond to new challenges 
in a timely way.   
5) Post-recognition process 
To ensure that the water resource plan of each Muang Fai community is implemented properly 
and continuously, and that the Muang Fai community continues to be a sustainable local 
governance institution of water resources, a post-recognition process is needed.  This thesis 
proposes a post-recognition process for Muang Fai that follows the models used in Samoa and 
Vanuatu. 
The legal measures to facilitate sustainable water management would include: 1) regular contact 
between Muang Fai communities and irrigation staff; 2)exchange of information between 
communities; 3) support for developing alternative sources of water; 4) support for developing 
the livelihood of people; 4)  technical advice and training; 5)  reviewing the water management 
plan in participating communities; 6)  identifying knowledge that is useful for 
water/ environment management in each Muang Fai community with assistance from 
government organisations; and 7)  generating a data base relating to water utilisation rules and 
activities to document water problems in all Muang Fai communities participating in the 
recognition programme. 
 
Furthermore, another problem that undermines existing Muang Fai communities is the 
migration of people from rural to urban areas.15 This results in traditional knowledge not being 
transferred to the new generation and contributes to the depletion of Muang Fai communities. 
Therefore, this thesis proposes programmes to educate a new generation of people in the 
provinces where Muang Fai communities are located with knowledge relating to Muang Fai 
customs.  A new generation of students may then realise the importance of the Muang Fai 
community and try to conserve and develop the communities to ensure they ar compatible with 
the present way of life.  Therefore, the Muang Fai community is not only ancient wisdom, but 
a lively and sustainable institution.  This follows the recommendations set out in Agenda 2116 
and target 4.7 of the SD Goals.17 Furthermore, the principle to educate students with local 
wisdom is provided in the National Education Act of Thailand. 18  Additionally, this thesis 
                                                                
15 See Topic 2.2.4 B in Chapter 2. 
16 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th session, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 1992) Chapter 36.  
17 Target 4.7 of Sustainable Development Goals. By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to 
promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable 
lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and 
appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg4>. 
18 National Education Act of Thailand 1999, S 27.  
The Basic Education Commission shall prescribe core curricula for basic education for the purposes of preserving Thai 
identity, good citizenship, a desirable way of life, livelihood, and for further education . 
In accord with the objectives in the first paragraph, basic education institutions shall be responsible for prescribing curricular 
substance relating to needs of the community and society, and the local wisdom and attributes of desirable members of the 
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argues that this endeavour would serve the purposes of recording the history of adaptation, as 
explained by Bosselman, and the need for knowledge management, suggested by Gachenga.19 
Transferring knowledge to a new generation is one factor that indicates sustainable customary 
law.  This is because the historical data of adaption and knowledge management to define the 
data relating to environmental changes and the sustainability of institutions, are useless if they 
are not transferred to the next generation.  
The process to recognise customary law and Muang Fai in each Muang Fai community can be 
seen in Figure 30: 
 
 
Figure 30 Process to recognise Muang Fai communities in each area (source:  adapted from King, M. , K.  Passfield and 
E.  Ropeti, Management of village fisheries:  Samoa community-based management strategy Samoa.  Fisheries Division- 
Min. Apia, Samoa 2001.) 
 
                                                                
family, community, society, and nation. 
<http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/Thailand184.pdf>. 
19 Bosselman uses the term ‘recording the history of adaptation’; whereas, Gachenga uses the term ‘Knowledge management 
system’.  
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7. 3 The prospects of recognising Muang Fai law customary as a sustainable water 
management process and a sustainable customary law 
 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this thesis is to gain recognition of Muang Fai customary law 
to support the SD of Thailand. Towards this aim, a number of tools have been used to measure 
sustainability.  They include the eight design principles for self-governing organisations, the 
legal framework for successful community-based natural resource management and CM, and 
the criteria to measure sustainable customary law.   
Table 38 Comparison of Ostrom’s eight design principles for collective action, the recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law in the PIA between 1939 to 2015, and prospects for recognising Muang Fai customary law by this 
thesis 
Ostrom’ s eight design principles for 
collective action 
Recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law in the PIA 
between 1939 and 2015  
Prospects for recognising 
Muang Fai customary 
law by this thesis 
1.  The CPRM approach has clearly- defined   
boundaries ( effective exclusion of external 
unentitled parties) 
Partly  
2.  There is congruence between the resource 
environment and its governance structure or 
rules  
Partly  
3. Decisions are made through collective-choice 
arrangements that allow most resource 
appropriators to participate 
Partly  
4.  Rules are enforced through effective 
monitoring by those who are affiliated with or 
accountable to the appropriators 
Partly  
5.  Violations are punished with graduated 
sanctions 
Partly  
6.  Conflicts and issues are addressed with low-
cost and easy- to- access conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
No  
7.  Higher-level    authorities    recognise    the    
right    of    the    resource appropriators to self-
govern 
Partly  
8. In the case of larger CPRs, rules are organised 
and enforced through multiple layers of nested 
enterprises 
No  
  
With respect to the boundaries of resources, the boundary demarcation in the PIA20 provided 
the demarcation method generally, with no concern for the land adjacent to the Muang Fai 
community.  Furthermore, it did not mention how to settle conflicts over water between the 
water users in the Muang Fai community and people in the areas adjacent to Muang Fai 
communities who use water from the same water source.  In contrast, the approach to 
recognising the Muang Fai Community suggested by this thesis proposes to demarcate the 
boundaries of water resources by considering the water rights of people who occupy the lands 
adjacent to the Muang Fai community. To prevent conflicts over water, this thesis suggests the 
                                                                
20 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 11. (See Appendix) 
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introduction of water sharing contracts between the Muang Fai community and the people who 
stay close to the Muang Fai community.  The contract should include a method to settle water 
disputes which reflects SD and the equitable and reasonable utilisation of water principle. This 
is because the water supplies fluctuate each year depending on the natural conditions.  
With respect to the congruence between the resource environment and its governance structure 
or rules, the PIA provided the method to allocate water among users in the Muang Fai 
community in relation to the area of cultivation only.21 Moreover, the sharing of labour and 
equipment to maintain the structure also needs to address the cultivation area of each water 
user.22 Although the cultivation area is an important factor and can lead to equitable solutions 
with regard to water sharing23, it should not be the only factor considered in the allocation of 
water. As indicated in Chapter 2, the Muang Fai community considers other factors such as the 
type of soil and the species of plant being cultivated in the allocation of water.  Tang supports 
this idea, reporting that successful farmer-led irrigation systems have more than one rule in 
their allocation of water to water users during each period of the year.24 The PIA’s system to 
only apply one rule to sharing water in each Muang Fai community was too rigid.  In contrast, 
this thesis proposes to study the physical, natural, social and ecological conditions of each 
Muang Fai community before recognising the Muang Fai community as a WUO.  This is 
because a major factor contributing to the failure of present-day irrigation systems is that the 
number of water users exceeds the capacity of the natural water supply. 25 Such irrigation 
systems cannot fulfil the needs of all water users sustainably. Hence, it is necessary to limit the 
number of water users by considering the water supply capacity of each water resource.  This 
thesis argues that the license for the water rights of the Muang Fai community should include 
a mechanism to ensure that the demand for water in each Muang Fai community does not 
exceed the natural capacity of the water source to supply water.  
With respect to the decision-making processes, all decisions would ideally be made through 
collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate. However, 
the PIA did not allow all water users in the Muang Fai community to participate directly in 
decision making or the rule-crafting processes.26 With regard to the cultivation area, the PIA 
instead provided the authority to the Village Headman, Village Elder or Chief of Irrigation (Gae 
                                                                
21 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21. (See Appendix) 
22 Ibid, S 16. (See Appendix) 
23 Equitable and reasonable utilisation of water does not mean that each person has access to an equal share or equal portion 
of water. It depends on the needs and relating criteria. On the other hand, it means that each water user has the right to access 
water. See UN Watercourses Convention User’s Guide Fact Sheet Series: Number 4    
<https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documents/UNWC-Fact-Sheet-4-Equitable-and-Reasonable-Utilisation.pdf>. and 
Ximena Feuntes, ‘The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers’ (1997) 67(1) The British Year Book of 
International Law 337. 
24 Shui Yan Tang, ‘Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems’ (1994), in Elinor Ostrom et al., Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resources (University of Michigan Press, 1994), 234 
25 Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation System (ICS press, 1992). 
26 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 15, 17, 21. (See Appendix) 
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Muang Fai or Water Manager) or his assistant to allocate both the water and the accessories for 
maintaining the Muang Fai infrastructure.  The PIA allowed water users in Muang Fai to elect 
the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager)  and his assistant,27 but the PIA did 
not define the term length for each position.  In this way, the PIA was essentially not allowing 
water users in the Muang Fai community to craft their own rules to govern water utilisation 
and recruitment of accessories.  In contrast, this thesis proposes to allow water users to 
participate in the decision-making process, particularly the rule-crafting process for irrigation 
activities.  The Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager)  and his assistant would 
then be left to monitor and enforce the rules.   
For effective water management it is also important for the rules to be enforced through robust 
monitoring by those affiliated with, or accountable to, the appropriators. The PIA provided that 
the rules of the Muang Fai community could be applied to only the residents or water users in 
the community’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, the law was inadequate when water conflicts with 
outsiders occurred.28 Furthermore, under the PIA the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or 
Water Manager)  did not have the authority to present cases to the Court as the representative 
of the Muang Fai community. 29 Instead, the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water 
Manager) and the water users were obliged to see the Chief of the District to set up a committee 
to settle water disputes.30 Additionally, there was no clear process regarding how to enforce the 
Committee’s decisions.  This thesis argues that the rules of the Muang Fai community must 
obligate outsiders who use water and land within the jurisdiction of the Muang Fai community 
in the same way as the Village Fono approach in Samoa.  Furthermore, outsiders must comply 
with the decision of the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager) .  This might 
make the power to exclude the outsider from water utilisation according to CPRM theory a 
reality. 
Another key element of effective water management is that violations are punished with 
graduated sanctions. Under the PIA, person/s who violated the decisions of officials in relation 
to labour and accessories recruitment or land use in the Muang Fai community were punished 
as if they had committed petty offenses.   The arrest and punishment of violators could only be 
accomplished by District Officers. Problems emerged when a particular Muang Fai community 
was far from the District Office.  This provision caused an additional burden on the Chief of 
Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager)  and water users in having to notify the District 
Officers or policeman in order to enforce the law.  In contrast, this thesis proposes that each 
Muang Fai community has the authority to enforce the Muang Fai community rules in the same 
                                                                
27 Ibid, S 13. (See Appendix) 
28 See the conflict between Muang Fai community and the Orange Company at Chiang Mai Province in Chapter 2. 
29 See the Thailand Supreme Court decision on the matter of the authority of Chief of Irrigation  (Gae Muang Fai or Water 
Manager) to present case to the Court in Chapter 6. 
30 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21, 22. (See Appendix) 
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way as the Village Fono approach in Samoa.  To ensure transparency and due-process of law, 
the law should provide for the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager)  to pass 
judgement based on the evidence and provide the right to the violator to appeal the decision if 
they think it is unjust.         
Ensuring that conflicts and issues are addressed with low-cost and easy- to-access conflict 
resolution mechanisms is also vitally important.  The PIA provided this duty to the District 
Officer or his representative, the Village Headman, and the Chief of Irrigation.   Not less than 
three persons were required to consider the matter when an agreement to share water could not 
be reached.31 Problems with this system frequently emerged if the Muang Fai community was 
far from the district office.  Settling water conflicts was time consuming and expensive.  This 
thesis proposes, however, that the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager)  of 
each Muang Fai community has the authority to consider cases of water conflict in Muang Fai 
communities and the power to enforce the Muang Fai community rules, similarly to how this 
was accomplished in the Village Fono approach in Samoa. To ensure transparency and the due-
process of law, the law should provide procedures for the Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai 
or Water Manager)  to make judgement on the basis of evidence.  The law should also provide 
for the right of the violator to appeal the decision if they think it is unjust.  
In effective water management, the higher-level authorities must recognise the rights of the    
resource appropriators to self-govern.  The PIA did recognise the Muang Fai community as a 
juristic person. The Chief of Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager) was not recognised 
as a representative of the Muang Fai community and subsequently could not present cases to 
the Court on behalf of the community to protect their rights.  They could also not express their 
opinion to officials on behalf of the Muang Fai community. In contrast, this thesis proposes that 
the law recognise the Muang Fai community as a juristic person and recognise the Chief of 
Irrigation (Gae Muang Fai or Water Manager) as a representative of the community. 
The PIA provided took a one-size-fits-all approach to the Muang Fai system and did not allow 
farmers to craft their own rules.  In contrast, this thesis proposes that the law provide the legal 
space for farmers to craft their own rules, particularly for large-size Muang Fai communities 
that have many water users and a diverse geographical area. However, the rules to use water in 
one area must not violate the water rights of other water users. 
 
 
 
                                                                
31 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21. (See Appendix) 
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Table 39 Comparison among Lindsey’s proposal for reforming law for promoting community-based natural 
resources management and co-management, the recognition of Muang Fai customary law in the People’s Irrigation 
Act during 1939-2015 and the prospects to recognise Muang Fai customary law by this thesis 
Lindsey’ s proposal for reforming law for 
promoting CBNRM and CM 
Recognition of Muang Fai 
customary law in the PIA 
during 1939-2015 
Prospects to recognise 
Muang Fai customary law 
by this thesis 
Rights must be clear No  
Rights must be a certainty and cannot be taken 
away or changed unilaterally and unfairly 
No  
Rights should be ensured either in perpetuity or 
for a clearly defined period long enough for the 
benefits of participation to be fully realised  
No  
Rights must be enforceable against State or local 
government institutions 
No  
Rights must be exclusive No  
The legal recognition of the rights holder Partly  
The clear authority of government entities 
which enter into the agreement 
No  
The certainty of the subjects of the rights No  
The certainty and the boundaries of the 
resources 
Yes  
Legal mechanisms to protect rights and to settle 
disputes relating to rights 
Yes  
Flexibility to decide the management objectives 
and the rules in use  
No  
Flexibility to recognise the traditional and local 
institutions 
No  
 
As can be seen in Table 39 outlining the proposal for reforming laws in support of CBNRM 
and CM, the proposals can be organised into three groups: rights; rules crafting; and recognition 
of local institutions.   
In terms of water rights – which Lindsay argues should be secured, clear, exclusive and certain 
–  it is evident that the PIA did not mention the water rights of either the Muang Fai community 
or individual users in the community.  Although the PIA provided a process to settle water 
conflict,32 it did not provide a process to settle water conflicts between water users in the Muang 
Fai community and outsiders.  The PIA also did not provide a time frame for the settlement of 
disputes, or guidance on how to enforce the decisions of the ad hoc Committee according to 
Sections 21-22 of the PIA.  Hence, a weakness in Thai water law is the lack of clarity around 
water rights.  
This thesis proposes the establishment of a licensing system for water utilisation with a special 
license for Muang Fai communities or WUOs.  According to the special license, water rights 
would be distributed and transferred to each water user in the Muang Fai community or WUO. 
The license would also allow special conditions for water utilisation including the period 
covered by the license; the quantity, quality and location of the water; and specifics about the 
transfer of water rights.  Through this proposed licensing system, the water rights of both the 
Muang Fai community and individual water users is secured along with the water rights of 
                                                                
32 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21-22 (See the appendix)  
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WUOs. Furthermore, the license will protect the water rights of the Muang Fai community from 
outsiders as well as the State.  Additionally, this thesis proposes that the authority of the Water 
Manager (Chief of irrigation)  to settle water disputes among water users be recognised in the 
same Muang Fai community.  This is an economic, easy and safe way for water users in the 
Muang Fai community to settle their water disputes.       
In terms of ‘rules crafting’ , or what Lindsay refers to as the ‘flexibility to decide what the 
objectives of management should be and rules in use’, it is clear that the PIA did not allow the 
Muang Fai community members to craft their own rules, particularly the rules to allocate 
water.33 In contrast, this thesis supports water users to craft their own rules for their own benefit 
and to ensure sustainable water resources.    
In terms of the flexibility to recognise traditional and local institutions, the PIA did not provide 
the exact structure of the Muang Fai organisation.34 The Act designated authority to the Chief 
of District to appoint the Chief of Irrigation or his assistant35 with limited duties and powers.36 
The PIA did not mention the Treasury Committee or the water messenger, key parts of the 
traditional Muang Fai community structure.37 In practice, however, water users in the Muang 
Fai community often nominate the Chief of Irrigation’s assistant to be a member of the Treasury 
Committee and as water messengers. Therefore, it is possible that the PIA was flexible enough 
to recognise the traditional Muang Fai community.  However, the PIA did not provide the 
Muang Fai community with clear authority to create its own structure.  In contrast, this thesis 
recommends the development of a legal framework to recognise the traditional Muang Fai 
community and to establish a new WUO by allowing them to create their own organisational 
structure to match the irrigation activities in each area. 
Table 40 Sustainable customary law by Bosselman and proposals for recognising Muang Fai customary law argued by 
this thesis 
Sustainable customary law by Bosselman Proposals for recognising Muang Fai 
customary law argued by this thesis 
1) Recording a history adaptation   
2) Offering a vehicle for making changes  
3) Providing a feedback mechanism  
4) Encouraging fine grained rules  
5) Creating a balance in rights and responsibility  
 
Although the proposals for recognising Muang Fai customary law and Muang Fai institutions 
proposed by this thesis have previously not been applied, this approach is compatible with 
Bosselman’s criteria for measuring sustainable customs (as discussed in Chapter 4) .  This is 
                                                                
33 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21. (See Appendix) 
34 Ibid, S 13. (See Appendix) 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, S 14, 17, 21. (See Appendix) 
37See Chapter 2. 
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because the approach suggested by this thesis supports the public participation of water users 
in the Muang Fai community.  It also allows water users in the community to craft their own 
rules and to provide feedback on uses of the water sharing rules at the annual meeting and 
extraordinary meeting.  This is compatible Bosselman’s first three criteria.  Furthermore, this 
thesis suggests that multiple rules to govern irrigation activities in the large Muang Fai 
communities are formulated.  This is to ensure the rules are compatible with the natural 
conditions of each area in large Muang Fai irrigation systems.  Finally, this thesis supports all 
local water users to negotiate and conclude water management contracts independently and for 
their own benefit. However, the law can provide the legal principles to govern the water sharing 
agreements according to the principles of reasonability, equitability and sustainability. 
Furthermore, the law can provide the principles to govern duty sharing by considering the 
benefits that a person gains from the Muang Fai irrigation system.  
Table 41 Framework for analysing sustainable water resource management customary law by Gachenga and the 
prospects to recognise Muang Fai customary law by this thesis 
Framework for analysing sustainable water 
resource management customary law by 
Gachenga 
Prospects to recognise Muang Fai 
customary law by this thesis 
1) Knowledge management system  
2) Feedback mechanism  
3) Inherent rule modification procedure  
4) Stratification of norms  
5) Balance of rights and duties  
6) Autonomy  
 
1) Knowledge management system  
This thesis proposes to have a process to identify knowledge that may be useful for sustainable 
water and other natural resources management.  This would involve public participation and 
technical support by experts from related organisations.  Furthermore, this thesis proposes the 
creation of a database for water management, requiring each Muang Fai community to 
complete an annual self-assessment report using public participation and financial/technical 
support from the experts.  The annual report must then be submitted to the government water 
organisation and the public would be allowed to access it. Finally, data from the database must 
be incorporated into the compulsory study programmes in schools in Provinces which include 
Muang Fai communities to ensure the knowledge is transferred from one generation to the next.   
2) Feedback mechanism  
This thesis proposes to use the annual meeting and extraordinary meeting of Muang Fai 
communities as a mechanism to access feedback on the problems, challenges and struggles 
experienced by users implementing the water utilisation rules.  This would provide the 
opportunity for all water users to seek solutions or to adjust and improve the rules to ensure 
sustainability.   
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3) Inherent rule modification procedures  
This thesis proposes that Muang Fai community be permitted to craft their own rules according 
to the local custom. Furthermore, the water allocation rules should be changed according to the 
natural conditions of each area and season.  
4) Stratification of norms  
This thesis proposes that large Muang Fai communities be afforded more than one rule to 
govern water utilisation.  The rules must be compatible with the physical, hydrological and 
geographical conditions of each large Muang Fai irrigation system. However, water utilisation 
rules in one area of the Muang Fai community must not violate the equitable and reasonable 
rights of other water users in other areas of the Muang Fai community.  
5) Balance of rights and duties  
Traditionally, the balance of right and duties in the Muang Fai community is evidenced in the 
ratio of water sharing and the recruitment of accessories, equipment and labour to maintain the 
weirs and dike structures of each water user.   This thesis proposes that all local water users be 
permitted to negotiate and conclude water management contracts independently and for their 
own benefit.  However, the law should provide the legal principles to govern water sharing 
according to the principles of reasonability, equitability and sustainability.  
6) Autonomy  
Finally, this thesis proposes that the Muang Fai community has autonomy in three 
dimensions:1)  to design their own rules relating to irrigation activities; 2)  to design their own 
structure; and 3) to enforce rules and sanctions on both water users in the Muang Fai community 
and on outsiders. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter address the research question; What law reform approaches would improve the 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law for the SD of water resources in Thailand? It indicates 
that recognising Muang Fai customary law raises two issues:  the legal approaches for the 
recognition of Muang Fai customary law; and the legal framework to recognise Muang Fai 
customary law.  In terms of the legal approaches for the recognition of Muang Fai customary 
law, this could be accomplished in both public law and private law.  However, the preferable 
approach is in public law.  Regarding the legal framework to recognise Muang Fai customary 
law, there are two considerations:  the process to recognise the Muang Fai community as a 
sustainable organisation that manages water sustainably; and the activities of the Muang Fai 
community including capacity-building programmes, adjustment mechanisms, autonomy and 
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legal protections.In terms of the process to recognise Muang Fai customary law, this thesis 
proposes to use five steps and 11 stages to recognise Muang Fai customary law. 
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Chapter eight - Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the hypothesis that Muang Fai customary law in Thailand 
provides a sustainable form of water management and that it should be recognised within the 
legal system of Thailand. To achieve this aim, this thesis reviewed the meaning and current trends 
in sustainable water management and examined Common Pool Resource Management (CPRM) 
theory.  This thesis argues that Muang Fai customary law is a sustainable customary law with 
regard to surface water management, but not in terms of ground water management. It also argues 
that the Muang Fai community is a traditional form of what is now referred to as a water user 
organisation (WUO) .  This is the type of organisation is used in many countries to include local 
people in water management processes to ensure sustainability. Hence, this thesis concludes that 
Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community should be recognised and incorporated 
into the water management system of Thailand with a proper legal framework focused on 
sustainability. The incorporation should avoid repeating the failures of past attempts to recognise 
Muang Fai customary law.  Additionally, this thesis concludes that the present issues regarding 
the recognition of customary law for governing natural resources are the disconnect between 
statutory law and customary law and the inadequacy of customary law. Therefore, the customary 
law regime to govern natural resource is fractured by the current legal system in Thailand.      
The meaning, rules and processes of Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community, 
as well as the associated limitations, problems and challenges in present-day Thailand, are 
analysed in the context of sustainable developments and the related principles This thesis found 
that Muang Fai customary law is a system that can manage water sustainably by establishing an 
institution (Muang Fai community) to enact and enforce the rules for water utilisation. It does this 
by focusing on the compatibly of the customs in relation to the special features of each area. This 
implies that the rules of each Muang Fai community differ from each other.  The rules of each 
Muang Fai community are enacted via resolutions from meetings of all water users and as a 
result the water users craft their own rules to fit their needs and the limitations, physical 
characteristics, quantity of water supply, and the climate of each area. It is this flexibility that has 
enabled the Muang Fai community to manage water sustainably for nearly 1,000 years.  Today, 
Muang Fai communities supply water for agriculture to at least 300,000 farmers who are outside 
the government irrigation zone. 1  
However, there are also several limitations to Muang Fai customary law. For much of the period 
of sustainable water use under Muang Fai customary law, the population was much smaller than 
                                                                
1 Pornpilai Lertwicha, Supachai Methin, Nonthachai Namdhep, Muang-Fai: The Water Resource and the Human Resource 
Management on the Geographical and Cultural Base (Tarnpanya Press, Chiang Mai, 2009) 43. 
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it is to day.  In addition, Muang Fai customary law focuses only on surface water management 
(not ground water management) and the quantity of water (not the quality of water). Finally, it is 
worth noting that Muang Fai customary law was previously recognised by Thai law in the 
People’s Irrigation Act (PIA) between 1935-2015. This recognition has since been repealed. 
This thesis focuses on the principles of SD, sustainable water management and CPRM theory to 
examine whether Muang Fai customary law is the type of custom that supports SD.  Furthermore, 
it explores how to create a legal framework to recognise Muang Fai customary law and Muang 
Fai institutions to maintain and improve the sustainable governance of water utilisation.  
The aim of SD is to maintain the level of natural resources as capital for future generations, while 
allowing the present generation to continue to use such resources. To achieve this aim, the needs 
of both present and future generations must be considered.  Current attempts to achieve 
sustainable levels of natural resource use at both international and national levels is accomplished 
by using market mechanisms. The aim is to maintain the quantity of natural resources by placing 
emphasis on the green economy.  In terms of law, SD is a principle of international law and 
imposes legal obligations on States.  
In terms of sustainable water management, the present-day issue pertains to the control of fresh 
water during periods of population growth.  Water is necessary to the development of all sectors 
in the economy, but particularly food production and energy. It is generally agreed that there is a 
sufficient quantity of water to meet everyone’ s needs, but also that an effective water 
management system is required from all countries around the world to address sustainability 
issues, particularly with regard to demand. Some scholars have suggested that the issue is a crisis 
of governance, not insufficiencies in infrastructure to manage water.    
In terms of water management at the national level, the present trend consists of eight measures: 
1) the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach; 2) the establishment of a water 
rights regime; 3) using economic tools to manage water demands and to facilitate effective water 
utilisation; 4) establishing  WUOs to ensure people participate in the water management process 
and ensure the effective use of water; 5) maintaining environmental flow; 6) special measures for 
water management in agriculture and irrigation; 7)  recognition of customary water law; and 8)  a 
shift from command control to governance.While maintaining environmental flow can conserve 
the river source and sustain the ecosystem, the water rights regime promotes effective water 
utilisation through the use of economic tools and market mechanisms such as a water 
fees.However, such mechanisms must be imposed in a way that  acknowledges the human right 
of access to water.  
Similarly, WUOs support sustainable water management by crafting rules relating to water 
utilisation for the effective and equitable utilisation of water among all members. This is because 
WUOs ensure that farmers receive water at the right time and place according to their needs. 
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Furthermore, WUOs decrease government operation and maintenance costs.  The recognition of 
customary water law assists local people to access water and secure existing rights while 
preventing conflicts over water allocations.  Additionally, some water management customary 
law can regulate water utilisation and result in sustainable water management.  Finally, 
transitioning from a command control approach to a local governance approach can guarantee 
public participation and the success of the water project. 
Upon consideration of all of these measures, Muang Fai customary law arguably supports and is 
compatible with the principles of SD and sustainable water management.  It is a method of 
managing water in response to the needs of water users effectively, equitably and dynamically. 
Moreover, the activities of the Muang Fai community are regulated according to the natural 
resource limitations and through public participation with the use of economic tools.  It follows 
therefore that the recognition of Muang Fai customary law, the Muang Fai community and the 
water rights of Muang Fai community are compatible with the current trend in sustainable water 
management. It is a system that should be recognised and adopted by the Thai government. 
The CPRM theory posits different types of knowledge related to natural resource management. 
Specifically, the theory asserts: 1) managing natural resources sustainably requires rules to govern 
the resource utilisation; 2) both the government and community collectives with proper rules can 
manage natural resources sustainably; 3)  rules to govern natural resource utilisation established 
via top-down processes such as legislation are often not compatible with the actual situations in 
the field; 4)  people do not always cooperate with each other, although the benefits from 
cooperation outweigh the benefits from operating as an individual; 5)  CPRM theory tries to 
answer two questions:  why people participate in collective action to avoid the ‘tragedy of the 
common’, and what types of rules make people cooperate in using natural resources successfully; 
and 6)  Ostrom analysed research data about collective action to manage common pool resource 
and proposed eight design principles for self-governing organisation.   
The eight design principles for self-governing organisation assert:  a)  CPRM has clearly-defined 
boundaries (effective exclusion of external unentitled parties); b) there is congruence between the 
resource environment and its governance structure or rules; c)  decisions are made through 
collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate; d) rules are 
enforced through effective monitoring by those who are affiliated with, or accountable to, the 
appropriators; e)  violations are punished with graduated sanctions; f)  conflicts and issues are 
addressed with low- cost and easy- to- access conflict resolution mechanisms; g)  higher- level 
authorities recognise the right of the resource appropriators to self-govern; and h)  in the case of 
larger common pool resources, rules are organised and enforced through multiple layers of nested 
enterprises. 
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Although it cannot be guaranteed that all organisations who apply the eight design principles, it 
can be argued that organisations possessing these eight attributes will manage common pool 
resources sustainably.  It is also clearly evident however that many organisations which try to 
apply the eight design principles fail or experience significant internal conflicts. Hence, it cannot 
be said that the eight principles are the solution.  On the contrary, they should be treated as a 
beginning point for communities to craft rules to fit the local conditions and their unique needs. 
The proposals of Ostrom and other CPRM scholars have been incorporated into the principles to 
manage common pool resources such as water, fish, wild-life, forests and others.  CPRM theory 
supports the principle of SD because it supports the principle of equitable sharing or equitable 
distribution of natural resources, as well as the principle of public participation.  Muang Fai 
reflects many features compatible with Ostrom’s principles.  In particular, Muang Fai customary 
law reflects collective action to govern common pool resources by a limited number of people.  
This thesis also reviewed the theoretical concepts of customary law recognition, particularly in 
relation to natural resource management.  It found that the most effective way to recognise 
customary law is through Constitutional recognition.  However, the Constitution needs to have 
additional subsidiary legislation to ensure the Constitution mechanism works effectively.  The 
second effective method to recognise customary law is through legislation and administrative 
recognition.  However, the weakness of this approach is that administrative recognition 
particularly can shift according to the policy of the government of the day.  Moreover, both 
legislative and administrative forms of recognition can be subject to the biases of officials. 
Therefore, clear policy and guidelines are required to implement these forms of recognition. 
The recognition of customary law relating to natural resource management does not imply any 
type of customary law can result sustainable natural resource management. Only customary laws 
which focus on the rights of people to use natural resource through equitable sharing and public 
participation, and which allow for change according to the situational dynamics and the physical 
conditions in each area can support survival and living sustainably.  Any legal framework to 
recognise customary law must also include the features mentioned above.  Three functions that 
consistently form part of legislation to recognise customary law are: 1) recognition of customary 
rights; 2) conciliation between customary rights and statutory rights; and 3) mechanisms to settle 
disputes between customary rights and statutory rights. In addition, the recognition of customary 
law in natural resource management must recognise the customary institutions that create the 
rules to govern natural resources. However, State practice in customary law recognition is based 
on the principle that recognition of customary law must not contradict human rights principles 
and justice.      
The lastest approach to recognize customary law is to give personhood to nature with the aim to 
allow nature to protect itself for its own benefits by the representative as well as other legal entity. 
353 
 
The thesis also proposed that the findings from studies of the recognition of Indigenous people’s 
customary rights in both developed and developing countries could be applied to Muang Fai 
customary law.  Particularly, Samoa and Vanuatu provide examples of successful recognition of 
both customary law and customary institutions.  
Water law in Thailand does not presently include a Water Act or water rights regime.   Thailand 
follows the riparian doctrine and does not separate the rights to use water and land.  The human 
right to access water is not currently provided for in Thailand’s legal system. This means that the 
human right to access water cannot be argued in a Court or claimed to a State Officer.  Thailand 
has no legislation to establish and regulate the water market.  However, related legislation does 
provide an economic tool to manage water demand in the form of a water fee.  The fee was 
introduced in 2017 and is payable to the agricultural sector. Thailand applies an IWRM approach 
in an effort to reform water institutions.  However, the enforcement of water law is still 
problematic.    
Surface water for agriculture in Thailand is regulated by the RID, and the DWR.  The RID is 
responsible for supplying water to the agricultural sector in zones declared as irrigation areas, as 
well as to the industrial sector and households. The DWR is responsible for supervising the water 
from other natural water resources.  Both departments use WUOs as a mechanism to include 
people in the water planning process.  The customary water rights of water users in Muang Fai 
are not currently mentioned in, and secured by, water laws.  There is no mechanism expressed 
clearly in legislation to combine customary water rights and statutory water rights.  There is also 
no clear dispute settlement mechanism for conflicts between the customary water rights and 
statutory water rights. It follows then that any new legal mechanism to recognise customary water 
law should at least have the afore mentioned three elements and also the legal mechanisms to 
ensure sustainable water management. 
Muang Fai customary law was previously recognised by the PIA.  Crucially, this thesis not only 
explored how to properly recognise Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community to 
make the community stronger and to support the effective governance of water, it also sought to 
discover how to avoid repeating the failures of the PIA recognition of Muang Fai between 1935 
and 2015.   
In relation to the first aspect outlined above, CPRM theory offers valuable guidance, particularly 
in relation to irrigation management and the principle of sustainable water management.  When 
combined with lessons learned from the cases of Samoa and Vanuatu, it is clearly evident that: 
1)  there needs to be legislation to establish water rights in Thailand or at least legislation to 
recognise and secure the water rights of the Muang Fai community and the water rights of the 
water users in the Muang Fai community; 2)  any new law needs to define the boundaries of the 
resource; 3) such laws need to provide autonomy to water users to craft and adjust their own rules 
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to govern water utilisation, to design their own institutional structures, and to enforce their own 
rules with both members of Muang Fai community and outsiders who fall inside Muang Fai 
jurisdiction; 4)  any new law needs to support and ensure a capacity-building process to assist 
water users to create water utilisation rules, develop modern water management knowledge, and 
adjust to the realities of global climate change; 5)  any new law needs to create mechanisms to 
reconcile and settle disputes between customary water rights and statutory water rights; 6)  such 
laws need to recognise the power of Muang Fai communities to enact their own rules relating to 
fines and other punishments for violators; and 7)  such laws need to recognise the power of the 
Muang Fai community to create its own process to settle disputes between and among water 
users in the Muang Fai community.      
Implementing measures such as those outlined above will help to avoid failure such as was 
previously experienced when Muang Fai was recognised by the PIA. This thesis found that there 
were a number of problems with the way recognition was attempted previously.  For example, 
the PIA did not refer to the water rights of both the Muang Fai community and individual water 
users in the community.  Although the PIA provided a process to settle disputes over water2, it 
did not provide a process to settle water disputes between water users in the Muang Fai 
community and outsiders.  The PIA also failed to provide a time frame for settling disputes and 
was unclear on how to enforce the decisions of the ad hoc committee according to Section 21-22 
of the PIA.  In addition, the PIA did not provide the power to water users in the Muang Fai 
community to craft, adjust and enforce their own rules in relation to outsiders who fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Muang Fai community. This is comparable with the failure of the Village Fono 
Act of Samoa prior to the provision of power to the Village Fono to enforce Fono rules to 
outsiders.   Furthermore, the PIA did not recognise the Water Manager of the Muang Fai 
community as a representative of Muang Fai. Subsequently, he did not have the power to present 
a case to Court to protect the water rights of the Muang Fai community and its water users.  
Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai community currently face the challenge of labour 
migration from rural to urban areas, particularly the migration of young adults.  This means that 
traditional knowledge cannot be transferred from elders to the next generation.  
All data and lessons learned through this research regarding the challenges confronting Muang 
Fai communities today leads to the conclusion that the creation of a new legal framework is 
needed to recognise Muang Fai customary law in Thailand.  This is further explained in the next 
section. 
 
                                                                
2 People Irrigation Act 1939 [Thailand] S 21-22 (See Appendix) 
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8.2 A new approach to recognition of Muang Fai customary law   
This thesis proposes a new approach to recognition of Muang Fai customary law and the Muang 
Fai community in Thailand.  The proposal includes two approaches, five points of concern, and 
five steps with12 stages.  The two approaches refer to recognition of the Muang Fai community 
in present- day Thailand through either public or private law.  The preferred approach is 
recognition by public law. The legal framework to recognise Muang Fai must specifically address 
five points of concern:  1)  the activities of the Muang Fai community; 2)  the capacity-building 
programme; 3)  the mechanism for the adjustment of rules; 4)  the autonomy of the Muang Fai 
community; and 5)  the legal recognition or legal protection of the Muang Fai community. 
Irrespective of the approach used to recognise Muang Fai customary law and the Muang Fai 
community, these five points must be addressed.  Finally, the process to recognise Muang Fai 
customary law and the Muang Fai community, as well as to ensure that the Muang Fai 
community is sustainable, must include the following five steps:  1)  study of the physical, social 
and ecological conditions; 2)  capacity training and partnership creation; 3)  making agreements; 
4)  implementing and adjusting plans; and 5)  the post-recognition process.  These five steps must 
comprise the following 12 stages: 
1) Research to assess social, ecological and physical conditions; the quantity of water; and the 
water rights regime in the Muang Fai community; 
2) Meetings with the Muang Fai community to test the willingness of water users to gain 
recognition; 
3) A meeting for water users in Muang Fai Community to define water problems in the area; 
4) A draft plan to resolve the water problems in the Muang Fai community; 
5) A meeting to discuss and vote on (approve or reject) the plan; 
6) Execution of an agreement between the Muang Fai community and the relating government 
organisations to ensure a partnership based on exchanging information and technical 
knowledge; 
7) Enactment of the rules and implementation of the plan; 
8) The monitoring, review and assessment of the rules and the plan with assistance from related 
government organisations; 
9) Knowledge identification; 
10) The development of databases; 
11) Transfer of knowledge and the education of the next generation; and 
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12) The implementation of other measures after the recognition of Muang Fai institutions  
By following the 12-stage process outlined above, the Muang Fai community and Muang Fai 
customary law can be recognised as a sustainable collective action organisation capable of 
governing water sustainably. 
8.3 Further study 
Water rights in the existing water law of Thailand are unclear.  This is especially true in relation 
to the water rights of farmers.  This is largely because the Water Bill has not yet passed the 
Parliament.  There is currently no legislation in Thailand to establish a water rights regime. 
Furthermore, water rights as currently defined in the proposed Water Bill do not indicate the 
difference between ownership of water and the right to use water. Without a modern water rights 
regime, it becomes impossible for Thailand to recognise the customary water rights of local 
people.  The process to reconcile the water customary rights and statutory rights and the dispute 
settlement processes between customary water rights and statutory rights is also impossible. 
Thus, one key element of the recognition of customary water law in Thailand is the establishment 
of a modern water rights regime. 
A settlement process for dispute over water is not provided for clearly in legislation in Thailand. 
This is especially true for water users who remain outside of the government irrigation areas 
where there is no law to apply to disputes over water.        
The approach to conserve nature by recognising it as a legal entity should be studied and applied 
in Thailand.  This is another way to conserve the ecosystem of the rivers effectively because it 
adds another ‘player’ to the conservation game. It is not only the people, the NGOs and the State 
who are potential players in game, but also the new legally recognised river, with the same legal 
rights as a natural person.  This could make a significant difference, particularly if the State 
mechanisms to conserve the river are not working due to conflicts of interest or corruption.  By 
recognising the river as a legal entity, it can be protected from over exploitation.3 However, the 
concerning points before giving personhood to the river are as follow; 1)  the representatives of 
nature must come from the local people who are using water from the river not only the state 
officers; 2)  the time frame to solve the conflict need to be included in the law to establish the 
legal entity of the nature in order to prevent the delay of work because of the conflict between 
the representatives of nature and other state’s officer / state’s organization;4 3) the benefits for the 
nature must be concerned as a priority and provided in law that the benefits for nature must 
                                                                
3See arguments relating to in chapter 4, Topic 4.2.5 last paragraph. 
4 See two cases relating to the conflicts between representatives of nature and state’s officer in Ecuador and the conflict 
between representatives of nature and mining company in John Studley, Juristic Personhood for Sacred Natural Sites : a 
potential means for protecting nature,  PARKS VOL 24.1 MAY 2018, 88-89. < 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_Studley/publication/325450830_Juristic_Personhood_for_Sacred_Natural_Sites_A_P
otential_Means_for_Protecting_Nature/links/5b0eae8f4585157f87232a7a/Juristic-Personhood-for-Sacred-Natural-Sites-A-
Potential-Means-for-Protecting-Nature.pdf > 
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prevail over the benefit of human when it has conflict between nature’s benefits and human’s 
benefit .    
The tax burden of WUOs is a new issue which has not been considered critically or seriously in 
Thailand. This may be because public services such as the electricity and water for domestic use 
are considered as a welfare benefit that the State must provide to its citizens.  Furthermore, the 
services provided by State enterprises receive tax exemptions.  So, the question emerges as to 
why WUOs have to pay tax for their water use.  Additionally, the question of how much of a tax 
burden the WUOs should carry must also be considered.  According to Hodgson5, the income of 
a WUO should be exempt from tax as long as it covers operational, maintenance and 
development costs.  This would facilitate the sustainability of the WUOs.  However, the question 
of how much income the WUOs can keep and the amount of surplus income to be paid as tax is 
yet to be asked.         
The IWRM approach and institutional adjustment in Thailand is another significant issue for 
future research to identify the best approach to facilitating cooperation among government 
agencies to achieve sustainable water management.  This area of research interest is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, however one suggested area for further study is the adaptive management or 
the adaptive governance concept.  This would focus on how to adjust water management and 
legislation to fit the dynamics of water problems.   
Ancient methods such as the Muang Fai water management system have survived because they 
are relevant and demonstrably more efficient than modern methods.  The problems now faced 
by Muang Fai communities are not insurmountable, and they must be addressed sooner rather 
than later. This thesis has discussed the implementation of several solutions to benefit not only 
the Muang Fai communities, but also Thai society in general.
                                                                
5 Stephen Hodgson, Legislation on Water Users' Organizations: A Comparative Analysis (Food & Agriculture Org., 2003)  
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5049E/y5049e05.htm#bm05.2> and 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5049E/y5049e0d.htm#bm13.8>. 
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Appendix 
Table of Thai law and governmental documents in Thai name and English name 
Thai name English Name (alphabetically) Source Miscellenious 
พระรำชบญัญติัยกเลิก
พระรำชบญัญติักำรชลประทำน
รำษฎร์ พทุธศกัรำช ๒๔๘๒ 
พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๘ 
Act to repeal People Irrigation 
Act Buddist Era 2482 B.E.2558 
(Thailand) 
<http://library2.parliament.go.th/gi
ventake/content_nla2557/law6-
050258-5.pdf>. 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติัควบคุมกำร
เหมืองฝำยและพนงักั้นน ้ำ พ.ศ.  
Act to Regulate Canals, Weirs 
and Dikes B.E. 2477 (Thailand) 
Cannot find online source abolished by the 
effect of People 
Irrigation Act 
มติคณะรัฐมนตรี วำ่ดว้ยแผน
ยทุธศำสตร์กำรจดักำรทรัพยำกร
น ้ำ พ.ศ.๒๕๕๘-๒๕๖๙ 
Cabinet’s Resolution on National 
Strategic plan for water resource 
management B.E. 2558 - 2569     
http://www.cabinet.soc.go.th/soc/Pr
ogram2-3.jsp?top_serl=99313540 
Thai Language 
ระเบียบส ำนกัทะเบียนกลำง  
วำ่ดว้ยกำรพิจำรณำลงรำยกำร
สถำนะบุคคลในทะเบียนรำษฎร 
ให้แก่บคุคลบนพ้ืนท่ีสูง พ.ศ. 
๒๕๔๓ 
Central Civil Registration, The 
Regulation of the Central Civil 
Registration for Considering the 
Legal Status of the Hill Tribe 
People B.E. 2543  
http://www.stateless4child.net/sites
/stateless4child.net/files/Law-
18.pdf 
Thai Language 
ประมวลกฎหมำยแพง่และ
พำณิชย ์
Civil and Commercial Code 
(Thailand) 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w4/%bb03/%bb03-20-9999-
update.pdf 
Thai language 
ประมวลกฎหมำยวิธีพิจำรณำ
ควำมแพง่และพำณิชย ์
Civil Procedure Code (Thailand) web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/law4/%
bb04/%bb04-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งรำชอำณำจกัร
ไทย พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๐ 
Constitution of Thailand B.E. 
2540 (Thailand) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natle
x4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=49728
&p_country=THA&p_classificati
on=01.01 
English language 
รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งรำชอำณำจกัร
ไทย พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๐ 
Constitution of Thailand B.E. 
2550 (Thailand) 
www.krisdika.go.th/wps/wcm/conn
ect/efc1bf004ea9ed10953a9d1b6e
11f099/C04.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=efc1bf004ea9ed109
53a9d1b6e11f099 
English language 
รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งรำชอำณำจกัร
ไทย พ.ศ. ๒๕๖๐ 
Constitution of Thailand B.E.2560 
(Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/wcm
/connect/d230f08040ee034ca306a
f7292cbe309/CONSTITUTION+
OF+THE+KINGDOM+OF+THAI
LAND+%28B.E.+2560+%282017%2
9%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CAC
HEID=d230f08040ee034ca306af7
292cbe309 
English language 
พระรำชบญัญติัส่งเสริม และ
รักษำคุณภำพส่ิงแวดลอ้ม พ.ศ. 
๒๕๓๕ 
Enhancement and Conservation 
of the National Environmental 
Quality Act B.E. 2535 (Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/wcm
/connect/cb9fc5004e34c615bdfbfd
f7e6da8c7c/ENHANCEMENT+A
ND+CONSERVATION+OF+THE
+NATIONAL+ENVIRONMENT+
QUALITY+ACT%2C+B.E.+2535+
%281992%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERE
S&CACHEID=cb9fc5004e34c615
bdfbfdf7e6da8c7c 
English language 
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รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งรำชอำณำจกัร
ไทย (ชัว่ครำว) พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๗ 
Interim Constitution of Thailand 
B.E.2557 (Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/wcm
/connect/c6127f004ea9e1cb94fb9
d1b6e11f099/Constitution+of+the+
Kingdom+of+Thailand+%28Interi
m%29%2C+B.E.+2557+%282014%2
9.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEI
D=c6127f004ea9e1cb94fb9d1b6e
11f099 
English language 
พระรำชบญัญติัลกัษณะปกครอง
ทอ้งท่ีพระพทุธศกัรำช ๒๔๕๗ 
Local Administration Act 
B.E.2457 (Thailand) 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%C503/%C503-20-2525-
006u.htm 
Thai language 
เทศบญัญติัต ำบลลอ้มแรด 
เร่ือง กำรบริหำรกิจกำรสถำนี
สูบน ้ำดว้ยไฟฟ้ำ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๑ 
Local ordinance on the 
management of water pumping 
station B.E.2541 
http://www.lomrad.com/articles/29
5487/%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%97%E0
%B8%A8%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%B1
%E0%B8%8D%E0%B8%8D%E0%B8
%B1%E0%B8%95%E0%B8%B4%E0
%B8%AA%E0%B8%B9%E0%B8%9
A%E0%B8%99%E0%B9%89%E0%B
8%B3%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%9F%E
0%B8%9F%E0%B9%89%E0%B8%B
2-
%E0%B9%81%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8
%B0%E0%B8%82%E0%B9%89%E0
%B8%AD%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%B
1%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%84%E0%B8
%B1%E0%B8%9A.html 
Thai language 
กฎกระทรวง พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๑ ออก
ตำมควำมในพระรำชบญัติ
องคก์ำรบริหำรส่วนจงัหวดั  
Ministerial regulations according 
to Provincial Administrative 
Organization Act B.E.2541 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%cd16/%cd16-2b-2541-a004.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติัเทศบำล พ.ศ. 
๒๔๙๖ 
Municipality Act B.E.2496   
(Thailand)  
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%b705/%b705-20-9999-
update.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติัวฒันธรรม
แห่งชำติ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๓ 
National Culture Act B.E.2553 
(Thailand)  
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%C701/%C701-20-2553-
a0001.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติักำรศึกษำ
แห่งชำติ พ.ศ.๒๕๔๒ 
National Education Act 1999 
(Thailand)  
http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/Th
ailand184.pdf 
English language 
พระรำชบญัญติัอุทยำนแห่งชำติ  
พ.ศ. ๒๕๐๔ 
National Park Act B.E. 2505 
(Thailand)  
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%CD10/%CD10-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติัป่ำสงวน
แห่งชำติ พ.ศ. ๒๕๐๗ 
National Reserved Forest Act B.E. 
2507 (Thailand) 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%BB27/%BB27-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
ค ำสัง่หวัหนำ้คณะรักษำควำม
สงบแห่งชำติ ท่ี ๙/๒๕๕๙ เร่ือง
กำรแกไ้ขเพ่ิมเติมกฎหมำยวำ่
ดว้ยกำรส่งเสริม และรักษำ
คุณภำพส่ิงแวดลอ้มแห่งชำติ 
Order of the Chief of National 
Council for Peace and Order 
9/2559  
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%ca08/%ca08-20-2559-
a0001.pdf  
Thai language 
ประมวลกฎหมำยอำญำ Penal Code (Thailand) web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/law4/%
bb06/%bb06-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติักำรชลประทำน
รำษฎร์ พทุธศกัรำช ๒๔๘๒ 
People Irrigation Act B.E.2482 https://www.ecolex.org/details/legi
slation/people-irrigation-act-lex-
faoc002551/ 
abolished on 31st 
January 2015, 
(English 
language) 
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พระรำชบญัญติัก ำหนดแผนและ
ขั้นตอนกำรกระจำยอ ำนำจ
ให้แก่องคก์รปกครองส่วน
ทอ้งถ่ิน พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๒ 
Plan and the process of 
decentralization to local 
government Act B.E.2542 
(Thailand)  
http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw
0070_6.pdf 
English language 
พระรำชบญัติองคก์ำรบริหำร
ส่วนจงัหวดั พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๐ 
Provincial Administrative 
Organization Act B.E.2540 
(Thailand) 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%cd16/%cd16-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบส ำนกันำยกรัฐมนตรีว่ำ
ดว้ยกำรสร้ำงระบบบริหำร
กิจกำรและสงัคมท่ีดี พ.ศ. 
๒๕๔๓ 
Regulations of Prime Minister 
Office on the creation of good 
national management B.E.2543 
http://www.publicreport.opm.go.th/
uploading/uploadfile/files/200710
1132856regulation3.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชกฤษฎีกำ. วำ่ดว้ย
หลกัเกณฑแ์ละวิธีกำรบริหำร
กิจกำรบำ้นเมืองท่ีดี. พ.ศ. 
๒๕๔๖ 
Royal decree on the principles 
and methods for the good 
administration B.E. 2546 
(Thailand) 
http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw
17512.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบส ำนกันำยกรัฐมนตรีว่ำ
ดว้ยกำรรับฟังควำมคิดของ
ประชำชน  พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๘ 
Rules of the office of Prime 
Minister on Public consultation 
B.E.2548  (Thailand) 
http://www.publicreport.opm.go.th/
uploading/uploadfile/files/200710
1132652Rule.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติักำรชลประทำน
หลวง พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๕ 
State Irrigation Act B.E. 2485 
(Thailand) 
http://www.thailawforum.com/data
base1/state-irrigation-act.html 
English language 
พระรำชบญัญติั. สภำต ำบลและ
องคก์ำรบริหำรส่วนต ำบล พ.ศ. 
๒๕๓๗ 
Sub-district council and Sub-
District Administrative 
Organization B.E.2537 (Thailand)  
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%ca52/%ca52-20-9999-update.pdf 
Thai language 
กฎกระทรวง ฉบบัท่ี ๖๓ (พ.ศ. 
๒๕๓๗) ก ำหนดหลกัเกณฑ์
และวิธีกำรในกำรอนุญำตให้ปู
ลกสร้ำงส่ิงล ้ำล  ำน ้ำ 
The 63th ministerial rules for 
construction in water way 
B.E.2537 (Thailand) 
http://oldweb.md.go.th/data_form/r
egister1_pdf/63_2537.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติั ว่ำดว้ยกำรใช้
กฎหมำยอิสลำมในเขตจงัหวดั
ปัตตำนี นรำธิวำส ยะลำ และ
สตูล พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ 
The Act for Exercising Islamic 
Law in Pattani, Narthiwat, Yala 
and Satun B.E.  2489 (1946A.D.) 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%c722/%c722-20-2489-001.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติั ควำมเท่ำเทียม
ระหวำ่งเพศ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๘ 
The Gender Equality Act B.E.  
2558 (Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/port
al/general_en/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xL
LM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A2cz
Q0cTQ89ApyAnA0__EIOAQGdX
AwNDc6B8JG55dzMCuv088nNT9S
P1o8wRqowczd0MHC29vAO8PU
MM3Z3N9CNzUtMTkyv1C3Ijyv
MdFRUByl01jw!!/dl3/d3/L0lJSklna2
shL0lCakFBRXlBQkVSQ0lBISE
vWUZOQzFOS18yN3chLzdfTjB
DNjFBNDFJMkE3RjBBOUpLU
EtJVDFHQzY!/?PC_7_N0C61A41I2
A7F0A9JKPKIT1GC6_WCM_CO
NTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/ksdkw
ebcontent_en/legal+translation/leg
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al+english/gender+equality+act%2C
+b.e.+2558+%282015%29 
พระรำชบญัญติัจดัรูปท่ีดินเพื่อ
เกษตรกรรม พ.ศ. 2558 
The Land Consolidation Act for 
the Agriculture purpose B.E. 2558 
(Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/port
al/general_en/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8x
LLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A
2czQ0cTQ89ApyAnA0__EIOAQ
GdXAwNDc6B8JG55dzMCuv08
8nNT9SP1o8wRqowczd0MHC29
vAO8PUMM3Z3N9CNzUtMTky
v1C3IjyvMdFRUByl01jw!!/dl3/d3
/L0lJSklna2shL0lCakFBRXlBQk
VSQ0lBISEvWUZOQzFOS18yN
3chLzdfTjBDNjFBNDFJMkE3Rj
BBOUpLUEtJVDFHQzY!/?PC_7
_N0C61A41I2A7F0A9JKPKIT1
GC6_WCM_CONTEXT=/wps/wc
m/connect/ksdkwebcontent_en/leg
al+translation/legal+english/officia
l+information+act%2C+b.e.+2540 
Thai language 
กฎกระทรวงก ำหนดให้ทำงน ้ำ
ชลประทำนในเขตโครงกำรส่ง
น ้ำและบ ำรุงรักษำก ำแพงแสน 
เป็น ทำงน ้ำชลประทำนท่ีจะ
เรียกเก็บค่ำชลประทำน 
The ministery’s regulation for 
collecting water fee in the 
irrigation zone   
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/
DATA/PDF/2558/A/105/3.PDF 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติัขอ้มูลข่ำวสำร
ของรำชกำร พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๐ 
The Official Information Act B.E.  
2540 (Thailand) 
 Thai language 
ประกำศธนำคำรแห่งประเทศ
ไทย ท่ี สนส ๗/๒๕๕๙ เร่ือง
หลกัเกณฑ ์กำรรับฝำกเงิน หรือ
กำรรับเงินจำกประชำชน 
The regulation of Bank of 
Thailand Sor Nor Sor 7/2559 
https://www.bot.or.th/Thai/FIPCS/
Documents/FPG/2559/ThaiPDF/25590
157.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบกระทรวงมหำดไทยว่ำ
ดว้ยกำรจดัท ำแผนพฒันำของ
องคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน 
พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๘ 
The Regulation of Ministry of 
Interior on Development Plan of 
Local Administrative 
Organization B.E. 2548 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/law/la
w2/%a1100/%a1100-2g-2548-
a0002.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบส ำนกันำยกรัฐมนตรีว่ำ
ดว้ยกำรบริหำรจดักำรทรัพยำกร
น ้ำแห่งชำติ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๐ 
The Regulation of Prime 
Minister’s Office on Water 
Resource Management B.E. 2550 
(Thailand)  
http://www.dwr.go.th/informationc
enter/Scrip/%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%
B0%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%9A%E0%
B8%B5%E0%B8%A2%E0%B8%9A%
E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%B3%E0%B8
%99%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%81%E0
%B8%99%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A2
%E0%B8%81.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบส ำนกันำยกรัฐมนตรีว่ำ
ดว้ยกำรบริหำรจจดักำรนน ้ำและ
อุทกภยัแห่งชำติ พ.ศ.๒๕๕๕ 
The Regulations of Prime 
Minister Office on water 
management and flooding 
management B.E.  2555  
http://www.pdmo.go.th/upload/dow
nload_pdf/down_2903201218011
6.pdf 
Thai language 
พระรำชบญัญติักำรผงัเมือง พ.ศ. 
๒๕๑๘ 
Town and City Planning Act B.E. 
2518 (Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/port
al/general_en/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xL
LM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A2cz
Q0cTQ89ApyAnA0__EIOAQGdX
AwNDc6B8JG55dzMCuv088nNT9S
P1o8wRqowczd0MHC29vAO8PU
MM3Z3N9CNzUtMTkyv1C3Ijyv
English language 
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MdFRUByl01jw!!/dl3/d3/L0lJSklna2
shL0lCakFBRXlBQkVSQ0lBISE
vWUZOQzFOS18yN3chLzdfTjB
DNjFBNDFJMkE3RjBBOUpLU
EtJVDFHQzY!/?PC_7_N0C61A41I2
A7F0A9JKPKIT1GC6_WCM_CO
NTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/ksdkw
ebcontent_en/legal+translation/leg
al+english/town+planning+act+b.e.+
2518+%281975%29 
พระรำชบญัญติัสงวนและ
คุม้ครองสตัวป่์ำ พ.ศ. ๒๕๓๕ 
Wildlife Preservation and 
Protection Act, B.E. 2535 
(Thailand) 
http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/port
al/general_en/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xL
LM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A2cz
Q0cTQ89ApyAnA0__EIOAQGdX
AwNDc6B8JG55dzMCuv088nNT9S
P1o8wRqowczd0MHC29vAO8PU
MM3Z3N9CNzUtMTkyv1C3Ijyv
MdFRUByl01jw!!/dl3/d3/L0lJSklna2
shL0lCakFBRXlBQkVSQ0lBISE
vWUZOQzFOS18yN3chLzdfTjB
DNjFBNDFJMkE3RjBBOUpLU
EtJVDFHQzY!/?PC_7_N0C61A41I2
A7F0A9JKPKIT1GC6_WCM_CO
NTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/ksdkw
ebcontent_en/legal+translation/leg
al+english/wildlife+conservation+a
nd+protection++act%2C+b.e.+2535+%2
81992%29 
English language 
ค ำสัง่คณะรักษำควำมสงบ
แห่งชำติ ท่ี ๘๕/๒๕๕๗. เร่ือง
แต่งตั้งคณะกรรมกำรนโยบำย
และกำรบริหำรจดักำรทรัพยำกร
น้ำํ 
85th/ 2557 Order of National 
Council for Peace and Order 
B.E.2557(Thailand) 
http://library2.parliament.go.th/give
ntake/content_ncpo/ncpo-order85-
2557.pdf 
Thai language 
ระเบียบส ำนกันำยกรัฐมนตรี 
วำ่ดว้ยกำรบริหำรทรัพยำกรน ้ำ
แห่งชำติ พ.ศ.๒๕๓๒ 
The Regulation of Prime 
Minister’s Office on Water 
Resource Management B.E.2532 
(Thailand) 
http://202.129.59.73/spt/rman/rule1.
htm 
Thai language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
